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PUBLIC OPINION
IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
PUBLIC OPINION
IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949
Edited by
ANNA J. MERRITT and RICHARD L. MERRITT
With a Foreword by
FREDERICK W. WILLIAMS
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
Urbana Chicago London
© 1970 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 74-94397
252 00077 3
3oiJSi ^
For Christopher, Geoffrey, and Theo
—our wanderers between two worlds
CONTENTS
Foreword xvii
List of Abbreviations xxiii
PARTI: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
THE OMGUS SURVEYS 4
Questionnaires 4
Sampling 5
Field Work 5
Analysis 8
IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION POLICIES 9
Attitudes toward the American Occupation 9
American Information Policies 12
Specific Issues of the Occupation 15
Food Rationing 15
Refugees and Expellees 18
The Currency Reform 21
The Division of Germany 23
Berlin and the Blockade 26
DEMOCRATIZING POSTWAR GERMANY 29
Nazism and Denazification 30
Attitudes toward National Socialism 30
The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 33
Denazification 35
Re-education for Democracy 39
German Political Culture 40
Political Participation 43
FROM DEMOCRATIZATION TO ANTICOMMUNISM: THE
REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLICY 50
NOTES 58
PART II: THE OMGUS SURVEYS
1. Radio Listening in Germany, Winter 1946 (1 March 1946) 69
2. Who in Germany Has Read Mein Kampf? (March 1946) 70
3. Some Political Attitudes Probed on Recent Surveys (15 March 1946) 71
4. Income and Expenditures of German Families in the American
Zone, Winter 1946 (25 March 1946) 73
5. Special Political Survey, Winter 1946 (1 April 1946) 74
6. Law No. 3 (20 April 1946) 77
viii/ CONTENTS
7. Reactions to Recent Revisions in the Denazification Program
(11 May 1946) 79
8. Reactions to the New Tax Laws (1 June 1946) 80
9. Attitudes toward Religion and the Church as Political Factors
in German Life (7 June 1946) 81
10. Attitudes toward Politics as a Career for the Coming Generation
in Germany (21 June 1946) 83
1 1 . German Attitudes toward Trade Unions (27 June 1946) 85
12. Attitudes of Some Bavarian Schoolchildren (28 June 1946) 86
13. A Preliminary Study of Book Reading in Germany
(28 June 1946) 88
14. Mail to Stimme Amerikas, February and March 1946
(6 July 1946) 89
14A. German Attitudes toward the Expulsion of German Nationals
from Neighboring Countries (8 July 1946) 90
15. Relative Effects of Food Scarcity in Two Countries
(27 July 1946) 92
16. German Attitudes toward the Nuremberg Trials
(7 August 1946) 93
17. Attitudes toward International Leadership in Germany Compared
with Attitudes in Seven Other Countries (8 August 1946) 95
18. A Study of Food Consumption and Attitudes toward
Rationing and General Health of the German Population
(14 August 1946) 96
19. Basic Attitudes Explored by the German Attitude Scale
(19 August 1946) 99
20. Preliminary Study of Motion Picture Attendance and Attitudes
(27 August 1946) 100
21. Attitudes toward Licensed Newspapers in Some American
Occupied Areas (25 September 1946) 102
22. A Study of Attitudes toward the Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation of Germany (25 September 1946) 103
23. The Viennese Newspapers: An Opinion Research Study
(22 October 1946) 106
24. Mannheim Attitudes toward Negro Troops (22 October 1946) 107
25. German Knowledge about and Attitudes toward Inflation
(8 November 1946) 108
26. Information about the Land Constitutions and the Intention to
Vote in the Constitutional Elections (13 November 1946) 110
27. German-American Relations in Germany: Frequencies of
Group Contacts (13 November 1946) 111
28. An Investigation to Determine Any Changes in Attitudes of
Native Germans toward the Expellees in Wuerttemberg-Baden
(14 November 1946) 112
29. The Trend of Cares and Worries in Germany (21 November 1946) 114
30. Radio Listening in Vienna (14 December 1946) 115
31. The Standard of Living (14 December 1946) 117
32. Income, Expenditures, and Currency Holdings of the German
Population and Attitudes toward General Economic Problems
(10 December 1946) 118
33. The Trend of Public Reactions to the Nuremberg Trials
(18 December 1946) 121
34. Attitudes toward Licensed Newspapers in Some American
Occupied Areas (28 December 1946) 123
CONTENTS / ix
35. Attitudesof Trade Union Members (5 January 1947) 123
36. The German People and Social Classes (1 1 January 1947) 125
37. Opinions of Newspaper Readers (13 January 1947) 126
38. A Preliminary Study of Changes in Job Status
(14 January 1947) 127
39. Reactions to and Penetration of Information Media in Vienna
(14 January 1947) 128
40. Austrian Economic Difficulties and Attitudes toward Economic
Problems (21 January 1947) 130
41. Attitudes toward General Economic Conditions (15 January 1947) 131
42. The Trend of Rumors (5 February 1947) 134
43. Readership of Heute, Amerikanische Rundschau and Neue Auslese
(5 February 1947) 135
44. Opinions of German Community Leaders on International Affairs
(6 February 1947) 137
45. Radio Listening in the American Zone and in Berlin
(17 February 1947) 140
46. Army Aid to German Youth Activities Evaluated by German Adults
(19 February 1947) 142
47. Opinions on the Expellee Problem (20 February 1947) 144
48. German Attitudes toward Freedom of Speech (5 March 1947) 145
49. Anti-Semitism in the American Zone (3 March 1947) 146
50. A Pilot Study on Displaced Persons (20 March 1947) 148
51. Attitudes toward Collective Guilt in the American Zone of Germany
(2 April 1947) 149
52. Attitudes toward Food, Fuel, and Building Materials Conditions
(27 March 1947) 150
53. Magazine Reading in the American Zone (8 April 1947) 152
54. Viennese Reactions to New Denazification Laws (8 April 1947) 153
55. Public Attitudes toward Denazification (15 April 1947) 154
56. German Children Appraise the Youth Program (26 April 1947) 155
57. Readership and Popularity of the Frankfurt Newspapers
(29 April 1947) 157
58. Confidence in News in Present-Day Germany (1 May 1947) 158
59. Expectations Regarding Reparations (10 May 1947) 159
60. Trends in German Public Opinion (April 1947) 160
61. Some Attitudes toward the School System in Wuerttemberg-Baden
(12 June 1947) 163
62. German Attitudes toward a Peace Treaty after the Conclusion of
the Moscow Conference (14 June 1947) 164
63. German Opinion toward the Prospective Peace Treaty
(8 August 1947) 166
64. Trends in Attitudes toward the Food Situation (25 August 1947) 167
65. Attitudes of Bavarians toward Loritz' Dismissal (27 September 1947) 168
66. German Attitudes toward Corporal Punishment (27 September 1947) 169
67. German Attitudes toward International Leadership
(10 October 1947) 170
68. Trends in Attitudes toward National Socialism (10 October 1947) 171
69. German Opinions Regarding the Organization of Europe
(16 October 1947) 172
70. German Understanding of the Reasons for the Food Shortage
(17 October 1947) 173
71. Berlin: Symbol of a National State (17 October 1947) 174
72. A Report on German Morale (November 1947) 175
X /CONTENTS
73. A Guide to Some Propaganda Problems (28 October 1947) 177
74. Attitudes of AMZON Germans toward Government and Politics
(27 October 1947) 178
75. What Berliners Expect from the London Conference (28 October 1947) 179
76. German Attitudes toward the Four Occupying Powers
(29 October 1947) 180
77. Opinions on the Press in the American Zone of Germany
(5 November 1947) 181
78. Bavarian Attitudes toward Newspapers (6 November 1947) 182
79. Attitudes toward American Capitalism (22 November 1947) 183
80. Opinions on Denazification (26 November 1947) 185
81. German Reactions to Expellees and DPs (3 December 1947) 186
82. German Sentiment for Peace and Economic Security
(8 December 1947) 187
83. Newspaper Readership and Newscast Listening
(9 December 1947) 188
84. Who Are the Expellees? And What Do They Think?
(17 December 1947) 189
85. Summary of Trends of German Public Opinion (17 December 1947) 191
86. Summary of Reactions to End of London Conference
(17 December 1947) 193
87. The Trend of German Attitudes toward Allied Cooperation
(9 January 1948) 194
88. German Opinion on the People's Part in Political Affairs
(20 January 1948) 195
89. Reception of the Pamphlet O^^en Gesagt (22 January 1948) 196
90. German Opinions on Socialization of Industry (23 January 1948) 197
91 . German Conceptions of American Bartering and Black Marketeering
(24 January 1948) 198
92. Readers of Mein Kampf (9 February 1948) 199
93. "The Cream of the Crop" Two Years Later (11 February 1948) 200
94. Contacts between Germans and Americans (24 February 1948) 202
95. Appraisal of the Content of Education and Educational Facilities
(25 February 1948) 203
96. German Youth versus Adults on Ouestions of Democracy
(3 March 1948) 205
97. Berlin Reactions to Nagy's Pamphlet Machtraub in Ungarn
(3 March 1948) 206
98. Government by Politicians, Experts, or the People? (6 March 1948) 207
99. A Report on German Youth (5 March 1948) 208
100. Trends in German Public Opinion (March 1948) 210
101. German Youth and Adults View Individual Responsibility
(24 March 1948) 213
102. Patronage of U.S. Information Centers (24 March 1948) 215
103. Readership of Political Books and Pamphlets (24 March 1948) 216
104. The Marshall Plan in Prospect (24 March 1948) 216
105. Internationalism in Germany (27 March 1948) 217
106. The Radio Audience in AMZON, Berlin, and Bremen
(27 March 1948) 219
107. Public Reception of the Bizonal Administration (29 March 1948) 220
108. Magazine Readers (29 March 1948) 222
109. The Effect of Foreign Travel on Knowledge and Attitudes
(5 April 1948) 223
CONTENTS /xi
110. Bremen Attitudes Compared with Berlin and AMZON
(15 April 1948) 224
111. Attitudes toward the Bavarian Party (9 April 1948) 226
112. Reactions to a Foreign Policy Pamphlet (12 April 1948) 227
113. AMZON Attitudes and Information about Russia
(15 April 1948) 228
114. Germans Assay Their Freedoms (23 April 1948) 229
114A. Germans Assay Their Freedoms (11 May 1948) 230
115. The "Advertising Pillar" as an Information Medium
(26 April 1948) 231
116. The Moving Picture Audience in AMZON (28 April 1948) 232
117. Berliners View the Czechoslovakian Situation (27 April 1948) 233
118. Newspaper Readership (3 May 1948) 234
119. Cumulative Impact of the Mass Media (10 May 1948) 236
120. German Opinions on Daylight Saving Time (20 May 1948) 237
121. Uniformity of Religious Preferences in AMZON Communities
(19 May 1948) 238
122. Prejudice and Anti-Semitism (22 May 1948) 239
123. Reactions to the Volkskongress Petition in Berlin and Darmstadt
(25 May 1948) 241
124. Social Characteristics of the German People in the American
Zone and in Berlin (British and American Sectors) (1 June 1948) 242
125. Berlin Radio Listeners Appraise "American Voices" (22 June 1948) 243
126. Religious Instruction in the Schools (29 June 1948) 243
127. Some Opinions on the University of Berlin (8 July 1948) 244
128. A Pilot Study of Attitudes toward the Joint Export-Import Agency
(8 July 1948) 246
129. Reactions of a Panel of Readers to the Pamphlet Mit Vereinten
Kraeften (19 July 1948) 246
130. Berlin Reactions to the Air Lift and the Western Powers
(23 July 1948) 248
1 31 . Germans View the Six Power Conference Proposals
(4 August 1948) 249
132. Some Aspects of Morale in Berlin (10 August 1948) 250
133. Reactions toward Currency Reform in the U.S. Zone of Germany
(10 August 1948) 251
134. Some Trends in Berlin Morale with Sidelights on Recreation
(2 September 1948) 253
135. Radio Listening in Berlin since the Blockade (13 September 1948) 254
136. Attitudes toward a Government for Western Germany (21 September 255
1948)
137. The Munich Movie Audience (21 September 1948) 256
138. Newspaper Reading in Berlin since Currency Reform and the Blockade
(17 September 1948) 257
139. Chief Cares and Worries since the Currency Reform (22 September 1948) 258
140. Opinions on the Proposed Withdrawal of the Four Occupying Powers
(24 September 1948) 260
141. Berlin Attitudes on the Air Lift: Further Trends (4 October 1948) 261
142. Attitudes toward JE I A (5 October 1948) 262
143. Government or Administration for Western Germany? (14 October 1948) 262
144. U.S. Zone Germans View the Air Lift (26 October 1948) 263
145. The Amerika Haus in Five German Cities (1 November 1948) 265
146. The Problem of Cleanliness in Present-Day Germany (13 November 1948) 266
xii/ CONTENTS
147. How Berliners Expect and Want the Crisis Settled: With Their
Recommendations (17 November 1948) 267
148. Radio Bremen Evaluated by Bremen Listeners (30 November 1948) 268
149. Trends and Present Attitudes on the Marshall Plan
(10 December 1948) 269
150. Attitudes and Resources of Berliners as They Look Forward to a
Blockaded Winter (15 December 1948) 271
151. Security versus Freedom in Blockaded Berlin (18 December 1948) 272
152. AMZON Views its Civil Service (24 January 1949) 273
153. Book Reading in the U.S. Zone, Berlin, and Bremen (26 January 1949) 274
154. Opinions on the Neue Zeitung (3 February 1949) 274
155. The Town Hall Meeting in Reilingen (3 February 1949) 275
156. AMZON Views its Civil Service (9 February 1949) 276
157. Opinions on the Work Stoppage in Bavaria (3 February 1949) 277
158. Bremen Views the Picturama America Today (4 February 1949) 278
159. Bavarian Reactions to Town Hall Meetings and Public Forums
(11 February 1949) 278
160. Germans Consider the Withdrawal of the Occupying Powers
(23 February 1949) 279
161. Some German Opinions on Occupation Costs (24 February 1949) 280
162. Characteristics of Natives and Refugees in AMZON in 1948
(4 March 1949) 281
163. Social Characteristics of the German People in Bavaria, Hesse, and
Wuerttemberg-Baden (7 March 1949) 282
164. AMZON Views its Civil Service (2 April 1949) 282
165. Opinion on Fusion in Wuerttemberg and Baden (22 April 1949) 283
166. Public Attitudes toward Postwar German Police (25 April 1949) 284
167. Public Attitudes toward Postwar German Police (25 April 1949) 285
168. West Berlin's Reaction to a Single Currency (27 April 1949) 286
169. German Appraisal of Lasfe/7at/sff/e/c/j (6 May 1949) 287
170. German Attitudes toward Economic and Political Strikes (16 May 1949) 288
171. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience
(23 May 1949) 290
172. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience
(23 May 1949) 291
1 73. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience
(18 May 1949) 292
1 74. Hessians Consider the Effect of Lifting the Blockade (27 May 1949) 293
175. Trends in German Public Opinion (June 1949) 294
176. German Opinions on the "Voice of America" (27 May 1949) 298
177. Readership of Heute (15 June 1949) 299
178. Germans View the Ruhr Statute (30 June 1949) 300
179. German Desires and Expectations on Future Ownership of the
Ruhr Factories (1 July 1949) 301
180. Bonn and Berlin, German Capitals (1 July 1949) 303
181. The RIAS Audience in West Berlin (7 July 1949) 303
182. German Views on Denazification (11 July 1949) 304
183. People in Three Hessian Cities Consider Their Reconstruction Problems
(21 July 1949) 306
183A. Knowledge of the Bonn Constitution (26 July 1949) 307
CONTENTS /xiii
184. The "Voice of America" Audience (26 July 1949) 307
185. German Opinions on a Peace Treaty before Unification (29 July 1949) 308
186. German Opinions on American Aid (22 August 1949) 309
187. Current Views on a Suggested Withdrawal of the Occupiers
(23 August 1949) 310
188. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience
(1 September 1949) 311
189. The Public Compares Present and Past Economic Conditions
(21 September 1949) 312
190. The Marshall Plan and Western Germany (17 October 1949) 313
191. The State of German Political Interest at the Outset of the
West German Republic (9 December 1949) 314
Index 319
CHARTS
1 . Major Cares and Worries of A MZON Germans 1 6
Question: "What are your greatest cares and worries at the
present time?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 3.
2. Government Efforts to Overcome tfie Black Market 22
Question: "In your opinion, are the government off icials doing everything to
overcome the black market?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 37.
3. The Prospects for a United Germany 24
Question: "Do you believe the Allies will cooperate successfully to leave behind
a united Germany at the end of the occupation?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 58.
4a. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: AMZON Views 28
4b. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: Berlin Views 29
Question: "In your opinion are the Western Powers doing all they possibly can
to relieve the needs of Berlin or could they do more?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 52
5. Views on National Socialism 33
Question: "Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried
out?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.
6. Collective German Responsibility for World War II 36
Question: "Do you think that the entire German people are responsible for the
war because they let a government come to power which plunged the whole
world into war?"
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 8.
7. Government and Racial Superiority 39
Question: "Do you think that some races of people are more fit to rule than
others?"
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 194P, p. 9.
8. Economic Security vs. Guaranteed Freedoms 42
Question: "Which of these types of government would you, personally, choose
as better:
A. A government which offers the people economic security and the
possibility of a good income,
B. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a free
press and religious freedom?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 7.
CHARTS / XV
9. Interest in Politics 44
Question: "Are you yourself interested in political affairs or do you prefer to
leave that to others?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 13.
10. Politics as a Career 45
Question: "If you had a son who had just finished school, would you like to see
him take up politics as a career?"
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1949, p. 15.
11. Trust in Local German Officials 46
Question: "In general, do officials in the local German government work for the
good of the community or are they primarily self-interested?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 16.
12. Preference for Political Parties 48
Question: "Which political party do you belong to or prefer?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 18, 19. The following page in the
same report gives preferences for the smaller parties as well as those responding
"don't know."
1 3. The Reconstruction of Germany 53
Question: "Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion?
A. Germany herself should bear the responsibility for her reconstruction
under the supervision of the Allies.
B. Germany should be occupied by the Allies until she is able to form a good
democratic government.
C. The Americans should reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order to
avoid her becoming a prey to Communism.
D. The reconstruction of their country should be left to the Germans
themselves without interference from the Allies."
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 57.
14. Relative Influence of tfie United States and tfie Soviet Union 54
Question: "Which country will have the greatest influence on world affairs in
the next ten years?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 47.
1 5. The Choice between National Socialism and Communism 55
Question: "If you had to choose between Communism and National Socialism,
under which government would you prefer to live?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people and institutions assisted us in the preparation of
tliis volume. For providing us with the OMGUS survey reports,
we are indebted to Professor Robert E. Lane of the Political
Science Department and Mrs. Gretchen Swibold of the Pohtical
Science Research Library of Yale University; Dr. Donald V.
McGranahan, Research and Development Branch, United
Nations; Dr. Frederick W. Williams; and the Archives Branch,
Washington National Records Center. Drs. McGranahan, Wil-
liams, and Leo P. Crespi of the United States Information
Agency gave us words of encouragement. Pamela C. TiUing
assisted in preparing some of the summaries included in Part II.
Harriet Stockanes typed the bulk of the manuscript. And the
University Research Board of the University of lUinois gave us a
grant to faciUtate the task of summarizing the reports. We
would like to express our appreciation to all these individuals
and institutions.
An earlier and shorter version of Part I appeared as "Political
Perspectives in Germany: The Occupation Period, 1945-1949,"
Social Science Information, 8:2 (April 1969), 129-140.
A.J.M. & R.L.M.
Urbana, Illinois
4 March 1969
FOREWORD
I first set foot in Germany late in the summer of 1945. But
acquaintance with the German people, their history and culture,
had deep roots in my personal experience. That experience had
been topped by nearly six months of intensive interviewing and
samphng of opinion among captured German soldiers in the
prisoner-of-war camps in England.
When I left England for Germany, I was assigned briefly to
the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Force. On arrival in Bad Nauheim, the
assignment was transferred to Information Control Division
(Office of Mihtary Government, U.S. — OMGUS). The interests
and personnel of the Psychological Warfare Division and the
Information Control Division overlapped closely. Both were
focused upon understanding the motivations, drives and in-
terests of the German people so that operations could be
planned and carried out which would help to guide the German
people to reacquire responsibihty for and management of their
nation in freedom.
Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the head of Informa-
tion Control Division, had recommended to General Lucius D.
Clay, the deputy military governor, that McClure's Intelligence
Branch be authorized to establish an organization which would
sample German public opinion and report regularly the analysis
of such samplings. General Clay wrote in Decision in Germany:
"In October 1945 a public opinion survey unit was created. We
had much faith in these polls, although it was shattered
somewhat by the election at home in November 1948."
The planning for the work of the survey unit was
accomplished in Bad Nauheim prior to establishing its head-
quarters in Bad Homburg. Essential to making the plan a reality
was acquisition of personnel, transportation and a sample
design. Personnel were acquired from the staff of the U.S.
xviii / FOREWORD
Strategic Bombing Survey when their assignment was completed
in early fall, 1945. Jeeps for each man were acquired. The
sample design was more troublesome.
Germany in 1945 was a nightmare of dislocated persons.
Typically, 90 per cent of the buildings in major population
centers were destroyed. Bridges were out. Roads were torn up.
People lived under the rubble. Refugees streamed west from
Soviet-held territories. Soldiers, released from captured armies,
walked home. Wives and children who had been evacuated from
the cities returned to start rebuilding. Occupying armies settled
into those hotels and homes which were still in sound
condition.
The scarcity of food and the highly professional adminis-
tration of a food ration card system made possible the design of
a practically ideal sample under nearly worst possible condi-
tions. In essence, there was a current and continuously up-dated
listing of all persons living within the German economy. This
meant that every person was attached to an administrative
center and that any community selected for interviewing could
be systematically and randomly sampled by drawing cards from
a card file. Selection of communities for sampling, below the
largest cities, within each Land (State), was randomized by
random number selection of cells within a grid applied to an
enormous map which displayed all communities throughout the
American-controlled area. The authority and prestige of the
occupying force was such that requests made to individuals to
grant an interview were almost universally honored.
The Strategic Bombing Survey staff members, heavily
trained and experienced, personally drew the samples and
conducted the interviews for the early studies. At the same
time, they were responsible to recruit and train German
interviewers to whom that particular task was assigned before
the end of 1945.
Supervision of the organization, training and scheduling of
the field operations was commendably handled by William
Diefenbach. Within the several Laender regions, Robert Speagle,
George Florsheim, Dr. Richard H. Williams, Norman Sharp,
FOREWORD /xix
Fred Brauckmann and Dr. Henry Hart directed the coordinated
efforts. Dr. Max Ralis worked with these units on special
assignment.
During the planning period in Bad Nauheim, skepticism
was frequently heard about the possibihty of constructing an
organization which could, in practice, meet strict time
schedules. That skepticism was almost immediately overcome
once operations were started. But skepticism was also voiced
about the worth of the findings. Would the German people tell
military government representatives what was really in their
hearts and minds?
The determining factor, of course, was the attitude of the
interviewers themselves. Given honest, thoughtful, sensitive,
decent interviewers, it was reasonable to expect that individual
Germans would respond in kind. Tests were made comparing
responses given to the original set of American interviewers with
responses given to newly trained German interviewers. But the
ultimate test was to be made in elections of public officials. The
first elections for city-wide positions were held in January
1946. The problem posed was to determine in advance the
turnout of voters. Estimates were simultaneously drawn from
all official and responsible sources channeled to the military
governor's office. General Clay reports in Decision in Germany
how important the size of turnout was to him: "I have listened
to election returns in the United States many times and with
eager interest, but never have I waited so anxiously to know
how many voted. . . ." Among all the estimates reported to the
mihtary governor's office, the projection from our small sample
was closest to the actual proportion voting, being well within
the margin of error.
The success of that one report placed the operation on a
well-accepted foundation. It did not presage a flow of requests
from the highest level for additional subjects to be explored.
The fact is that the Intelligence Branch had had a proud
history throughout the European campaigns and had earned the
highest respect for the quality of its work. It had continually
brought information to the attention of commanders which was
XX /FOREWORD
believed to be critical from the point of view of behavioral
scientists. That practice was continued within the military
government organization. Guidance on topics to be explored
through samples of German public opinion was derived from
internal staff meetings in the Information Control Division's
Intelligence Branch. Mr. Alfred Toombs and Dr. Alexander
George provided continuous and thoughtful counsel.
Supporting the Intelligence Branch's position of pro-
fessional anticipation of requirements for essential information
was the emphasis given to repeating identical questions on
successive surveys. Such repetition permitted subsequent re-
ports of trends of public opinion.
Military government was centrally concerned with
change — change interpreted as the political maturing of the
German people, an increase in their readiness to accept
responsibility as individuals and as a great nation, a deepening in
awareness of the nature of a free society, with its strengths and
weaknesses, an improvement in the peoples' knowledge of the
history of their own nation and the character of the tyrants
they had supported. Reports of trends of public opinion, in
these respects, went far to satisfy a deep interest among miUtary
government and German officials for any information which
might limit speculation and guide interpretation as to changes
occurring.
Reports of the surveys of public opinion were dissemi-
nated to all major divisions of military government. Wider
distribution was assured through incorporation of highlights of
surveys into publications of the Intelligence Branch which
regularly reached all top commanders and, through the intelli-
gence community, all operational arms of mihtary government.
The daily contacts of the survey staff — especially its field
representatives - with German officials (mayoral, administra-
tive, police, for example) built, in time, good relations with the
German government which was being erected parallel to
mihtary government. Particular studies of public reception of
the mass media opened doors to conversations with executives
in radio, newspaper and magazine offices. A continuous effort
FOREWORD /xxi
was made to tell such officials informally about aspects of
public opinion which were related to their areas of responsi-
bility. As regards the topic of anti-Semitism in Germany, a
major effort was made to bring the findings of our studies to
the attention of the broadest range of German leadership so
that they could, in mutual consultation, consider the implica-
tions to their own fields of interest and activity.
Analysis and interpretation of the survey findings were
more easily coped with in the early days of the work than later,
toward 1948. Public issues, at first, appeared sharp and
well-defined, the meaning of the data seemed to be clear. The
addition of analytical staff, as time passed, brought fresh views
from the United States, generous and warmly humanitarian in
outlook toward the German people, tolerant and indulgent
toward Soviet power. Important contributions toward richer
interpretations and presentation of the findings were made by
Dr. Hedvig Ylvisaker, Ann Schuetz, and Henry Halpem.
But all those interpretations are now historical curiosities.
They tell us, perhaps, as much about the situations of the day
and about the interpreter as the facts being analyzed. But the
facts reported remain as given.
The reports issued by the survey unit were made enduring
by the elegance of the sample design, the dedication to
wholesome interview procedures and the impeccabiUty of the
card counts (thanks to Louise Hopwood's insistence). The
studies merit careful consideration by historians, political
scientists, sociologists, psychologists, communications special-
ists and other persons who seek to understand the hopes
and fears, the judgments, the expectations and the response to
events which characterized German outlooks after the collapse
of Hitler's Reich.
Frederick W. Williams
New York, New York
August, 1968
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AMG American Military Government
AMZON American Zone of Occupation
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CSU Christian SociaUst Union
DM Deutsche Mark
DP Displaced Persons
DVP Democratic People's Party
ECA European Cooperation Administration
ERP European Recovery Program
IMT International Mihtary Tribunal (Nuremberg
Trials)
JEIA Joint Export-Import Agency
KPD Communist Party of Germany
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
MG Military Government
NSDAP National SociaUst German Workers Party (Nazi
Party)
OeVP Austrian People's Party
OMGUS Office of Mihtary Government of the United
States for Germany
PG Party Member (of NSDAP)
RIAS Radio in the American Sector (Berlin)
RM Reichsmark
SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany
SPOe Socialist Party of Austria
VOA Voice of America
WAV Economic Reconstruction Party
PARTI
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Throughout the years since the end of World War II, as
Germany was rising from a shattering defeat to resume its
position as a leading member of the international community,
American pohcy makers and scholars have closely watched
developments in German public opinion. Just after the first
American troops penetrated the crumbling Third Reich in 1 945
came batteries of social psychologists. These men, responsible
to the United States Army, were charged with the formidable
task of ascertaining the potential for resistance among the
population, singling out those citizens - preferably democrati-
cally oriented — most likely to be most useful in restoring
municipal and other services, and in keeping the Army
administrators informed about the mood and concerns of the
defeated Germans.
The Army quickly saw the need for formalized procedures
to gather information on public perspectives. In October 1945,
less than six months after the capitulation of Hitler's Germany,
the Intelligence Branch of the Office of the Director of
Information Control, Office of Mihtary Government for
Germany (U.S.), set up its Opinion Survey Section, under the
direction of Dr. Frederick W. Williams. This agency conducted
72 major surveys during the course of the next four years, an
average of one every third week. The reports based on these
surveys went to the highest levels of the American occupation
authorities.*
Even after West Germany regained a measure of sover-
eignty in September 1949, with the promulgation of the
Federal Republic, American officials retained their interest in
the political perspectives of its citizens. The Opinion Survey
Section within the Office of Military Government, United
States (OMGUS) became the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of
Public Affairs, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for
4 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Germany (HICOG). From 1949 until 1955 this agency, too,
conducted a multitude of public opinion surveys. Meanwhile
the United States government had become aware of the utihty
of such surveys, not for occupied West Germany alone, but for
other Western European countries as well. A small survey
research section within the Department of State ultimately
developed into a major arm of the United States Information
Agency. More than twenty times since September 1952 the
USIA has commissioned extensive surveys in at least four major
Western European countries.^
THE OMGUS SURVEYS
This volume deals specifically with the surveys of West German
attitudes conducted under the auspices of OMGUS. Its body
comprises summaries of the reports prepared by the Opinion
Survey Section. These introductory remarks, after discussing
some technical aspects of the surveys, will outhne some of the
main findings of interest to present-day students of public
policy issues.
Questionnaires. A review of its procedures by the Infor-
mation Control Division's Opinion Survey Section reported:
The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with
Division or Branch heads who are most closely concerned
with the problem under investigation. The studies are
usually designed to produce evidence which is zone-wide in
its imphcation. But special segments of the population or
special areas are also studied on occasion.
The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are
tried out on small groups of Germans to determine
whether they are meaningful and understandable to the
wide variety of types of Germans to be studied.
A set of the questionnaires is now available through the United
States National Achives and Records Service.^
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 5
Sampling. The Opinion Survey Section's initial intent was
to concentrate solely upon the American Zone of Occupation in
the south of Germany, that is, Bavaria, Hesse, and what was
then called Wuerttemberg-Baden. By March 1946, however, it
had begun surveying the opinions of West Berhners, and
somewhat later expanded operations to Bremen (together with
its harbor city of Bremerhaven), a city-state under American
control in the north of Germany. The first eight surveys,
conducted between 26 October 1945 and 13 December 1945,
rested upon area samples of 39 to 45 communities, with a
sample size that ranged between 331 and 466 respondents.
Beginning on 27 December 1945 the Opinion Survey Section
interviewed approximately 1 ,000 persons in 80 communities; in
April 1946 it increased this number to about 1,500 respondents
in 141 communities; and by April 1947 it was surveying
roughly 3,000 persons in 241 communities (Table 1).
The earliest surveys made little attempt to stratify the
sample even by Land. By April 1947, when the Section
formalized its samphng procedure, it could note that ". . . com-
munities under 10,000 in size are systematically selected at
random from lists which order all communities in [the
American Zone of] Germany according to size within the eight
administrative areas. Towns over 10,000 in size are weighted
out in the sample as separate items." The determination of
individual respondents rested upon the selection of every nXh.
name from the list of rationcard holders — which, in the earlier
years at least, doubtless constituted a complete enumeration of
residents of American-occupied Germany. A visiting expert,
Ehno C. Wilson, commented in August 1948 that the use of
such hsts offered a "samplers' paradise" unparalled in the United
States. He went on to characterize the Opinion Survey Section's
entire sampling procedure as being "of the highest order.'"*
Field Work. The field staff carried out the interviews in
the respondents' homes or offices. For surveys in October and
November 1945, American service personnel who could speak
German "like natives" conducted the interviews; thereafter,
6 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
TABLE 1 . THE OMGUS SURVEYS
The dates listed below are those printed on the questionnaires,
and represent the days on which the field workers began
interviewing. For approximate sample sizes, see the text: an
asterisk (*) denotes that the entire sample was split into two
halves, with each half getting a separate questionnaire.
1. 1945 26 Oct
37. 1947 7 Jan
2.
5 Nov
38.
3 Feb
3.
12 Nov
39.
17 Feb
4.
19 Nov
40.
7 Apr*
5.
26 Nov
41.
5 May
6.
1 Dec
42.
5 Jun
7.
6 Dec
43.
Jun*
8.
13 Dec
44.
8 Jul*
9.
27 Dec
45.
4 Aug
10. 1946 14 Jan
46.
25 Aug*
11.
21 Jan
47.
15 Sep*
12.
31 Jan
48.
6 Oct
13.
7 Feb
49.
10 Nov*
14.
14 Feb
50.
2 Dec*
15.
21 Feb
51. 1948 5 Jan*
16.
1 Mar
52.
IFeb
17.
8 Mar
53.
23 Feb
18.
15 Mar
54.
29 Mar
19.
22 Mar
55.
19 Apr*
20.
29 Mar
56.
17 May*
21.
5 Apr
57.
8 Jun*
22.
15 Apr
58.
30 Jun
23.
26 Apr
59.
19 Jul
24.
8 May
60.
2 Aug*
25.
7Jun
61.
23 Aug*
26.
21 Jun
62.
17 Sep*
27.
1 Jul
63.
12 Oct
28.
25 Jul
64.
1 1 Nov*
29.
9 Aug*
65.
2 Dec*
30.
Sep
66. 1949 8 Jan*
31.
4 Oct*
67.
3 Feb*
32.
3 Sep*
68.
1 Mar
33.
14 Oct
69.
15 Apr
34.
28 Oct*
70.
8 Jul*
35.
25 Nov*
71.
1 Aug
36.
10 Dec
72.
12 Sep*
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 7
Germans trained by the Opinion Survey Section carried out the
field work. In all cases the interviewers informed respondents of
OMGUS sponsorship of the surveys and assured them that their
anonymity would be preserved.
Given the fact that Germany was an occupied country, and
that the agent of the armed occupier was conducting these
surveys, one might legitimately ask what influence this fact had
upon the type of responses given by those polled. In November
1948 the Opinion Survey Section designed a survey specifically
to determine how much bias OMGUS sponsorship introduced
into the findings. Two sets of interviewers, one representing the
"MiUtary Government" and the other a "German public
opinion institute," asked separate samples in West Berlin a
variety of questions focusing upon political attitudes, partic-
ularly issues of occupation policy. In summarizing the results of
this survey, Leo P. Crespi, at that time chief of the Opinion
Survey Section, wrote:
Without in any way denying the importance of the
sponsorship problems that were uncovered in some areas
of questioning, it would not be unreasonable to hold that
the major import of the present experiment is not so much
the presence of sponsorship differences on MG [Military
Government] questions but their relative absence. With
only a third of the questions exhibiting differences at the
95 per cent level [of significance] and only 14 per cent at
the 99 per cent level; with a maximum difference of 17.1
per cent and a non-significant average difference of 6.6 per
cent on questions in large part selected to show up
sponsorship differences if they exist, the conclusion seems
fair that on the score of sponsorship MG polling is an
entirely workable method of inquiry in occupied Ger-
many. . . .^
The areas of greatest difference seemed to be questions bearing
upon American prestige and, to a lesser extent, questions about
militarism and National Socialism. In these areas, Crespi
continued:
It is on the side of caution not to take the obtained per-
centages entirely at face value. Perhaps a feasible suggestion
8 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
is to apply in such instances a 10 per cent safety factor—
the nearest round figure to the 11.1 per cent average
sponsorship difference found on questions passing the 95
per cent level. . . .^
But to this must be added the fact that sponsorship differences
do not necessarily mean that the OMGUS-sponsored surveys
were less valid than those conducted by the "independent"
German agency. Respondents may simply have given different
versions of the "truth" to interviewers from different agencies,
with neither version necessarily being a more accurate reflection
of the respondents' "true" perspectives than the other. ^ Those
who would use the OMGUS surveys, however, must bear in
mind the possibihty of bias.
Analysis. The staff of the Opinion Survey Section
transferred the information from the questionnaires to punch-
cards, produced sometimes elaborate cross-tabulations of the
data as well as longitudinal comparisons, and wrote reports for
distribution to other OMGUS agencies. Unfortunately, the
punchcards for these surveys have disappeared. All that remains
is the set of 194 reports based upon these data. The reports,
ranging in length from two to 7 1 pages, analyze specific aspects
of the data. They frequently contain tables of data broken
down by demographic characteristics, or cross-tabulated accord-
ing to expressed opinions on related subjects. Taken together,
these reports (despite the absence of punchcard data) comprise
a veritable wealth of information which social scientists have
not yet begun to mine thoroughly.
The purpose of this volume is to make this material more
widely available to the scholarly and pohcy-making community.
Its bulk is comprised of short summaries of each of the 194
separate reports, together with an index. Where possible we have
taken these summaries directly from the reports themselves.
Similarly, information on sample sizes and interviewing dates
stems from the individual reports. The complete set of reports,
in microfilmed or xeroxed form, can be obtained from the
United States National Archives and Records Service.^ The
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 9
remainder of this introductory survey will suggest some uses to
which social scientists could put the information contained in
the OMGUS reports of public opinion in occupied Germany, as
well as some findings that emerge from the reports.
IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION POLICIES
The OMGUS surveys were oriented toward policy problems
facing the American occupation authorities. Particularly at
the outset of the occupation years this meant short-range
policy — that seeking to deal with the day-to-day issues arising
in this massive effort to control an alien population. Cardinal
among these issues were the attitudes of Germans toward the
occupation itself, the effectiveness of the American information
policies, and a host of specific problems such as food rationing,
refugees and expellees, currency control and reform, the
division of Germany, and the city of Berlin.
Attitudes toward the American Occupation
Doubtless few nations relish the prospect of falling under the
control of a foreign country. The remarkable thing is that
Germans in the American Zone of Occupation (AMZON) and
West Berhn did not regard the occupation of the late 1 940s as a
national humiliation for Germany: For every person who
considered it as such (an average of 30 per cent of the
population), more than two (62%) did not view it as a national
humiliation (#22).^ Moreover, there was a general feeling
among AMZON Germans that they received better treatment,
particularly with respect to food rations, than did their
compatriots in other zones of occupation (#64); and they had
more confidence that the Americans would treat Germans fairly
than would the other occupying powers (#76).*°
Attitudes toward the American occupation forces were
ambivalent. On the one hand, few Germans came into direct
10 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
contact with soldiers. A survey in September 1 946 revealed that
only 28 per cent of Mannheim's citizens had struck up some
relationship with white soldiers, 16 per cent with black soldiers
(#24). For the American Zone as a whole, only one in seven
had come to know an American soldier well or rather well,
although as many as one in five had had an opportunity since
the beginning of the occupation to talk with an American
(#27). A year later almost twice as many AMZON Germans
(27%) could claim that they had become acquainted with an
American since the end of the war (#94) - a figure that rose to
32 per cent by December 1949 (#11/6).
On the other hand, the lack of direct contact did not
prevent Germans from forming images of these American
troops. These images were by and large positive. There seems to
have been little basic hostiUty toward the soldiers: Almost
three-quarters (74%), for instance, would not have expressed
opposition to German girls from their circle of acquaintances or
family who dated Americans (#94). And surveys taken at
various times revealed the overwhelming German belief that
both the behavior and the popularity of the American troops
were improving rather than worsening as the occupation months
progressed (#94, 110, and II/6). Minorities felt in November
1947 (#94) that the Americans enriched themselves through
barter (30%), had heard that the troops wasted or destroyed
food (36%), knew of cases where American negligence had
destroyed German property (21%), or had had unpleasant or
irritating experiences with Americans (13%). But to this must
be added the fact that, among respondents who claimed to
know Americans, the share reporting such negative images
averaged 13 percentage points greater than among those who
knew no Americans. Negro troops, although seen as friendher
than white soldiers, seemed to arouse somewhat greater
anxieties among Mannheim residents (#24): Most of these
respondents described the behavior of black soldiers either as
decent (37%) or as decent with some exceptions (33%), as
opposed to a small minority (17%) characterizing their behavior
as not decent; but as many as 29 per cent reported their fear of
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 1 1
black soldiers (a self-description that the interviewers' estimates,
based upon the tenor of the respondents' comments, more than
confirmed).
Germans in the American Zone were not sanguine about
the prospects for an early end to the occupation. In April 1946,
of those willing to estimate how long the occupation would last
(62 per cent of the entire sample), two-thirds suggested at least
a decade or "many years." Only one in nine of those willing to
make an estimate thought that the occupation would end
within the next three years (#22). The same question was asked
a half year later of 188 community leaders in areas under
American control. Three-quarters of this sample felt that the
occupation would last for at least another ten years, and a
quarter even thought it might last until 1966 or longer. A large
majority (76%) backed up their best guesses about the duration
of the American occupation with the assertion that the
Americans "should" stay that long (#44). Incidentally, of those
wilhng to estimate how long Germany would have to continue
paying reparations (67 per cent of the entire sample), less than
one in seven thought it would be under 20 years (#59).
More problematic was the German view on reconstruction.
In early 1946 residents of the American Zone were optimistic
despite their recognition that the road to full recovery was long.
Only a seventh (14%) expected reconstruction within a decade;
four times as many (57%) thought that it would take two or
more decades; and a fifth (20%) anticipated that it might
require at least 50 years (#22). About as many (41%) were
satisfied that recovery was proceeding more quickly than
expected as the number seeing it proceeding more slowly than
expected (40%). Over half (56%) were nonetheless optimistic
that reconstruction could be accomplished with some degree of
speed and energy (with 35 per cent expressing pessimism).
American Zone Germans expected and felt that they were
getting more assistance in reconstruction from the United States
than from joint Allied efforts (#22, 76, 100). Satisfaction with
the American contribution declined, however, from November
1945, when as many as 70 per cent of AMZON respondents
12 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
expressed the view that the United States had furthered rather
than hindered the reconstruction, to September 1946, when
this percentage stood at 44 per cent; after remaining at this level
until the following August, it rose again to 55 per cent in
January 1948 and 63 per cent in August of that year (#60, 85,
175).
The Marshall Plan evidently played a large role in
increasing German confidence in the United States. In August
1949 as many as 69 per cent of the AMZON Germans were
aware of this aid program, and all but a handful of these knew
that Germany was to benefit through it (#190). Asked what
underlay the Marshall Plan, the bulk of the respondents saw
America's self-interest: Almost two-thirds (63%) felt that
America wished to prevent Western Europe from becoming
communist, and almost half (48%) thought that America
wanted to win friends in Western Europe so that it would have
allies in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. Purely
altruistic motives found third place in this ranking, with 45 per
cent stating that America was earnestly anxious to help
homeless and starving people. A few saw sinister motives — a
desire to use the Marshall Plan to dump surplus goods (18%), to
achieve dominance over Western Europe (7%), or to penetrate
the European market (6%).
On all these points — attitudes toward American soldiers,
the American contribution to German reconstruction, views of
the Marshall Plan — West Berliners were consistently more ready
to express an opinion and more likely to take a pro-American
position. This trend was in evidence even before the crises that
led up to the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949. During and after
the blockade, however, West Berliners were even more predis-
posed to look upon the Americans as their friends in an
otherwise hostile environment.
American Information Policies
The occupation authorities were quite naturally interested in
the effectiveness of their information program. This program
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 13
included the licensing and publication of newspapers and
magazines, radio programs, pamphlets, special programs, and
the facihties of the so-called Amerika-Haeuser, or United States
information centers.
Although newspaper readership was high in all segments of
the German population under American control, with roughly
70 per cent consistently reporting themselves as regular readers
(#175), it was nonetheless higher among the more educated,
men rather than women, and city dwellers, particularly West
Berliners. The American-sponsored newspaper, Neue Zeitung,
found its greatest readership in West BerUn, where 20 per cent
of the sample reported reading it regularly, in contrast to ten
per cent in the American Zone. Of present and past readers, 63
per cent said that they liked the paper; 22 per cent felt that it
was one-sided (#154). More generally, AMZON Germans felt
that the licensed press contained fair and trustworthy news,
particularly when compared with newspapers published during
the war (e.g. #58).
Other written media reached smaller audiences. Less than a
quarter of the respondents in the American Zone, and 42 per
cent of those in West Berlin, reported that they regularly read
magazines (#53, 108). Together, the American-sponsored //ewr^,
Neue Auslese, and Amerikanische Rundschau accounted for
about half of the magazine readership (#43). In February 1946
as many as 55 per cent of the respondents in the American
Zone reported that they did not read books at all, but by
October 1948, 50 per cent (64 per cent in West Berlin) said that
they did (#13, 153). Generally, Germans claimed to prefer
novels, fiction, and short stories to other types of books;
specifically, they hsted the Bible (71%), the Prayer Book (27%),
and the works of Goethe as their favorites. Occasionally the
American Military Government published information pam-
phlets on political issues for sale to the general public. Studies
among those who had received these pamphlets as gifts revealed
that the readership ranged between 35 and 75 per cent,
although it was higher among men, upper socioeconomic
groups, and the better educated (#89, 97, 103, 112, 129). In
most cases only minorities claimed to have learned something
14 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
new from these pamphlets. Majorities nonetheless felt that they
presented a fair rather than one-sided picture of the facts.
Slightly more than half of the American Zone Germans
described themselves as regular radio listeners (#175). Most
preferred the radio station located in their own Land (or state),
particularly in West Berhn where RIAS (Radio in the American
Sector) had to compete with programs beamed from the Soviet
Zone of Occupation (#45). The most popular type of program
in both AMZON (72%) and West Berhn (85%) was musical.
Regarding political controls, substantial majorities in both the
American Zone (64%) and West Berlin (72%) felt that the AUies
had censored the programs; but in contrast to West Berlin,
where 58 per cent thought that the programs contained too
much propaganda, in the American Zone 66 per cent did not
think that this was the case (#45). The share of the AMZON
public listening to the "Voice of America" varied, from 63 per
cent in January 1946 to 75 per cent in October of that year and
41 per cent in May 1949 (#1, 45, 176).*^ Again, those most
likely to listen to VOA programs were men, upper socio-
economic groups, the better educated, and Protestants. Al-
though the bulk of VOA listeners (56%) considered the
programming good, criticism focused on its propagandistic
tendencies and its dullness (#176). More generally, however,
Germans tended to rely upon the radio rather than the
newspapers as their chief source of news: In January 1946,
almost two-thirds (65%) thought the radio more truthful than
newspapers (#1); but by the spring of 1947 only 24 per cent
were more inchned to rely upon the radio, with eight per cent
preferring the press and another 37 per cent finding them equal
in their trustworthiness (#68).
The movie audience was not large, fluctuating around
a quarter of the population (#20, 116, 171). Love themes
were most popular. Allied policies sharply restricting the
number of pre- 1945 films that theaters could show, and the
absence of extensive German production companies in the
immediate postwar period, meant that foreign films, and
particularly those made in the United States, dominated the
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 15
market. Germans nonetheless indicated that they would have
preferred German films, in large part simply because they
corresponded more closely to traditional German culture.
An important aspect of the United States information
policy was the establishment of information centers. Almost
every major city had its own Amerika-Haus, where its citizens
could read books and see films about the United States, hear
lectures relevant to American foreign policy interests, and
participate in other activities. It is remarkable that, although a
majority of the people knew of these information centers and
about four in ten knew what they offered, only four per cent
had ever been in one. And most of these were the better
educated, especially community and opinion leaders (#145).
A study conducted in early 1948 on the cumulative impact
of all mass media revealed that 12 per cent of the AMZON
population seemed to have no source of information whatever,
and another 1 7 per cent had no regular source of information
(#192). The more sources of information a person had, it
turned out, the more hkely that he had a favorable attitude
toward the United States and its government and economics.
Similarly, the more information the respondent had about the
Soviet Union, the more likely it was that his attitude toward
American capitalism was favorable.
Specific Issues of the Occupation
The number of specific issues on which the occupation
authorities wanted to know German attitudes was too great for
each of them to be discussed here. A few, however, deserve
special attention: rationing, expellees, currency problems, the
division of Germany, the question of Berlin, and more
specifically, the Berhn blockade.
Food Rationing. Questions about food rationing pro-
duced mixed reactions among AMZON Germans. On the one
hand, they definitely felt that they were suffering from the
16 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Fig. 1 . Major Cares and Worries of A MZON Germans
Question: "What are your greatest cares and worries at the present time?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 3.
shortages, particularly in the earlier part of the occupation (see
Figure 1). Even before a cut in rations, which took place in
April 1946, three in five respondents (61%) stated that they
were not getting enough food to be able to work efficiently; by
late April this proportion had reached 72 per cent, and it
remained at 71 per cent in the following month (#15, 18). Only
one in eight (12%) was satisfied with his food allotment, and
another two in eight (24%) considered it adequate. Even as late
as January 1 949, four in ten continued to feel that they were
getting insufficient food to permit efficient work (#175).*^
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 17
On the other hand, rationing evidently did not pose an
overwhelming hardship for most Germans in the American
Zone. For one thing, the rationcard system seemed to be
equitable (although the number seeing it carried out unjustly
rose from three per cent in November 1945 to slightly under a
third in January 1948 before dropping off to about a fifth in
February 1949). For another, eight out of ten AMZON
Germans were able to supplement their rations by canning
foods from their gardens, obtaining food from friends or
relatives who lived on farms, or securing special supplements
18 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
because of the nature of their work (#18). Third, and what may
have been most important, they saw themselves in a good
position compared to that of the residents of other zones. In
May 1946, two-fifths (41%) beheved that food rations were
largest in the American Zone, with 29 per cent citing British
Zone residents as the best fed. Less than a half of one per cent
felt that rations were smallest in the American Zone, with 22
per cent naming the Soviet Zone and 18 per cent the French
Zone (#18).
An interesting shift occurred in the perceived causes of
food shortages. Asked in May 1946 why rations had been
reduced, the responses given most frequently stressed either
food shortages in Germany and/or the world (41%) or else
insufficient stocks and poor crops (27%). In third place (15%)
stood perceptions that available supplies had to feed others in
Germany, that the country was overcrowded, or that too many
occupation forces were in the country (#18). General causes,
however, soon became specific. In November 1946 and July
1947, the reason given most frequently for food shortages (46
and 44 per cent, respectively) was overpopulation due to
displaced persons, evacuees, and so forth (#70). Other causes
listed included the loss of the war or wartime destruction (22
and 10 per cent, respectively), the loss of the eastern territories
(20 and 22 per cent), an imbalance between imports and
exports (19 and 17 per cent), and the black market (8 and 26
per cent).
Refugees and Expellees. The data on underlying causes of
food shortages are indicative of growing hostihty in postwar
Germany toward refugees and expellees. The October 1946
census revealed that no less than 16.2 per cent of the entire
AMZON population comprised refugees from the Soviet Zone
of Occupation, expellees from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and other displaced persons. By
the end of the occupation period their numbers amounted to
one-fifth of the total population in the American Zone. In most
of their characteristics and political attitudes the evacuees did
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 19
not differ greatly from the natives. Exceptions were that the
evacuees were more likely to be CathoUc, adherents of the
Social Democratic Party, and from unskilled occupational
groups (#84, 162). Integrating these masses of refugees and
expellees proved to be one of the most serious problems that
the Western Allies, and later the Federal Republic, had to face.
The native inhabitants of the American Zone resented the
circumstances that had led to the influx of the refugees and
expellees. In March 1946, before food shortages seriously hit
the AMZON Germans, as many as 14 per cent of them saw
some justification in the expulsions; thereafter, only about
three per cent did so, as well over 90 per cent felt them to be
unjust (#14A, 175). Asked who was responsible for the
expulsions, over half (51%) attributed them to the Allies, to a
desire for revenge against the Germans, to antipathy in Eastern
Europe toward Germans. About three in ten (29%) blamed the
defunct Nazi government or Hitler himself, one per cent said
that the Germans themselves were responsible, and a quarter
would not or could not assign responsibility (#14A). But the
question of responsibihty raised the further question of who
should care for the expellees. In March 1946, about two-thirds
of the AMZON respondents (63%) felt that Germans should
perform this task, almost half (48%) that it should be up to the
Allies or the countries which expelled them (#14A). By
November of that year respondents were inclined to place the
main burden on the state expelling them (46%), rather than
either the Germans (28%), or the Allies (14%), although it must
be added that West Berliners were considerably more willing to
place the burden on Germans (#47). Somewhat less than a year
later, in September 1947, almost half of those asked (48%)
thought that Germany should provide for the expellees; a
quarter continued to feel that the native countries of the
expellees should bear the costs, and 13 per cent continued to
name the Alhes (#81).
These native inhabitants were not much less resentful
toward the expellees themselves. Throughout the occupation
period, whereas about half expected the expellees to be able to
20 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
get along with the native population, a solid third expected
trouble (#14A, 28, 47, 175). In November 1946, at the height
of the food crisis, as many as 46 per cent foresaw trouble, in
contrast to a more optimistic 47 per cent. In March 1946,
substantial majorities despaired of finding solutions to food
(71%) and housing (64%) problems. More than a third (35%)
thought the matter of jobs insoluble. In November of that year,
78 per cent of a sample in Wuerttemberg-Baden expressed their
conviction that the expellees constituted an economic burden
for the American Zone.^^
It was a burden that the native residents were nonetheless
willing to accept, if sometimes begrudgingly. Large majorities
agreed in March 1946 that the expellees should have both
economic equality (81%) and full political rights (74%). In
November of the same year five in six Wuerttemberg-Badeners
(83%) wanted to permit the expellees to participate fully in
politics. The share of native residents seeing the expellees as
German citizens rose from 49 per cent in early 1946 to 67 per
cent in late 1947, during which period those viewing them as
foreigners dropped from 28 to 18 per cent. Even so, throughout
the entire occupation years roughly 90 per cent expected that
the expellees would return to their homelands if they were
permitted to do so.
The perceptions of the expellees themselves differed
sharply in important respects. To be sure, most expressed a
desire to return to their homelands, but the percentage
expressing this desire declined steadily, and it was persistently
lower than the percentage of native inhabitants expecting the
expellees to return to their homelands if given a chance.^*
Moreover, almost three in four (73%) viewed themselves in
September 1947 as German citizens. By June 1947 almost
two-thirds (64%) were expressing the expectation that they
would not get along with the native Germans. The share of
those expressing actual dissatisfaction with their treatment by
local populations rose from seven per cent in March 1946 to 50
per cent in June 1948. And majorities persistently felt that the
Land governments were not doing all within their power to
assist the expellees. To all this, however, must be added the fact
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 21
that, after the severe food and economic crises were over, the
level of latent hostility among the expellees dechned.
The Currency Reform. The key to ending the economic
crises that contributed so much to such problems as mounting
tensions between the expellees and the native residents was the
currency reform, carried through in June 1948. In their earhest
surveys the American occupation authorities focused on popu-
lar perceptions of inflationary trends, the standing of the
Reichsmark, rent and price controls, rationing, the black
market, and still other problems emanating in part from the
Allied inabiUty to cooperate fully on currency reform.
The first two years of the occupation saw increasing
desperation among AMZON Germans. In January 1946, 67 per
cent of the respondents reported that their incomes were
adequate; two years later only 57 per cent felt this way (#100).
Between January and June 1946 half the population believed
that anti-inflationary measures would not succeed (#60).
Confidence in the Reichsmark fell to the point where, in June
1947, about as many persons felt that it would maintain its
then-current value as thought it would not (#100). We noted
earlier a declining belief in the fairness of the rationcard system,
accompanying increasing worries about the adequacy of food
rations. Meanwhile, there was a growing recognition of the
importance of the black market in German economic life.
Although in February 1946 over half (51%) denied the
existence of a black market in their community, two years later
71 percent knew of one (see Figure 2). A more general mood of
pessimism underscored all these trends: Whereas in December
1945 nearly eight in ten thought that economic conditions would
improve, by April 1947 only 45 per cent thought so (#100).
There was a measure of confusion about the sources and
solutions of their economic woes. Asked why ten times as much
currency was in circulation in July 1946 as before the war, most
attributed it either to black market dealers (66%) or Nazis
and war profiteers (33%), and 17 per cent were unable to
suggest a reason. And yet pluraUties of 40 per cent in the
22 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Fig. 2. Government Efforts to Overcome the Black Market
Question: "In your opinion, are the government off icials doing everything
to overcome the black market?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 37.
American Zone and 52 per cent in West Berlin opposed a
currency reform at that time (with 36 and 40 per cent
respectively, favoring it). Presented with alternative schedules
for carrying out such a reform, however, a plurality in the
American Zone (44%) favored an immediate adjustment rather
than delaying it until economic conditions should improve
(12%) or until a new government should be formed (16%). In
the meantime, most of those with opinions preferred to keep
their reserves in goods rather than cash or bank accounts (#32).
Once instituted, the currency reform received hearty
approval (#133). Nine in ten termed it necessary, and over half
(53%) thought that it should have taken place earher. It tended
to create an optimistic mood: Over half (54%) expected the
new currency to retain its value, 58 per cent believed that they
would get along better during the coming year because of the
currency reform, seven in ten intended to make additional
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 23
purchases, and most expected the reform either to Hmit (71%)
or overcome (14%) the black market. There was nonetheless
some dissatisfaction. It focused particularly upon the ten to one
conversion ratio which, according to more than a third (35%) of
the AMZON Germans, treated the small savers more harshly
than the rich. And 77 per cent expected — correctly, as it
turned out — that the currency reform would lead to greater
unemployment (see Figure 1).
The actual effect of the currency reform was a bag of
blessings mixed with curses. On the one hand, after some
temporary dislocations, it permitted the three western zones of
Germany and the three western sectors of Berlin to get their
economies moving again. That these West Germans could,
before another decade was over, establish themselves as the
economically strongest state in Europe is in no small measure an
indication of the success of the currency reform and similar
decisions made during the occupation. But, on the other hand,
for Germans throughout the occupied territories it was a
symbolic step that sealed the division of Germany into East and
West.
The Division of Germany. The occupation years
witnessed growing uneasiness about the prospect for ending the
"temporary" division of Germany. Germans in territories under
American control saw clearly a split emerging along east-west
lines, due in large part to the inabihty of the victorious wartime
Allies to agree upon the course of Germany's future. The
percentage seeing the AUies as having furthered the reconstruc-
tion of Germany increased from a quarter in September 1 946 to
a half in January 1948, with the share of more optimistic
responses declining from four to three in nine (#100). By
January 1948 some 85 per cent of the respondents thought that
the Four Powers were not cooperating successfully in the recon-
struction (see Figure 3). Four in five did not think that a unified
Germany would survive the end of the occupation (#175).
The failure of successive conferences of foreign ministers
in 1947 enhanced this pessimistic mood. AMZON Germans
thought that the Soviet Union had torpedoed the Moscow
24 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
5
25
5
JUN
AUG
JAN
1947
1948
Fig. 3. The Prospects for a United Germany
Question: "Do you believe the Allies will cooperate successfully to leave
behind a united Germany at the end of the occupation?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 58.
Conference (10 March-24 April). A substantial plurality (49%)
did not expect the Allies to conclude a peace treaty by the
summer of 1948 (#62, 63). To be sure, Berliners in the
American-controlled borough of Neukoelln hoped that the
London Conference (25 November- 16 December) would pro-
duce such a peace treaty, but only 14 per cent dared to beheve
that it would (#75). A spot survey after the breakdown of this
conference revealed an overwhelming sentiment among West
Berliners that the Soviets were to blame (#86). One in three
(32%) felt that it meant the final division of Germany, another
26 per cent expected a continuation of the status quo, and as
many as one in seven (15%) said simply that conditions would
deteriorate or that war would ensue.
By the spring of 1948 Germans were prepared to accept a
government for the three western zones of occupation. Ameri-
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 25
can, British, and French representatives, together with their
colleagues from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg,
met in London during the first half of 1948 to lay the
groundwork for such a government. Of the relatively few
respondents who later claimed to know anything about the
London proposals, the bulk favored them (#131). And, when
apprised of these proposals, 78 per cent of all respondents in
the American Zone (89 per cent in West Berhn, 93 per cent in
Bremen) reacted positively. Support dropped to 72 per cent,
however, when the interviewers pointed out the possibility that
only representatives from the western zones would be able to
help set up the government. A subsequent survey in August
1 948 found 70 per cent favoring the creation of a provisional
government for western Germany, with only one in eight (12%)
opposed to the idea (#136).
In agreeing to a West German government, the respondents
were evidently well aware that it meant a continued, and
perhaps permanent, division of their country. The comment
made most frequently by informed respondents (26%), when
asked about the disadvantages of the London proposals, was
"the division of Germany" but, it must be added, more either
expressed no opinion (35%) or saw no disadvantages (8%). Told
that, according to the London proposals, the French Zone
would be added to the bizonal (American-British) economic
arrangements, 72 per cent of the entire sample saw it as a step
toward unification, six per cent as a step backward (#131). A
more exphcit question in August 1948 seemed to clarify this
apparent ambiguity: Almost half (47%) of the respondents in
the American Zone thought that the establishment of a
provisional government for western Germany would widen the
East-West split, with only two-thirds as many (33%) feehng that
it would make no difference (#136).
The reasons for favoring a West German government were
diverse. Asked what advantages the London proposals meant for
western Germany, 36 per cent of the respondents who knew
what these proposals were pointed to better living conditions
and another 14 per cent mentioned that they were a step
toward independence. Five times more respondents either saw
26 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
no advantages ( 1 8%) or had no opinion (24%) than the number
(8%) mentioning that the proposals would constitute a bar to
communism (#131). And yet, as subsequent questions and
surveys revealed, a fear of communism was very prevalent. ^^ In
July 1948, 95 per cent of all AMZON respondents expressed a
preference for a democratic government in western Germany
alone and only one per cent for a communist central govern-
ment for all of Germany. More generally, Germans were becom-
ing increasingly outspoken in asserting their dislike of the Soviet
Union and distrust of its intentions (e.g. #185). Throughout the
period from January 1947 to February 1949 approximately
half agreed with the proposition that "The Americans should
reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order to avoid her
becoming a prey to Communism" (#175).
We shall return later to the question of German attitudes
toward communism and the Soviet Union. The point to be
stressed here is that these negative views helped induce Germans
in the western zones of occupation to accept a specific policy.
This policy sought to strengthen the abiUty of these areas to
resist pressure from the East, at the cost of steps aimed at
restoring German unity. And perhaps in no place in that portion
of Germany under Western controls and at no time was this
hostihty to the East more prevalent than in West Berlin during
the blockade months from June 1948 to May 1949.
Berlin and the Blockade. The breakdown of interallied
cooperation, the currency crisis, and the competition to create a
Germany that would be an ally in the raging Cold War all met in
June 1948 on the banks of the Spree River in BerHn. Using the
Western currency reform as its justification, on the 24th of that
month the Soviet Union closed the roads and canals leading to
the western sectors of the city. The West's response was quick
to come. American officials agreed that it would be technically
feasible, however difficult, to airUft sufficient supplies to the
two and a quarter miUion West Berliners. But the effectiveness
of this tactic in countering the blockade would rest upon the
morale of the city's leadership and its people. Ernst Reuter and
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 27
other leaders gave their assurances immediately. But what about
the mass of West Berliners?
Spot surveys, bolstered by more substantial investigations
later, revealed that Berhners in the western sectors stood soUdly
behind the West and the Allied air lift. Four weeks after the
imposition of the blockade 98 per cent of a Berlin sample
expressed the view that the West was pursuing the correct
policy (#130). From the very outset and throughout the
blockade about nine in ten were confident that the Americans
would stay in Berlin as long as they remained in Germany. This
is not to say that they were without worries. Although three in
four (77%) felt that the Western Powers were doing their
utmost to relieve distressed conditions in Berlin (see Figure 4)
and five in six (84%) thought that the air lift could provide
them with sufficient food, more than half (52%) doubted that
the air Uft could carry them through the winter months.
Confidence grew as the air lift proved increasingly success-
ful. By September 85 per cent — and by October 89 per
cent — expected the air hft to provision them adequately during
the winter months (#141, 150). Meanwhile, however bad their
circumstances were, 88 per cent of the West Berhners preferred
them to uniting their city under the communists (4%). And the
percentage of those reporting that, if given an opportunity, they
would leave Berlin dropped from 43 per cent in July to 30 per
cent in October. Respondents in the American Zone were
somewhat less sanguine about the Berhn situation. Only seven
in ten were convinced that the Americans would remain in
Berhn, nine in ten thought the Western position to be the
correct one, and only somewhat over half (56%) thought that
the air Hft was providing sufficient food to maintain rations at
their preblockade levels (#144, 175).
Ultimately, of course, the air hft exceeded all earlier
hopes. The Soviet hfting of the blockade in May 1949 was
widely seen as a triumph both for the American policy of
hardness and the West Berhners' firmness. It is this perception
that West Berhners celebrate down to the present day in their
loyalty to the West in general and the United States in
28 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Fig. 4a. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: AMZON Views
particular. ^^ But the blockade also left a divided Berlin in its
wake - a divided Berlin that symbolized the division of
Germany as a whole. What is more, the Federal RepubUc that
emerged in West Germany no longer had Berlin as the focal
point of its attention. If 58 per cent of the residents of the
American Zone agreed in August 1947 that Berlin should be
Germany's capital, it remains a fact that the founding fathers of
the Federal Republic located their capital in Bonn, a choice in
which two out of three AMZON Germans with opinions
concurred (#71, 180). Berlin itself became a symbol - a symbol
of the united Germany that used to be, a symbol of the united
Germany that many hope for in the future.
In their concern with these and a plethora of other issues
stemming both from the need to make immediate policy
decisions and from changes in the environment of interaUied
cooperation, the researchers of the Opinion Survey Section did
not lose sight of the long-range issues that had brought them,
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 29
Fig. 4b. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: Berlin Views
Question: "In your opinion are the Western Powers doing all they possibly
can to relieve the needs of Berlin or could they do more?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 52.
and indeed the entire structure of the military occupation, to
Germany in the first place.
DEMOCRATIZING POSTWAR GERMANY
Among the purposes announced by Churchill, Roosevelt, and
Stalin when they were formulating plans for the postwar
occupation of Germany, the democratization of the country
was particularly important. This policy implied several things.
Most immediately, of course, it meant the punishment of those
guilty of the Nazi excesses, the removal of Nazi sympathizers
from important posts in governmental or private life, the
effective disarmament of the country, and, more generally, the
elimination of symbols of the Nazi past. More problematic was
a second task — democratizing Germany's political culture.
30 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Removing the leaders and reminders of the past was one thing,
but revising the predispositions, perceptions, and values of an
entire population was quite another. For the Opinion Survey
Section it meant, on the one hand, an assessment of the state of
German pohtical culture and, on the other, a continual
evaluation of the effectiveness of Alhed programs aimed at
changing this culture.
Nazism and Denazification
Many Americans, no less than Europeans, harbored deep
resentments toward their wartime enemy, Germany. What
explained the fact, many asked themselves, that Germany had
initiated major wars of expansion three times within the past
century? Was it something inherent in German national charac-
ter? A common assumption was that in the breast of every
German beat the heart of a Nazi. It was this assumption on
which rested some of the early wartime policies for the postwar
occupation — the Morgenthau-White plan, which called for a
demilitarized, dismembered, and pastoralized Germany, and
even Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 1067 (JCS 1067), which set
down guidelines for the American Military Government to
follow. And one even sees it in the initial questions and reports
emanating from the offices of the OMGUS Opinion Survey
Section. But how true was it? To what extent were Germans
bUnd adherents of National Socialism?
Attitudes toward National Socialism. It is not entirely
clear how thoroughly mobilized in their support of Adolf Hitler
the German population was. Few (7%) claimed to have read his
Mein Kampf in its entirety, although another 16 per cent
remembered reading part of it (#2; cf. #92). Only one in eight
(12%) recalled trusting Hitler as a leader up to the end of the
war; over half claimed either never to have trusted him (35%) or
to have lost their faith in him by the time war had broken out
in 1939 (16%). Asked whether they would like to have seen
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 31
Hitler before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
interestingly enough, 72 per cent of AMZON Germans re-
sponded positively in October 1946, and only 12 per cent felt it
better that he had spared himself this ignominy.*''
Attitude toward Hitler notwithstanding, large numbers of
postwar Germans in the areas under American control con-
tinued to express perceptions characteristic of National Socialist
ideology (#19). To cite some examples, nine per cent agreed
that "a civihan is an unworthy (lower) person compared to a
member of the army"; ten per cent that "in all probability
foreign nations and races are enemies; therefore, one should be
prepared at all times to attack them first," and that "if a pure
German marries a non-Aryan wife he should be condemned";
1 2 per cent that "the horrors committed by the Germans are an
invention of the propaganda of our enemies"; 15 per cent that
"the Communists and the Social Democrats should be sup-
pressed"; 18 per cent that "only a government with a dictator is
able to create a strong nation," and that "this war was caused
by a conspiracy between the International Bankers and the
Communists"; 19 per cent that "the German people were the
victims of a conspiracy by other nations"; 20 per cent that "it
would have been much better for the Allies to have had a war
with Russia instead of with Germany"; 29 per cent that "the
publication of no book that criticizes a government or
recommends any changes in government should be permitted";
30 per cent that "Negroes are members of an unworthy (lower)
race"; 33 per cent that "Jews should not have the same rights as
those belonging to the Aryan race"; 37 per cent denied that
"extermination of the Jews and Poles and other non-Aryans was
not necessary for the security of Germans"; and 52 per cent
agreed that "territories such as Danzig, Sudetenland, and
Austria should be part of Germany proper." Two caveats are
important in interpreting these findings. First, we must wonder
whether these response patterns are typically German or
whether, to the contrary, Americans, Frenchmen, and citizens
of other industrialized countries might not agree to similar
propositions. Second, these data say nothing about the extent
32 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
to which such perceptions antedated the emergence of Nazism
in Germany.
The Opinion Survey Section made an interesting attempt
to test the latter point. Using the split-sample technique, it
sought to find out what differences would emerge on perspec-
tives according to whether assertions were explicitly identified
as stemming from Hitler. Thus half of a sample responded to
the question, "Before the war it was often said that parts of
Europe with considerable German minorities (e.g. Sudetenland)
should be legally reincorporated in Germany; did you agree to
that or not?" and the other half got the question, "Before the
war Hitler often said that parts of Europe with considerable
German minorities (e.g. Sudetenland) should be legally rein-
corporated in Germany; did you agree to that or not?" In
response to the questions, 36 per cent of the first sample
reported having agreed, as did 39 per cent of the second sample.
A similar pair of questions dealt with the prewar sentiment that
"international Jewry alone would profit from the war." In this
case 14 per cent agreed with the generalized proposition and 1 1
per cent were willing to identify themselves with Hitler in
accepting it. A third pair of questions asked about the putative
superiority of the "Nordic race," with results similar to the
second. In short, there were no statistically significant dif-
ferences in the responses to differently-worded questions. This
in turn suggests that Hitler may merely have tapped a set of
underlying perspectives while, to be sure, reinforcing them at
the same time through his propaganda.
Further indications of this are to be found in the postwar
population's unwilhngness to reject Nazism completely. In
eleven surveys between November 1945 and December 1946, an
average of 47 per cent expressed their feehng that National
Socialism was a good idea badly carried out; by August 1947
this figure had risen to 55 per cent remaining fairly constant
throughout the remainder of the occupation (#60, 68, 175).
Meanwhile, the share of respondents thinking it a bad idea
dropped from 41 to about 30 per cent (see Figure 5).^^ A
breakdown of the August 1947 survey revealed that the
respondents most likely to describe National Socialism as a
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 33
Fig. 5. Views on National Socialism
Question: "Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried out?'
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.
good idea badly carried out were those with nine to twelve
years of schooUng (64%), people under the age of 30 (68%),
Protestants (64%), former NSDAP members (67%), West Ber-
liners (62%), and Hessians (61%). They also tended to be more
critical than others of the postwar news media, to be more
likely to find fault with democracy, and to prefer a government
offering security rather than one stressing liberty. Moreover,
asked to choose between National Socialism and Communism,
the number opting for the former increased from 19 per cent in
November 1945 to well over twice that figure in February
1949, with the number preferring the latter alternative declining
from 35 to 3 per cent (#60, 175).
The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. The relatively cool
attitude that postwar Germans displayed toward Hitler carried
over to other leaders of the Nazi state. This view came out
clearly in their reactions to the trial of the major war criminals
before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
Originally, the IMT brought an indictment against 24 top Nazi
leaders, three of whom ultimately did not stand trial. After
sessions lasting from November 1945 to October 1946, the
Tribunal handed down 1 1 death sentences (plus another death
sentence for Martin Bormann, tried in absentia), seven prison
34 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
sentences ranging from ten years to life, and three acquittals.
The Tribunal also declared the leadership corps of the Nazi
Party, the Gestapo and the State Security Service, and the SS to
be "criminal organizations."
Generally speaking, popular interest in the trial was high.
In January 1946, 78 per cent of German respondents in the
American Zone of Occupation indicated that they had read
newspaper articles about the trial. Subsequent surveys, however,
revealed both a declining interest in following the press
treatment (67 per cent in March and 72 per cent in August) and
that less than half of these read the reports in their entirety (34
per cent in March and 3 1 per cent in August). In October 1946,
93 per cent of the respondents claimed to have heard about the
judgments (#16, 33). Confidence in the completeness and
reliabiUty of the press also dropped, from 79 per cent in
October 1945 to 67 per cent in August 1946. In October, after
the trial's completion, 48 per cent indicated that the newspaper
reports had been complete, 65 per cent reliable (45 per cent
complete and reUable), and six per cent thought that they had
been neither.
The trial increased AMZON Germans' knowledge of the
Nazi era. In December 1945, 84 per cent of these respondents
indicated that they had learned something new from the trial:
64 per cent specified the concentration camps, 23 per cent the
extermination of Jews and other groups, and seven per cent the
character of the Nazi leaders; one out of eight (13%) said that
he had known nothing about the evils of National Socialism
prior to the trial. ^^ In October 1946, the share of Germans
saying that they had learned something new had dropped off to
71 per cent, and the number claiming that they had not learned
anything new doubled to 27 per cent from 13 per cent in
December 1945.
Asked about the guilt of the accused, AMZON Germans
gave increasingly differentiated answers. The share of respon-
dents holding all the accused to be guilty rose from 70 per cent
in December 1945 to 75 per cent in the following March, only
to drop to 52 per cent by August 1946. (In March, 71 per cent
indicated that all the accused shared guilt for the preparation of
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 35
the war, with another ten per cent wanting to except some of
them; 59 per cent did not feel that the accused could defend
themselves in the face of the charges levied against them.)
Conversely, the share holding none to be guilty dropped from
five per cent in December 1945 to one per cent in March 1946
and to less than a half of one per cent by August. After hearing
the verdicts, the respondents were generally satisfied: 55 per
cent felt that the sentences had been just, but 21 per cent felt
them to be too mild and nine per cent too harsh. ^*^ Well over
half felt it proper that organizations should be indicted for their
criminal activity; the percentages varied from 56 per cent in
October 1945 to 60 per cent in December 1945 to 59 per cent
in October 1946.
Most AMZON Germans with opinions felt that the trial
was being conducted fairly (an average of 79 per cent in seven
surveys conducted from October 1945 to August 1946, as
opposed to four per cent who saw them as unfair). To this,
however, must be added the fact that the perception of
unfairness crept up slowly over this period. In October 1946,
after the conclusion of the trial, 78 per cent of the respondents
thought that it had been fair, and six per cent thought it unfair.
These data lend themselves, of course, to varying interpre-
tations. One possible interpretation is that the postwar Germans
were truly desirous of seeing those responsible for the Nazi
excesses punished by the International Mihtary Tribunal. Others
may see in these findings a large body of politically apathetic
and irresponsible Germans looking for scapegoats to exonerate
themselves of any blame for the crimes of the Nazi era (see
Figure 6). Either interpretation clearly needs additional infor-
mation (such as that provided by close readings of the German
press, the works of postwar publicists, and memoirs) before it
can be accepted. Another hne of collateral data stems from
public attitudes in postwar Germany toward the extensive
denazification proceedings.
Denazification. Set up under JCS 1067, the denazifica-
tion proceedings aimed at removing from "public office and
from positions of importance in quasi-public and private
36 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
10 5
NOV JAN.
1947 1948
Fig. 6. Collective German Responsibility tor World War II
Question: "Do you think that the entire German people are responsible for
the war because they let a government come to power which plunged the
whole world into war?"
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 8.
enterprises" those Germans who had been "active supporters of
Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to AlUed
purposes." This meant searching the records of some 1 3 million
residents of the American Zone of Occupation, and ultimately
processing some 3.5 million cases. By the beginning of 1947 the
American authorities had removed 292,089 such persons from
public or important private positions and excluded an addi-
tional 81,673.^1
Unlike the war crimes trials, which focused upon a handful
of very prominent Nazis, the denazification proceedings
affected the AMZON population more directly. In principle, at
least, every fourth citizen was subject to punishment. The
immensity of the task of trying all such persons, together with
the imphcations for the efficient operation of German industry
and government should this many people be removed from
positions of responsibility, soon led the occupation authorities
to lower their sights. ^^ Even so, the potential disruption of
German life was great.
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 37
What at first glance is most surprising is the fact that
Germans in the American Zone seemed to endorse the idea of
denazification. Indeed, in January 1949, when the hearings
were coming to a close, two-thirds (66%) thought it important
to hold to account "such people as furthered National Sociahsm
in any way" (#182). Significantly enough, however, the most
ardent opponents of the idea of denazification were the highly
educated and the upper middle and upper socioeconomic groups.
Acceptance in principle did not imply acceptance in
practice. The number of respondents satisfied with the way in
which denazification was being carried out declined from
roughly half in the winter of 1945-1946, when the idea was new
and relatively untried, to about a third from October 1946 to
the following September, to about a sixth in January 1949 (#7,
60, 182). The dissatisfied respondents (65%) were almost equal
in number to those approving of the idea of denazification
(66%).^^ And again the more socially mobilized groups within
the population were the most likely to express criticism.
The most frequently heard objection to the denazification
procedures was that they dealt too harshly with minor party
members in comparison with the major ones (#7, 182). The
second most persistent complaint was that the proceedings were
too arbitrary and the judgments too inconsistent. Only from
those who thought the program too easy did interviewers hear
the view expressed that some punishments should be harsher.
Those directly affected by the proceedings, because of
their past affiliation with the NSDAP, did not share this latter
view. In contrast to respondents without such connections, only
five per cent of whom had been dismissed from their jobs once
or more times between January 1945 and September 1947, well
over a third of the former members had suffered such a fate
(#80). Over four in five reported that they were either much
worse off (69%) or somewhat worse off (13%) in their current
jobs than they were formerly. Half (51%) of the unaffected but
as many as 78 per cent of those who claimed former
membership in the NSDAP expressed dissatisfaction with the
denazification proceedings. Asked what the most serious con-
sequences of these proceedings were, former Nazi adherents
most frequently named the lack of governmental and business
38 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
experts, as well as the economic stress suffered by those
removed from their jobs.
All this bitterness notwithstanding, few Germans were
wilhng to take denazification entirely out of the hands of
American occupation authorities. In March 1946 only one in
eleven wanted primary German responsibility, a position held
by every sixth respondent a year later (#7, 55). The reason
most frequently given for this was the expectation that the
Americans would be more impartial than Germans in meting
out justice. But underlying this was the simple unwilhngness to
assume full responsibility for an unpopular program.
Summing up, the views on National Sociahsm, the Nurem-
berg trials, and the denazification proceedings uncovered by the
OMGUS surveys point to a persistent pattern. On the one hand,
there were relatively few wholehearted Nazis in the American
Zone. Our impressionistic judgment, based on a review of all the
surveys reported in this volume, is that roughly 15 to 18
percent of the adult population were unreconstructed Nazis in
the immediate postwar period.^"* The bulk of Germans emphati-
cally rejected the specifically Nazi aspects and leaders of their
recent history. And it seemed unlikely, at least for the near
future, that they would again follow a pied piper of Hitler's
caliber — especially if he were garbed in explicitly Nazi robes.
un the other hand, however, AMZON Germans were far
from unanimous in turning their backs on National Socialism,
They increasingly expressed their view that National Socialism
was basically a good idea, although carried out poorly (see
Figure 5). Substantial numbers continued to subscribe to
sentiments closely tied up with Nazi ideology (as well, of
course, as with other racist and reactionary ideologies, such as
shown in Figure 7). And not only did they refuse to accept
responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era, but they objected
when denazification boards levied stiff penalties upon the lesser
supporters of the NSDAP.
Even if the Nazi Party and its leaders were discredited,
then, it was by no means certain that their underlying principles
were. The eradication of the outward manifestations of Nazism
seems not to have eliminated the potential for movements
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 39
10
12
10
5
DEC.
MAY
NOV.
JAN.
1946
1947
1948
Fig. 7. Government and Racial Superiority
Question: "Do you think that some races of people are more fit to rule
than others?"
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 9.
equally totalitarian in their aims although explicitly eschewing
the "brown" past. But what about the more positive aspects of
the American occupation policy — those seeking to change, or
democratize, German political culture?
Re-education for Democracy
Crucial to any attempt to change German political culture was a
determination of what, in fact, its chief characteristics were.
Although this is a topic that has interested writers since the
time of Tacitus, the possibihty of investigating it in an
objective, systematic manner did not really exist before World
War II. The OMGUS surveys came at a time when social
scientists were developing the necessary concepts and tools. It is
not surprising, therefore, that these surveys sometimes seem
naive to the modern scholar: The hypotheses are occasionally
primitive, the questions used to test them often not very
sophisticated and the conclusions rather overly simpUfied.
40 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Moreover, given the preoccupation of American occupation
authorities with the heinous interlude of Nazism, it is also not
surprising that some of their research suffered from an
underlying tendentiousness. These caveats notwithstanding, the
surveys provided some material basic both to the occupiers
trying to change the perspectives on which German pohtics
rested as well as to subsequent investigators interested in the
actual impact of the occupation upon Germany's political
culture. ^^
German Political Culture. There are, of course, many
aspects of German poUtical culture that deserve mention. Of
most importance here are the views of Germans on authority
and democratic processes, no less than aspects of their political
behavior.
"Two souls, alas, do dwell in my breast!" lamented
Goethe's Faust. And roughly the same is true of the postwar
German body politic (although not necessarily of individual
Germans). Living amongst a sizable proportion of "democrats"
was a goodly number of "authoritarians," conceivably suscep-
tible to the sirens of yet another demagogue promising an
ordered society.
As suggested earlier, it is not difficult to demonstrate the
persistence in postwar Germany of perspectives closely
associated with National Socialist ideology: 15 per cent of the
AMZON Germans and West Berliners wilhng to suppress
leftwing parties; 18 per cent agreeing on the importance of a
dictator in creating a strong nation; 29 per cent amenable to
censorship of publications critical of the government; 33 per
cent feehng that Jews should not have the same rights as others
(#19). Perhaps one in six could be said to have held explicitly
Nazi orientations. In December 1946 the Opinion Survey
Section classified 21 per cent of its AMZON respondents as
anti-Semites, and another 18 per cent as intense anti-Semites —
a total of 39 per cent (#49).
And yet to write off the mass of postwar Germans as
authoritarians and racists would most surely be an injustice.
Indeed, the main finding of the extensive survey cited in the
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 41
previous paragraph is that most Germans had perspectives that
were by and large democratic. An average of three in ten
responded in a democratic direction on each of the eleven scales
included in the survey; an additional third answered in a
democratic direction on all but one question in each scale
(#19). Similarly, the later survey on anti-Semitism found a fifth
(20%) of the AMZON population to have little bias and another
fifth (19%) to be nationahsts but not racists - again a total of
39 per cent (#49).
Other signs of a predispositional duahty in German society
are scattered throughout the OMGUS surveys. Consider, for
example, German views on the purpose and means of education.
In January 1948, respondents considered the chief purpose of
the schools to be a comprehensive education (37 per cent in
West Berhn and 52 per cent in Stuttgart); the second most
frequently mentioned purpose in West Berlin (28%) was
discipline and, in Stuttgart (20%), job training; and only one in
six opted for the response "to teach children to think for
themselves" (#95). An earlier survey revealed that 65 per cent
in the American Zone and 51 per cent in the American and
British sectors of Berhn approved of granting teachers the right
to whip or beat "very disobedient and very unruly children"
(#66). (It must be added, however, that those opposing such a
right were much more vehement in expressing their views than
were those favoring it.)
Another example focuses upon the freedoms that Germans
thought necessary. Asked whether they preferred a government
offering "economic security and the possibility of a good
income" or else one guaranteeing "free elections, freedom of
speech, a free press and religious freedom," six out of ten
persistently opted for economic security from February 1947
to January 1949, with half that number preferring guaranteed
liberties (#175; see Figure 8). Asked in June 1947 which of a
hst of four freedoms they considered most important, a
plurality (31%) selected commercial freedom. Of the remainder,
22 per cent chose religious freedom, 19 per cent free elections,
and 14 per cent free speech (#82). Close to a third indicated
that they would give up certain rights "if the state would
42 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
FEB
1947
Fig. 8.
5
19
B
1*^1
APR
JUN
1946
Economic Security vs. Guaranteed Freedoms
Question: "Which of these types of government would you, personally,
choose as better:
A. A government which offers the people economic security and the
possibility of a good income,
B. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a
free press and religious freedom?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 7.
thereby promise economic security" (#175). About half of
those wiUing to give up some rights were wiUing to do without
the right "to vote for the pohtical party" of their choice; almost
a third the right "to read all the books and magazines" they
wished to read; almost a quarter the right "to work in the
place" they liked; about a tenth the right "to express [their]
opinion freely"; and roughly a twentieth the right "to bring up
[their] children according to [their own] view." Regarding
freedom of speech, although 77 per cent were willing to grant it
to all Germans, only 55 per cent agreed that it should be
applicable for communists (#48).
Still another area in which this duality appears in the
survey data comprises German attitudes toward leadership. On
the one hand, large majorities felt that the people should
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 43
determine what direction the government should follow: In
response to one question, 78 per cent of the AMZON residents
thought that the people, rather than the pohticians, (14%)
should perform that task; in response to another question they
expressed their preference for the people (70%) over the
"experts" (23%) to perform it {#9d>)}^ On the other hand, in a
situation close to them, AMZON youth displayed a different
predisposition (#96, 99, 101). Two-fifths of those in youth
clubs reported having appointed leaders rather than elected
leaders (51%). Roughly the same percentages (41 and 58
percent, respectively), preferred the different modes of selec-
tion. In the event of a difference of opinion on the day on
which their club should meet next, 43 per cent felt that they
should meet on the day the leader wanted, and 56 per cent
wanted to meet on the day chosen by the majority.
In evaluating these data, several points must be borne in
mind. First, although they suggest a duality, this duahty did not
permeate all aspects of social Ufe or politics. There were many
areas which enjoyed high degrees of consensus. It nonetheless
does seem that there was a sharp split in occupied Germany on
some of the more crucial aspects of political Ufe. Second, this
duahsm was not spread evenly throughout the areas of Germany
under American control. Typically, the more democratic
individuals were those living in large cities, respondents with 12
or more years of schoohng, professionals rather than workers or
employees, adherents of the Social Democratic Party, and
middle income groups. Third, the data presented above say Uttle
about either the salience of the issues to the respondents or the
hkelihood that they would translate their perspectives into
action. Finally, the data also tell us nothing about the middle
groups — the sometimes substantial numbers of Germans hover-
ing between democratic and authoritarian perspectives. In what
circumstances, for instance, would they swing their support in
one direction or another?
Political Participation. The first surveys conducted by the
American mihtary authorities revealed a fairly low interest in
political activity: Only half felt themselves sufficiently in-
formed about political events, and most of the remainder
44 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Interest in Politics
Question: "Are you yourself interested in political affairs or do you prefer
to leave that to others?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 13.
indicated that they were making no effort to get more
information (see Figure 9); over three-quarters were not and did
not intend to become members of a poUtical party; whereas
seven in ten knew that political meetings were allowed, less than
a third of these claimed to have attended one; and about
two-thirds of those eligible to vote in elections held in January
1946 had in fact done so (#3). In April 1946, 76 per cent flatly
said that, if they had a son leaving school, they would not Hke
to see him choose politics as a profession (#10; see Figure 10).
Typical of the comments made by those respondents were
"politics is a dirty business" and "one is a poUtician for ten
years and then lands in a concentration camp" (see also Figure
1 1). The percentage seeing politics as a worthy profession (14%)
was considerably lower than that in England (25%) or the
United States (21-25%). In September of the same year, just
before referenda on the state constitutions and elections to the
state parhaments, a series of questions demonstrated that only
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 45
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
^^^^SSSms^msmarj^JorMsmi
io%-
0-
0ESli
15
APR.
1946
7
APR.
1947
S
JAN.
1948
Fig. 10. Politics as a Career
Question: "If you had a son who had just finished school, would you like
to see him take up politics as a career?"
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1949, p. 15.
one in five persons was sufficiently interested to have even the
barest of information on the issues at stake (#26).
Similar findings emerged from surveys in the middle of
1947, more than two years after the beginning of the
occupation. About two in five (42 per cent in May, 40 per cent
in August) felt sufficiently well informed about current pohtical
events; of the remainder almost four in five either had not
bothered to seek further information or did not care to (#72,
74). Levels of political information varied. Although 88 per
cent knew the name of their town's mayor, only 47 per cent
could name the minister president of their Land and 60 per cent
could adequately define a secret ballot. Two-thirds (67 per cent
in May, 64 per cent in August) preferred to leave politics to
others rather than to concern themselves personally with it.
And, indeed, few were active politically. In May, 90 per cent of
the AMZON respondents indicated that they were personally
doing everything possible to help rebuild Germany - but only
seven per cent reported voluntarily helping with the census of
October 1946, six per cent did any sort of volunteer work in
46 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
1
9
7
DEC
AUG
JAN
1945
1946
1947
1^
JAN
1948
fIb
1949
Fig. 1 1 . Trust in Local German Officials
Question: "In general, do officials in the local German government work
for the good of the community or are they primarily self-interested?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 16.
their local community, and four per cent were members of a
political party. As many as 40 per cent claimed no preference
for any political party — a figure half again as great as for the
occupation period as a whole (see Figure 12). More generally,
they were inclined to see the responsibihty for government
lying with officials rather than with voters: Asked about poor
government, 38 per cent held government officials responsible,
26 per cent the voting pubhc, with 12 per cent assigning
responsibility to both; regarding good government, 48 per cent
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 47
were willing to give credit to government officials, 21 per cent
to the voters, and 13 percent to both equally.
Two years later, on the eve of the promulgation of West
Germany's Federal Republic, political participation continued
at relatively low levels (#191). Few were well informed about
politics: Less than one in six could venture a guess as to
whether or not their state constitutions contained provisions for
initiatives and referenda (and of these only somewhat over half
gave the correct answer), 58 per cent could name the minister
president of their Land, and as few as 39 per cent knew that the
Parliamentary Assembly, which had met in Bonn since the fall
of 1948, had drawn up a constitution for West Germany (but
less than half of these could claim any familiarity with this
constitution). Nor was interest in politics much greater.
Two-thirds (67%) continued to prefer leaving poUtics to others
(see Figure 9), only 38 per cent perceived any great interest in
politics among their contemporaries, and, when asked the cause
of low participation in the affairs of government, 61 per cent
indicated a general lack of interest, 20 per cent a lack of
opportunity. Whereas 76 per cent expressed a willingness to
work an hour daily without pay for the economic reconstruc-
tion of Germany, only a third of that number (24%) were
prepared, if asked to do so, to take a responsible position in the
political Ufe of their community.
These findings, taken together, reveal two key aspects of
German pohtical participation during the occupation period.
First, it was not high. And yet, compared to other countries, as
subsequent surveys have indicated, levels of political participa-
tion in Germany are not inordinately low. There is nonetheless
an interesting stylistic difference in political behavior. In their
survey of the late 1950s, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba
found West Germans more interested in and knowledgeable
about politics than citizens of four other democracies. The
German sample ranked about midway between Americans and
Englishmen on the one hand, and, on the other, Italians and
Mexicans with respect to their behef that individuals should
participate actively in the life of their community, their feeling
that their activity could influence the course of pohtical events,
48 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Fig. 12. Preference for Political Parties
Question: "Which political party do you belong to or prefer?"
and their expectation that they would receive serious considera-
tion both in a government office and from the police. Almond
and Verba concluded that, in West Germany "Awareness of
politics and political activity, though substantial, tend to be
passive and formal. Voting is frequent, but more informal
means of poHtical involvement, particularly pohtical discussion
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 49
JAN FEB FEB MAR APR
-=^:
SPD
JAN FEB FEB MAR APR
^^
^^^^^^^^^y
1
1
1
1
1
II
■
8 4 25 6 10 S 1 23 29 19 8 1 2 23 17 12 II 2 8 3
JOl AUS AUG OCT NOV JAN FEB FEB MAR APR JUN JUL AUG AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FE
1947 ' 1948 L1949J
B
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 18, 19. The following page in
the sanne report gives preferences for the smaller parties as well as those
responding "don't know."
and the forming of political groups, are more limited . . . And
norms favoring active political participation are not well
developed. Many Germans assume that the act of voting is all
that is required of a citizen," West Germans were satisfied
enough with what their government was doing for them — but
otherwise they felt no strong emotional ties to the West German
50 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
political system. ^'^ The OMGUS data of the late 1940s suggest a
similar detachment from politics. But whether this detachment
is a long-standing characteristic of German poUtical behavior, or
whether it stemmed from a feehng that too much pohtical
activity in the past had led to too many burnt fingers, these
data cannot tell us.
Second, the level of participation in the American-con-
trolled areas remained fairly constant throughout the occupa-
tion years. (And, judging by data currently available, this level
has not changed substantially in the two decades since the
formation of the Federal Republic!) This finding raises a serious
question about the overall effectiveness of the democratization
program pursued by American occupation authorities — at least
in terms of its measurable effects. Germans proved wilhng to go
along with the destruction of Nazi symbols, including the last
remnants of Nazi leadership. They were also agreeable to the
principle of removing Nazi party members and sympathizers
from important public and private jobs (provided, of course,
that the denazification proceedings did not impinge upon their
own families or circles of friends). But they did not adopt most
of the new patterns of democratic behavior fostered by the
mihtary governments.
FROM DEMOCRATIZATION TO ANTICOMMUNISM:
THE REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLICY
The total picture presented by the OMGUS surveys is therefore
paradoxical — a population that was, potentially at least, pliable
and yet did not change dramatically. Social psychologists tell us
that the moods of entire publics are slow to change. The
concatenation of traumatic experiences and official pohcy shifts,
however, can shake all but the most deep-seated aspects of
political culture. ^^ For Germans, the physical and psychological
destruction of the lost war was such a trauma; the pohcies
enunciated by the Alhes and the resurgence of voices suppressed
during the Nazi period lent a tone to pohtics that Germans had
not heard for well over a decade. Together, they could have
meant a great watershed in the course of German history.
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 51
The existence of a population that was receptive to
reorientation, if we are to judge from the available survey data,
enhanced the AlHes' opportunity to help shape German history.
First of all, respondents in the American Zone were responsive
to the occupiers: They recognized that the occupation would
last for some time; they accepted American troops, without,
however, ignoring their misdeeds; and they were not particu-
larly hostile toward (although apparently few had great interest
in) American information programs. Second, these respondents
were by and large willing to cooperate with fundamental Allied
policies aimed at eradicating remnants of the Nazi past — pro-
vided, of course, that these measures did not strike too close to
home. And, third, the respondents reported finding conditions
under the occupation tolerable. They seem to have expected
much worse. Perhaps many of them had believed the all-too-
credible Nazi propaganda about the Allied intention to imple-
ment the Morgenthau Plan, which would have reduced Germans
to shepherds in a disarmed, de-industrialized, and dismembered
land. This all-in-the-same-boat acceptance nonetheless changed
as the occupation continued. The cumulation of shortages, the
influx of refugees who taxed severely Germany's capacity to
feed and clothe its citizens adequately, and possibly even the
realization that the military government's bite was far less
frightening than its bark led to rising grumbUng despite the fact
that the objective condition of the population (for example, in
regard to caloric intake) was improving.
The four wartime AlUes proved unable to reaUze this
opportunity to test the extent to which they could actually
change Germany's political culture. Although the Cold War surely
did not originate in the years from 1945 to 1949, it was during
this period that it blossomed. And the battleground was, to a
very large measure, Germany. Disputes among the AHies about
reparations, boundaries, transit rights, denazification, currency,
economic and poUtical reconstruction, and numerous smaller
issues replaced interallied practices and institutions with bitter-
ness and separate pohtical systems. Here is not the place to
assay the causes or history of the Cold War. Suffice it to say that,
as early as the summer of 1945, Germans were feehng its effects.
LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT URBANA- CHAMPAIGN
52 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
The OMGUS surveys make clear the fact that these
Germans saw what was happening to their country. They
increasingly expressed alarm about the breakdown of East-West
cooperation in Germany. They estimated a diminishing prob-
ability that the Allies would be able to work together to
reconstruct the country in its 1937 or even its 1945 borders
(see Figure 3). And they increasingly began to take sides. As
Opinion Survey Section analysts wrote in August 1946 (#17):
"It has been said that the world is becoming polarized toward
either Russia or toward the United States, that these two
countries are attracting a decision on the part of other people to
line up with one or the other great nation. The data indicate
that such a situation, if true, is further advanced in Germany
than in countries such as France or Denmark." As the months
rolled on, and particularly after the Soviet delegate walked out
of the Allied Control Council meetings in March 1 948 and the
Soviet imposition of the Berlin blockade three months later,
German hostility toward the USSR became even more pro-
nounced.
Changes in American policy toward occupied Germany
accompanied the deepening of the Cold War.^^ It became less
interested in creating a new German society than in establishing
Germany as a bulwark against communism. This had several
practical imphcations. Of particular importance was the belief
that revitalized economic and poHtical institutions needed
competent staffs (see Figure 13). But many of those whose
training and abihties made them most desirable had records that
were, according to current principles of denazification, dubious
at best. The solution to this dilemma was a relaxation of the
standards of personnel screening committees as well as the
exoneration of Germans in wholesale lots from any impUcation
in Nazi criminal activities. The changing policy also meant
turning over more functions to German institutions. And it
meant efforts to win over the German population.
Better living conditions and greater autonomy as instru-
ments in the ideological battle over Germany were accompanied
by heavy barrages of propaganda, aimed both at improving the
image of the United States and sullying that of the Soviet
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 53
Fig. 1 3. The Reconstruction of Germany
Question: "Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion?
A. Germany herself should bear the responsibility for her reconstruction
under the supervision of the Allies.
B. Germany should be occupied by the Allies until she is able to form a
good democratic government.
C. The Americans should reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order
to avoid her becoming a prey to Communism.
D. The reconstruction of their country should be left to the Germans
themselves without interference from the Allies."
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 57.
Union. The "Voice of America," the information centers, and
the American-controlled mass media saw to this latter task. And
it is remarkable how receptive AMZON Germans were to
publications decrying Soviet pohcies (e.g. #89 and 97). To some
extent, interestingly enough, even the OMGUS surveys served in
54 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Fig. 1 4. Relative Influence of the United States and the Soviet Union
Question: "Which country will have the greatest influence on world affairs
in the next ten years?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 47.
the propaganda battle. In December 1947, for instance,
interviewers asked a small panel of Berliners why the London
Conference had broken up (#86). The report, after noting
diminished morale because of "a feeling that events are
occurring apart from the German people and in a direction over
which they have no control," went on to make a pohcy
recommendation:
It is suggested that mterpretation of the London Con-
ference should attempt to make clear to the public what the
principles are which have guided American diplomats in
their negotiations during the Conference. . . . These princi-
ples can be affirmed in such a way as to make room for the
German people to associate themselves with the mainte-
nance of such tenets. It might well be possible, thus to
induce some Germans to consider that, instead of Alhed
disagreements bringing the Conference to an end, it was
Russian refusal to accept principles (which everyone else
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 55
25
NOV
1946
1947
25
5
k
3
AUG
JAN
JUN
FEB
1948
1949
Fig. 1 5. The Choice between National Socialism and Communism
Question: "If you had to choose between Communism and National
Socialism, under which government would you prefer to live?"
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.
recognizes as necessary to maintain) which caused adjourn-
ment.
It was not difficult to follow this advice. By then Germans
were quite receptive to anti-Soviet propaganda. A report in
April 1948 (#\\3) noted that, although AMZON Germans
"have very strong opinions about Russia and the Russians, their
factual information about what country is in general at a fairly
low level." Moreover, "when in doubt, they tend to select the
'fact' least favorable to Russia." It would seem, then, that
Western interpretations of Soviet behavior merely activated a
latent antibolshevism in the German population (see Figure
14).3o
The all-out effort to enUst Germans on the side of the
West in the Cold War, however successful, had its costs. Most
immediately, as suggested earher, it meant a partial abandon-
ment of efforts to root out the remnants of Nazism. We do not
mean to suggest that American occupation authorities were no
longer concerned with this task. They were, both in their
emotions and their behavior. It is merely that anti-Nazism had to
take second place to anticommunism. It must have been with
considerable ambivalence that these officers read reports show-
ing that AMZON Germans, asked to choose between a National
56 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Socialist and a communist form of government, increasingly .
chose the former (#60, 175; see Figure 15). Were their efforts
to discredit communism producing a "brown" reaction in
postwar Germany?
The OMGUS surveys indicate that the danger of resurgent
Nazism, viewed with alarm by some observers even today, was
in fact highly overrated. The bulk of Germans had already
rejected the National Socialist movement. The movement itself
had had many faults, its leaders had proved themselves to be
less than heroic, and both, moreover, had led Germany to
disaster. Relatively few, perhaps a sixth, seemed to continue
espousing a complete set of Nazi images and values.
More ominous was the possibility of recreating those
conditions that had given rise to the Nazi version of extremism
in the first place. Some of these were to be sure the
consequence of external circumstances: resentment about pro-
visions of the Versailles Treaty, the virtual withdrawal from
world politics of the Soviet Union and the United States, and
the world economic crisis that began in 1929. But other
European countries, too, winners and losers alike, had felt the
disastrous effects of World War I and subsequent changes in the
international environment. The events themselves do not
provide much of an explanation for domestic changes. More
important were the perspectives of those who had to deal with
these events — perspectives that found their roots in German
pohtical culture. Groups with different perspectives, after all,
can interpret the same set of events and behavior as hostile or
friendly, as threatening or nonthreatening. This suggests, then,
that we must pay more attention to domestic conditions.
Several aspects of pohtical culture are important in this
regard. Some can be explored through surveying techniques. To
the extent that we can project postwar German political
perspectives backwards into an earlier era, it would seem that
among the conditions prevailing when Nazi extremism emerged
and seized power were an ethic of passive participation, reliance
upon administrative rather than political procedures, the pre-
sence of authoritarians and democrats in the midst of the
relatively uncommitted majority, a strong strain of anti-
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 57
Semitism and, more generally, a lack of tolerance of people and
ideas that were different. Ralf Dahrendorf has pointed to still
other aspects of pre-Nazi political culture in Germany: a high
degree of industrial concentration, a low degree of social
mobility, a social chasm between the elites and the masses, and
principles of decision making that prevented basic conflicts
from coming into public discussion.^' Above all, a traditional
political eUte relied upon these popular orientations and the
structural rigidity of German Hfe to maintain themselves in
power. Whatever its evils, and these should never be forgotten
or underplayed, the Nazi regime under Hitler made great strides
in destroying this traditional, relatively closed political culture.
Taking charge of a Germany with discredited pasts — the
traditional political culture that had led to the breakdown of
the Weimar Republic, as well as the revolutionary but unsuc-
cessful politics of the National Socialists — presented the AlHes
with their unheard-of opportunity to help guide the nation in
its choice of alternative futures. Coordinated persistence on the
part of the Allies might have produced extensive cultural
change. But there was neither coordination nor, in the Western
zones at least, persistence. As the Cold War descended upon
Europe, the Soviet Union devoted ever more of its attention to
the establishment of a loyal satellite in its zone of occupation,
and the West to the recreation of an anticommunist pohtical
system modelled upon the Weimar pattern.
In the American Zone in particular growing anticom-
munism got in the way of policies aimed at cultural change.
AMZON residents were caught in the mill. Promised education
for democracy, they ended up getting pushed off on another
ideological crusade. Promised democratic procedures, they got
an Allied occupation interested more in setting up bulwarks
against communism than a clean sweep of the past, interested
more in propaganda against the new enemy than in the critical
self-appraisal and sometimes painful search for the truth that
accompany democratic processes. Promised new democratic
leadership, they got a reentrenchment of leaders from the
discredited Weimar period, together with those too clever or
lucky enough to avoid entanglement in the webs of either
58 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Nazism or denazification. The OMGUS survey data summarized
in this volume cannot, of course, demonstrate conclusively the
accuracy of these assertions. They nonetheless show that the
changes toward a more democratic pubhc consciousness initially
intended by the occupiers did not materialize: On the level of
individual perspectives and behavior, there were few major
changes to be noted; on the level of attitudes toward public
events, a new set of frequently Uberal perspectives merely
replaced the old set.
Perhaps the restoration of practices and leaders ambivalent
toward democracy, as well as the accompanying propagandistic
distortions, were necessary to protect democracy against a
communist threat. We do not deny it, although we also fail to
see as much concrete evidence as was assumed at the time to
exist. The point here is somewhat different: Having pounded
anticommunism into receptive Germans, all the while giving
impetus to the reemergence of ilHberal predispositions, the
United States and its allies prepared to leave the country to its
own devices. What was left was for the United States and the
rest of the world to reap the fruits of this restoration sown in
the late 1940s.
NOTES
Cf. General Lucius D. Clay's stress on their importance in Decision in
Germany (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1950), p. 283. The British,
French, and Soviet military governments also sought to create
organizations to conduct survey research, evidently not too success-
fully in the Soviet case. Cf. Henry Halpern, "Soviet Attitude Toward
Public Opinion Research in Germany," Public Opinion Quarterly,
13:1 (Spring 1949), 117-118. The Soviet Military Government
viewed American operations as espionage, subsequently infiltrating
the Opinion Survey Section itself and turning over at least some of its
findings to the press in East Berhn. On the occupation in the western
zones, cf. also W. Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of
Germany (London: Stevens and Sons, 1947); Hajo Holbom, American
Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington,
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 59
D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); Carl J. Friedrich et al., American
Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York:
Rinehart and Co., 1948); Edward H. Litchfield et al., Governing
Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953);
John D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in
Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957);
Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton,
N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1957); W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin
Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1958); Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of
Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959); Raymond Ehy^oxXh, Restoring Democracy
in Germany: The British Contribution (London: Stevens and Sons;
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); F. S. V. Donnison, Gvil
Affairs and Military Government: North-West Europe, 1944-1946
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961); John Gimbel, A
German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962); Harry L. Coles
and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of
Military History, 1964); and John Gimbel, The American Occupation
of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1968). For a recent German view, see
Caspar Schrenck-Notzing, Charakterwaesche: Die amerikanische
Besatzung in Deutschland und ihre Folgen (Stuttgart: Seewald
Verlag, 1965). Basic to an understanding of the occupation, of
course, is some insight into the Nazi period itself. Perhaps the best
brief introduction is Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, rev.
ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); in addition to numerous,
more specific monographs, an excellent body of German documenta-
tion exists, as catalogued in Gerhard L. Weinberg and the War
Documentation Project Staff, under the direction of Fritz T. Epstein,
Guide to Captured German Documents, War Documentation Project,
Study No. 1, Research Memorandum No. 2, Vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force
Base, Ala.: Air University, Human Resources Research Institute,
December 1952); and the series initiated by the American Historical
Association's Committee for the Study of War Documents, Guides to
German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va. (Washington, D.C.:
The National Archives, National Archives and Records Services,
General Services Administration, 1958- ).
60 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
The reports summarized in this volume also include five on
aspects of the American occupation of Austria, particularly Vienna.
Since they deal primarily with mass communications media, we shall
not analyze them in this brief introductory section.
2. For a compilation of the USIA data from France, West Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom, covering the years from 1952 to
1963, as well as for a series of methodological and substantive articles
using these data, see Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala,
Western European Perspectives on International Affairs: Public
Opinion Studies and Evaluations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1968).
3. Inquiries should be addressed to: Archives Branch, Washington
National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409. The files are in
Box 233-3/5 and 233-5/5 (#1243) at the Washington National
Records Center's office in Suitland, Maryland.
4. Elmo C. Wilson, "Report on ICD Opinion Surveys," memorandum
prepared for Colonel Gordon E. Textor, Director, Information
Control Division, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.),
4 August 1948 (dittoed), p. 9.
5. Leo P. Crespi, "The Influence of Military Government Sponsorship in
German Opinion Polling," International Journal of Opinion and
Attitude Research, 4:2 (Summer 1950), 167-168.
6. Ibid. pp. 168-169.
7. Cf. Aaron M. Bindman, "Interviewing in the Search for 'Truth',"
Sociological Quarterly, 6:3 (Summer 1965), 281-288.
8. Inquiries should be addressed to: Archives Branch, Washington
National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409. The cost is five
cents per page on 35 mm. microfilm (positive or negative) or 20 cents
per page for electrostatic (xeroxed) prints. The summaries contained
in this volume show the number of pages in each report; the total
number, excluding extraneous material, is about 2,081 pages.
9. Cf. Report No. 22, "A Study of Attitudes Toward the Reconstruc-
tion and Rehabilitation of Germany" (25 September 1946). Hence-
forward the numbers in parentheses, e.g. (#22), will refer to the
reports summarized in the next section of this volume; report
numbers prefaced by II refer to Series 2 (HICOG) of the American-
sponsored surveys of German attitudes, summaries of which will be
published in due course.
10. In June 1950, almost half (46%) of a nationwide sample reported
that their experiences during the occupation had been unpleasant
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 61
(23%) or very unpleasant (23%); ten per cent recalled that their
experiences were pleasant, and another 28 per cent did not remember
noticing anything in particular (the remainder, 16 per cent, had not
been in Germany). Broken down by occupation zones, those who had
been in the British Zone were least negative (37 per cent unpleasant,
16 per cent pleasant, and 47 per cent not noticing), followed by
residents of the American Zone (49, 15, and 36 per cent, respec-
tively), the French Zone (65, 7, and 28 per cent, respectively), and
the Soviet Zone (95, 1, and 4 per cent, respectively). Elisabeth Noelle
and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen
Meinung, 1947-1955 (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag fuer
Demoskopie, 1956), p. 146.
11. Ibid., p. 74. Among radio listeners in the Federal Republic as a
whole, the share listening regularly to VOA declined from 22 per cent
in March 1950 to 14 per cent in March 1955, those listening
occasionally from 33 to 27 per cent.
12. In July 1955, only a quarter (27%) of a nationwide sample felt that
at the time of the currency reform seven years earlier they had been
undernourished, and two-thirds (67%) denied this. The items they
reported most often having to purchase on the black market were,
first, bread, flour, and potatoes, and, second, fats, butter, and cooking
oil, followed by clothing, meat, sugar, and eggs. Elisabeth Noelle and
Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung,
1957 (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1957), p.
226.
13. In February 1953, almost two-thirds (63%) of a nationwide sample
felt that the refugees had adjusted satisfactorily to life in the Federal
Republic (with 18 per cent taking the opposite position), but only 36
per cent felt that enough was currently being done for refugees from
the German Democratic Republic (with 28 per cent saying that not
enough was being done). Asked whether the Federal Republic should
continue to accept refugees from the German Democratic Republic,
25 per cent were unconditionally positive in their response, 57 per
cent specified conditions that should be met (such as proof that flight
had resulted from political persecution), and 15 per cent responded
negatively. Noelle and Neumann, editoTs, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, pp.
199-200.
14. A decade later, in April 1959, 38 per cent of the expellees from the
Oder-Neisse territories reported that they would definitely return if
the area were restored to German control, 27 per cent that they
62 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
would perhaps return, and 30 per cent said that their return was out
of the question. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editors,
Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 1958-1964 (Allensbach and
Bonn: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1965), p. 505.
15. Over the course of the next two decades, reunification and economic
issues vied for top position in Germans' view of the most important
problem facing their country. As economic prosperity overcame the
country in the mid-1950s, the reunification question took first place
with unprecedented consensus (45 per cent in Janaury 1959), but the
economic crisis that began in 1965 again raised the issue of prosperity
to first place (62 per cent in January 1967). Ibid., p. 482, Elisabeth
Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editois, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen
Meinung, 7965-7967 (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag fuer Demoskopie,
1967), p. 387.
16. Cf. Richard L. Merritt, "West Berlin - Center or Periphery?" in
Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National
Research, eds. Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 321-336.
17. Hitler's image suffered during succeeding years. In January 1950 as
much as a tenth of a nationwide sample rated Hitler as the statesman
who had done most for Germany, but in April-May 1967 only two
per cent did so. In July 1952 a tenth agreed that Hitler was the
greatest statesman of the century whose true greatness would be
recognized only later, with another 22 per cent feeling that, although
he had made a few mistakes. Hitler was nonetheless an excellent
chief-of-state. The percentage claiming that, except for the war.
Hitler would have been one of Germany's greatest statesmen declined
from 48 per cent in May 1955 to 32 per cent in April-May 1967; the
number denying this assertion rose from 36 to 52 per cent. The
percentage reporting their willingness to vote again for a man such as
Hitler dropped from 14 per cent in 1953 to 6 per cent in 1968
(although in 1965 and 1967 it had been still lower, at four per cent);
interestingly enough, in 1968 34 per cent of the adherents of the new
rightist National Democratic Party (NPD) indicated that, if the
opportunity arose, they would vote for a man like Hitler. Noelle and
Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, pp. 144-145; and EMNID-
Institut, Informationen 20:8-9 (August-September 1968), p. A- 18.
18. Of a nationwide sample of university students in July 1966, 44 per
cent reported that they could think of something positive about
Hitler and the Third Reich (with over three-fifths of these mentioning
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 63
the resolution of Germany's economic crisis of the early 1930s), and
38 per cent could find nothing good to say. Noelle and Neumann,
editois, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, p. 368.
19. Some of these data are from summary sheets not included in the
OMGUS reports and hence differ slightly from data reported
elsewhere (e.g. #16). This special collection is to be found in the
Library of the University of Illinois under the title "Some Results of
Public Opinion Polls of the German Republic" (q940.9343, G3125s).
20. Asked in September 1952 about five defendants still serving prison
sentences, an average of 14 per cent of a nationwide sample thought
it just that they were still there, with 52 per cent considering it
unjust. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, p. 202.
More generally, Germans have grown increasingly impatient with
discussions of German war crimes: In 1966 well over half (58%) of a
nationwide sample and 51 per cent of the university students
questioned thought that the time had come to stop such discussions.
Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967 pp. 204, 368. An
indication of the bitterness on this point came in November 1952,
when 46 per cent reported liking a recent speech containing the
sentence, "The real war criminals are those who made this unholy
peace alone, who destroyed entire cities without military reasons,
who dropped the bombs on Hiroshima, and who are producing new
atomic bombs" ; 29 per cent did not like the speech, and 25 per cent
gave no response. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955,
p. 276.
21. Meanwhile, Soviet military authorities had removed 307,370 and
excluded 83,108 Germans from jobs; the British had removed
186,692 and excluded 104,106; and the French had removed and
excluded 69,068 Germans. Friedmann, The Allied Military Govern-
ment of Germany, p. 332.
22. Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, pp. 101-110,
158-162, 246-252. Cf. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free; and John H.
Herz, "The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany," Political Science
Quarterly, 63:4 (December 1948), 569-594.
23. The independent Institut fuer Demoskopie found still greater
opposition in August 1948: 14 per cent felt that denazification had
accomplished its goals (17 per cent in November 1953), contrasted to
39 per cent who felt that the proceedings had been necessary but
incorrectly conducted (63 per cent in 1953), and 40 per cent who
expressed outright opposition (40 per cent in 1953). Asked in
64 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
September 1951 what the greatest mistake made by the occupiers
was, denazification ranked seventh (having been mentioned by six per
cent), right behind the war crimes trials (8%) and well behind the
response "dismanthng, destruction, and holding down of industry"
(21%). Noelle and Neumann, editois, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, pp. 142,
140.
24. Evidence summarized by Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger,
Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and
Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 40, suggests that, in the
mid-1950s, about one in eight Germans was a hardcore Nazi or partial
sympathizer. Public opinion data from the late 1960s indicate that
this proportion has dropped by about half.
25 . For a recent summary of some studies of German perspectives, see
Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in
Political Culture and Political Development, eds. Lucian W. Pye and
Sidney Verba (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp.
130-170. See also W. Phillips Davison, "Trends in West German
Public Opinion, 1946-1956," in West German Leadership and Foreign
Policy, eds. Hans Speier and W. Philhps Davison (Evanston, 111., and
White Plains, N.Y.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), pp. 282-304.
26. Surveys in the early 1950s nonetheless revealed that about a quarter
of the population (33 per cent of the women and 21 per cent of the
men), if given a choice, would have preferred a monarchy to any
other form of government for Germany; Noelle and Neumann,
Qdiiots, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, p. 132. In the winter of 1962-1963, 18
per cent were in favor of having a monarch on the British or Swedish
model; Noelle and Neumann, ediiois, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, p. 137.
27. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1963), particularly pp. 428-429. Other cross-
national surveys are to be found in William Buchanan and Hadley
Cantril, How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), and Merritt and Puchala,
Western European Perspectives on International Affairs.
28. See Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on
National and International Images," in International Behavior: A
Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 132-187.
29. More properly speaking, as Gimbel in The American Occupation of
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 65
Germany has pointed out, the conflict among American decision
makers was resolved in favor of General Clay and others favoring a
rapid rehabilitation of Germany; the effect from the point of view of
the outside observer, however, was the same, since the American
Military Government began to express views that sounded like policy
changes.
30. For a graphic indication of the increasing polarity of German images
of the United States and the Soviet Union, see Richard L. Merritt,
"Visual Representation of Mutual Friendliness," in Western European
Perspectives on International Affairs, eds. Merritt and Puchala, pp.
11 1-141, particularly p. 134.
31. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), who stresses the antiliberal elements
of Germany's pre-Nazi history. See also David Schoenbaum, Hitler's
Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1966).
PART II
THE OMGUS SURVEYS
Report No. 1 (1 March 1946)
RADIO LISTENING IN GERMANY, WINTER 1946
Sample: 964 households in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 21 January 1946. (21 pp.)
Fifty-six per cent of the population in the American Zone
listened to the radio, either on their own or someone else's set.
Only 42 per cent of the families interviewed had sets in working
order. Nearly all sets picked up middle-wave lengths, and
one-third also received short- and long-wave broadcasts.
Audience composition differed at different times of the
day, with the median group Ustening to the radio about two
hours daily. Among those most frequently tuning in one of the
three American-sponsored stations, both Radio Munich and
Radio Stuttgart had audiences that listened for rather long
periods of time. An appreciable number (37%) restricted their
daytime hstening to save electricity. The largest audiences were
during the evening hours from 6 to 10 p.m., but significant
numbers were also at their radios at 7 a.m. and at noon.
Listeners with above average-sized families seemed to use the
radio socially, as the center of the evening at home. Listening
habits varied with the size of the community: except in Bavaria,
the larger the community, the more people who listened to the
radio.
Most radio hstening occurred among groups with the
following characteristics: male; aged 18 to 29; twelve or more
years of education; upper-middle-class status; former member-
ship in the NSDAP; irregular churchgoing Catholics; profes-
sionals, government officials, or self-employed; and weekly
income of 70 RM or more.
Listeners preferred the American-licensed station in their
own Land, although they also listened to stations from other
Laender in AMZON. For the Zone as a whole. Radio Leipzig
and Radio Berhn ranked fourth and fifth respectively in the
69
70 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
competition for listeners, behind Radio Munich, Stuttgart, and
Frankfurt.
In regard to the type of program preferred, 65 per cent of
the respondents hsted musical programs. Second most popular
were news programs (25%). Differences of taste for types of
programs were related to sex, age, and education variables.
Among radio listeners, 65 per cent were confident that the
radio presented the news more truthfully than did the news-
papers. A majority of listeners, however, admitted that news-
papers have the advantage of being able to present more
complete news. Respondents seemed to feel that news broad-
casting in English was more complete than that in German, but
only 1 1 per cent claimed to listen to broadcasts in Enghsh.
Radio listeners also indicated a preference for personalized news
presentation.
Almost two-thirds (63%) of the listeners said that they
listened to the "Voice of America." Fifty per cent said that
they heard the program from German stations only; the
remainder heard it sometimes on German stations, sometimes
from London or New York. Among radio Usteners, those who
listened to the "Voice of America" were more likely to be male,
Protestant, middle or upper class, and to have had only eight
years of schooHng rather than much more or less. Those who
listened to the "Voice of America" on German stations were
also those who most frequently listened to Radio Frankfurt or
Radio Stuttgart,
Report No. 2 (March 1946)
WHO IN GERMANY HAS READ "MEIN KAMPF"?
Sample: 954 residents of the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 14 February 1946. (3 pp.)
Almost a quarter (23%) of the adult population in the American
Zone had read at least part of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Of this
group, seven per cent had read the entire book. The largest
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 71
percentage of readers were among the following groups: former
NSDAP members (18 per cent completely, 28 per cent in part);
upper social class (14 and 31 per cent, respectively); 12 or more
years of education (31 and 41 per cent respectively); young
people under the age of 30 (5 and 22 per cent, respectively);
men (1 1 and 21 per cent, respectively); prisoners of war (12 and
24 per cent, respectively); and those preferring the Communist
Party (13 and 18 per cent, respectively). Religious affiliation
was not a significant variable for discriminating readers from
nonreaders.
Report No. 3 (15 March 1946)
SOME POLITICAL ATTITUDES PROBED
ON RECENT SURVEYS
Sample: from 364 to 996 American Zone residents.
Interviewing dates: 14 surveys from 26 November 1945 to
15 March 1946. (9 pp.)
A third (33%) of the respondents polled in March 1946
preferred the SPD to other parties then in existence. Asked
which party they would choose in the event of a merger
between the SPD and the Communist Party, a third of these
SPD adherents indicated support for the new party, but 37
percent said that they would switch either to the CDU (19%) or
the CSU (18%), and another three per cent thought that they
would support one of the smaller, right-wing parties in that
event.
Regarding pohtical awareness, the number feeling that the
Germans had learned in recent months how to govern them-
selves better varied from 61 per cent in January to 47 per cent
in March. Roughly half felt themselves sufficiently informed
about political affairs; and somewhat over a third of the
remainder indicated that, although they were not sufficiently
informed, they were making an effort to inform themselves.
Only 15 per cent could name an outstanding German' who, in
72 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
their opinion, could hold an important position at the Land
level.
Regarding political participation, in March only seven per
cent claimed membership in a poHtical party, although another
16 per cent indicated their intention to join one. About
two-thirds (63%) in March wanted to exclude all but three or
four political parties, and as many as 1 1 per cent wanted to
exclude all but one. A solid majority, ranging from 60 per cent
in November 1945 to 72 per cent in March 1946, felt that
political meetings were desirable. By March as many as 25 per
cent of the entire population said that they had attended such a
meeting. Three in five respondents (60%) thought that some
categories of individuals should not be permitted to enter
pohtics, as opposed to another fifth (20%) favoring no such
discrimination: Almost all of those opting for a discriminatory
policy hsted former NSDAP members or functionaries as the
most undesirable. Support for the SPD grew and for the
conservative parties (CDU, CSU, LDP) declined with the
population size of the town. Of the former NSDAP members,
somewhat over a quarter (28%) supported leftist parties (SPD,
KPD) in early 1946, almost twice that number (52%) favored
conservative parties.
Those least likely to vote in elections taking place in early
1946 were individuals without party affiliation (54%), former
Nazi Party members (58%), men (36%), and persons under the
age of 30 (45%). Most voters in the January elections were able
to give a reason for having voted. Vaguely defined issues were
alluded to by a majority, while a sizable minority said that they
had voted merely out of a sense of civic duty (35%) or just to
express an opinion once again (4%). Issues referred to indirectly
included leadership (23%), reconstruction (12%), interparty
rivalry (10%), voting against the Communist Party (5%), and
political reorientation (7%).
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 73
Report No. 4 (25 March 1946)
INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF GERMAN FAMILIES
IN THE AMERICAN ZONE, WINTER 1946
Sample: 2,448 families in 70 communities in the American
Zone.
Interviewing dates: second week in January 1946. (10 pp.)
In the American Zone, the absolute labor force was at least
twice as large as the percentage of those actually working. While
28 per cent of family members interviewed were working, an
additional 30 per cent were adults capable of working but
holding no income-producing jobs; another ten per cent were
incapable of working. Almost two-thirds (63%) of the labor
force were male. People with jobs were, on the average, almost
as likely to be over 40 as younger. Most of the workers (77%)
had no more than 8 years of education.
The average income of famihes in the Zone was about 35
RM per week. Almost all of this income came from wages or
salaries. Nearly 15 per cent of all families interviewed said they
had no income. Their standard of living, however, approximated
that of the average German family. This group was most likely
temporarily dislocated and was living on its savings. Over a third
(35%) of all families were drawing on savings for necessary
living expenditures. Although 85 per cent of those with no
income were using savings for current expenses, this percentage
decreased as income rose.
Lowest incomes were reported in small towns and Baden-
Werttemberg (median family income of 35 RM). Cathohcs were
slightly better paid than Protestants (41 RM as opposed to 38
RM). Home owners (40 RM) and the better educated (92 RM)
received more income than renters (36 RM) or those with only
7 years of education (46 RM). Former NSDAP members (45
RM) were relatively well paid compared with those who had no
Party affiliations (36 RM). The difference in income between
men and women was not great, nor was it consistently greater
74 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
for men. Workers between the ages of 30 and 39 tended to
receive more income (42 RM) than younger (29 RM) or older
people (39 RM for those aged 40-49, 38 RM for those over 50
years of age).
On the average, incomes were higher than expenditures.
Respondents reported making expenditures only for necessities.
Even the best paid spent very httle for education, entertain-
ment, or luxuries. The greater the income, the more money
spent. The greatest difference between income groups was in
the amount spent for food; families earning 10-29 RM weekly
paid about 8 RM for food, whereas those earning 80 RM or
more weekly spent about 18 RM for food. Rents had hardly
increased since May 1945 for those in the average renting
brackets, and were stable for those paying high rents. Home
owners, who made up 46 per cent of the population, expected
to spend large sums in 1 946 for the repair of their homes.
Report No. 5 (1 April 1946)
SPECIAL POLITICAL SURVEY, WINTER 1946
Sample: 162 community leaders in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: end of February 1946. (17 pp.)
The 162 persons questioned in this survey were all community
leaders — politically alert and sophisticated — living in villages
and cities throughout AMZON. The majority were over 50
and mostly of higher socioeconomic groups. The overwhelming
majority preferred to be personally involved in politics rather
than leaving politics to others. The dominant impression given
by the respondents was nonetheless a general disillusionment
with party pohtics.
Those who admitted the need for democratic methods and
democracy in general regarded them only as preparation for the
mere function of voting without any reference to or indication
of their appreciation of democratic social attitudes or democ-
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 75
racy's functioning within a community. When asked what the
fundamentals of a democratic form of state were, most answered
from a classical point of view, giving short definitions. A large
percentage mentioned equality as a fundamental requirement,
but only two specified racial equahty among other forms
named. About two in five (43%) of the 162 respondents felt it
was generally possible to estabhsh democracy in Germany based
on western democratic principles, a third (34%) felt it was
generally not possible to do so, and 23 per cent were uncertain.
Many respondents, fearing a political situation in which there
would be a number of parties, felt democracy would encourage
this situation. Accordingly, many felt the number of pohtical
parties should be limited, especially during the period of
reconstruction. Many felt the British system should be emu-
lated, but with a president rather than a monarch.
When asked if the Military Government could do anything
to foster democracy, respondents most frequently demanded
unification, the immediate abolition of the Zone system, and
the reestablishment of economic prosperity. The next most
frequent demand was for a humane execution of denazification.
Many stressed that the occupation itself should be an example
of democracy. All favored the gradual trend by the Military
Government to give more power to the Germans themselves;
almost all, however, felt that the Military Government should
retain final control and decision.
Of the 162 respondents, 67 preferred the CSU or the CDU,
47 the SPD, nine the KPD, seven the LDP and two the Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei which exists in the British Zone. Most of the
former Nazi Party members preferred the CDU or the CSU.
Continuity in pre-1933 and postwar political allegiance was
noticeable mainly among the Social Democrats and, to a lesser
extent, the Communists. Sixty per cent of those who preferred
the CSU or the CDU were former members of the Center Party,
the Bavarian People's Party, or the German National People's
Party.
When questioned about responsibility for the Nazi rise to
power, 90 per cent concentrated on the factors which in their
view had lead to dictatorship; only about ten per cent gave
76 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
opinions as to what positive steps could have been taken to
prevent the Nazi rise to power. Rephes to this question, the
question of collective guilt of the German people, and the
responsibihty of the individual to obey his government divided
sharply according to the party preferences of the respondents.
These community leaders were sharply divided on the
possibility that the Nazis or some similar group might emerge
and attempt to seize power. Nearly all respondents thought that
such a seizure could not happen while the occupation lasted.
But the conditions that might favor a Nazi resurgence included
material difficulties and misery, unjust and harsh occupation
policy, nationalist reaction, together with division of Germany,
licensing of reactionary parties, and the problem of homeless
refugees and unemployed former prisoners of war. Conditions
hindering such a resurgence included the presence of occupation
troops, the fact that the Nazi regime and the war taught a lesson
to everyone, the existence of strong leftist parties, and stricter
international interdependence and surveillance in the frame-
work of the new international organization.
If the Nazis or some similar group attempted to seize
power, the majority of the respondents felt that civil war would
follow. A majority also thought that, after the Nazi experience,
the democratic parties would prevent any development which
might lead to such a coup. At least half the respondents
believed that the Allies would immediately intervene, and an
appreciable minority thought that it would be the duty of an
international organization to act. About five per cent hoped
that United States forces would not leave until, in the
respondents' words, "democracy is safely estabhshed."
When questioned about the main duties of the state
toward its citizens and what the respondent expected from his
government, about 75 per cent said that the satisfaction of
essentially material needs is the first duty of the state. Only
about 25 per cent mentioned individual freedom of conscience,
of expression, of religion, and freedom from secret police.
Respondents expected Germany to rebuild its cities, renew its
export trade, provide raw materials, more homes, and better
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 77
health services. A large percentage of respondents named the
establishment of friendly international relations as the chief
demand of the people on their government. On the one hand,
many felt that the government should not intervene in social
and economic life; on the other hand, many expected compre-
hensive social services from cradle to the grave.
Report No. 6 (20 April 1946)
LAW NO. 3
Sample: unspecified (c. 985) in American Zone.
Interviewing dates: third week in February 1946. (4 pp.)
Over three-quarters of the sample (76%) had heard of Law No.
3, which obliged workers to register at the local labor office.
Approval of the law was almost unanimous: 87 per cent of the
entire population approved of the law and thought that it
would facilitate reconstruction, as opposed to only two per cent
who disapproved of the law or thought that it would hinder
reconstruction. A firm majority (62%) approved and a quarter
(25%) disapproved of the provision that workers could not leave
their presently-held jobs.
Attitudinal differences among groups within the popula-
tion indicated that areas where conditions were more difficult
were also more discontented with the regulation. Bavarians,
who were best off of all people in the American Zone, were
more in agreement than those in the other Laender. In the large
cities of Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich there was a relatively
lower degree of approval than in other city-sized communities.
Towns with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 gave the
highest degree (70%) of approval of the law.
Seventy per cent of those interviewed allowed that many
78 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
people who could work did not do so because they could not
find appropriate positions. Indications of particular group
worries were found in the fact that more young people (81%)
than middle-aged (70%) said that many people were looking for
suitable jobs, and that more residents of the three large cities
(88%) than those of smaller cities (69%) also thought that many
were seeking work cut to their interests.
Among all those working, however, a sohd majority was
definitely well (63%) or fairly well (23%) satisfied with their
jobs and only ten per cent expressed dissatisfaction. The
middle-aged were more satisfied (83%) than were people under
the age of 30 (73%). Dissatisfaction stemmed largely from the
fact that respondents were engaged in work for which they had
not been trained. Some white-collar workers, for instance,
pointed out that circumstances forced them to accept ordinary
labor tasks. Others complained that their work was too hard,
and former Nazi Party members, particularly, said that their
work was frequently humiliating. Still another complaint was
that income was too low in view of the high taxes.
Those who did not work gave various reasons for their lack
of steady employment. Nearly half (44%) were housewives who
did not contemplate seeking any job. A quarter (24%) of the
unemployed reported that they were either unable to work
because of their age or the state of their health or did not have
to work because they were already pensioned. One in ten (9%)
nonworkers said that denazificiation had led to refusals of jobs.
About the same number (12%) asserted that there was no work
to be found in their area or that the work they sought could not
be found.
A substantial minority (31%) of workers considered that
they were not working as hard as they had during the war.
About half (51%) of all those who had worked during the war
and were still working reported no change in the pressure of
their work. About a fifth (18%) claimed that the times and
special hardships encountered made their work more difficult
than had previously been the case.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 79
Report No. 7(11 May 1946)
REACTIONS TO RECENT REVISIONS IN THE
DENAZIFICATION PROGRAM
Sample: 992 residents of the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 15 March 1946. (6 pp.)
Although 59 per cent of those interviewed in AMZON had
heard of the changes in the denazification program made just
prior to the survey, only 28 per cent had a reasonable idea of
what the changes were. Recognition of the provisions of the
new law was more widespread than recall of the changes
instituted, yet only 35 per cent were able to recognize these
changes.
Only four per cent of those who had heard of the new law
felt the changes to be for the worse. Over a third (36%) said
that the law would allow for a better implementation of
denazification, since it would permit individual treatment and
punishment. Others viewed the new law with misgivings.
Criticism from both those satisfied and dissatisfied with the
denazification program centered about suggestions for more
discrimination in judgments imposed and regarding each case on
its individual merits.
Over half (54%) of the population could give a compar-
ative estimate of the way denazification was being carried out in
all four zones. Of the 26 per cent who perceived a difference,
13 per cent said denazification was best carried out in the
American Zone, 12 per cent felt it was most rigorous in the
American Zone. An appreciable minority felt denazification to
be harshest in the Soviet Zone.
Well over half (57%) of the adult population said they
were satisfied with the manner in which denazification was
being carried out. This figure indicated an increase in satisfac-
tion over the level expressed in previous surveys. Three in four of
those who preferred to have the Americans handle the program
without any German help expected that this situation would
80 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
produce justice and impartiality. Those who would like to see
some German assistance while still leaving the main job in the
hands of the Americans argued that, despite the need for
cooperation, the responsibility and supervision should be
American (28%), or that the Germans could not be trusted to
do a fair and impartial job (22%). Another fifth (20%) frankly
admitted that the Americans were more just and impartial.
Satisfaction of former NSDAP members with the new
program or with denazification generally did not differ mark-
edly from that of the general population. Respondents with
relatives who were former Party members, however, criticized
the denazification program more sharply.
Report No. 8(1 June 1946)
REACTIONS TO THE NEW TAX LAWS
Sample: 99 1 residents of 80 communities in the American
Zone.
Interviewing dates: 1 March 1946. (5 pp.)
Of the 68 per cent of those interviewed in the American Zone
who had heard of the new tax law, almost all thought that its
effect would be to raise taxes. There was evidence of a lack of
knowledge about the new law. More than two in five (43%)
were unable to guess any amount when asked to estimate their
taxes. Lower income groups made up a higher percentage of
those who were uninformed than did higher income groups.
Income groups varied Uttle in the percentages which agreed that
the new taxes would make it impossible to meet necessary
expenses. When grouped by social class, however, there was
appreciable variation.
A plurality (43%) cited reparations when asked to account
for the increase in taxation. Almost three-quarters (72%) saw a
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 81
justification for the higher taxes. Reasons for favoring the new
tax law were the prevention of inflation (56%) and the
economic reconstruction of Germany (61%).
In commenting on the abolition of the social bonuses paid
under National Socialism to parents with many children, 62 per
cent expressed their opposition to the Nazi bonus plan and only
22 per cent endorsed it. More than half (55%) felt that the new
law abrogating the bonus system would actually prevent people
from having as many children as they might have had. As many
as a third (33%) felt this was the purpose of the new law. Those
who denied this intent to the law (47%) said, rather, that the
law was designed to raise money for Germany's reconstruction
(24%), to give equity to small families (7%), to raise money for
reparations (4%), or to help prevent inflation (3%).
Report No. 9 (7 June 1946)
ATTITUDES TOWARD RELIGION AND THE CHURCH AS
POLITICAL FACTORS IN GERMAN LIFE
Sample: 996 persons in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 8 March 1946. (1 1 pp.)
The survey focuses upon the attitudes of four major groups in
the AMZON population: regular churchgoing Catholics and
Protestants, and irregular churchgoing CathoUcs and Protes-
tants. Some of the characteristics of these groups are important
in that they shed light on the attitudinal patterns of their
representatives. Among Catholics, 65 per cent said they
attended church regularly. Fifty per cent of the Protestants
claimed regular attendance. Seventy-one per cent of the regular
churchgoing Catholics preferred the CSU or the CDU. Among
regular churchgoing Protestants, 38 per cent supported the SPD;
40 per cent, the two Christian parties (CDU and CSU). The
82 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
irregular churchgoing members of both faiths were predomi-
nately SPD supporters. Sixty-three per cent of the LDP
supporters were irregular churchgoers. More of those who
regularly attended church (74%) took part in the previous
elections than nonchurchgoers (59%).
Former Nazis tended to be nonchurchgoers. Of the regular
churchgoers interviewed, 12 per cent formerly belonged to the
NSDAP; 17 per cent of the nonchurchgoers were former
members. Hence, former NSDAP members, who were not
allowed to vote, increased disproportionately the size of the
nonvoting groups reported. Forty-nine per cent of regular
churchgoing Catholics had seven or less years of education.
About one-fourth of the other groups were similarly educated.
Twenty per cent of the regular churchgoers of both faiths had
attended nine or more years of school, while 28 per cent of the
irregular churchgoers had been similarly educated.
Members of each of the two major religious faiths
generally refrained from criticism of the other church's lack of
opposition to the Nazis. Criticism that did develop stemmed
mostly from irregular churchgoers of both faiths. While 70 per
cent of the regular churchgoing Catholics stated that the Church
had done its utmost to offer resistance to the National Sociahsts
during their regime, only 47 per cent of regular churchgoing
Protestants made a similar claim. Only among regular church-
going Catholics did a majority believe that the clergy had
warned them of the dangers of voting for National Sociahsm.
Among irregular churchgoing Catholics a plurality (35%) stated
that there were still Nazis among the clergy. Most members of
the other three groups denied this fact. It appears that a fairly
large percentage of respondents replied in a prejudiced fashion
in an attempt to stem criticism of their own church.
Important groups in the population felt that religion was a
real force in the reconstruction of Germany. But support of
religion as a moral force in life was distinguished from support
of the church when it plays a political role. A plurahty (43%) of
the entire population believed that the church was taking part
in political affairs at that time. Seventy per cent, however, felt
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 83
that the church should be less interested in political affairs.
Major opposition was also expressed to instruction by the clergy
in regard to voting in an election or support for particular
political parties. Support for the reconstitution of another
Zentrum party was found among 32 per cent of regular
churchgoing Catholics. As many Catholic women favored as
opposed the suggested move. But all other characteristic groups
expressed strong opposition. Underscoring the minimal inter-
church rivalry found, more members of all groups studied
thought that Catholics and Protestants would be able to
cooperate successfully in a "Christian" political party than
denied this possibility.
A large majority of the general population felt that the
military government had given sufficient and appropriate
support to the church.
Report No. 10 (21 June 1946)
ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AS A CAREER FOR THE
COMING GENERATION IN GERMANY
Sample: 1,515 adults in the American Zone and the
American Sector of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (9 pp.)
A very large majority (76%) of the German public thought of
politics as no career for their sons. Two important variations in
these attitudes occurred within the class structure of the
society. The very uppercrust was relatively more disposed, and
the upper-middle class relatively less disposed, toward such a
career than was the average German. Disillusionment with
politics was apparent not only among those who participated in
the Nazi government but also among those groups that closely
identified themselves with National Socialist aims and ideals.
84 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
The most important of these latter groups were the returned
prisoners of war, and the young men and women under 30 years
of age. Significantly greater respect for pohtics as a worthy
profession existed among supporters of left-wing political
parties and among trade union members.
Important differences were recorded among residents of
various sized communities. Farmers least favored (5% favored) a
political career for their sons. Residents of the large cities of
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich, and of the American Sector
of Berlin, seem to have overcome political apathy to an
appreciable degree.
Comments made by interviewees exemplified the patterns
of public thinking on this subject. Those not favoring a political
career for their sons remarked on the crooked nature of politics,
the belief that it is not a profession, and its demand for
maturity. Many respondents indicated horror and repugnance at
the thought of their sons taking up politics. Reasons for
favoring a political career included taking care of the needs of
the people, making things better, the need for greater attention
to pohtics, working for peace, freedom from militarism and
fascism, and becoming good democrats.
In contrast to the AMZON population, only 14 per cent of
which would favor pohtics as a career for their sons (76%
against), cross-samples of the American population revealed 21
per cent in favor and 68 per cent against in January 1945, and
25 per cent in favor and 65 per cent against in the spring of
1946. Among the British population in January 1945, 25 per
cent favored and 48 per cent opposed such a career for their
sons. In the United States the lower class was more inclined
than the upper class to be favorable; in England the reverse was
true.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 85
Report No. 11 (27 June 1946)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD TRADE UNIONS
Sample: 1,600 adults in the American Zone and in the
American Sector of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (11 pp.)
The general public was divided on whether the Nazis' denial of
collective bargaining and the right to strike was good or not.
Thirty-five per cent of the respondents viewed positively the
Nazi labor policy, asserting that strikes were bad and the
standard of living had been good. Thirty-eight per cent opposed
the Nazi policy on the grounds that the workers had lost all
their rights under the Nazi system. Opinion was also split on the
German Labor Front's record. Thirty-seven per cent said that
the DAF did an unsatisfactory job of representing workers'
interests, while 22 per cent thought it had done a good job
representing these interests. Some were wilhng to recognize the
DAF's pohcies on social benefits even though they did not
think that the DAF satisfactorily represented the workers. More
people (42%) opposed the reestablishment of collective bargain-
ing after the occupation than favored it (34%). Most people (71%)
favored an advisory voice for workers in management, such as
the Workers Councils (approved by 66 per cent) recently
authorized by the Allied Control Council provide. Fifty-five per
cent favored the Military Government's wage fixing pohcy; 24
per cent opposed it.
Unionists in the American Zone were oriented toward the
Western democracies rather than toward the Soviet Union. The
bulk of leftist sentiment among unionists favored the SPD
rather than the KPD. Certain authoritarian features of a
government-controlled economy attracted a surprisingly large
minority of unionists. Pre-1933 unionists (68%) and current
unionists (74%) were nonetheless more democratic than the
population as a whole (49%) in favoring free trade unions with
collective bargaining rights.
86 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Nazism made some inroads among the pre-1933 unionists,
but the compromised unionists tended to remain outside the
free trade unions now being organized. The new trade unions
attracted the more democratic of the pre-1933 unionists (for
example, 56 per cent of pre-1933 unionists active in 1946
thought the Nazi wage control policy bad). The new generation
of unionists without pre-1933 experience was not appreciably
less democratic than the old generation of pre-1933 unionists
who resumed their union activity.
Report No. 12 (28 June 1946)
ATTITUDES OF SOME BAVARIAN SCHOOLCHILDREN
Sample: 250 schoolchildren between the ages of 12 and 18
in Regensburg, Welheim, Pirkensee, and Burglengenfeld.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.)
Although 88 per cent of the children had belonged to Nazi
youth organizations, only 1 2 per cent were members of a new
youth organization. Thirty-seven per cent of their parents had
belonged to the NSDAP, a figure about average for the
American Zone. Eighty-four per cent of the youth were
CathoHc. Most (48%) would vote for the CSU if they were old
enough, 18 per cent for the SPD, and three per cent for the
KPD. Almost a third (29%), however, said they would not vote
even if they could.
Their principal concern was obtaining food. Thirty per
cent said that the type of aid Germany most needed was food,
and 26 per cent reported that their greatest wish was for more
food. They also desired peace and freedom for their brothers
who were prisoners of war. Their secondary concern were jobs,
clothing, and shoes. The children seemed to be in good health.
Reading, sports, and handicrafts provided recreation.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 87
Almost all the children (98%) claimed to like school. Most
(66%) thought themselves to be average students. About
one-third considered themselves to be good students. Only a
few (3%) admitted that they were bad students. Although they
were interested in a wide variety of subjects, they liked best
mathematics, German, geography, history, biology, and English.
Seventy-four per cent preferred to learn English rather than
some other foreign language.
The employment aspirations of the youth were generally
low. The girls wanted to be saleswomen, dressmakers, clerks,
teachers, and hairdressers. The boys wished to be bakers,
electricians, or carpenters. None of the boys wanted to teach.
More girls (7%) than boys (3%) hoped to become physicians or
dentists.
The most common reason given (36%) for Germany's loss
of the war was the overpowering strength of the enemy. Second
(30%) was Germany's lack of material. When asked to name the
three greatest Germans, about ten per cent named Hitler, a
quarter mentioned monarchs, and a third poets. When ques-
tioned as to what the respondent would do if he alone knew the
secret of the atom bomb, the most common answer given (36%)
was to keep it a secret. Democracy to these youths meant
freedom for the people (23%) and government by the people
(10%). Forty-eight per cent, however, had no opinion when
asked what democracy meant.
Almost as many (35%) liked the American soldier as
disliked him (39%). More than half of those who disliked the
American soldier mentioned his general behavior as a reason.
Most of the youth expected a good, lasting, or just or wise
peace from the Allies. Fifty-nine per cent did not expect
another war soon. Of the 41 per cent who did expect war, most
thought it would be with the Soviet Union.
88 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 13 (28 June 1946)
A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF BOOK READING
IN GERMANY
Sample: approximately 1 ,000 adult Germans in the Ameri-
can Zone.
Interviewing dates: late February 1946. (5 pp.)
Over half the sample population (55%) stated that they did not
read books at all. The remaining 43 per cent read for various
amounts of time. Eleven per cent read up to two hours a week;
14 per cent between two and six hours per week. Most readers
had recently been reading for amusement and diversion. Kitsch,
sentimental love stories, novels, mysteries, and detective stories
were most popular.
Although book readers came from widely diverse back-
grounds, they were most likely to be from better educated
circles, the younger adult age groups, and from middle-sized
cities rather than from very small communities (under 2,000
inhabitants) or very large cities (over 300,000 inhabitants).
Almost as many women read as men; men, however, tended to
read many more hours per week than women. Former Nazis
read a great deal more than those who had not been Nazis.
Twenty-two per cent of the readers who were former Nazis read
eight hours or more weekly, while only eight per cent of those
who had not been Nazis read this amount.
Only a very small number (five per cent of the total adult
population, nine per cent of all book readers) used local
libraries. Many books were personal loans. The opportunity to
purchase new books was still very limited.
Novels, fiction and short stories were by far the most
popular, both with groups that read up to four hours per week
(71%) and with those who read over four hours per week. Book
readers felt that forthcoming books on Germany's problems
should deal with reconstruction, the future of Germany, and
Europe. When asked what types of books and authors they
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 89
would like to see on sale as soon as possible, book readers
expressed greatest interest in books and authors forbidden
during the Nazi regime. Second choice comprised new books by
German writers living in Germany.
Report No. 14(6 July 1946)
MAIL TO "STIMME AMERIKAS," FEBRUARY AND MARCH
1946
Sample: 3,466 pieces of mail written to the "Voice of
America."
Interviewing dates: 29 January 1946 through 1 April
1946. (10 pp.)
Over half the mail to the "Voice of America" came from the
American Zone (52 per cent in February; 54 per cent in March).
Within AMZON there was an increase in the mail from the
Bavarian audience (17 per cent in February; 21 per cent in
March). Proportionate to the population of the three Laender in
the American Zone, more hsteners living in Hesse wrote to VOA
than listeners in the other two Laender. During the period of
this survey, nearly 85 per cent of the population lived in towns
or villages with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants. At the
beginning of the survey, 70 per cent of the mail came from
communities of this size. In later weeks, this percentage
dropped to about 60 per cent. Although 60 per cent of the
inhabitants of AMZON were women, well over half of the
letters written to the "Voice of America" came from men. More
letters were mailed to VOA on Monday (20%) than on any
other day of the week. This percentage declined as the week
progressed, falling to 6 per cent on Sunday.
In the period considered, a smaller percentage of letters
raised considerations of personal problems abroad, such as
90 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
requests for aid in returning prisoners of war from the United
States, than in earher periods. A large percentage of the mail
concerned personal problems in Germany (45 per cent in
February; 38 per cent in March). About an eighth of the mail ( 1 1
per cent in February; 13 per cent in March) contained denials of
the war guilt of all the German people or pointed out the guilt
of specific segments of the population, such as Hitler or the SS.
About half that number (six per cent in February; seven per
cent in March) criticized the denazification program. In March,
there was a sharp increase in mail containing references to the
reconstruction of Germany (eight per cent in February; 17 per
cent in March). About a tenth (11 per cent in February; nine
per cent in March) of the letters requested information about
leaving Germany.
The letters contained very few critical remarks. Such
criticism as there was concerned the commentators, the time at
which broadcasts took place, and a dishke for the jazz music
broadcast. The commentators remained the most popular
feature mentioned in this period. Second most popular were
discussions and speeches. About two per cent requested more
material about hfe in the United States or reported liking VOA
for its presentation of various aspects of American life.
Report No. 14A (8 July 1946)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EXPULSION OF
GERMAN NATIONALS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
Sample: 964 persons in the American Zone (nine per cent
of whom identified themselves as evacuees).
Interviewing dates: 1 1 March 1946. (16 pp.)
Although 60 per cent of the evacuees expected to get along
with the resident German population, only 50 per cent of
the resident population had a similar expectation. Even this
group made reservations. For example, the resident Germans
thought that the evacuees would get along if they were decent,
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 91
or if they did their part and cooperated. A quarter (25%) of
both the evacuees and the resident Germans did not expect to
get along. More members of the higher social classes had met
with evacuees than had members of the lower social classes.
More former NSDAP members (48%) had developed conversa-
tional contacts with evacuees than nonmembers of the Party
(32%).
The population of the American Zone was basically
unaware of the mass migrational character of the movement of
evacuees. Only 34 per cent thought that at least one million
evacuees would come to the American Zone, and 42 per cent
were unable to suggest any number at all.
Most people projected responsibility for the move upon
groups other than the general German population. One-half
(51%) blamed the Allies for a policy of hatred and revenge; 29
per cent blamed the Nazis and their misdeeds; and 25 per cent
of those questioned were unable to judge who or what was
responsible for the evacuations. More people (48%) felt the
Allies should be held fully, or at least partly, responsible for the
care of the evacuees than accepted the problem as a responsi-
bility of the German nation or communities (40%). Almost half
(46%) of the residents of Hesse were ready to accept the
responsibihty for the evacuees themselves. In the other two
Laender, there were more who wanted to escape the responsi-
bihty (45%) than were willing to accept it (37%). In general,
Protestants, the better educated, former NSDAP members, the
higher social classes, and residents of the largest cities demon-
strated a greater sense of responsibihty for the evacuees. There
was greatest resistance to German efforts to care for evacuees in
cities of between 100,000 and 250,000 population. Four-fifths
(81%) were ready to give economic equality to the evacuees,
but only 74 per cent were willing to give political equality.
Primary opposition to giving pohtical equality stemmed from
supporters of the CSU. A sohd majority of all those questioned
despaired of finding a solution for the lack of food (71%) and
housing (64%), but only a third (35%) thought the matter of
jobs to be insoluble.
92 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
A large majority (72%) felt that the evacuations were not
justified. Those most likely to support the policy (14 per cent
of the whole population) were SPD supporters (18%), irregular
churchgoers (18%), nonmembers of the NSDAP (16%), the
lower classes (17%), residents of the larger cities (25%), and
inhabitants of Hesse (19%).
Report No. 15 (27 July 1946)
RELATIVE EFFECTS OF FOOD SCARCITY
IN TWO COUNTRIES
Sample: a representative sample of 992 (March), 1 ,5 1 5
(April), and 1 ,698 (May) adults in the American Zone and,
in May only, in the American Sector of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 15 March 1946; 15 April 1946; and 8
May 1946. (3 pp.)
In the American Zone, 61 per cent of the respondents stated
in March 1946 that they were not getting enough food to
be able to work efficiently. There was a cut in rations which
took effect in AMZON on 1 April 1946. After this cut, 72 per
cent of the population reported insufficient food. In May 1946,
70 per cent reported insufficient food. Eighty-eight per cent of
the Berhn respondents, questioned for the first time in May,
reported food scarcity. Within the American Zone, an even
larger percentage (93%) of the residents of towns between
100,000 and 250,000 reported such hardship. Eighty-five per
cent complained of scarcity in towns between 50,000 and
100,000 population and in the large cities of Frankfurt,
Stuttgart, and Munich. The percentage reporting scarcity
dechned to 75 per cent in communities from 2,000 to 50,000
and to 60 per cent in villages under 2,000 population.
In England, a survey in late November 1945 and another in
March 1946 produced identical results: Exactly half the people
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 93
questioned said that they felt they were not getting enough
food to be able to work efficiently; and almost as many (47%)
said that they were procuring sufficient food.
Report No. 16 (7 August 1946)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
Sample: summary of eight surveys, with sample sizes rang-
ing from 331 in November 1945 to 2,969 in August 1946.
Interviewing dates: not specified; relevant surveys from 26
October 1945 to 9 August 1946. (6 pp.)
The results of a survey shortly after the International Military
Tribunal convened in November 1945 revealed that, in the
intervening few weeks, 65 per cent of the German people had
learned something from the proceedings. In later polls the
percentage of people having gained some information rose to 87
per cent. When asked at the time of the survey what they had
learned, 29 per cent reported first learning about the concentra-
tion camps. At the time of the second survey, 57 per cent
reported first learning of the concentration camps. In this
second survey, 30 per cent of the respondents said they first
learned of the annihilation of the Jews from the Trials. No one
on the first survey reported having gained this knowledge.
The number of respondents beUeving that the Nazis would
receive a fair trial never dropped below 75 per cent. The average
for the eight surveys showed the belief by 80 per cent that the
Nazi leaders would receive a fair trial; four per cent thought
that the trial would not be fair, and 16 per cent held no
opinion.
A majority of the population felt that the war leaders on
trial were guilty. Seventy per cent thought all to be guilty.
Among the nine per cent who named someone they considered
94 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
to be not guilty, Hess was mentioned most frequently. Sixty per
cent of the respondents felt that the indictment of whole
organizations — such as the Reich Cabinet, the leadership corps
of the Nazi Party, the SS, the SA, the Gestapo, and the General
Staff and High Command of the Army - was justified. A
quarter (25%) saw no justification for such an indictment.
Nearly half the respondents believed that the accused
would receive the death sentence. The sampled group split
sharply on the question of whether all defendants would receive
the same punishment. Over a third (37%) thought that they
would; and nearly all of these thought that the punishment would
be death. Almost half (46%) felt that the punishment would vary
according to the individual defendant.
Seventy per cent thought that there were others guilty of
war crimes in addition to the 21 then on trial. Respondents
most frequently named Nazi Party members and lesser leaders
as being guilty. Almost 60 per cent felt that those guilty should
be charged after the Nuremberg Trials, but a similar percentage
did not know which of these groups would be charged. And
although they expected further trials to be held at the
conclusion of the trial of the 21 major defendants, 82 per cent
of the people did not know that the political leaders then in
prison camps were expected to be tried.
The series of surveys showed that a majority of the readers
found newspaper reports of the Trials to be complete and
trustworthy.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 95
Report No. 17 (8 August 1946)
ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN GERMANY COMPARED WITH
ATTITUDES IN SEVEN OTHER COUNTRIES
Sample: 1 ,5 1 5 residents of the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (5 pp.)
A solid majority (58%) thought that the United States would
chiefly influence world history in the coming decade. About
one in 20 more (60%) was ready to assume that the United
States and Britain would act together as one power. Only about
one in ten AMZON Germans (11%) looked to the Soviet Union
as the most important country in the ten years to come, but a
small group (6%) could not distinguish between the relative
strengths of the United States and Russia. Only a very tiny
proportion (2%) held that Britain was the country which would
influence future world decisions. About one in seven respon-
dents (15%) was unable to express a judgment on this matter.
The reasons given in support of the replies emphasized the
fundamental distinction made by Germans when they thought
of the future reorganization of their own country under the
direction of the Allies. Practically half of those thinking that
America would dominate the world scene, for instance, held
that its great economic strength, rich resources, and great stocks
of food would place America in the supreme position. About
one in five thought that its political ideology and leadership
directed toward peaceful ends would carry America forward in
a dominant role. Only about one in seven referred to the
military might of the United States - its army and navy, and
the atomic bomb.
By way of contrast, nearly six in ten of those who thought
that the Soviet Union would occupy the leadership position
referred to the revolutionary drive of Bolshevism. Another one
in seven spoke respectfully about the ideological leadership and
96 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
need for peace which would determine Soviet behavior in the
future.
Britain's force, said most people who chose this nation, lay
in her political strength. Some also mentioned Britain's naval
and military power as well as the overseas economic resources
of the British Empire.
The rankings by eight countries seeing the United States
exerting future leadership were: the United States (63%),
AMZON Germany (58%), Austria (50%), Sweden (50%), Great
Britain (48%), France (43%), Canada (36%), and Denmark
(21%). The rank orders for countries envisioning future Soviet
leadership were: France (41%), Great Britain (31%), Austria
(26%), the United States (24%), Canada (24%), Sweden (21%),
Denmark (19%), and AMZON Germany (11%). Only Austrians
and Canadians (19%) saw the future importance of Britain to be
high, followed by the British (14%), Danes (9%), Swedes (8%),
Americans (5%), French (4%), and AMZON Germans (2%).
Report No. 18(14 August 1946)
A STUDY OF FOOD CONSUMPTION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD RATIONING AND GENERAL HEALTH OF THE
GERMAN POPULATION
Sample: 1,698 interviews (1,504 in the American Zone
and 194 in the British and American Sectors of Berhn)
plus 526 additional cases to build up the sample to permit
more detailed breakdowns, making a total of 2,224
respondents.
Interviewing dates: 8 May 1946. (53 pp.)
Two-fifths (41%) of the AMZON respondents and a fifth (22%)
of the Berhners beheved that food rations were largest in the
American Zone; 29 per cent of the AMZON Germans and 16
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 97
per cent of the Berliners felt rations to be largest in the British
Zone. A fifth (22%) of the AMZON sample and a third (32%) of
the Berliners saw residents of the Soviet Zone getting the
smallest rations. Almost nine in ten (89%) of the respondents in
the American Zone, but only 37 per cent of the Berliners, said
that the food rationcard system was fair. Respondents in Berhn
aimed their complaints about the rationcard system at those
who they thought obtained more food than they deserved
rather than at actual food shortages. Respondents in both
AMZON (41%) and Berlin (31%) nonetheless blamed an actual
shortage of food for the food reduction of 1 April 1946. A
majority of the Berliners (61%) but only a minority of the
AMZON residents (37%) felt that the food situation would
improve. More generally, not a single BerUner and only 12 per
cent of the AMZON respondents indicated satisfaction with the
food ration, although 21 per cent in Berlin and 24 per cent in
the American Zone reported that their rations were adequate.
AMZON residents, on the whole, ate much better than did
BerUners. Bread and potatoes led the hst of foods eaten in the
American Zone in the 24 hours immediately preceding the
interview, while most Berliners had had cereal and bread.
Greater food scarcity in Berlin was demonstrated by the fact
that Berhners (25%) received substitutes for unavailable ra-
tioned food items more frequently than did residents of
AMZON (12%), whereas more of the latter (25%) than of the
Berliners (5%) had received special food rations in the week
preceding the interview.
To supplement their food ration, 40 per cent of the
AMZON respondents had homemade preserves as did only 1 1
per cent of the Berhn respondents. Over half (53%) of the
Berlin respondents and 21 per cent of those in AMZON said
that they were able to obtain food in addition to the rationed
items purchased at the store. In Berhn, 15 per cent said they
obtained their supplementary food on the black market. The
median interval at which both Berhners and residents of
AMZON obtained supplementary food is, for the majority, one
meal for one person per week. About a sixth (18 per cent in
98 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
AMZON; 15 per cent in Berlin) went to the country to obtain
supplemental food. Only 1 1 per cent of the AMZON and 12 per
cent of the Berliners ate in restaurants. Eight per cent in
AMZON and ten per cent in Berlin indicated that they gave
food away, most often to members of the immediate family or
relatives. Considering all additional sources, 80 per cent of those
interviewed in the American Zone and 90 per cent of the Berhn
sample were able to obtain some food in addition to the
authorized ration.
Every respondent interviewed in Berlin said that a black
market existed in that city. In the American Zone, 43 per cent
of the respondents reported the existence of a black market in
their community, 29 per cent said that there was no black
market in their community, and 28 per cent did not know
whether or not a black market existed. Substantial majorities
(56 per cent in AMZON, 82 per cent in Berlin) blamed the
black market for shortages in food, clothing, shoes, and tobacco
as well as other items. Even larger majorities (67 per cent in
AMZON; 91 per cent in Berlin) believed that the black market
exerted an unfavorable influence on economic conditions. The
respondents directed their complaints particularly at farmers
who, they felt, were keeping their produce from the open
market. Over three in five (63 per cent in AMZON; 62 per cent
in Berlin) perceived the authorities to be doing everything
possible to eliminate the black market.
Regarding general health, 66 per cent of the AMZON
respondents and 76 per cent of the Berlin respondents reported
having lost weight between January 1946 and the time of the
interview. In the American Zone, the median number of
kilograms lost was four to five; in Berlin, six to ten. Seven-
tenths (71%) of the AMZON respondents and 88 per cent of the
Berhners said that they did not get enough food to work
efficiently. Over a quarter (30 per cent in AMZON; 26 per cent
in Berlin) had suffered at least one cold in the month prior to
the time of the interview.
Regarding prospective supplementary food sources, 50 per
cent of the AMZON and 3 1 per cent of the Berhn respondents
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 99
expected to make preserves during the coming summer. Sixty
per cent in AMZON and 24 per cent in Berlin planned to have a
garden that summer. Most respondents (92 per cent in AMZON;
91 per cent in Berhn) did not expect to receive food parcels
from friends or relatives outside Germany.
Report No. 19 (19 August 1946)
BASIC ATTITUDES EXPLORED BY THE
"GERMAN ATTITUDE SCALE"
Sample: 1,470 persons in the American Zone, 182 in the
American Sector of Berhn, 295 youths aged 17 to 27 in
Wuerttemberg-Baden, 84 political prisoners to be detained
in camp, 95 political prisoners to be released, and 214
Marburg University students.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (55 pp.)
The questionnaire used in this survey comprised eight sets of
questions (with a total of 110 items), each of which probed
attitudes in a generally defined area. Eleven scales focused on:
family, women, and children; ethics and justice (social responsi-
bihty); anti-Semitism; projection of guilt; future of Germany
(supervised responsibility); flattery (questions to which respon-
dents could give answers flattering to the occupation powers;
replies providing a test of the sincerity of the individual's
responses); war and mihtarism; and four aspects of government,
democracy, authority — the necessity of pohtical information
and interest, independent thinking as a value, the falhbihty of
leadership, and independence and rights of others.
On the average, about three in ten AMZON Germans
replied in the democratic direction on all eleven scales. An
additional third answered in a democratic direction on all but
100 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
one question within each scale. Those most likely to give
democratic responses were Hessians, residents of cities over
100,000 in population, those with more than 12 years of
schooUng, those between 50 and 59 years of age, men, married
persons, SPD supporters, those who had a professional occupa-
tion, middle income groups, pohtical prisoners, and the Marburg
students. Those who were usually undemocratic were residents
of towns under 10,000 in population, those with less than seven
years of schooUng, those who had a former member of the
NSDAP in the family, those under the age of 20, women, the
widowed, those with no party preference, farmers, low income
groups, and youth in Wuerttemberg-Baden.
Report No. 20 (27 August 1946)
PRELIMINARY STUDY OF MOTION PICTURE
ATTENDANCE AND ATTITUDES
Sample: in the American Zone, 331 respondents in
November 1945, 414 in December, 964 and 993 in
January 1946, and 985 in February 1946.
Interviewing dates: 19 November 1945, 1 December 1945,
21 January 1946, 31 January 1946, 21 February 1946.
(28 pp.)
In the period covered by this series of surveys, between 23
and 45 per cent of the respondents reported attending the
movies. When asked in February 1946 how often they had been
to the movies since the beginning of the occupation, most
(17%) had been to the movies from one to five times. Most
(16%) walked to the movies. The respondents who did not
attend the movies were also asked in February what their
reasons were: Most (26%) said that there were no movies in
their town; 20 per cent indicated that they had no time; and 13
per cent had no interest in the movies.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 101
Of the 23 per cent who attended movies at the time of the
February 1946 survey, about half (12%) felt that the films were
good or very good. Seven per cent gave answers ranging from
"all right" to "awful." Among moviegoers in the February
survey, 94 per cent stated they would like to see an old German
film again, as did 55 per cent of the nonmoviegoers. The two
main reasons for wanting to see an old German film were: a
preference for films emphasizing things German, that is,
German films made more sense, were more beautiful, or were
more personal; and because of the language, and particularly a
dislike of subtitles.
Of the 23 per cent who went to the movies at the time of
the February 1946 survey, 18 per cent had seen the newsreel Die
Welt im Film {The World in Film). Most (11%) thought the
newsreel good, all right, or interesting. Most (10%) gave as the
main reason for liking the film the fact that it brought news
from the outside.
Only 12 per cent of the 31 January 1946 respondents in
Bavaria (less than one third of the moviegoers in this Land) had
seen the concentration camp film Todesmuehlen {Mills of
Death). Nineteen per cent of all Bavarians interviewed (70 per
cent of the Bavarian moviegoers who had not seen the film) said
they would not have been deterred from going to the movies if
they had known ahead of time that a concentration camp film
was to be shown. Twelve per cent in Bavaria would not go to
the movies if they knew that such a film was being shown. Most
of those who saw the film (11%) thought the film an accurate
account of conditions in concentration camps; and most (9%)
said they had learned something from the film.
Of the American films seen by Germans, they liked
Madame Curie best and Todesmuehlen least. The old German
film which respondents would most like to see again was Die
Goldene Stadt {The Golden City).
102 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 21 (25 September 1946)
ATTITUDES TOWARD LICENSED NEWSPAPERS IN SOME
AMERICAN OCCUPIED AREAS
Sample: 8,029 adults in the American Zone and West Ber-
lin.
Interviewing dates: last three weeks of June 1946. (13 pp.)
This survey examined the attitudes toward 33 American-licensed
newspapers on the part of residents in the cities where the
newspapers were published; appendices appear in Report No.
34 of 28 December 1946.
The more education a person had, the more likely he was
to read newspapers: In Bavaria, 27 per cent of those with less
than seven years of schooling said that they did not read papers
and 1 5 per cent of this group in Wuerttemberg-Baden were in
the same category; only four per cent of those with 12 or more
years of schooling, however, said that they did not read
newspapers. Very few men (5%) did not do so, whereas nearly
three times as many women did not. Those able to name a
political party that they preferred were more likely to read
newspapers than were those who could not choose a party.
Those under 20 and those over 70 had the least number of
readers in their ranks, although in Hesse it was only the very old
who were nonreaders; Hessians under the age of 20 claimed to
read papers as frequently as their parents.
An average of 49 per cent felt that their local paper was
either "very good" or "good." Greatest dissatisfaction was
shown by the residents of Hesse, usually a fairly critical
population on any issue. There was only a slight positive
correlation between disapproval of the German press and the
feeling that it was hampered by American censorship. There was
some indication that dissatisfaction rested upon the fact that
the newspapers did not contain all that the readers were
interested in, although many indicated recognition of shortages
in newsprint, equipment, and personnel. The tetrachoric cor-
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 103
relations between proportions liking the paper and approving of
the local government administration showed a positive coef-
ficient in every instance except West Berlin and Fulda, which
showed no relationship between the two variables. In Bavaria
there was a strong relationship between the charges that a paper
propagandized and that it gave preference to a pohtical party;
this tendency was less strong in the other two Laender.
A large majority (77%) of newspaper readers preferred
papers with no political party domination. Bavarian feeUngs
were above average on this issue, with 80 per cent saying that
they were opposed to party papers; these data may have
reflected the overrepresentation of SPD editors in Bavaria,
considering the relative strength of this party in the Land.
Based on a weighted scale of replies to questions con-
cerning news coverage, the combined sources of all readers in
AMZON suggested that 34 per cent rated their own paper as
"good," 27 per cent rated it "fair," 21 per cent rated it "poor,"
and about the same proportion (18%) rated it "very good."
Report No. 22 (25 September 1946)
A STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION
OF GERMANY
Sample: 1,192 interviews - 993 in the American Zone
and 199 in the American Sector of Berhn.
Interviewing dates: first half of April 1946. (57 pp.)
Of those who could estimate how long the Americans would
continue to occupy Germany (62 per cent in AMZON; 90 per
cent in Berhn), the majority (37 per cent in AMZON; 55 per
cent in Berlin) expected it to last ten years or more. Most
respondents (22 per cent in AMZON; 26 per cent in Berlin)
104 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
estimated that the reconstruction of Germany would take from
20 to 30 years; an almost equally large number (20 per cent in
AMZON; 22 per cent in Berlin) thought that it would take 50
years or more. The bulk (72%) of the West Berlin respondents
reported that the reconstruction in the American Zone had
gone more quickly than they had expected. Respondents in the
American Zone were divided; 41 per cent said that reconstruc-
tion had gone more quickly than they had expected as opposed
to 40 per cent who thought that it had gone more slowly. The
majority of respondents in both the American Zone and Berlin
(56 and 73 per cent, respectively) were optimistic about the
possibility of reconstruction being accomplished with some
degree of speed and energy. Two-fifths (42%) of the AMZON
respondents and a third (34%) in Berlin had heard disturbing
rumors: Disturbing them most (34 per cent in AMZON; 20 per
cent in Berlin) was the rumor that there would be another war.
Seventy per cent of the AMZON respondents and 83 per
cent of the Berlin respondents believed that reconstruction
could best be accomplished through "hard work." Most (56 per
cent in AMZON; 62 per cent in Berlin) saw the greatest
handicap to reconstruction to be the lack of building and raw
materials. Over a third (35%) of the respondents in the American
Zone and 42 per cent in Berhn thought the SPD to be the party
best able to carry out the reconstruction of Germany.
Most respondents (60 per cent in AMZON; 90 per cent in
Berhn) thought that the Americans had furthered the recovery
and reconstruction of Germany. Over six in ten (63%) of the
respondents in Berhn said that the main way in which the
Americans had helped the recovery of Germany was by bringing
in food and improving food conditions. AMZON respondents
were more likely to stress American interest and aid in general
(23%) than food (1 1%). About half (49 per cent in AMZON; 55
per cent in Berhn), looking toward the future, said that the
Americans could help Germany most by bringing in food; large
numbers of respondents (49 per cent in AMZON; 47 per cent in
Berlin) also mentioned supplying materials and equipment.
Most respondents in both the American Zone and Berhn
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 105
(48 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively) did not expect the
four occupying powers to cooperate successfully in the recon-
struction of Germany. A quarter (24%) of the AMZON
residents and almost twice as many Berliners (44%) perceived
the Soviet Union as uncooperative; 13 per cent in the American
Zone and five per cent in Berhn mentioned both the Soviet
Union and France. Around two-thirds (59 per cent in AMZON;
70 per cent in Berlin) did not feel that occupation by foreign
powers was a national humiliation for Germany. Whereas 60 per
cent of the respondents in the American Zone and 77 per cent
in Berhn felt it was just that the Alhes first help the Allied
nations, an appreciable minority (25 per cent in AMZON; 20
per cent in Berhn) thought Germany should be aided first.
Three-quarters (74%) of the AMZON respondents and 70
per cent in Berlin denied that all Germans were responsible for
the war. Most (56 per cent in AMZON; 59 per cent in Berlin)
said that the Nazi regime had begun the war and hence had to
bear the responsibihty for it. As many as 41 per cent of the
respondents in the American Zone and 47 per cent in Berlin
denied their own guilt by such statements as "We couldn't do
anything about it; The httle people had no say; What could we
do; The leaders are the guilty ones." A majority (53 per cent in
AMZON; 65 per cent in Berlin) did not think that the individual
should always obey without question the orders of his state;
many (40 per cent in AMZON; 35 per cent in Berlin), however,
did approve of such obedience.
Roughly half (55 per cent in AMZON; 44 per cent in
Berlin) felt that National Socialism was a good idea badly
carried out. Almost all (87 per cent in AMZON; 91 per cent in
Berlin) indicated that they stopped trusting Hitler by the end of
the war; most of these (35 per cent in AMZON; 51 per cent in
Berlin) reported never having had any faith in Hitler. Over a
third (36%) of AMZON residents and 28 per cent of the
Berhners reported having accepted the prewar view that
territories with considerable German minorities should be
reincorporated into Germany. A minority (14 per cent in
AMZON; three per cent in Berlin) coninued to agree with the
106 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
prewar statement that international Jewry alone would profit
from the war. About an eighth (14 per cent in AMZON; 12 per
cent in Berlin) still felt the Nordic race to be superior to all
others.
Report No. 23 (22 October 1946)
THE VIENNESE NEWSPAPERS: AN OPINION
RESEARCH STUDY
Sample: about 500 persons in the American Sector of
Vienna.
Interviewing dates: first days of September 1946. (16 pp.)
The poll showed that Vienna was very largely (85%) a Cathohc
city. It was also a two party community, with the SPOe
{Sozialistische Partei Oesteneichs) and the OeVP {Oester-
reichische Volkspartei) amassing the support of a very large
proportion (93%) of voters with stated preferences.
More than nine in ten (92%) Viennese living in the
American Sector reported reading newspapers, with readership
being broadly defined as having read at least one paper during
the previous two weeks. The most widely read paper was the
United States sponsored Wiener Kurier (13%) and a solid
majority (60%) also liked it best of all the available newspapers.
Only 42 per cent of the readers of Neues Oesterreich liked that
paper the best, and only the Weltpresse approached the Wiener
Kurier in popularity. Among the five most popular newspapers,
no paper was strongly disliked by an appreciable proportion of
the population.
There were no significant differences between those who
thought National Socialism a bad idea and those who thought it
a good idea badly carried out in relation to their preference for
the Wiener Kurier. As for group differences, Protestants were
slightly more apt to like it than Cathohcs, there were no age
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 107
differentiations, and, as might be expected, laborers and
apprentices preferred the Arbeiter Zeitung; there was Uttle
distinction to be made along social class lines, again suggesting
its broad general appeal.
In a multiple factor rating scale designed to show readers'
opinions on coverage of 1 1 different types of news items in the
five most popular newspapers, it became clear that the Wiener
Kurier was publicly recognized as emphasizing news about the
Americans and the United States rather than the new responsi-
bilities of the Austrians. According to the same scale, the
Weltpresse satisfied its readers, more than others satisfied theirs,
in the coverage given foreign affairs.
Report No. 24 (22 October 1946)
MANNHEIM ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGRO TROOPS
Sample: 226 Mannheim adults (over 18 years of age).
Interviewing dates: 27 September 1946. (7 pp.)
Nearly two-thirds (64%) of the respondents reported having no
personal relations with American soldiers. A fifth (20%)
reported some relationship with white soldiers, eight per cent
with Negro soldiers, and eight per cent with both. Although
eight per cent said that they or some member of their family
had had a pleasant experience with a Negro, 13 per cent
reported an unpleasant experience; and a few (2%) told of both
pleasant and unpleasant experiences. When asked about the
behavior of Negro soldiers, a substantial number (36%) said that
the Negroes were friendlier toward the German populace than
white troops and only 16 per cent said they were less friendly.
Most respondents (45%) reported that they were definitely
not afraid of the Negroes in Mannheim, as opposed to 15 per
cent who expressed fears. When asked if the Negroes were
inferior to the white race, 38 per cent of those who responded
108 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
positively were also afraid of the Negroes, whereas only 21 per
cent of those who answered negatively were afraid of them.
The bulk (70%) of the respondents felt that the conduct of
the Negro had been good. Of these, however, almost half (33
per cent of the total sample) noted exceptions; and an
additional 17 per cent of the sample thought the Negroes'
behavior to be improper. As many as four in five of those
noting exceptions or improper behavior could point to specific
examples: The most common complaints were murder, rape,
mistreatment of citizens, mishandling women and girls (24%);
and drunken irresponsibihty (13%). More young people under
30 (68%) reported the behavior of Negroes not always decent
than did those over 30 (46%).
Report No. 25 (8 November 1946)
GERMAN KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD INFLATION
Sample: summaries of six surveys from 14 January to 7
June 1946; in the American Zone, 972 respondents in
January, 954 in February, 991 in March, 1,501 in April,
1,504 in May, and 1,486 in June; in West Berlin, 199 in
April, 194 in May, and 196 in June.
Interviewing dates: 14 January, 14 February, 1 March, 5
April, 8 May, and 7 June 1946. (47 pp.)
In AMZON, the percentage believing prices would go up
increased from 30 per cent in January 1946 to 56 per cent in
February, dropped to 40 per cent in May, and increased to 50
per cent in June. In Berlin, 25 per cent in both May and June
1946 felt that prices would go up; and 27 per cent in May and
41 per cent in June thought that prices would go down.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 109
Only in April did a majority (54%) of AMZON respon-
dents think that the Reichsmark would be worth as much in six
months as it was at the time of the interview. In Berlin,
however, a substantial majority in each survey (75 per cent in
April, 58 per cent in May, 63 per cent in June) expected no
such inflation.
In June, only 27 per cent of the AMZON respondents were
able to select the correct statement, given a choice of three,
defining the cause of inflation; even fewer in Berlin (14%)
selected the correct statement. In June, 36 per cent in the
American Zone and 41 per cent in Berlin believed there was a
possibility of inflation. At that time 85 per cent of the
respondents in the American Zone and 93 per cent in Berhn
said that the American and German authorities really wanted to
prevent inflation, and 79 per cent in the American Zone and 94
per cent in Berlin thought them able to do so. A substantial
majority (54 per cent in AMZON; 72 per cent in Berlin)
indicated that the MiHtary Government and the Civil Adminis-
tration were in the position to keep prices stable. An even
greater majority (82 per cent in AMZON; 91 per cent in Berlin)
was confident that the Military and Civil Governments would
actually do their best to hold prices at the existing level.
110/ PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 26 (13 November 1946)
INFORMATION ABOUT THE LAND CONSTITUTIONS AND
THE INTENTION TO VOTE IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS
Sample: 2,987 persons in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: first two weeks in September 1946. (6
PP-)
Only 19 per cent of the respondents knew that a Landtag
election or a constitutional vote was to be held late in the fall.
About a quarter (22%) knew that constitutional assemblies were
meeting at the time of the interview; and not many more (27%)
knew what the task of the constitutional assemblies was.
Among respondents who reported an interest in poUtics, 50 per
cent could state what the purpose of the coming elections was.
Of those who expected to vote in the coming elections, 28 per
cent were aware of the purpose of the election, whereas among
those who did not expect to vote, only 18 per cent knew their
purpose.
Almost eight in ten (78%) of the general population
expected to vote in the coming elections, including 86 per cent
of those who expressed an interest in pohtics. The highest
percentage of those expecting to vote were those with no
association with the NSDAP, either through personal member-
ship or membership in the family (82%); seven or less years of
education (83%); upper socioeconomic status (84%); and those
belonging to a political party (97%). The KPD had the highest
percentage of expected voters (89%), followed by the CSU
(88%), CDU (87%), LDP (86%), and SPD (85%). Place of
residence seemed to have slight effect on expectations of voting.
Sex did not make a significant difference in voting expectations,
except that incapacitated women (73%) were less likely to
express an expectation to vote than were women capable of
working (78%).
THE OMGUS SURVEYS /111
Report No. 27 (13 November 1946)
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN GERMANY:
FREQUENCIES OF GROUP CONTACTS
Sample: 2,987 persons in the American Zone; 404 persons
in the American and British Sectors of Berhn.
Interviewing dates: first two weeks in September 1946. (8
pp.)
Two-thirds (66%) in the American Zone had no relations
with the American forces. A fifth (20%) reported having talked
with an American and 14 per cent had come to know an
American "well" or "fairly well." In West Berlin, 80 per cent
had no relationship, 13 per cent said they had talked with an
American, and seven per cent claimed a closer relationship.
Persons most likely to have had contacts with American soldiers
were professionals (66%), LDP supporters (48%), those having a
telephone (47%), former NSDAP members (45%), those ex-
pressing an interest in pohtics (45%), and former soldiers (44%).
Perhaps the most important variable determining interac-
tion between Germans and Americans was socioeconomic
status. The higher the socioeconomic status of the respondent,
the greater the likeUhood that he had established a relationship
with an American. Over half (55%) of upper-class respondents
had contacts with Americans, as did only 1 5 per cent of those
living on government relief. Over half (54%) of those with 1 2 or
more years of education had contacts with an American, as did
only 29 per cent of those with seven or less years of education.
Professionals (66%), businessmen (46%), and white-collar workers
(52%) were more likely to have contacts with Americans than
were other occupational groups.
More men (42%) than women (32%) had developed some
relationship with an American. The younger people were more
likely to have had contact with an American: Almost three men
in five (59%) under 20 had contact with an American - a
percentage that decreased steadily with age. Women showed the
same basic pattern, except that among the youngest women
112 /PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
(those 20 or less) 30 per cent had contact with an American
whereas 43 per cent of women in their twenties had such
contact.
Rural-urban and regional differences probably indicated
the distribution of troops, as well as variant activity by area.
Hessians reported the most contacts (42%), followed by
Bavarians (36%), and residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden (28%).
Residents in small and medium-sized towns had a greater level
of contacts than did residents of larger towns.
The difference between churchgoing and nonchurchgoing
persons was far greater than the difference between Cathohcs
and Protestants. A third (34%) of regular churchgoing Catholics
and 29 per cent of regular churchgoing Protestants reported
contacts with Americans; 41 per cent of Catholics and 38 per
cent of Protestants who were not regular churchgoers reported
such relationships.
Report No. 28 (14 November 1946)
AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE ANY
CHANGES IN ATTITUDES OF NATIVE GERMANS
TOWARD THE EXPELLEES IN WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN
Sample: 624 persons (8.5 per cent of whom had lived in
Wuerttemberg-Baden for less than one year, 9.5 per cent
for a period not exceeding four years, 82 per cent for more
than five years).
Interviewing dates: 13 September 1946. (10 pp.)
From the point of view of the expellees, there was a decrease
from 75 per cent in March 1946 to 60 per cent in September in
the number expressing satisfaction with their reception in
Wuerttemberg-Baden (Cf. Report No. 14A of 8 July 1946).
Two-fifths of those who were dissatisfied with their reception
THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 113
Stated that, instead of regarding them as Germans, the natives
considered them to be human beings of inferior value,
foreigners, or even beggars. As many as seven in ten expressed a
desire to return to their original homes. Asked about the
greatest problem that they had faced since coming to the
American Zone, 35 per cent mentioned housing, 20 per cent the
lack of work, and another 20 per cent clothing. Asked what
problems they anticipated in view of the fact that winter was
approaching, nearly half (43%) mentioned housing, 39 per cent
clothing and shoes, 31 per cent work, and 24 per cent food.
(Native residents shared this ranking of problems, with 61 per
cent pointing to housing, 50 per cent to food and clothing, and
a smaller percentage to the lack of work.)
From the point of view of the native residents of
Wuerttemberg-Baden, opinions on the expellees were divided.
The population was generally convinced that Czechoslovakia
and Hungary were not justified in expelling these people (75 per
cent in March, 84 per cent in September). Indeed, in Septem-
ber, 28 per cent of the sample considered the expellees to be
foreigners, as opposed to 49 per cent willing to recognize them
as German citizens. (Among those with more than eight years of
education, the share viewing the expellees as foreigners rose to
42 per cent; and 38 per cent of the middle-class respondents
held the same view.) Majorities (83 per cent in March, 74 per
cent in September) were nonetheless willing to grant the
expellees full participation in politics, although the more highly
educated and better off citizens were somewhat more incUned
to limit these rights. Two-fifths (40%) of the 1 7 per cent of the
total sample who, in September, expressed a desire for
limitations of the expellees' political rights also indicated that
the expellees were not Germans and did not think as Germans.
The residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden were increasingly
unwilhng to assume responsibiUty for the care of the expellees:
The number stating that Germans alone should care for them
dropped from 39 per cent in March to 27 per cent in
September; those giving responsibihty to the countries which
expelled them rose from seven to 36 per cent; the number
114/ PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
mentioning international organizations remained roughly con-
stant (15 per cent in March, 16 per cent in September); and the
share mentioning the Americans or the Western Allies, with or
without a German contribution, dropped from 23 to six per
cent. Those with the highest level of education were least likely
to assign responsibility to Germany. Three-quarters of the
native residents (73%) and five-sixths of the expellees (83%) felt
that the American authorities were doing all they could to assist
German officials who were trying to solve the expellee problem.
Again, the highly educated and those of middle class status or
above were most incUned to disagree. Almost four in five of the
natives (78%) felt that the expellees were a burden on the
financial and economic status of the American Zone — an
attitude stronger among the well educated and the middle and
upper classes — as opposed to only 1 3 per cent who saw the
expellees exerting a favorable influence on the AMZON
economy.
Report No. 29 (21 November 1946)
THE TREND OF CARES AND WORRIES IN GERMANY
Sample: summary of seven surveys in the American Zone
between May and October 1946, with sample sizes of
1,427 in May, 1,485 and 1,524 in June, 1,536 in July,
2,969 m August, 2,985 in September, and 2,983 in
October.
Interviewing dates: 8 May, 7 June, late June, 1 July, 9
August, early September, and 4 October 1946. (8 pp.)
Between May 1946 and October 1946 there was a shift toward
greater material distress among the concerns of the general
population. The concerns mentioned in May in order of
frequency were lack of food (34%), anxiety over prisoners of
war and missing persons (18%), and general insecurity (9%). The
concerns mentioned in October in order of frequency were lack
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 15
of food (36%), lack of clothing and shoes (23%), unemploy-
ment (22%), anxiety over prisoners of war and missing persons
(15%), housing and furnishing problems (9%), and lack of
implements of production (7%).
Comparing the three Laender, residents of Wuerttemberg-
Baden reported difficulties, particularly regarding food, more
frequently than did residents of Bavaria or Hesse. Even rural
areas (under 2,000 population) in Wuerttemberg-Baden re-
ported greater concern over food than rural areas in Bavaria and
Hesse, but, in all three Laender, lack of food was mentioned by
increasing percentages of the population as the size of the
community increased. More people in smaller villages and towns
reported lack of clothing and shoes than in larger cities. Worry
about missing prisoners of war and other missing people was
centered in the rural areas. Lack of housing and furnishings was
more widespread in the large cities than in towns and villages.
Report No. 30 (14 December 1946)
RADIO LISTENING IN VIENNA
Sample: 1 ,496 persons living in the British and American
Sectors of Vienna.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (16 pp.)
A large majority of the population (73%) listened to the radio.
Radio listeners were likely to be men, better educated, younger,
from upper and middle classes, and from higher occupational
status positions.
Among listeners, 46 per cent said radio was their chief
source of news, as opposed to 51 per cent who cited
newspapers. More radio listeners (85%) read newspapers than
did nonlisteners (77%). Although about as many listeners (42%)
considered radio more accurate than newspapers as believed the
116/ PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
opposite (43%), a large majority of listeners (67%) felt that
newspapers gave more complete news. A majority of listeners
(56%) did not think that radio programs contained too much
propaganda; a large majority (64%), however, felt that radio was
censored. The largest percentages of those who felt both that
radio was censored and contained too much propaganda were
those with 12 or more years of education (28%) or under 30
(28%), as well as owners of a radio in good condition (23%).
The median number of listeners per radio was 2.15.
Whereas 57 per cent of those with less than seven years of
schooling and 49 per cent of those in the lower social classes
listened in groups of one or two other people, only 40 per cent
of those with college education and 33 per cent of those in the
upper-middle class listened in groups of this size. Within the
upper class, listening was an individual function or an activity of
a rather large group. Larger Ustening groups were found among
young people.
Radio listening was well dispersed throughout the week
days. Sixty per cent of the listening audience listened two or
more hours a day, and 26 per cent listened from one to two
hours a day. Those who listened two or more hours were more
likely to have nine or more years of education (61%), to be
under 30 (70%), and women (64%). Three-quarters (74%) said
that they did not restrict their listening to save electricity.
As many (44%) would like to hear more American
programs if they could be well received as would not like to
hear these programs. A majority of those with 1 2 or more years
of education (59%), of upper-middle (71%) and upper (62%)
classes, half of those under 30, half of those with nine to 1 1
years of education, and almost half (48%) of the men, however,
would like to hear more programs from America.
A quarter (23%) reported hearing the "Voice of America."
A majority (60%) of the VOA listeners felt that the program
offered just the right amount of political news, and 1 7 per cent
thought it offered too little news. Most (32%) liked best the
news portion of VOA.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 117
Report No. 31 (14 December 1946)
THE STANDARD OF LIVING
Sample: 1 ,485 persons in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 7 June 1946. (7 pp.)
Although 36 per cent knew that the four powers had
announced plans for the allocation of German industry, 53 per
cent were not aware of it and as many as 1 1 per cent stated that
there had been no announcement. Seven in ten (71%) stated
that Germany's industry was being reduced to do away with
war industries. Close to an absolute majority (49%) felt that the
limits were more severe than they should be, as opposed to
seven per cent who thought them not severe enough and 44 per
cent who expressed no opinion. A substantial number (44%)
felt that the Allies were not justified in placing these limits on
German industry, in contrast to 29 per cent who felt the limits
justified.
Almost half (45%) of all the respondents and 59 per cent
of the informed respondents felt that under the new plan the
German people would have a worse living standard than the
average European country (excluding England and the Soviet
Union). Almost half (48%) saw no justification for the
reduction in standard of living, as opposed to 30 per cent who
felt it just and 22 per cent who withheld judgment. A quarter
(26%) of all the respondents (over half of those who felt that
the reduced living standard was not justified) saw such
inhumanity to man as a frightful thing. A smaller group, 18 per
cent of the total number of respondents, felt the reductions
unfair because they were personally innocent.
Whereas 64 per cent of those who thought the limitation
of industry unjust and 61 per cent of those who thought the
reduction in the standard of living unjust also felt that the
German civil government was in some way to blame for the
food situation in Germany, 41 per cent and 46 per cent,
respectively, saw the German civil government in no way
responsible for it. Slightly larger percentages - 69 per cent of
118 /PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
those perceiving unjust industrial limitations and 67 per cent
perceiving unjust reductions in the standard of living — attached
some blame to the Military Government for the food situation,
an appreciable minority (36 and 41 per cent, respectively) did
not. Half (52%) of both dissatisfied groups felt that National
Socialism was a good idea but badly carried out. Half (50%) of
those who felt the limitations just and 44 per cent of those who
felt the reductions just also saw some truth to the statement
that the German people were responsible for the war because
they allowed a government to come to power which intended to
bring war upon the world.
When asked about the probable duration of the Allied
industrial program, 41 per cent could give time estimates: Most
of these (17%) foresaw a period from four to eleven years, but
almost as many (15%) expected a shorter duration. Half (53%)
stated various factors that might influence the duration of the
plans, of which the most frequently named (16%) was that the
restrictions would last "until the economic situation is better;
until work and food for all men are available; until trade is
reestablished in the world; until the world situation is cleared
up." As many as 30 per cent of the sample had no idea how
long the Allied industrial program would remain in effect.
Report No. 32 (10 December 1946)
INCOME, EXPENDITURES, AND CURRENCY HOLDINGS
OF THE GERMAN POPULATION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD GENERAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Sample: 1,524 respondents in the American Zone, 198 in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 1 July 1946. (70 pp.)
About three-quarters (69 per cent in AMZON; 74 per cent in
West BerUn) reported having at least one bank account. In West
Berhn, however, 63 per cent of the respondents reported their
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 19
bank accounts to be frozen, as did only .2 per cent in the
American Zone. Savings accounts outnumbered checking
accounts by a ratio of almost four to one in the American Zone
and five to one in West Berlin. Half (53%) of the AMZON
Germans and eight per cent in West Berlin had at least RM
1,000 in their checking accounts: The median account holdings
were RM 2,575 in the American Zone and RM 2,325 in West
Berlin. Between January and July 1946 there had been a slight
increase (.3%) in total number of accounts in the American
Zone and an increase of almost three per cent in Berlin. The
median holdings, however, decreased in AMZON (from RM
2,725 to RM 2,575) while rising in West Berlin (from RM 1,700
to RM 2,325). Those whose accounts decreased generally gave
living expenses as the reason.
About three-quarters (78 per cent in AMZON; 72 per cent
in West Berhn) reported having at least RM 50 cash in addition
to their funds in bank accounts. The median amount on hand
was RM 160 in the American Zone and RM 165 in West Berlin.
The median monthly income from all sources was RM 1 70
in AMZON (on the basis of reports by 86 per cent of the
respondents) and RM 251 in West Berhn (with 93 per cent
reporting). Reported median income rose as the size of the city
increased - from RM 137 in communities with less than 2,000
inhabitants to RM 266 in cities with a population of a quarter
of a million or more.
The median family expenditure per month was RM 152 in
the American Zone and RM 267 in West Berlin. Most income
was spent for food, followed by building repairs, rent, clothing,
utilities, insurance premiums, and fuel. Median family expend-
itures increased with city size, from RM 117 in the smallest
(under 2,000) to RM 220 in the largest (over 250,000). About a
third (32 per cent in AMZON; 39 per cent in West Berlin) said
that their family's total income was not high enough to cover
necessary living expenses; a quarter (23%) of the AMZON
respondents reported having to make up the difference from
their savings.
Only minorities (39 per cent in AMZON; 25 per cent in
120 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
West Berlin) had life insurance policies. Most of the policy
holders (34 per cent in AMZON; 18 per cent in West Berhn) had
their premiums paid up. The median amount for which
respondents were insured in the American Zone was RM 2,700;
in West Berlin, RM 1,180.
Almost all respondents (88 per cent in AMZON; 97 per
cent in West Berlin) saw the black market influencing the
economic situation. The bulk (66 per cent in AMZON; 83 per
cent in West Berlin) held black market dealers responsible for
the increase in the volume of money in circulation.
Only minorities of 36 per cent in the American Zone and
40 per cent in West Berlin felt that a new currency was needed.
Those who did not see a need for currency reform (52 per cent
in AMZON; 40 per cent in West Berlin) were questioned about
freezing bank accounts as a means of reform. Most (28 per cent
in AMZON; 32 per cent in West Berlin) advocated freezing bank
accounts over a certain amount, but an appreciable minority (4
and 10 per cent, respectively) disapproved of such a move. On
the question of timing most (44 per cent in AMZON; 45 per
cent in West Berlin) thought that the monetary adjustment
should take place immediately.
Most (46%) of the AMZON respondents and a majority
(51%) in West Berlin would have preferred to have any money
reserve in the form of goods. Second and third choices in the
American Zone were bank accounts (29%) and cash (8%), and,
in West Berlin, cash (25%) and bank accounts (20%).
Substantial numbers (38 per cent in AMZON; 72 per cent
in West Berlin) had claims against the former Reich government
but, of those with such claims, 29 and 43 per cent, respectively,
expected no compensation. The most frequent claim was for
war damages and bombing (23 per cent in AMZON; 43 per cent
in West Berlin), the median of which were RM 4,900 in the
American Zone and RM 6,300 in West Berlin. (In addition, 39
per cent of the West Berhners had claims for frozen bank
accounts, the median being RM 2,700.) Although 40 per cent in
the American Zone and 8 1 per cent in West Berlin had suffered
property damage during the war, three and 16 per cent,
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 121
respectively, wanted no compensation; and only six and eight
per cent, respectively, felt that they should be compensated for
all war damage.
Seven in ten (72%) of the AMZON respondents felt that
those who had not suffered war losses should be asked to help
those who had. Almost all respondents (95 per cent in AMZON;
90 per cent in West Berlin) said that people who had an average
income during the war or were in a position to save substanti-
ally should be asked to help those less fortunate. Two-thirds
(63%) of the AMZON respondents and 43 per cent in West
Berlin mentioned war casualties as the group which should
receive such aid, followed by those who were bombed out,
refugees, expellees, dependents of war casualties, political
persecutees, and Jews. A quarter (24%) in AMZON and 3 1 per
cent in West Berhn said all of these groups should receive aid.
Report No. 33 (18 December 1946)
THE TREND OF PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS
Sample: 2,983 respondents in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 4 October 1946. (5 pp.)
There was a decline in interest in the trials beginning in late
February 1946 and continuing through March and into April.
Readership interest in newspaper accounts of the trials
increased when it was announced in August 1 946 that the trials
would soon be completed. After the sentencing, public interest
in the trials was almost as great as when the trials were getting
under way: Ninety-three per cent of the population claimed to
have heard what the verdicts were.
Most people were satisfied that the news reports of the
trials had been complete and trustworthy. Those who were not
122 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
satisfied criticized the news for its incompleteness rather than
for inaccuracy.
There was widespread feehng that the defendants were
receiving a fair and orderly trial. When the verdicts were
announced in October 1946, just as many agreed that the trial
was fair and orderly as had anticipated a year previously that
the defendants would receive a fair trial.
Seven in ten (71%) felt that the current defendants were
not the only guilty ones. After the verdicts, just as many (43%)
thought that lesser leaders should be brought to trial as thought
it was sufficient to have the higher leaders punished. Three in
four (77%) felt that a heavier burden of guilt for the Hitler
regime lay on NSDAP officeholders than on those who did not
hold office. One-third thought pre-1937 Party members carried
greater guilt for Party actions. Only 18 per cent felt post- 1937
joiners more blameworthy. One-third held there was no
difference in degree of guilt between the two groups.
The bulk of AMZON Germans (92%) rejected the idea of
collective war guilt. A majority (51%), however, felt that the
Germans, because of their support of Hitler's government, were
at least partly responsible for its actions.
In August 1946 only about half felt all defendants to be
guilty, whereas in December 1945 and in March 1946, 70 per
cent had said this. After the sentences were announced, 60 per
cent reported feeling none of the verdicts to be too harsh.
Majorities (57 per cent in November 1945, 60 per cent in
January 1946; and 59 per cent in October 1946) favored the
indictment of whole organizations, such as the SA, SS, and the
General Staff. Although a considerable minority opposed
indicting these organizations, few opposed indicting the Gesta-
po, the Reich cabinet, and the leadership corps of the NSDAP.
After the verdicts were announced, when asked what they
had learned from the trial, 30 per cent pointed out the dangers
of dictatorship and one-sided politics, and said caution was
needed in the election of future statesmen. A quarter (25%) said
that the lesson of the trials was to maintain peace. Only a few
(6%) spoke in negative terms: that there is no justice, that only
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 123
Germans get punished, that human rights were violated, that
pohtics should be avoided. And over a third (34%) gave no
articulate reply as to the lesson of the trials. Half (50%) said
they had become more aware of the inhumanity of the
concentration camps.
Report No. 34 (28 December 1946)
ATTITUDES TOWARD LICENSED NEWSPAPERS
IN SOME AMERICAN OCCUPIED AREAS
Sample: 8,029 persons.
Interviewing dates: last three weeks in June 1946. (1 1 pp.)
This report consists solely of appendices to Report No. 21 of 25
September 1946.
Report No. 35 (5 January 1947)
ATTITUDES OF TRADE UNION MEMBERS
Sample: 527 members of trade unions in the American
Zone and British and American Sectors of Berhn.
Interviewing dates: not specified (c. first two weeks of
November 1946). (14 pp.)
This survey is primarily concerned with three groups of trade
union members: rejoiners, that is, those who had been members
of unions before 1933 and had since rejoined (37%); new-
comers, those who did not belong to a trade union before 1 933
but had recently become members (27%); and abstainers, those
who were members of a trade union before 1933 but had not
renewed their membership (36%). The group of newcomers,
when compared with others, was both younger and better
124 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
educated, and more likely to be women, Catholics and
Bavarians. Despite the fact that the newcomers were more
conservative than the rejoiners, 59 per cent of them favored
leftist political parties. The newcomers' primary reason for
joining a union was inducement by fellow workers (48%),
followed by the desire to obtain better wages and working
conditions (39%).
Almost all (94 per cent of the rejoiners; 84 per cent of the
newcomers; 91 per cent of the abstainers) favored extending the
base of union activities throughout all of Germany. About 80
per cent found nothing strongly objectionable to a central
organization of trade unions in Germany. Most favored broadly
based vertical unions. Most (69 per cent of the rejoiners; 75 per
cent of the newcomers; 70 per cent of the abstainers) favored a
single common union rather than industrial unions. Whereas a
majority (55%) suggested democratic procedures for settling
differences of opinion on how a union should be organized, 45
per cent could not explain or express democratic procedures.
On only one of three questions — the form of organization
which is permissible — concerning basic information about union
rights in Germany did a majority answer correctly (61 per cent
of the newcomers; 62 per cent of the rejoiners; 44 per cent of
the abstainers).
Most (49 per cent of respondents) felt that collective
bargaining to secure higher wages and better living conditions
for workers was the most important activity of a trade union.
Second most important (16%) was preventing rearmament,
followed closely by securing workers' representation in the
management of business and industry (15%), and educating
union members and youth on a democratic basis (14%). A
majority (58%) thought that the estabhshment of free bargain-
ing for wages and hours would greatly help the unions. A
somewhat smaller percentage (33%) stressed the establishment
by law of certain standards for wages and hours as a means to
help the unions.
Only among the rejoiners did a majority (56%) feel that
the leaders of the local unions did a good job, as opposed to a
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 125
fairly good or a bad job. While most (41%) of the newcomers
felt the local leaders did a good job, 30 per cent felt they did a
fairly good job and 28 per cent had no opinion. A majority
(62%) of the abstainers had no opinion.
A majority (68 per cent of the rejoiners; 58 per cent of the
newcomers; 62 per cent of the abstainers) felt that the actions
of the Military Government had helped the growth of trade
unions. Almost two-thirds (64%) of all groups also thought that
attendance by local Military Government officials at union
meetings would substantially help the unions. Eight in ten
(81%) felt that the church should not exert an influence in
union affairs, as did 72 per cent with regard to poUtical parties.
Report No. 36 (1 1 January 1947)
THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND SOCIAL CLASSES
Sample: 1,485 persons in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 1 June 1946. (5 pp.)
Respondents classified themselves as belonging to one of
four classes: upper (2%), middle (45%), working (51%), and
lower (2%). Interviewers then ranked the respondents according
to a socioeconomic scale: upper (1%), middle (41%), working
(55%), and lower (3%). At the lower end of the scale there was
high correspondence between interviewers' ratings and self-class-
ification. Only 30 per cent of those who said they were upper
class were also ranked "upper" by the interviewer, however, and
60 per cent of the self-reported "middle class" received such a
rating from the interviewers. Nearly all the remainder were
downgraded in the interviewers' ratings.
Those self-perceived members of the middle class whom
the interviewers downgraded (16%) differed markedly in some
aspects from those seen by themselves and the interviewers as
126 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
middle class (27%). The former group contained more women
and more Bavarians than did the latter. Members of the former
group more frequently were employed at skilled or semi-skilled
jobs, and many were unemployed. The latter group were largely
white-collar workers, professionals, independent businessmen,
and government employees. This group was better educated. It
also contained more former members of the NSDAP. Among
the attitudinal differences between the two groups, the sharpest
was in regard to political interest: Whereas 1 1 per cent of those
who were ranked lower by the interviewer were interested in
politics, 26 per cent of those who were ranked middle by the
interviewer were interested in politics. The former group was
more inchned to blame the German civil government and the
Military Government for food shortages, to perceive denazifica-
tion as too harsh, to deny any collective guilt on the part of the
German people for the Nazi accession to power, and to think
that the Allied imposition on controls of German industry was
justified.
Report No. 37 (13 January 1947)
OPINIONS OF NEWSPAPER READERS
Sample: 3,423 persons in the American Zone and the
American and British sectors of Berhn.
Interviewing dates: first two weeks of November 1946. (3
PP)
Although West Berliners were more frequently newspaper
readers (91%) than were residents of the three Laender in the
American Zone, they did not differ greatly from residents of
large cities in the American Zone. Wuerttemberg-Baden had the
highest percentage (85%) of newspaper readers of the three
Laender, followed by 83 per cent in Bavaria and 79 per cent in
Hesse. Even in the smaller towns and villages of Wuerttemberg-
THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 127
Baden there were more who read newspapers (in villages under
1,000, 14 per cent nonreaders; and in towns from 2,000 to
5,000, 18 per cent nonreaders; in Hesse, 30 and 30 per cent,
respectively; in Bavaria, 20 and 19 per cent respectively).
Almost half (48%) of the AMZON respondents (51 per
cent in Bavaria; 45 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden; 38 per cent
in Hesse) and a majority (71%) in West Berlin rated their
newspapers "good" or "very good." In cities from 10,000 to
100,000 in population, respondents tended to consider their
newspapers only "fair."
A large majority (77%) in West Berlin did not feel that the
local government influenced their newspapers. In the three
Laender, 48 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 54 percent in
Hesse, and 60 percent in Bavaria made a similar claim. In
contrast, only 1 1 per cent in West Berlin, 14 per cent in Bavaria,
17 per cent in Hesse, and 21 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden
felt that the local government did influence the newspapers.
Almost three in ten (29%) of those who rated their newspapers
"poor" saw them as politically dominated. Of those who
complained about the political domination of the press, about
half thought that the newspapers were not sufficiently critical
of the local government.
Report No. 38 (14 January 1947)
A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF CHANGES IN JOB STATUS
Sample: 2,860 respondents in the American Zone and 406
in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 14 October 1946. (18 pp.)
With few exceptions, changes in occupational status have been
in a downward direction. Those strata of society which cater to
its fundamental needs (such as for food, housing, and clothing)
were relatively unaffected by the defeat or the occupation.
128 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Such crises hit more severely those groups catering to the more
speciahzed demands of society.
Recovery from the downgrading experienced by the more
specialized occupational groups was perceived to be dependent
upon the length of stay of the Allies in Germany, the
amelioration of the denazification program, the energy of any
future government of Germany, the reconstruction of basic and
consumer goods industries, and so forth.
In only one occupational classification, that of former
government officials, did more than half change their occupa-
tion in the postwar period: In the American Zone, only 40 per
cent remained in their former occupation as did only 29 per
cent in West Berlin; as many as a quarter of the former officials
of the American Zone had become unskilled workers ( 1 9%) or
clerks (7%). Levels of stability over time were considerably
higher in other AMZON occupational groups: farmers (86%);
independent businessmen (77%); unskilled workers (74%);
independent craftsmen (70%); clerks (59%); semiskilled workers
(54%); professionals (53%); and skilled workers (50%).
Report No. 39 (14 January 1947)
REACTIONS TO AND PENETRATION OF INFORMATION
MEDIA IN VIENNA
Sample: 1 ,499 persons in the American and British Sectors
of Vienna.
Interviewing dates: latter part of November 1946. (9 pp.)
Most of the respondents paid attention to one or another of the
information media. Four-fifths (80%) listened to the radio. The
same proportion reported reading a newspaper regularly, and an
additional 17 per cent said they read a paper occasionally. The
most widely read paper (52%) was the Wiener Kurier. Well over
THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 129
half (57%) said that they went to the movies. And almost half
(45%) had heard the Vienna Philharmonic within the past year:
39 per cent on the radio; 1 1 per cent at a concert; and five per
cent did both.
When questioned about denazification of films and of the
Vienna Philharmonic, 52 per cent thought that films should be
shown even though the actors appearing in them were former
members of the NSDAP or aUied organizations. Almost the
same 52 percent also supported the continuation of former
NSDAP members in the Vienna Philharmonic.
Practically the entire adult population (99%) of Vienna
could be reached through the combined impact of newspaper
reading, listening to the radio, attendance at movies and at
concerts. The most popular single activity was newspaper
reading. Eleven per cent reported reading newspapers regularly
but doing nothing else. When two media activities were enjoyed,
they were usually radio listening and newspaper reading (27%).
The most popular combination of three media was radio-
movies-newspaper (41%), Only six per cent participated in all
four activities.
Different groups exhibited different characteristics regard-
ing media participation. Whereas 44 per cent of the men
listened to the radio, read a paper, and went to the movies, only
38 per cent of the women did all three. Over a quarter (28%) of
those high in socioeconomic status participated in all four
activities or in combinations of any three except the paper-
movie-radio grouping. The better educated and the younger
groups participated in more media activities than did the poorly
educated or older groups. Older but better educated people,
however, participated in more media activities than did the
young but poorly educated.
Media participation was also related to attitudinal charac-
teristics. Seven in ten (70%) of those who participated in all
four media activities or attended concerts in addition to
participating in two of the other three activities opposed most
strenuously denazification of the Vienna Philharmonic and 64
per cent approved most strongly the showing of films in which
130 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
former NSDAP members appeared. These groups consisted
largely of the upper class, the better educated, and the young.
Eight in ten (79%) of this group who had an opinion said that
the Allies had hindered Austrian reconstruction.
Report No. 40 (21 January 1947)
AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Sample: 1 ,499 persons in the American and British Sectors
of Vienna.
Interviewing dates: latter part of November 1946. (12 pp.)
Responses to an initial question concerning the person's greatest
care and worry indicated that the Viennese were not much
better off than Germans with respect to the number of prob-
lems facing them. Only one in a hundred Viennese said that
he had no problems; for 54 per cent food was the greatest
problem. Significant minorities were concerned primarily about
former NSDAP membership (25%), fuel (19%), clothing and
shoes (18%), unemployment (11%), and housing (10%), etc.
Although food was a major concern, a large majority (67%) felt
that the rationcard system was being handled fairly, and nearly
everybody (88%) said that the stores usually had the things they
came for when they had the necessary coupons; the largest
problem was getting potatoes. The margin of adequate winter
clothing was very slim for over half the population. A bare
majority said that they had enough such clothing and about the
same number claimed to have only one pair of shoes, which in
many cases were not heavy enough to withstand the rigors of
the winter months. Those most frequently saying that they had
enough clothing for the winter were craftsmen (73%), inde-
pendent businessmen (72%), and managers and officials (63%).
At the bottom of the hst were semi-skilled workers (37%).
Not a single respondent denied the existence of a black
market and 83 per cent said that it was widespread and serious.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 31
People who thought that the authorities were not doing
everything possible to eliminate the black market also believed
strongly that it was widespread and serious, or was responsible
for shortages of goods, or adversely affected the economy. In
contrast, those who felt that the authorities were doing all they
could tended to take a more sanguine view of the entire black
market situation.
In response to a question concerning trade, a greater
number of people (61%) spoke of the importance of imports
than mentioned exports (51%). Although pohtical party affilia-
tion did not seem to affect a respondent's views on these
matters, other group differences were evident. A soUd majority
(61%) of the college educated said that both imports and
exports were very important but only 22 per cent of those with
seven years or less schoohng did so. More of the upper classes
(67%) maintained the great importance of both aspects of trade
than did members of the poorest groups (37%); the poorer
elements in the population spoke more insistently for imports
than for exports.
Almost everyone (98%) had heard of the Vienna Fair, and
a very large proportion of these (86%) thought that it was a
good idea. Most of the objections to the Fair centered on the
complaint that it was all for foreign trade and not for purchases
by private Viennese citizens.
Report No. 41 (15 January 1947)
ATTITUDES TOWARD GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Sample: 3,022 respondents in the American Zone and 401
in the American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: first part of November 1946. (25 pp.)
From July 1946 to November 1946 monthly family incomes
declined RM 20 in the American Zone and RM 30 in West
Berhn. In November 1946 the median family monthly income
132 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
was RM 129 in the American Zone and RM 199 in Berlin. Of
the three Laender in the American Zone, Wuerttemberg-Baden
reported the highest median monthly income (RM 150),
followed by Bavaria (RM 123) and Hesse (RM 120). Highest
monthly incomes were reported by professionals and business-
men (RM 287), residents of cities of 250,000 or more in
population (RM 188), those with more than 11 years of
education (RM 177), men (RM 153), and those between 40 and
49 (RM 148).
In November 1946, 39 per cent of the respondents in the
American Zone said that their family's total income was not
sufficient to cover necessary living expenses, as did 48 per cent
in West Berhn. These percentages were the highest recorded
since surveying began in November 1945. Among the three
Laender of the American Zone, more respondents in Hesse
(41%) reported insufficient income than in Bavaria (39%) or
Wuerttemberg-Baden (37%). The highest percentages reporting
insufficient income were residents of cities between 100,000
and 249,999 in population (46%), unskilled laborers (53%),
those with 12 or more years of education (46%), women (41%),
those between 30 and 39 (48%), and those with no income
(86%).
A substantial number (26%) of AMZON respondents relied
on their savings to meet necessary expenses. Many West
Berliners (18%) relied on barter and the sale of personal
property, and only ten per cent fell back upon their savings. It
should be noted, however, that an increasing percentage said
that they could not buy everything they needed (seven per cent
in AMZON; 13 per cent in West BerUn).
Half (52%) of the respondents in both the American Zone
and West Berlin felt that there were some taxes which should be
lowered or which were not fairly apportioned. In general, the
higher the income, the greater was the objection to current
taxes, except among the three Laender of the American Zone.
Half (52%) of the respondents in Bavaria, where incomes tended
to be lower, said taxes were not fairly apportioned or should be
lowered, in contrast to 49 per cent of the respondents in
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 133
Wuerttemberg-Baden and 44 per cent in Hesse who made a
similar claim. Respondents in the American Zone objected most
to taxes on tobacco (25%) and alcohol and luxury items (16%).
Respondents in West Berlin objected most to taxes on wages
and community taxes (23%) and to income and personal
property taxes (14%).
Confidence in the continued value of the Reichsmark had
declined since April 1946. A substantial portion (43%) of the
AMZON and West Berhn respondents did not think the
Reichsmark would be worth as much six months later as it was
in November 1946. Half (50%) of the respondents in West
Berlin, however, expected no such inflationary trend. As far as
confidence in the Reichsmark as compared to Allied miUtary
money was concerned, most people (55 per cent in AMZON; 46
per cent in West Berlin) found no difference between the two
currencies.
The respondents were optimistic about economic condi-
tions in the next six months: 45 per cent of the AMZON
respondents and 5 1 per cent in West Berlin felt that economic
conditions would improve in the next six months; 22 and 18
per cent, respectively, expected no change, and 24 and 13 per
cent, respectively, expected a deterioration of economic condi-
tions.
134 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 42 (5 February 1947)
THE TREND OF RUMORS
Sample: trend results from four surveys in 1946, with 954
respondents in the American Zone in February, 964 in the
American and British Sectors of Berlin in March, and 3,022
persons in the American Zone and 401 in the American
and British Sectors of Berlin in November.
Interviewing dates: 14 February, 22 March, 29 March, and
early November 1946. (13 pp.)
There was a fluctuation in the percentages hearing disturbing
rumors during 1946. In February, 33 per cent heard disturbing
rumors; in March, 38 per cent; in April, 43 per cent, and in
November, 25 per cent. Among the three Laender of the
American Zone, the percentages hearing rumors in Hesse were
consistently lower than those in Bavaria or Wuerttemberg-
Baden. There was also considerable and inconsistent variation in
the incidence of rumors among different-sized communities.
Perhaps the most significant rumor was that of a war
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the
American Zone, in February, 30 per cent of the reported
rumors concerned war (reported by 10 per cent of the
population). In March, 85 per cent and in April, 80 per cent of
the reported rumors concerned war (reported by 33 and 34 per
cent, respectively, of the population). By November 1946, only
55 per cent of the reported rumors concerned war. In West
Berlin, however, these percentages increased between April and
November 1946. In April, 60 per cent of the reported rumors
concerned war and in November, 65 per cent (reported by 20
per cent of the population).
A persistent rumor throughout 1 946 in the American Zone
was that the Soviet Union would take over more of Germany.
In November this rumor took the form that the Soviet Union
would move into the American Zone. At its height in November
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 135
1946, it accounted for eight per cent of the reported rumors
and was reported by two per cent of the AMZON population.
Other common rumors were that the Reichsmark would be
revalued; there would be smaller food rations; there would be a
housing shortage caused by American requisitions; and there
would be housing shortages caused by the influx of evacuees.
According to the November 1946 survey, different groups
in the AMZON population were more Ukely to hear rumors.
The likelihood of hearing a rumor increased if the respondent
was under the age of 40 (27%), in a professional or academic
occupation (37%), highly educated (43%), and a newspaper
reader (27%) rather than a nonreader (16%), or if he had an
interest in pohtics (36%) and felt himself sufficiently informed
about politics (32%).
Report No. 43 (5 February 1947)
READERSHIP OF "HEUTE," "AMERIKANISCHE RUND-
SCHAU," AND "NEUE AUSLESE"
Sample: 3,022 respondents in the American Zone and 401
in the American and British Sectors of BerUn.
Interviewing dates: first two weeks of November 1946. (10
PP)
The total readership of Heute, Amerikanische Rundschau, and
Neue Auslese constituted more than half of all magazine readers
at the time of the survey. One-seventh (14%) of the respondents
were magazine readers. The combined readership of the three
American-sponsored magazines was nine per cent of this 1 4 per
cent. The total readership of each in the American Zone was as
follows: Heute, eight per cent; Neue Auslese, four per cent; and
Amerikanische Rundschau, three per cent. Higher socio-
economic status and better educated groups were more likely to
read one of the three magazines. Of those who reported
136 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
thinking about politics, 74 per cent read one of these
magazines. Eight in ten (81%) of the readers felt themselves
sufficiently informed about present day affairs.
Group differences, however, existed among readers of the
three magazines. Heute had a broader based readership. Those
with seven years of education or less (1 1%), the less well to do,
that is, with a monthly income between RM 90 and RM 190
(24%), Bavarians (40%), and women (35%) read Heute.
Amerikanische Rundschau readers, by way of contrast, com-
prised a greater share of those with 12 or more years of
education (38%), of those with a monthly income of RM 390 or
more (28%), and of respondents aged 50 and older (25%). Neue
Auslese had the highest portion of readers with 12 or more years
of education (42%), professionals, businessmen, officials, and
white-collar workers (78%), and those with a monthly income
of RM 390 or more (30%).
Circulation figures alone do not give the complete picture
of the coverage of the magazine, since more than two people
read each copy {Heute, 2.9; Rundschau, 23; Auslese, 2.5). A
majority bought the magazine at newsstands. A majority also
felt the price of the magazine was fair.
When asked about the quahty of the magazines, most
reported finding them good {Heute, 56 per cent; Rundschau, 61
per cent; Auslese, 48 per cent). Half (49%) were unable either
to point to any inadequacies of the magazines or to voice a
specific criticism. Of those who did specify needed improve-
ments, the largest number (13%) wanted more articles about
conditions in the United States. When asked directly, 32 per
cent did not think that the magazines presented enough detailed
articles about the United States to enable the reader to form an
objective picture of conditions there. A majority of readers,
however, did feel enough coverage was given to American affairs
{Heute, 66 per cent; Rundschau, 64 per cent ; Auslese, 58 per
cent).
The majority of the readers (68%) approved the "tone" of
the three magazines. When questioned directly, most readers
{Heute, 41 per cent; Rundschau, 51 per cent; Auslese, 52 per
THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 137
cent) nonetheless felt that the point of view taken in the
magazine was foreign.
Only a minority (20%) thought that the magazines should
be under German control. A larger proportion (36%) advocated
publication by the occupation forces, and almost as many
(34%) sought joint United States-German pubhcation.
Report No. 44 (6 February 1947)
OPINIONS OF GERMAN COMMUNITY LEADERS ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Sample: 188 persons in the American Zone and West
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: first two weeks of November 1946. (8
pp.)
The 188 persons who were selected and interviewed as
community leaders exhibited the following characteristics:
Almost all (185) were men. Half (51%) were Catholics; 42 per
cent, Protestants. Half were between 44 and 59 years of age, the
median being 49 years. Four in ten (41%) had college training
but a large minority (29%) had seven or less years of education.
Over half (56%) were employers; 12 per cent were farmers; and
a quarter (27%) worked for the German government. As a
group, these leaders had shifted rather sharply away from some
former occupation for which they had been trained to other
positions.
Less than half (45%) reported membership in a poUtical
party; the remainder (55%) said that they did not belong to a
party. Of those who were members, 55 per cent preferred
parties of the right and center; 45 per cent, parties of the left. A
fifth of those who claimed no party membership said that they
wanted nothing to do with poUtics anymore. These individuals
138 /PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
tended to be older than the group as a whole, the median age
being 54; more of them were well educated and professionally
trained than the entire group of community leaders; and nearly
two-thirds lived in Bavaria.
A large percentage of all the community leaders defended
the German people as a whole from the charge that large
numbers of Germans wanted Germany to rule the world in
1938. As many as three-fourths said that less than 25 per cent
of the German people had such desires; and half said ten per
cent or less. Two-thirds (66%) of the community leaders said
that those few who had desires for German supremacy had
learned their lesson from the war. Almost a third (31%),
however, thought that those who desired supremacy would try
again.
When asked to recall the two most important events which
had occurred since the end of the war, 40 per cent named the
Nuremberg Trials and 30 per cent named Secretary of State
James Byrnes' speech of 4 September 1946 in Stuttgart.
Although nine in ten (91%) said that the Nuremberg Trials had,
as one of its most important results, set up an international legal
basis for trying those who commit crimes against humanity or
against peace, 30 per cent also pointed out that aggressors in
other countries were not being charged under the laws applied
at Nuremberg. Asked what steps they felt were necessary
immediately and in the long run to implement Secretary
Byrnes' ennunciated poHcy of a lasting peace, 55 per cent of the
immediate proposals were economic in nature, and 33 per cent
said that what was most needed was increased cooperation
among the Allies; for the long run, the response most frequently
given (29%) was that such cooperation was a basic necessity.
Almost half (45%) of the community leaders reported no
change in their attitude toward the United States in the past
year; over a third (37%), however, reported a friendUer attitude,
and 17 per cent reported a less friendly attitude. Most (64%)
also reported no change in their attitude toward Great Britain,
with 28 per cent saying their attitude was more, and six per
cent less, friendly. France and the Soviet Union were less well
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 39
regarded than they had been. Almost half (45%) reported no
change in their attitude toward France, but 39 per cent said
that they felt less friendly as opposed to 1 1 per cent who were
friendlier. Most (54%) felt less friendly toward the Soviet
Union; only three per cent reported more friendhness and 37
per cent no change. The community leaders were evenly spUt on
the question of whether there would be another war within the
next 25-30 years (47 per cent on each side, and the remaining 6
per cent undecided).
Three-quarters expected the United States to occupy
Germany for ten years if not more, a fourth for 20 years or
longer. Whatever their guesses, however, 76 per cent felt that
the United States should stay that length of time. A majority
(55%) felt the United States would have the greatest influence
upon world affairs in the next ten years as opposed to 1 5 per
cent who mentioned the Soviet Union and 21 per cent who
mentioned both. Three-quarters (77%) considered economic
unification more important than political as a first step toward
achieving complete unification of the Zones.
Very large majorities favored central government for all
European countries (82%) and active participation by Germany
in world affairs (85%). As a first step in the direction of a
united Europe, the response most frequently given (24%) stated
that Germany should ally herself with western European
countries. Of those who mentioned specific countries, most
(33%) named France, followed by Great Britain (20%), Belgium
(16%), the Netherlands (16%), Austria (13%), and Switzerland
(10%).
140 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 45 (17 February 1947)
RADIO LISTENING IN THE AMERICAN ZONE
AND IN BERLIN
Sample: 2,861 respondents in the American Zone and 407
in the American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 14 October 1946. (13 pp.)
Over half (51%) of the adult population in the American Zone
and 67 per cent in West Berhn were radio listeners. More men
(56 per cent in AMZON; 76 per cent in West Berlin) than
women (44 and 66 per cent, respectively) were listeners.
Listening increased with educational level: Whereas 46 per cent
of those with seven or less years of education in the American
Zone and 60 per cent in West Berlin were listeners, 66 and 79
per cent, respectively, of those with 12 or more years of
education were hsteners. The percentage of listeners also
increased with community size. Four in ten residents of
AMZON communities with less than 2,000 in population were
listeners; 72 per cent listened in communities of 250,000 or
more. Fewer older people Hstened. The lowest percentages of
listeners were found in those 60 and over in the American Zone
(43%) and in those between 50 and 59 in West Berlin (60%).
Among occupational groups in AMZON, farmers listened least
(33%), and more employers (69%) than employees (55%)
listened. In West Berlin, more employees (70%) listened than
employers (67%).
Half (50%) of the listeners claimed to have no favorite day
for listening. Among listeners who did prefer certain days,
AMZON listeners named Sunday (42%) and Saturday (22%)
most frequently, as did West Berliners. The most popular time
for listening was 8:00 p.m.: 70 per cent in the American Zone
and in West Berhn hstened at that hour.
The government of each Land controls its own radio
station and there are no independently owned stations. In each
Land the most frequently heard station was that of the Land's
major metropolis: In Bavaria, 79 per cent listened to Munich; in
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 41
Hesse, 70 per cent listened to Frankfurt; in Wuerttem berg-
Baden, 93 per cent listened to Stuttgart. Nine in ten listeners in
each Land listened to these stations because of their good
reception. In West Berhn, 67 per cent listened to the Soviet
station, again largely because of clearer reception. Of all the
Laender stations, Stuttgart had the largest audience outside the
territory of its own Land. Of stations outside the American
Zone, Leipzig was the only one with a significant secondary
audience: 22 per cent in Bavaria, 15 per cent in Hesse, and eight
per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden sometimes tuned in Leipzig.
Laender residents tended to consider their local station
best: 62 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden liked Stuttgart best;
57 per cent in Bavaria, Munich; 41 per cent in Hesse, Frankfurt;
40 per cent in West Berhn, (Soviet) Berlin. Most of the radio
audience (75 per cent in Bavaria and Hesse; 87 per cent in
Wuerttemberg-Baden; 62 per cent in West Berlin) found it
difficult to name the station they liked least. When asked
directly what station in the American Zone had the best
programs, respondents in Wuerttemberg-Baden (79%) and
Bavaria (70%) favored their local Land station. In Hesse, a
relatively large number (27%) was unable to decide, while 38
per cent said Frankfurt had the best programs. Almost
three-quarters (72%) in the American Zone and 85 per cent in
West Berlin preferred musical programs. Large majorities in the
American Zone (86%) and West Berlin (87%) wanted half or
more of all radio time devoted to music.
Whereas a majority (51%) in the American Zone preferred
factual news reporting, the majority in West Berlin (61%)
preferred news commentaries. In the American Zone, slightly
more (41%) favored impersonal than personalized reporting
(37%); in West Berhn, the majority (51%) favored personalized
reporting. Radio listeners (55%) tended to think that radio gave
the most accurate news, but that newspapers gave more
complete news. In the American Zone, 66 per cent did not
think that radio programs contained too much propaganda; in
West Berlin, however, 58 per cent thought the opposite. A
majority in both the American Zone (64%) and West Berhn
(72%) felt that there was radio censorship.
142 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Three-quarters (75%) in the American Zone heard 5r/mme
Amerikas ("Voice of America"), but only a third (33%) heard it
in West Berhn. In the American Zone, most (26%) liked VGA's
news best. Second most popular (24%) were the commentaries.
In West Berlin, most (16%) liked the commentaries best while
1 1 per cent preferred the news on VOA.
Report No. 46 (19 February 1947)
ARMY AID TO GERMAN YOUTH ACTIVITIES
EVALUATED BY GERMAN ADULTS
Sample: 3,008 adults (those over 18) in the American
Zone and 399 in the American and British Sectors of
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 25 November 1946. (15 pp.)
A majority (55%) of the general population reported having
heard of the United States Army Youth Program. Certain
groups of the population, however, were more likely to have
heard about the program than others: those with 12 or more
years of education (84%), men (67%), residents of the four
largest cities of the American Zone (68%), and those with
children (57%). Although a majority in each Land knew about
the program, more Bavarians (58%) claimed such knowledge
than residents of Hesse (51%) or Wuerttemberg-Baden (52%).
Reported participation in the Army Youth Program was
not widespread. Only seven per cent of all parents and 1 1 per
cent of parents who knew about the program said that their
children had taken part in these activities. Areas with highest
participation were towns with between 5,000 and 10,000 in
population (14%); 13 per cent in West Berlin reported participa-
tion by their children.
Although few parents said that their children were taking
part in the Army program, parents generally did not object to
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 143
participation. Almost all (94%) of the parents who had heard of
the program and who thought that the program was designed to
teach the American way of hfe, and 88 per cent of the parents
who had heard of the program but thought that their main
purpose was to keep children off the streets would have
permitted their children to participate. Even among parents
whose children had not yet participated in the program, 84 per
cent said they would give permission to participate.
Those who knew about the Army program most often
approved the program. Among those who had not heard of the
program, only 37 per cent approved, while 68 per cent of those
who had heard of the program approved of it. Three-quarters
(77%) of those parents whose children had participated
approved of the Army Youth Program.
Respondents had varied images of the program's goals: The
largest number (37%) spoke of a democratic education for
youth, 1 2 per cent about understanding other peoples, 1 1 per
cent of freeing the youth from Nazi spirit and political
education, and 1 1 per cent of the development of friendship
and trust for Americans and the occupation troops. Among
parents whose children had participated in the Army sponsored
program, 43 per cent felt the goal of the program to be
democratic education.
Asked directly what they thought the most important part
of the program was — teaching youth about the American way
of life, giving them something to do in their spare time, or
keeping them off the streets — the largest number (41%) said
that keeping the youth off the streets was most important, 26
per cent teaching the American way of life, and 19 per cent
occupation in spare time. Responses in West Berlin were 56, 20,
and 15 per cent, respectively.
144 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 47 (20 February 1947)
OPINIONS ON THE EXPELLEE PROBLEM
Sample: 3,417 persons in the American Zone and the
American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: last two weeks in November 1946. (8
PP-)
Among those interviewed in the American Zone, seven per cent
were expellees (5 per cent from Czechoslovakia, 1 per cent from
Hungary, 1 per cent from Poland). Almost all (89%) of these
expellees, except the Hungarians, considered themselves to be
Germans, 84 per cent of them nonetheless wanted to return to
their homeland, 64 per cent emphatically. Although a majority
of the expellees (72%) in November 1946 were satisfied with
the treatment they had received from the native AMZON
population, this percentage had declined from March 1946
(78%). A majority (53%) also felt that the Laender governments
were not doing all they could to ease the expellees' problems.
In November 1946, 50 per cent of the native AMZON
population thought the expellees would get along with the
native Germans, as opposed to 36 per cent who expected no
such cooperation. (Both figures had increased since March
1946.) Six in ten native Germans thought that the Laender
governments were handhng the expellee problem satisfactorily.
Even though a majority of the native Germans (55 per cent in
AMZON; 65 per cent in West Berlin) considered the expellees
German citizens, these figures were considerably below the 88
per cent of the expellees who considered themselves Germans.
Nine in ten (91%) of the native Germans expected the expellees
to return to their homelands when and if given a chance to do
so.
A large majority of both the native Germans (90%) and the
expellees (97%) saw no justification for the expulsion from
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A substantial majority (59%) of
the expellees and minorities of the native Germans (46 per cent
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 145
in AMZON; 31 per cent in West Berlin) thought that the state
expelling these people should be responsible for their care. In
contrast, 20 per cent of the expellees, 28 per cent of the native
AMZON Germans, and 48 per cent of the West Berliners felt the
German government to be responsible for caring for the
expellees. A ninth (11%) of the expellees, 14 per cent of the
native AMZON Germans, and 19 per cent of the West Berliners
thought that the responsibility lay with the Allies.
Report No. 48 (5 March 1947))
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Sample: 3,008 persons in the American Zone and 399 in
the American and British Sectors of BerUn.
Interviewing dates: 25 November to 10 December 1946
(21 pp.)
To test attitudes toward freedom of speech, respondents were
asked three questions: Should the German people have com-
plete, freedom of speech? Should trade union members be
permitted to speak on the radio? Should members of the
Communist Party be permitted to speak on radio? A majority
of AMZON respondents answered the questions affirmatively
(77, 71, and 55 per cent, respectively). Relatively large
percentages denied complete freedom of speech for the German
people and access to the radio for members of the Communist
Party (14 and 26 per cent, respectively), but only six per cent
said that union leaders should not be permitted to speak on
radio.
Among various population groups, men were more affir-
mative, as were members of the KPD in AMZON and the SPD
and SED in West Berlin, members of the upper and middle
classes in AMZON and of the lower class in West Berlin, former
members of the NSDAP, the well educated, AMZON Protes-
146 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
tants and West Berlin Protestants, and younger people. There
were also differences among the three Laender: In Bavaria, 76
per cent favored complete freedom of speech, 72 per cent radio
access for union leaders, and 54 per cent radio access for
communists; in Hesse the percentages were 78, 71, and 61 per
cent, respectively; and in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 77, 68, and 52
per cent respectively.
Report No. 49 (3 March 1947)
ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE AMERICAN ZONE
Sample: 3,006 persons in the American Zone and 409 in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: last two weeks in December 1946. (19
PP-)
Nationalistic sentiment and racism had been shown in earlier
surveys to provide a convenient base for anti-Semitism. With an
increase in nationalistic feeling and racism, there was more
anti-Semitic expression in the American Zone. This survey used
a Guttmann scale, based on eight questions bearing directly or
indirectly on attitudes toward Jews. It distinguished among five
groups: those with little bias (20%), nationalists (19%), racists
(22%), anti-Semites (21%), and intense anti-Semites (18%).
Different population groups exhibited different amounts
of bias. West Berlin was comparatively less biased, with 45 per
cent classified as racists, anti-Semites, and intense anti-Semites.
Among the Laender, Bavaria had fewest in this biased category
(59%), followed by Hesse (63%), and Wuerttemberg-Baden
(65%). When examined by party preference, those supporting
the KPD were least likely to be in the three biased groups
(43%). Bias decreased as education increased: 63 per cent of
those with seven years of education, compared to 48 per cent of
those with 1 2 years or more of education fell into the biased
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 147
groups. Those of upper middle or higher socioeconomic status
(53%) were less biased than other groups. Professionals were less
biased (48%) than other occupational groups. Catholics (61%)
were less biased than Protestants (69%); those of both faiths
who attended church irregularly (60 per cent Catholics, 57 per
cent Protestants), however, were less biased than regular
churchgoers. Women were markedly more biased than men:
Considering only men and women able to work, 50 per cent of
the former and 67 per cent of the latter were classified as
racists, anti-Semites, and intense anti-Semites.
Frustration did not seem to play a role in bias. The most
intensely anti-Semitic groups were not more seriously troubled
by day-to-day difficulties than was the least biased group. A
certain amount of apathy did characterize more biased groups.
Only 12 per cent of the intense anti-Semites read magazines and
less than half (46%) listened to the radio. As the level of bias
increased, the proportion of those who knew how denazi-
fication was being carried out declined (from 66 per cent among
those with little bias to 42 per cent among the intense
anti-Semites), as did those who agreed that research had shown
that the Germans tortured and murdered millions of helpless
Europeans (from 72 to 41 per cent, respectively).
Criticism of the Allies also increased with the level of bias.
On the question of AUied limitations on the number and types
of industries that Germany could have in the future, the
percentage thinking the pohcy just declined (from 17 per cent
among those with little bias to 5 per cent among the intense
anti-Semites), although the percentage declaring it unjust
remained roughly constant (72 and 74 per cent, respectively).
The percentage satisfied with the way in which denazification
was being carried out declined from 35 to 28 per cent,
respectively.
Differences were more marked on questions of general
orientation. The percentage saying that National Socialism was
a bad idea rather than a good idea badly carried out declined
from 5 1 per cent among the least biased to 27 per cent among
the intense anti-Semites. Similarly, the proportion denying that
148 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
it was a national humiliation for Germany to be occupied by
foreign powers declined from 67 per cent among the least
biased to 43 per cent among the intense anti-Semites.
Report No. 50 (20 March 1947)
A PILOT STUDY ON DISPLACED PERSONS
Sample: 298 displaced persons in Hesse and Bavaria.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.)
Nine per cent of the displaced persons claimed to be stateless or
uncertain of their country of origin. The remainder represented
25 nationalities of which the largest single group (12%) was
Polish. Most were men (62%) and under 30 years of age (48%);
40 per cent reported having gone to Germany in 1 944 or later.
When asked why they had come to Germany, the most frequent
response was "deported" (19%), followed by "forced to come"
(16%) and "brought to Germany by German government" or its
agencies (14%). Three in five (61%) did not plan on remaining
in Germany, but only 34 per cent of these people intended to
return to their homelands, and 53 per cent hoped to move to
another country (most particularly, the United States). Most of
those who did not plan to return to their homelands were from
eastern Europe: Almost half (49%) of the displaced persons
mentioned that Soviet occupation of their homeland was the
reason for not returning. The largest single group (38%) was
comprised of skilled workers; 15 per cent were professional
people. When questioned about making their living in the
future, 47 per cent said they planned to work in the occupation
for which they were trained; 30 per cent said they would be
workers, do anything, or work where needed.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 49
Report No. 51 (2 April 1947)
ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE GUILT IN THE
AMERICAN ZONE OF GERMANY
Sample:3,005 persons in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: last two weeks of December 1946. (16
pp.)
Respondents in the American Zone were asked seven questions
to ascertain their acceptance or rejection of collective guilt for
the events of the Nazi era. Scores were computed by totaling
the percentages rejecting each of the seven questions. Those
scoring zero accepted responsibility on all seven questions;
those scoring seven rejected collective responsibility on all seven
questions. The median score for the total AMZON population
was 3.8. On the whole, there were only slight variations among
population groups in their acceptance or rejection of collective
guilt. Those most likely to reject guilt were residents of
Wuerttemberg-Baden (3.82), the less well-educated (3.83), those
aged 30 to 39 (3.85) or 60 years of age or older (3.92), women
(3.96), Protestants (3.88), the lowest socioeconomic (3.85) and
income (3.90) groups. Intensely anti-Semitic respondents were
particularly likely to reject any collective guilt.
On specific questions: 63 per cent felt that the German
people were at least partly to blame for acts of the Hitler regime
because they had supported that regime; 28 per cent felt that
the Germans were to blame for the outbreak of World War II;
68 per cent stated that the harshness of the Versailles Treaty
did not give the German people the right to start another war,
but 52 per cent said the Versailles Treaty was a cause of the
war, 46 per cent denied that Germany had attacked Poland to
protect Germans living there; 56 per cent felt that Germany
often found itself in a difficult situation because other people
had no understanding of Germany; 83 per cent beheved that
both sides in World War II committed many crimes against
humanity and peace; and 59 per cent agreed that Germany had
tortured and murdered millions of helpless Europeans.
150 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 52 (27 March 1947)
ATTITUDES TOWARD FOOD, FUEL, AND BUILDING
MATERIALS CONDITIONS
Sample: 3,022 respondents in the American Zone and 401
in the British and American Sectors of West Berlin in the
survey of October-November 1946; in the November-
December 1946 survey, 3,008 respondents in the American
Zone and 399 in the British and American Sectors of Berlin;
and, in January 1947, 3,011 in the American Zone and
about 400 in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 28 October to 15 November 1946 (or
building materials); 28 November to 10 December 1946
(on food and fuel); and January 1946. (45 pp.)
With the increase in the food ration from 1,250 to 1,550
calories per day came improvements in the reported health and
morale of the German population: Two-fifths (42%) of AMZON
Germans said that they felt "somewhat" better; 46 per cent in
the American Zone and 20 per cent in West Berlin in November
1946 reported having sufficient food to do good work
(compared to 28 and nine per cent, respectively, in May 1946).
There was still considerable complaint. Residents in large
cities felt that equalizing the ration of all people regardless of
whether they lived in a small town or in a large city was unfair:
Two-thirds (68%) of the West Berliners disapproved of the
equalization, whereas, in the American Zone as a whole, 66 per
cent approved; in AMZON cities with between 100,000 and
249,999, however, 47 per cent disapproved.
The food situation in West Berlin and Wuerttemberg-Baden
was more critical than anywhere else in the American-controlled
areas: Four-fifths (81%) in West Berlin and 57 per cent in
Wuerttemberg-Baden said that they got along only "poorly"
with the food ration; 48 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden
reported not feeUng any better since the food ration was
increased; and 78 per cent in West Berlin and 62 per cent in
Wuerttemberg-Baden claimed not to have enough food to
enable them to do good work.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 51
Farmers, being the source of supply, offered few com-
plaints and indicated the highest degree of satisfaction with the
food ration. A third (34%) of the farmers said that they got by
"well" with the food ration and 56 per cent said they "managed
to get by." In contrast, only eight and 29 per cent, respectively,
of those in professional or business occupations made the same
claim. Almost two-thirds (63%) of this group said they got by
"poorly" whereas only ten per cent of the farmers gave this
answer. Following farmers in degree of satisfaction with the
food rations were artisans and master craftsmen: Nine per cent
of this group got along "well" and 42 per cent "managed to get
by."
Fuel did not appear to offer as great a problem as food at
the time of the study, even though it was the height of winter.
In November 1946, only six per cent of the AMZON population
said that fuel was their greatest care or worry; in January 1947,
only 12 per cent reported fuel to be of major concern. Fuel was
a more important problem in Berlin: In January 1947 as many
as 36 per cent mentioned it as their major concern, as
contrasted to 18 per cent in November-December 1946.
Respondents felt nearly unanimously (87 per cent in
AMZON; 94 per cent in West Berlin) that it was more urgent to
repair buildings then in use than to allocate available building
materials for the reconstruction of heavily bombed cities. Large
percentages (39 per cent in AMZON; 62 per cent in West BerUn)
felt that the distribution of available building materials was
unjustly handled. When asked why they believed it unjust, 23
and 17 per cent, respectively, said that materials could be
obtained only in return for other goods and that, therefore,
those in a position to barter got everything; in West Berhn, 27
per cent felt that there was unnecessary building and repairing
of churches and businesses. Of the 33 per cent in the American
Zone and 13 per cent Berlin who owned property, 13 and six
per cent, respectively, said that they had not been able to get
through legal channels the materials necessary to keep their
buildings in repair or to rebuild them.
152 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 53 (8 April 1947)
MAGAZINE READING IN THE AMERICAN ZONE
Sample: 3,005 interviews in the American Zone and 409 in
the British and American Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: last two weeks in December 1946. (14
pp.)
A minority (18%) in the American Zone read magazines. In
Berlin more (42%) read magazines. About half (44 per cent in
AMZON; 57 per cent in West Berhn) said that they did not read
because they had no interest or time. An equal percentage of
AMZON Germans (44%) said they had no opportunity to get
magazines; 37 per cent in West Berlin said they could not afford
magazines. About three-quarters (70 per cent in AMZON; 75
per cent in West Berlin) felt that magazines were better at the
time of the survey than they had been in the preceding 12
years.
The combined readership of the American-sponsored
magazines Heute, Neue Auslese, and Amerikanishe Rundschau
in both the American Zone and West Berlin was nine per cent.
In the American Zone, 15 per cent read one of these three
magazines; in West Berlin, however, more (22%) read the
Soviet-licensed Neue Illustrierte Zeitung and only 13 per cent
read the American-licensed Sie. AMZON Germans with more
education, Cathohcs, older people, and those of higher socio-
economic status were more likely than others to read Ameri-
can-licensed magazines. Amerikanische Rundschau tended to
appeal to an upper-middle class, older, and more highly edu-
cated audience; Neue Auslese more to middle than to lower
socioeconomic status groups; and Heute, although it had a more
general appeal, to women, Cathohcs, and lower middle or lower
socioeconomic status groups.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 153
Report No. 54 (8 April 1947)
VIENNESE REACTIONS TO NEW DENAZIFICATION LAWS
Sample: 1,502 persons in the American and British Sectors
of Vienna.
Interviewing dates: December 1946. (7 pp.)
This survey was taken shortly after the pubHcation of new
denazification regulations. Almost all (85%) of the respondents
had heard of the changes. Of these informed respondents, a
plurality (44 per cent of the entire sample) could not say
whether or not they liked the law in its new form. Of those
with opinions, most (24 per cent of the entire sample)
disapproved of it, 14 per cent approved, and three per cent
agreed partly with it. Of those who answered that they either
agreed or partly agreed, most (56 per cent and 82 per cent of
the respective subsamples) stated that the harsher punishment of
those seriously charged was what they liked about the change in
the law. Most of those who answered that they did not like the
new law or only partly liked it (27 per cent and 80 per cent of
the respective subsamples) gave as their reason the belief that
the punishment for lesser charges was too harsh. The groups
most disapproving of the newly defined denazification law were
the better educated, middle and upper classes, upper-income
groups, men, and supporters of the Austrian Communist Party.
About three-quarters (74%) of those who thought that National
Socialism was a good idea badly carried out also disapproved of
the new form.
154 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 55 (15 April 1947)
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD DENAZIFICATION
Sample: 3,005 adults in the American Zone and 409 in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: ten-day periods in the months of
December 1946, January and February 1947. (10 pp.)
Educational background, and perhaps even more importantly,
direct interest in the proceedings affected knowledge about the
denazification program. Those in higher socioeconomic groups
(64%), the better educated (73%), as well as former NSDAP
members (62%) were much more likely than others to know
about how denazification was carried out, and much more
likely to have heard or read about General Lucius Clay's speech
to the Laenderrat criticizing the way in which denazification
was being carried out. A fifth (21%) were so uninterested or so
unaffected by denazification that they held no discernible
attitude toward denazification. The general public favored, by a
small plurality (36%), the then-current plan, in which Germans
carried out denazification under American scrutiny. Nearly as
many (30%), however, would have liked to see the Americans
assume full responsibility for the program.
Nearly half (47%) of the people had heard or read about
General Clay's speech to the Laenderrat. Probably because the
speech was given in Stuttgart, residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden
(56%) were more likely to have heard about it than were
Bavarians (45%), Hessians (45%), or West Berliners (37%). Most
(72%) of those who had heard about General Clay's speech
thought the remarks justified; but few (13%) had observed any
change in denazification methods in the first weeks following
the speech.
Results of ten separate sampUngs since November 1945
showed that the percentage satisfied with denazification had
declined about 15 per cent, whereas the percentage dissatisfied
or expressing no opinion had increased in size. About as many
(34%) said in December 1946 that they were satisfied with the
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 155
way denazification was being carried out as were dissatisfied
(32%). About 14 per cent thought the Spruchkammer rulings
too lenient. A quarter (25%) would have differentiated more
clearly between Activists and Followers, between guilty and not
guilty. A seventh (14%) would have punished Activists more
strictly.
In the American Zone, a majority (62%) opposed both
noting former NSDAP membership on identification cards and
keeping former NSDAP members from their former jobs.
Former NSDAP members were all but unanimous in opposing
these measures.
Report No. 56 (26 April 1947)
GERMAN CHILDREN APPRAISE THE YOUTH PROGRAM
Sample: 1,021 boys and girls ranging in age from ten to
18 years living in Frankfurt, Kassel, Heidelberg, and
Munich.
Interviewing dates: early March 1947. (16 pp.)
Large proportions of the youth (an average of 45 per cent in the
four cities) stated that they had not heard anything about the
American Youth Program. Only a small percentage (12%)
claimed to have heard a great deal about the program. Few
(11%) said that they had actually taken part in the program,
and most of those who had attended not only had attended
infrequently but also stated that the meetings were either fairly
well or very well led (10%).
Of those children who had an opinion (48%), most (30%)
felt the program to be a very good idea. When asked what their
main reason for taking part in the program was, the most
frequent response (40%) was "to get candy and food." This was
followed by "a chance for sports and games" (26%), "to show
our former enemies what Germans really are" (23%), and "to
156 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
learn English" (17%). Twenty-seven per cent stated their belief
that German boys and girls attended because they really
enjoyed the program rather than because they had nothing else
to do or to keep warm (7%). Respondents tended to think that
it was a good idea for boys and girls to take part in the program
(41%), as opposed to nine per cent who categorically rejected
this idea.
The children who participated showed greater interest in
sports, hiking and trips offered by the Youth Program than in
more sedentary or "educational" activities. When asked about
improvements in the program, there were major differences
among the cities: Most who had an opinion in Frankfurt (37%)
suggested helping youth get more food, clothing and shoes; in
Heidelberg 47 per cent suggested more sports opportunities and
obtaining more sports equipment. To ascertain whether the
respondents were aware of some of the broader purposes of the
program, they were asked to rate the need for the program in
certain specific areas: social development, education, vocational
choice, religion, music and art, sports and games, democratic
experiences, and German and world problems. Except for
religion, the children rated the program "very necessary" in
each of these areas.
Most of the youth who had an opinion on the subject
(22%) stated they received either a little better or a much better
idea of democracy from the youth activities; only four per cent
denied this, A large majority of those with opinions believed
that the Youth Program contributed fairly much (17%) or very
much (17%) to the preservation of peace; only 12 per cent
thought that it contributed httle or nothing. A majority
expected that German youth would learn a great deal (32%) or
something (24%) about the United States and its aims through
this Youth Program.
Asked what Americans gained through participation in the
program, 33 per cent mentioned a chance to learn the problems
and needs of Germany, and 28 per cent responded with the
opportunity to "learn really to know Germans." Of those with
opinions (46%) half (23%) thought that the Americans who
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 157
participated did so because they enjoyed it and only four per
cent thought that the Americans had been ordered to partici-
pate; the remainder gave both responses. The bulk of the
respondents believed that German boys and girls would get to
know American soldiers either well (31%) or somewhat better
(23%) through the program. Most of these young people clearly
had a very good (23%) or fairly good (39%) opinion of
American soldiers, and a very good (30%) or fairly good (47%)
opinion of the American people. Only a minority knew some
Americans in Germany very well (16%), or fairly well (12%);
the bulk either knew none but had spoken with some (29%) or
had never spoken with Americans (37%).
Report No. 57 (29 April 1947)
READERSHIP AND POPULARITY OF THE FRANKFURT
NEWSPAPERS
Sample: 300 adult Frankfurt residents.
Interviewing dates: third week in April 1947. (9 pp.)
More Frankfurt residents read the Frankfurter Rundschau
(35%) than the Neue Presse (17%). Readers of the Neue Presse
were better educated than Rundschau readers, had a higher
income, were more likely to have been associated with the Nazi
Party, and less likely to belong to a postwar political party.
There was a slight tendency for more Neue Presse readers (16%)
to say they would not read the Rundschau than Rundschau
readers (6%) to say they would not read the Neue Presse. Half
of the Neue Presse readers (8%) who objected to reading the
Rundschau stated that they felt the Rundschau too biased or
politically distasteful. Rundschau readers were aware of the bias
of their paper, criticizing it particularly for its political bias and
lack of coverage of cultural affairs. When asked which topics
158 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
they would like to see more about in their papers, more Neue
Presse readers (24%) than Rundschau readers (18%) wanted
more news of Frankfurt; in contrast, more Rundschau readers
(37%) than Neue Presse readers (32%) wanted more news of
Germany.
Report No. 58(1 May 1947)
CONFIDENCE IN NEWS IN PRESENT-DAY GERMANY
Sample: 3,400 adults in the American Zone and the
American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: unspecified. (9 pp.)
A large majority in both the American Zone (74%) and in West
Berlin (85%) considered the news at the time of the survey to
be more trustworthy than news during the war. The more one
was incUned to suspect the postwar news, the greater the
sympathy for the idea of National Socialism: Of the four per
cent who thought postwar news was less accurate, 89 per cent
thought National SociaHsm was a good idea badly carried out,
as did only 5 1 per cent of those reporting postwar news to be
more accurate. When questioned as to the accuracy of the
postwar news, 46 per cent said that all or most of it was
truthful, 27 per cent thought about half of it truthful, and nine
per cent said that little of the postwar news was truthful. A
majority (55%) felt that little of the wartime news was truthful.
Those holding wartime news to be more accurate than or just as
accurate as postwar news contained proportionately larger
numbers of young, well-educated, and prosperous people.
Comparing the radio and newspapers, 37 per cent of
AMZON Germans thought them equal in bringing the most
trustworthy news; 24 per cent were more inchned to rely on
the radio and eight per cent the newspapers. In West Berhn,
however, most (32%) considered newspapers more trustworthy,
with 26 per cent relying more on the radio and 19 per cent
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 159
finding them equally trustworthy. Most in both the American
Zone (43%) and West Berhn (59%) said newspapers brought
more complete news.
Report No. 59 (10 May 1947)
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING REPARATIONS
Sample: 2,998 persons living in the American Zone and
401 in the American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: February 1947. (6 pp.)
There were almost no discernible population differences con-
cerning reparations, although West Berliners, as usual, displayed
more sophistication and had a heightened degree of awareness
of various facets of the problem as compared with AMZON
residents. In addition, West Berliners tended to be somewhat
more optimistic regarding Germany's future while at the same
time appreciating even more fully than the people in AMZON
that the Russians were prepared to insist on stiff reparations.
Almost all people (82%) believed that a higher reparations
bill would be submitted to the German people following World
War II than had been submitted after World War I. A large
majority also expected that it would take a very long time to
pay off these reparations: Only 13 per cent in West Berlin and
ten per cent in AMZON estimated a period under 20 years.
Large majorities estimated that the payments would generally
be accomplished by means of goods or through production (30
per cent in AMZON; 48 per cent in West Berlin). Fewer believed
that they would be paid by the removal of factories and
machines (14 and 13 per cent, respectively). A plurality of
AMZON respondents (44 per cent as opposed to 33 per cent in
West Berlin) considered that both types of payments would be
made.
Nearly all Germans (74 per cent in AMZON; 84 per cent in
West Berlin) thought that the Soviet Union would demand the
160 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
heaviest reparations; half the AMZON Germans (50%) and 39
per cent of the West Berliners thought that France would make
the highest demands (multiple responses were permitted). Al-
though in an earlier survey (January 1947) 71 per cent of the
AMZON Germans indicated optimism regarding their personal
future, a solid majority of 56 per cent said in February that an
improvement in the standard of living was not possible while
Germany was paying off the reparations.
Report No. 60 (April 1947)
TRENDS IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION
Sample: the number of respondents varied from 365 in the
first survey to 3,500 interviewed in April 1947; the total
number of persons interviewed was more than 75,000 in
the American Zone and in the American and British
Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: from 26 October 1945 to 7 April 1947
during which time forty complete studies of the American
Zone were made as well as an additional 23 surveys of
smaller size and in limited areas. (43 pp.)
This report summarizes in graphic form major trends of
German opinion in the American occupied areas, covering seven
major issues: economic affairs, food, the occupation, Nurem-
berg Trials, media, politics, and reorientation.
Economic Affairs. The proportion of the population who
said that their incomes were adequate remained constant
between November 1945 and July 1946 but then began to
decline. General opinion that prices would rise increased sharply
between January and June 1946; half the population believed
that anti-inflationary measures would not succeed. In December
1945 nearly eight in ten people thought that conditions would
improve within six months whereas in April 1947 only 45 per
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 161
cent held this view. Confidence in the continued value of the
Reichsmark suffered a constant decline after April 1946, when
54 per cent had such confidence; by October 1946, 43 per cent
thought that its value would drop. Confidence in both AUied
money and the German Reichsmark dechned between April and
October 1946, with over half saying that they saw no difference
between the two.
Food. Although there was extensive complaining about
the rationing of food, almost everyone agreed that the ration
card system was being handled justly, with only a slight decrease
between November 1945 and May 1946 from 93 to 88 per cent.
Belief that the food ration was larger in some zones than in
others gained less support in May 1946 (47%) than it did in
March (60%). Between November 1945 and April 1947 people
spoke of being worried about food more than about any other
matter. Urban residents were three times as likely to mention it
as were rural people; the latter, in turn, were twice as Hkely to
complain about the lack of clothing and shoes as were city
dwellers.
The Occupation. In November 1945, 70 per cent of those
interviewed in AMZON said that the American occupation
forces had furthered the reconstruction of Germany; by
September 1946 this proportion had shrunk to 44 per cent of
the population. At the same time there was a steady increase in
the size of the group without an opinion on the issue and, in the
last two surveys, there was a sharp increase in the proportion
saying that the Americans were hindering that reconstruction.
Nuremberg Trials. A heavy majority of about eight in ten
persons felt that the trials were conducted justly. Readership of
newspaper reports concerning the trials declined from a high of
eight in ten persons in January 1946 to 65 per cent in March
1946, and then rose once again to the original figure on the day
following publication of the verdicts. As the trials progressed,
waning confidence in the completeness and trustworthiness in
the newspaper reports was displayed; nonetheless, even at the
162 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
lowest point, seven in ten people were satisfied with the
integrity and detail of the reports.
Media. The number of regular newspaper readers among
AMZON residents declined 13 percentage points between
January and October 1946, when it reached 63 per cent. Three
surveys conducted between January and December 1946
revealed that slightly more than one-half of the population were
radio listeners.
Politics. Claimed political interest rose gradually between
October 1945 and June 1946 and then dropped off sharply,
following the conclusion of general elections. The proportion of
people considering poHtical meetings to be worthwhile rose
from 60 to 72 per cent between November 1945 and March
1946. In AMZON, until mid-summer 1946, the CDU/CSU
enjoyed about 40 per cent plurality of membership or pref-
erence over other parties, with the SPD in second place, favored
by about 30 per cent. Later studies revealed that while the SPD
did not make any substantial gain, the CDU/CSU suffered a loss
of about ten per cent of its following, with most of the
defectors saying that they no longer favored any party. Less
than one in ten supported the LDP/DVP and between two and
three per cent favored the KPD. In Bavaria, the CSU was the
foremost party (about 40 per cent); the SPD was second with
about three in ten; about one- fourth of the people preferred no
party; the KPD and the LDP each held about five per cent of
the population; and the WAV claimed three to four per cent. In
Berlin, from a low point of 36 per cent in the spring of 1946,
the SPD increased its following to 68 per cent by December
1946; less than two in ten expressed a preference for the CDU;
and very few people indicated that they had no party
preference.
Reorientation. Although about 35 per cent of the popu-
lation felt that the occupation was a humiliation, about 55 per
cent did not think so. In the course of eleven surveys made
between November 1945 and December 1946, an average of 47
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 163
per cent of the people thought that National Socialism was a
good idea, badly carried out; 41 per cent said that it was a bad
idea; 12 per cent held no opinion. The percentage of persons
indicating satisfaction with the denazification process decreased
from 57 per cent in March 1946 to 34 per cent in December
1946. The proportion of the German population indicating a
preference for neither communism nor National Socialism rose
from 22 per cent to 66 per cent between November 1945 and
November 1946. Those favoring communism decreased in
number, those favoring National Socialism remained constant,
and a considerable decrease was noted in the number of those
holding no opinion. About seven in ten said that the Germans
were not responsible for the war. Approximately one in three
people indicated that they were troubled by rumors, with the
most frequently heard rumor being that of an impending war
with the Soviet Union. Only half the respondents said that they
considered themselves sufficiently well informed about political
events. A majority of AMZON residents felt that the best way
to achieve the reconstruction of Germany was through "hard
work." Between ten and 15 per cent hoped for a new strong
Fuehrer and/or the rebirth of the old national spirit.
Report No. 61 (12 June 1947)
SOME ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SCHOOL SYSTEM
IN WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN
Sample: 650 people representing a cross-section of adults
in Wuerttemberg-Baden.
Interviewing dates: first three weeks of May 1947. (6 pp.)
A solid majority (62%) of the public in the Land of Wuerttem-
berg-Baden expressed satisfaction with the ability of the
schools, under normal conditions, to fulfill the needs of German
youth. Only a minority (30%), however, felt that school
children could receive training equal to their abiUties, 44 per
164 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
cent felt such complete training depended on the financial and
social position of the parents.
A large majority (71%) supported the idea of school
boards elected in each Kreis (county). A large majority of those
supporting such elections was firmly convinced that economic
bias operated to deny some children the training that their
talents would seem to demand. Leadership groups - the well-
educated, men, residents of large towns and cities — were more
dissatisfied with the school system than were the poorly
educated, the women, or small town and village residents.
Catholics were less informed and had less interest in public
school matters, possibly because they relied more heavily upon
private institutions.
Report No. 62 (14 June 1947)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD A PEACE TREATY
AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE MOSCOW
CONFERENCE
Sample: 600 people living in Hesse, Wuerttemberg-Baden,
and West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: during the last week in April and the
first week in May 1947. (8 pp.)
Most people knew that a conference had been held among the
Allies and that it had broken up. Asked about the latest news
they had heard concerning the conference, replies varied from
the simple statement that it had ended (31 per cent in West
Berlin; 28 per cent in Hesse; 24 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden)
to more specific replies such as reference to Secretary of State
Marshall's radio address upon his return home, or reports on the
disunity of the Allies.
Not surprisingly, majority opinion held that the con-
ference had accomplished nothing. A few took a more sanguine
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 65
view, pointing out positive measures helpful to Germany or
suggesting that at least Allied differences were finally out in the
open. Those interviewed tended to blame the Soviet Union for
the lack of results at the Moscow Conference (49 per cent in
West Berlin; 31 per cent in Hesse; 41 per cent in Wuerttem-
berg-Baden). About half this number spoke of disunity among
the Allies as the reason.
Although many people believed that a delay in signing a
treaty would mean milder terms (58 per cent in West Berlin; 39
per cent in Hesse; 42 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden),
majority opinion favored an immediate treaty (65 per cent in
West Berlin; 57 per cent in Hesse; 52 per cent in Wuerttem-
berg-Baden). Only in West Berlin did a majority (57%) think
that a treaty would be signed by the summer of 1948. In Hesse
and Wuerttemberg-Baden majorities either thought that it
would take more than two years to complete a treaty or had no
idea how long it would take. Most Germans had a good idea of
what they thought ought to be included in the treaty.
Uppermost in their minds were economic reconstruction, bound-
aries—especially to the east— the return of prisoners of war,
reparations, disarmament, form of government. Whatever the
terms of the treaty, those interviewed were certain that the mere
fact of settlement would lead to improved conditions in Germany
(85 per cent in West Berhn; 74 per cent in Hesse; 79 per cent in
Wuerttemberg-Baden).
A great number of Germans agreed that there were two
major problems facing the Alhes: Allied unity or disunity and
the problem of food. Aside from the treaty, majorities in West
Berlin (55%), Hesse (63%), and Wuerttemberg-Baden (68%)
considered food to be the most important problem facing
Germany itself. Economic reconstruction followed in second
place.
166 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 63 (8 August 1947)
GERMAN OPINION TOWARD THE PROSPECTIVE PEACE
TREATY
Sample: 2,986 respondents in the American Zone and in
the American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: June 1947. (10 pp.)
A majority of the public, looking back at the Moscow
Conference, condemned the Russians for obstructionism. A
fourth of those questioned felt that the Conference definitively
outlined the separate points of view held by the Allies or, at
least, were conducted with good will on all sides.
A very large majority of AMZON Germans (82%) thought
that a peace treaty would mean an improvement in Germany's
situation. This feeling was so general throughout the population
that there were no significant differences among any of the
major population groups. Among those who credited the United
States with giving aid to German reconstruction, however, an
even larger majority (88%) looked forward to an improvement
in their lot after a peace treaty. Those denying the existence of
such aid were less apt (76%) to expect improvements.
About half (49%) the people did not expect that the Allies
would complete a peace treaty by the summer of 1948,
although a large minority (35%) did believe that Allied unity on
the matter would be achieved by then. Those expecting
agreement tended to be drawn from the broad masses of the
population, whereas critics and skeptics were much more often
upper class, well-educated men, or former NSDAP members.
The most important thing hoped for by all population
groups was a revival of German trade and commerce. Higher
socioeconomic status groups suggested, as the next in impor-
tance, provision for widened national boundaries, a unified
democratic government, and relief from financial difficulties,
including reparations payments. Lower socioeconomic status
groups spoke in more simple terms, stressing the return of
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 167
prisoners of war, relief from the burden imposed by the
presence of evacuees, and an improvement of the food
situation.
Report No. 64 (25 August 1947)
TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FOOD SITUATION
Sample: a cross-section of the adult population in the
American Zone and in the American and British Sectors of
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: from several surveys made between
February 1946 and June 1947. (7 pp.)
In the course of the year, the German public became
increasingly skeptical about the amount of food that the United
States sent to Germany. Whereas in July 1946, 73 per cent
believed the American claim that they were providing a fifth of
the total food supply, by June 1947 only 49 per cent believed
this claim. Relatively more Bavarians were skeptical of the claim
than residents of either Hesse or Wuerttemberg-Baden. Support
for the claim tended to come more from among men, the better
educated, the self-styled upper class, and former Nazi Party
members.
In June 1947, regular newspaper readers were more likely
(52%) than occasional readers and nonreaders (45 per cent
each) to believe that America's imports amounted to a fifth of
the Zone's food. Fewer nonreaders, however, than readers denied
the claim. Proportionately as many urban as rural people
reportedly beheved the American claim although the number of
denials increased with city size: 45 per cent of the residents of
large cities in contrast to 33 per cent in small villages rejected
the claim. Some of these opinions evidently resulted from the
fact that urban residents had a harder time getting food than
168 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
did rural residents. In fact, in June 1947, when 64 per cent of
the people in rural areas said that they had enough food to get
along, only 22 per cent of the urban dwellers could make this
claim. And when the question was refined still further to
whether or not they had enough food to do their work well, the
figures for the two groups went down even further, to 50 per
cent for rural residents and nine per cent for urban dwellers.
Despite dissatisfaction with the food supply, AMZON
residents felt that they were the best fed in the four zones. In
June 1947, 41 per cent of AMZON Germans thought that the
rations were smallest in the Soviet Zone, 28 per cent mentioned
the French Zone, 18 per cent saia the British Zone. Interest-
ingly enough, West Berliners placed the French Zone at the top
of the list with 40 per cent and the Soviet Zone second with 3 1
per cent.
Report No. 65 (27 September 1947)
ATTITUDES OF BAVARIANS TOWARD LORITZ' DISMISSAL
Sample: 1 ,6 1 4 Bavarians.
Interviewing dates: between 14 July and 4 August 1947.
(4 pp.)
This survey was made to test reactions to the dismissal of Alfred
Loritz from his positions as Denazification Minister in Bavaria
and leader of the WAV.
A sohd majority (69%) had heard of the affair and most of
these (63%) knew that both posts were involved in the ouster.
Nearly four in ten (38%) felt that the post of Denazification
Minister was of greater concern to the pubUc and had an opinion
on this move whereas only 24 per cent were ready to judge his
removal from the party leadership.
Those best informed about Loritz' dismissal from these
posts tended to come from among former NSDAP members,
men, upper classes, and the well educated.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 169
Very few respondents opposed the dismissals: Only five
per cent thought that he ought to have remained as Denazifica-
tion Minister, as opposed to 33 per cent who favored the
dismissal; and four per cent favored his continuance as party
leader, with 20 per cent against it and 32 per cent not
interested.
Report No. 66 (27 September 1947)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Sample: 3,400 adults living in the American Zone and in
the American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (5 pp.)
Most German adults living in the American Zone (78%) and in
the American and British Sectors of Berlin (66%) were either
uninformed or misinformed on whether corporal punishment
was permitted in German schools. (Although there was no
directive against such punishment, in practice it did not exist in
AMZON schools.)
Large majorities (65%) in AMZON and a smaller majority
of 51 per cent in West Berhn approved granting teachers the
right to whip or beat "very disobedient and very unruly
children." Significantly, however, those who opposed (30%)
tended to hold their opinion more strongly than proponents: 54
per cent of the former group in AMZON said that their feeling
was very strong whereas only 48 per cent of those favoring
corporal punishment said that their opinion was very strong;
comparable figures in West Berlin were 61 and 46 per cent,
respectively.
Parents gave high approval to corporal punishment in the
schools regardless of whether their children were in or out of
school (between 62 and 69 per cent). Only three groups in the
AMZON population failed to register majority approval of the
proposal to permit corporal punishment: the highly educated,
170 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
communist party affiliates, and those with no church affiliation.
Among CDU/CSU followers, those with seven years or less of
schooling, women, Catholics, those who were never affiliated
with the NSDAP, and small town people there were more
proponents of corporal punishment than among their counter-
part groups.
Report No. 67 (10 October 1947)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
LEADERSHIP
Sample: an unspecified number of adults in the American
Zone.
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (2 pp.)
A large number of AMZON Germans (70%) thought that the
United States would have the greatest intluence on world events
in the following ten years. The Soviet Union took a poor second
place with 13 per cent. No other country received any
significant mention. Comparison with results from the same
question when it was asked one year earlier showed that in the
interim more Germans had become convinced that the United
States would exert a predominant influence.
Of those who thought that the United States would have a
dominant role, 78 per cent thought that this influence would be
for peace. Of those who had chosen the Soviet Union for the
dominant position, 88 per cent felt it would result in war.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 71
Report No. 68 (10 October 1947)
TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL SOCIALISM
Sample: unspecified number, representing a cross-section
of the adults in the American Zone and the American and
British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: between November 1945 and August
1947. (5 pp.)
Despite fluctuations, the percentage of Germans describing
National Socialism as a good idea badly carried out remained at
a fairly high number - starting at 53 per cent in November
1945, dipping to a low of 42 per cent in July 1946, and rising
again to 55 per cent by August 1947. Those regarding it as a bad
idea rose from 41 per cent in November 1945 to 48 per cent in
July 1946 but dropped once more to 35 per cent in August 1947.
Another way of describing this trend is to say that, in the
period from November 1945 to July 1946, the average number
of people who thought National Socialism basically a good idea
was 48 per cent; between December 1946 and August 1947 it
was 52 per cent.
In July 1947, opinions on this issue were related to
attitudes toward democracy, individual liberty as against
economic security, and the responsibility of Hitler and his
advisers for his acts. People who tended to excuse National
Sociahsm were most ready to pick flaws in the working of
democracy (42%), to choose security (70%) rather than hberty
(22%), and to throw the blame for Hitler's acts on his advisers
(32%) rather than on Hitler himself (25%), with another 37 per
cent blaming both.
In August 1947, the population groups containing the
largest proportion of persons describing National Sociahsm as a
good idea badly carried out were persons with eight years of
education (60%), those under 30 (68%), Protestants (64%),
LDP/DVP party adherents (68%). More West Berliners (62%)
held this view than Hessians (61%), residents of Wuerttemberg-
172 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Baden (60%), and Bavarians (50%); Bavarians led the list of
those who rejected Nazism as a bad idea (38%), followed by
West Berliners and Hessians (33%), and residents of Wuerttem-
berg-Baden(31%).
Report No. 69 (16 October 1947)
GERMAN OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION
OF EUROPE
Sample: 3,400 people living in the American Zone and the
American and British Sectors of Berhn.
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (5 pp.)
This report deals with German reactions to two issues involved
in the possible organization of Europe: a "United States of
Europe," and the Marshall Plan.
On many issues of the day, the German people were
apathetic, resigned, or persistently deluded. On some issues,
however, such as turning to the west for economic and world
leadership, their opinions were crystallized in positive direc-
tions. Regarding intra-European matters, their orientation was
also largely western.
Asked to select from a checklist of 23 countries those
which they thought should become part of a European nation,
majorities of varying degrees voted to include each of the
countries named except the Soviet Union, for which 38 per cent
of the AMZON respondents voted.
In this climate of opinion the Marshall Plan could not fail
to elicit high approval. In August 1947, however, knowledge of
the plan was neither extensive nor definite. Only 47 per cent
claimed to have heard of it, and the amount of information held
by about half of this group was extremely shaky. Not
unexpectedly, educational background had a great deal to do
with the level of information. After a brief description of the
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 73
plan, all those interviewe4 were asked whether they thought it
would solve Europe's economic difficulties; a large majority in
AMZON (78%) and even more West Berliners (88%) thought it
would. Separate population groups did not differ significantly
in their estimation of the possibihties of working out Secretary of
State Marshall's proposal. There was nonetheless one telling
factor that differentiated those expressing confidence in the
plan from those who did not. Among the confident, 75 per cent
were convinced that the United States would have the greatest
influence on world affairs during the next decade and only 12
per cent thought that the Soviet Union would play this
dominant role. Those expressing skepticism about the Marshall
Plan were much more likely than the confident to believe that
the Soviet role would be dominant (27%) and less often
expected American leadership (58%).
Report No. 70 (17 October 1947)
GERMAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS FOR THE
FOOD SHORTAGE
Sample: 3,008 respondents from the American Zone in
November 1946 and 3,007 in July 1947; 399 and 400,
respectively, in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: November 1946; July 1947. (6 pp.)
In May 1946, immediately following the reduction in rations
for the general public, 41 per cent of the AMZON Germans said
that they thought food shortages in Germany and throughout
the world had necessitated the cut; 27 per cent thought that
poor crops and insufficient stocks were responsible.
By November 1946, 46 per cent of the respondents
attributed the situation to overpopulation through the arrival of
DPs, evacuees, and "foreigners." This percentage held through
midsummer 1947. Two significant changes, however, did take
174 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
place between November 1946 and July 1947. Whereas at the
earlier date 22 per cent felt that the lost war was responsible for
the bad food situation, only ten per cent gave this as the reason
in July 1947. More, however, had come to blame the black
market: Instead of eight per cent making this charge, as was the
case in 1946, 26 per cent considered this reason pertinent in the
summer of 1947.
Both of these changes were reflected in West Berlin
thinking, too, but in addition the summer poll showed 37 per
cent accusing the occupying powers (read "Russians") with
taking away too much; only 18 per cent had made a similar
charge a year ear her.
Report No. 71 (17 October 1947)
BERLIN: SYMBOL OF A NATIONAL STATE
Sample: 3,400 adults from the American Zone and the
American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (4 pp.)
This report summarizes German opinion on Berlin as the
capital. Among West Berliners there was virtually unanimous
agreement (93%) that Berlin ought to be the capital. In
AMZON, however, opinion was rather differentiated. Hessians,
with 70 per cent, were most in favor of Berlin as capital,
the residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden followed with 58 per
cent, and the Bavarians trailed behind with 52 per cent. In
small towns and villages in AMZON the number of people
withholding opinions was larger than in towns and cities,
although Hessian villages tended to display more structured
thinking than rural residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden and
Bavaria. Thus in communities with less than 10,000 residents,
72 per cent of the Hessians favored Berlin as the capital city, 59
per cent of those in Wuerttemberg-Baden, and only 49 per cent
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 75
of the Bavarians. In medium-sized towns, the largest amount of
support for Berhn as capital city came from Hesse (63%). In
both Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden, residents of these
medium-sized towns were more favorably disposed toward
Berhn (59 and 61 per cent, respectively) than their large city
counterparts (58 and 53 per cent, respectively).
In sum, the particularism of Bavarian villages had more
influence than local civic pride among city dwellers in negating
national feehngs, whereas in Hesse national pride in the villages
induced more centrist thinking than was evident in the cities. In
Wuerttemberg-Baden, community pride in the large cities acted
as a damper to national feelings when compared with centrist
dispositions in the smaller towns.
About half (47%) of those not in favor of Berlin as capital
said they would prefer Frankfurt; Munich was the next most
popular choice (32%).
Report No. 72 (November 1947)
A REPORT ON GERMAN MORALE
Sample: a representative sample of about 3,000 people
from the American Zone and about 400 persons from the
American and British Sectors of Berhn.
Interviewing dates: first half of May 1947. (47 pp.)
The report deals chiefly with four broad attitudinal areas which
were thought to be basic elements in German morale: (1)
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the aims and practices of the
Nazi regime; (2) awareness of and interest in public affairs; (3)
voluntary participation in political and community hfe; and (4)
optimistic or pessimistic outlook regarding the future. Participa-
tion and awareness were most closely related but attitudes
toward Nazism were found to be the variable showing the
closest relation to all the others, suggesting that a good index to
176 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
low morale is disposition toward the aims and practices of
National Socialism.
Those dissatisfied with Nazism tended to be more liberal,
more tolerant, and more optimistic, whereas those who were
satisfied with it tended to show the opposite traits. People who
were aware tended to have a coldly reaUstic but pessimistic
outlook on Hfe; the unaware displayed greater optimism. Those
in the former group were in general the better educated, city
dwellers, business and professional people, communists, former
soldiers, and NSDAP members. The least aware were in general
from the lower class, women, farmers, the least educated, and
the elderly.
Very few Germans participated in community life to any
appreciable extent; those that did had characteristics and
attitudes similar to those of the "aware" group described above.
Confidence in the future did not vary with any population
dimensions except education: Those with the best education
were the least confident. Those under thirty exhibited a
pessimism that went far beyond that of any other population
group. The upper social classes were better informed than the
lower and tended also to be more pessimistic. There were
indications that wealthy people were more afraid of com-
munism than the lower class respondents and, therefore, if
forced to choose, would tend to select National Socialism over
communism.
Each political party showed a characteristic pattern of
responses distinguishing it from the others. SPD affiliates
appeared relatively optimistic and relatively satisfied with the
way in which the occupation powers were working. CDU/CSU
followers were found to be the least well informed, whereas
LDP/DVP supporters were among the best informed. WAV
voters showed the greatest sympathy with the aims of National
Socialism.
The final section of the report is an appendix containing
the questions asked together with the breakdown of responses
by AMZON Germans.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 177
Report No. 73 (28 October 1947)
A GUIDE TO SOME PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS
Sample: a representative sample of 500 adults in West
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: unspecified. (1 1 pp.)
Four types of statements on 14 topics were used: One set was
unfavorable to the United States, another was phrased favor-
ably, the third presented alternative propositions in as fair and
objective a manner as possible, and the fourth was unfavorable
to the United States with the source of the charge given as the
Soviet Union.
The average number giving favorable responses to the
"objective" or "balanced" questions was 75 per cent. This
figure moved up only three percentage points to 78 per cent in
response to the statements with a pro-American bias but moved
down ten percentage points to 65 per cent in response to
anti-American propositions. When these anti-American proposi-
tions were identified as Russian-sponsored, the average moved
up to 81 per cent.
The claim presented in one question that imperialistic aims
underlay United States foreign policy had real plausibility to
the Germans unless presented as a Soviet claim. Statements
deahng with capitalistic domination of America were parti-
cularly disadvantageous to the United States; counterclaims to
these did not relieve the effectiveness of such charges. At least
one "favorable" overstatement, regarding the treatment of
Negroes in the United States, elicited a more negative response
(with 58 per cent of the sample responding in a pro- American
fashion) than the comparable "unfavorable" (77%) and
"balanced" (81%) statement.
Asked after the interview (which included 15 or more
additional questions) to recall the one or two statements which
first came to mind, people tended to recall unfavorable rather
than compUmentary statements about the United States.
Generally best remembered were statements about the treat-
178 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
ment of Negroes, followed by the charge that a third of
America's population was ill-fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed,
allegations that the United States was determined to dominate
the world, or that American society was composed of money-
grabbing people.
Report No. 74 (27 October 1947)
ATTITUDES OF AMZON GERMANS TOWARD
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Sample: more than 3,400 Germans in the American Zone
and in the American and British Sectors of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (17 pp.)
Although a majority of AMZON Germans (59 per cent as
contrasted to 44 per cent in West Berlin) said that they did not
know enough about what was happening politically, 78 per cent
(73 per cent in West BerUn) did not want to know more and 64
per cent (45 per cent in West Berlin) never thought about
politics, preferring to leave that to others. Most (61%) would
not take any effective measures to protest an unpopular
poUtical measure and 96 per cent said that they had never
written to an official about a political matter. Nonetheless,
more were inclined to hold officials responsible for government
than to put the responsibility on the electorate.
More people thought a democratic republic to be the most
probable form of government for Germany (40%), preferred it
(56%), and thought it best for the German economy (47%) than
any other kind. Regardless of the form of government, however,
six in ten AMZON residents and 89 per cent of the West
Berhners preferred that that government have its headquarters in
Berlin.
AMZON and West Berlin Germans not only claimed
preference for a democratic republican form of government, but
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 79
they were also unable, or unwilling, to criticize the idea of
democracy to any important extent. In contrast, 71 per cent in
AMZON and 57 per cent in West Berlin did not hesitate to say
that communism was entirely bad. Small, well-informed groups,
however, did specify faults in democracy and point out good
aspects of communism.
Despite the claimed preference for democracy, when
forced to choose between a government guaranteeing liberty
and one providing economic security, 62 per cent selected the
latter and 26 per cent the former. Moreover, less than half
(44%) of the AMZON Germans and half (50%) of the West
Berliners felt that the Germans were capable of running a
democratic government at that time, with corruption and
disunity cited as the primary reasons. Further, almost four in
ten could not mention any way in which democracy could help
their country.
Considering the avowed disinterest in political matters and
the confusion attending their thinking about government, the
Germans were fairly well informed about politics.
Report No. 75 (28 October 1947)
WHAT BERLINERS EXPECT FROM THE LONDON
CONFERENCE
Sample: 254 people from the borough of Neukoelln in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: between 12 and 21 October 1947. (7
pp.)
If the Berliners of Neukoelln had had their way, the Allies
would have agreed on a peace treaty for Germany at the
London Conference and they would have agreed to reconstitute
Germany as a political and economic unit. As a second best
solution, they hoped for free economic exchange between
180 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
zones. Hopes and actual expectations, however, were quite
different. Only 14 per cent believed that the Conference would
result in a treaty, although 60 per cent thought there would be
agreement at least on some points. One in four (24%) felt that
there would be no agreement whatsoever, and about the same
number (23%) thought that there would never be agreement
among the Allies on a peace treaty. In fact, a plurality (32%)
expected that the result of the Conference would be a Germany
divided into two autonomous areas. At the same time, such a
division was what they feared most as a possible outcome.
If a split came, 74 per cent predicted that the United
States would remain in Berlin. If the Americans were to have
left, however, 59 per cent said that they too would have wanted
to go.
Of those familiar with the Marshall Plan (69%), a majority
hoped to see it carried out. A plurality (41%) believed that the
United States had political aims in suggesting the plan and quite
a few (23%) thought it was primarily to secure profits for
Americans. A sixth (16%) expected the United States to profit
more from the Marshall Plan, nine per cent Europe, and 40 per
cent expected both to profit equally.
Report No. 76 (29 October 1947)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FOUR OCCUPYING
POWERS
Sample: an unspecified number of respondents in the
American Zone and in the American and British Sectors of
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: spring and summer of 1947. (4 pp.)
AMZON Germans were not convinced that the Allies or the
United States were doing all they could to rebuild Germany,
although more of them were ready to acknowledge American
than Allied help. Thus 44 per cent of the AMZON Germans (as
contrasted to 74 per cent in West Berlin) said that the United
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 181
States had furthered the rebuilding of Germany, whereas only
31 per cent (47 per cent in West BerUn) admitted such help
from the AUies. Equally noteworthy is the fact that 33 per cent
(16 per cent in West Berlin) claimed that the United States had
hindered reconstruction; 43 per cent (45 per cent in West Berlin)
made the same charge against the Allies.
AMZON Germans were strongly convinced (70%) that the
United States would wield the most influence in world affairs
during the next ten years, and 55 per cent of the total
population felt that this influence would be directed toward
peace. Of the 13 per cent who thought such world influence
would be wielded by the Soviet Union, most (11%) thought it
would lead to war.
Of the four Allies, the Germans most trusted the United
States to treat Germany fairly (63%); 45 per cent placed much
trust in the British, only four per cent in the French, and none
in the Russians. An overwhelming number of AMZON Germans
(84%) would have picked the United States as an occupying
power if history could have been turned back. AMZON Germans
were also firm in their opinion that they were better off than
people in any of the other three zones.
Report No. 77 (5 November 1947)
OPINIONS ON THE PRESS IN THE AMERICAN ZONE OF
GERMANY
Sample: approximately 3,400 people living in the Ameri-
can Zone and in the American and British Sectors of
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: July 1947. (13 pp.)
Almost half (47%) of the AMZON respondents felt that there
was a free press in AMZON; in West Berhn the figure was as
high as 66 per cent. Over two-thirds (68%) of those who read
the Neue Zeitung, which was published by the American
authorities, considered this paper to be free.
182 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Six out of ten (60%) of those interviewed did not think
that German editors were permitted to print everything they-
considered to be correct and two-thirds (64%) felt that they
ought to be allowed to do so.
About one in ten (6 per cent in AMZON; 12 per cent in
West Berlin) preferred a party press to an independent press
although a large number of people (27 and 42 per cent,
respectively) were willing to have poUtical parties publish
newspapers if independent papers continued to be published as
well. Much of the sentiment against the party press reflected the
negative attitudes toward poHtical parties generally. At the same
time there was a great deal of misinformation about the party
press; over half of those living in AMZON did not know that
existing papers were independently edited. Among the informed
respondents, there was more sentiment in favor of an in-
dependent press than among the uninformed.
Report No. 78 (6 November 1947)
BAVARIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NEWSPAPERS
Sample: 1,613 adults representing a cross-section of the
population in Bavaria.
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (4 pp.)
Half the people in Bavaria (53%) claimed to be regular
newspaper readers, as compared with 55 per cent who had made
the same claim one month earher in AMZON. Not unex-
pectedly, regular readers tended to be the well-educated, from
the upper social classes, men, and former NSDAP members.
Among former NSDAP members, 76 per cent claimed regular
readership, in contrast to 50 per cent of the nonaffiliates.
About three-fifths of the Bavarians questioned felt that the
newspapers carried enough Bavarian as well as community news
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 183
items. Almost a fifth, liowever, wished there were more of both.
Regular readers were more Ukely than occasional readers to say
that the papers they were reading were good, although 48 per
cent of them thought that they were only fair.
Report No. 79 (22 November 1947)
ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN CAPITALISM
Sample: about 2,250 residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden and
Bavaria, and an unspecified number of respondents in West
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: between 15 September and 15 October
1947. (7 pp.)
The heart of the questionnaire was comprised of fourteen
questions, each one of which had been cast into four different
forms for presentation to four separate but comparable cross-
sections of the people. One set was phrased unfavorably to
America; a second preceded each of these statements with an
identification of the source of the charge as Russian; a third
presented alternative propositions on the fourteen topics; and
the fourth presented favorably phrased propositions in as fair
and objective a sense as possible.
The average of the favorable responses to all 56 questions
was 59 per cent in the two southern Laender and 75 per cent in
West BerUn. The average percentage of favorable responses
varied with the wording of the question - from unfavorable
statements with the source identified (64 per cent in Bavaria
and Wuerttemberg-Baden), to statements favorable to the
United States (63%), to objective or balanced statements (59%),
to statements unfavorable to the United States (49%).
In addition to a simple reply to the questions asked,
respondents were requested to indicate the strength of their
184 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
feelings on the various topics. No fewer than seven in ten
persons were favorably disposed toward the United States on
the issue of national capitalism. Scarcely more than one in ten
held the opposite view. Both groups, however, held their
opinions with a high degree of intensity. The most significant
characteristic of the people who were firmly and favorably
disposed toward the United States and the Americans was their
high educational level. In addition, the majority of the group
were men of rather high socioeconomic status. There were
relatively few regular churchgoing Catholics, 95 per cent of
them read newspapers, and about six in ten sometimes listened
to the radio. The people on the other side of the fence - those
who were firmly and unfavorably disposed toward the United
States and to Americans — were markedly average in their
educational background; they were mainly women; 52 per cent
of them might be classified as upper lower socioeconomic
status; and they tended to be nonchurchgoing Protestants. The
in-between group - those open to persuasion by one or the
other point of view — comprised primarily people with only
seven years or less of schooUng, more than six in ten were
women, nearly half attended Catholic services regularly, more
than seven in ten came from the lowest socioeconomic group,
and nearly half lived in villages with fewer than 2,000
population.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 185
Report No. 80 (26 November 1947)
OPINIONS ON DENAZIFICATION
Sample: a random selection of 300 names from the
Meldebogen files of former NSDAP members as well as
3,000 people representing a cross-section of the American
Zone population.
Interviewing dates: September 1947. (9 pp.)
This report on the impact of the denazification program deals
with three groups: former party members (PGs) whose
Meldebogen were still on active file, those who during the
interview admitted former affiliation with the NSDAP, and
those who claimed no connection with the Nazi party and were
not affected by the Law of National Liberation.
Among the Meldebogen group and the claimed PGs, about
four in ten had not yet been cleared. The members of the two
groups differed from each other to a certain extent, but, as
compared with the population as a whole, they were more alike
than different. Each group contained more well-educated people,
more upper middle-class people, more former soldiers, and more
men than did the nonaffected public; they also contained more
apolitical people.
Although many more former PGs than other Germans lost
their jobs temporarily after 1945, only about eight per cent
were still unemployed in September 1947. Almost all of the
former PGs who had new jobs thought they were worse than
their former ones.
There was no clear-cut division on whether the purpose of
denazification was to remove National Socialist influence from
pubUc life or to restore followers to their old jobs. Large
majorities in both groups, as compared with only 56 per cent of
the general pubUc, knew that the denazification procedures
were conducted by Germans under Allied supervision. Those
not affected by the procedures gave majority approval to
denazification in principle, but majority disapproval to its
methods.
186 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
A majority of former PGs felt that denazification had had
a greater impact on the economic life than on the political Hfe
of Germany; those not affected who had opinions on the matter
tended to divide evenly on the two aspects.
The most frequently mentioned result of denazification
was the lack of capable officials and businessmen.
Report No. 81 (3 December 1947)
GERMAN REACTIONS TO EXPELLEES AND DP'S
Sample: a cross-section of native residents and expellees in
the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: March 1946, November 1946, June
1947, and September 1947. (9 pp.)
Expellees and native Germans were almost unanimous in the
belief that the expulsions were unjustified. Dissatisfaction
among both groups increased, with seven per cent of the
expellees saying in March 1 946 that they were not satisifed with
the way they had been treated and 45 per cent expressing this
view by September 1947; among native residents, in March
1946 a fourth (25%) predicted that the expellees would not get
along with the native population and in September 1947 almost
half (46%) made this prediction. Six out of ten native Germans
(59%) considered the expellees to be German citizens; they
were also the respondents most Ukely to think that the
expellees would adjust to their new surroundings.
A vast majority of the expellees (85%) would go back to
the place of their birth if they had a chance; nine out of ten
native residents (91%) also felt that the expellees would go
home if they could.
Two-thirds (66%) of AMZON residents predicted that the
displaced persons would not be able to get along with the native
population, and as few as three per cent of those interviewed
considered the DPs to be German citizens. About one in seven
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 187
(25%) thought that Germany should be responsible for the
support of the DPs, with one-third (32%) placing this responsi-
bility at the door of the DPs' native country.
Report No. 82 (8 December 1947)
GERMAN SENTIMENT FOR PEACE AND ECONOMIC
SECURITY
Sample: in the course of three surveys, 1,470, 3,005, and
3,004 interviews were conducted in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: 26 April 1946, 10 December 1946, and
4 August 1947.(5 pp.)
Large and sohd majorities of the public consistently rejected
many of the propositions, presented to them in the interviews,
expressing a basic inclination toward the values of militarism or
war. At the same time, more than half the public did not deny
the idea of racial superiority with its implication of a right to
rule. The three statements with which respondents most
frequently agreed were: "The human spirit is not glorified by
war alone" (96%); "War does not pay" (94%); and "A civilian is
not less worthy than a soldier" (90%). (Complete wordings and
results appear in an appendix in the report.)
Reaction to the propositions suggests that the German
public saw only a partial or indirect relationship between the
actions of their government and themselves. Probably still more
basic to this problem is the German outlook on individual
rights. Asked to choose between a government that provides
economic security and one which guarantees civil hberties, the
majority (62%) preferred the former and many fewer (26%)
chose the latter. Asked which was the most important of the
basic freedoms, 31 percent mentioned commercial freedom, 22
per cent chose religious freedom, 1 9 per cent free elections, and
only 14 per cent free speech.
188 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 83 (9 December 1947)
NEWSPAPER READERSHIP AND NEWSCAST LISTENING
Sample: more than 1,500 Bavarian adults and over 600
adults from Wuerttemberg-Baden, as well as 500 West
Berliners.
Interviewing dates: latter part of September 1947. (10 pp.)
More than half of the people interviewed in Bavaria (53%)
and Wuerttemberg-Baden (58%) considered themselves to be
regular newspaper readers; in West Berlin nearly three-fourths
(73%) made this claim. The most widely read paper in West
Berlin was the British licensed Telegraf, followed by the
American hcensed Tagesspiegel.
A fourth (25%) of the people in Bavaria and Wuerttem-
berg-Baden (and 31 per cent in West Berlin) said that they
listened to radio newscasts regularly. In both areas 90 per cent
or more of the respondents Ustened to the local station. In West
Berlin, Radio Berlin had 47 per cent of this audience, followed
by RIAS with 38 per cent.
Those who considered themselves regular newspaper
readers or radio Usteners were generally inclined to think that
the news they were getting was more rehable than what had
been available during the war. Nonetheless, more than a quarter
apparently felt that there had been Uttle change.
Regular readers and listeners were also more inclined than
others to assert an interest in political matters. Neither
newspaper reading nor radio listening, however, appeared to
influence opinions on the intention of the Allies regarding
Germany; only about two in ten of all groups felt that the Allies
would unite Germany.
Not unexpectedly, the more educated, men, urban resi-
dents, and those of higher socioeconomic status were more
likely than their counterparts to read newspapers and Hsten to
radio newscasts. In September 1947, only seven per cent of the
Bavarian respondents and 13 per cent of the people in
Wuerttemberg-Baden said that they read newspapers from other
THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 189
zones. More than eight in ten of those out-of-zone newspaper
readers claimed preference for AMZON papers. The readers
themselves possessed, for the most part, those characteristics
usually associated with the most alert, best informed population
groups.
Report No. 84 (17 December 1947)
WHO ARE THE EXPELLEES AND WHAT DO THEY THINK?
Sample: 466 expellees and 2,373 native Germans in the
American Zone.
Interviewing dates: September 1947. (10 pp.)
According to the October 1946 German census - one year
before this survey was made— 16.2 per cent of the AMZON
population came from former German territories; 8.3 per cent
from Czechoslovakia, 4.3 per cent from territories east of the
Oder-Neisse, 1.8 per cent from southeastern Europe, and 1.8
per cent from other foreign countries. This report compares the
socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes of these expellees
with those of the native residents of the regions to which they
had moved.
The expellees were rather similar to the native population,
both in their socioeconomic characteristics and in their atti-
tudes. Six out of ten expellees (60%) were living in small towns
of under 2,000 population and as few as five per cent lived in
cities of over 100,000; for native AMZON residents the figures
were 49 and 22 per cent, respectively. The age distribution of
both groups was about the same, as was their education.
The economic situation of the expellees, however, was
considerably worse than that of the native residents. A third
(34%) of the expellees received less than 70 Reichsniarks a
month as compared to 19 per cent of the native population.
Conversely, as few as 1 5 per cent of the new arrivals had
190 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
monthly incomes above RM 200, whereas 34 per cent of the
native Germans received this sum every month. The work status
of expellees followed about the same pattern as that of the
native Germans, except that few expellees were tradesmen and
farmers and twice as many were working as unskilled laborers.
Only 18 per cent of them were unemployed, and of these only
three per cent were employable.
About three-fourths (72%) of the new arrivals were
Catholics, whereas only 52 per cent of the native population
was Catholic. Twenty-six per cent of the expellees and 45 per
cent of the native Germans were Protestants. Native Germans
tended to go to church more regularly than the newcomers.
Over half of the expellees (54%) as compared to 41 per
cent of the native Germans said either that they favored none of
the existing parties or that they had not yet decided which one
they preferred. Among those who did express a party
preference, about the same number of expellees (28%) and
native Germans (27%) chose the SPD.
Whereas 66 per cent of the native population claimed that
they did not get enough to eat, 80 per cent of the expellees
made this claim. Their greatest worry, however, was simply the
fact of being an evacuee coupled with the desire to return to
their homes.
Close to 80 per cent of both expellees and native Germans
lacked confidence in Allied reconstruction efforts. And the
same number of new arrivals and native residents (41%) felt that
local officials were working primarily for their own benefit. In
addition, four out of ten expellees and long-time residents did
not consider it worthwhile to hold political meetings. If forced
to choose between communism or National Socialism, as few as
two per cent of the expellees and four per cent of the native
Germans chose communism. Almost the same number (37 and
38 per cent, respectively) felt that National Socialism was a bad
idea; whereas 52 per cent of the native population thought it
was a good idea badly carried out, 46 per cent of the expellees
held this viewpoint.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 191
Report No. 85 (17 December 1947)
SUMMARY OF TRENDS OF GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION
Sample: not specified.
Interviewing dates: between November 1945 and late
1947. (6 pp.)
Food. In November 1945, 20 per cent of the population
mentioned food as their chief source of concern. This figure
held, on the average, until March 1946 when it rose to 30 per
cent — following a cut in food rations — and then to 40 per cent
where it remained until February 1947; by the end of 1947 it
had risen still higher, to 50 per cent. In Berlin the situation was
consistently worse, with the figures rising from 52 per cent in
March 1946 to a high of 74 per cent in July 1947, just before
the harvest, and then back down to 57 per cent at the end of
the year, following the harvest.
Fuel. Concern about fuel closely followed seasonal needs,
dropping almost to nothing in the summer, rising sharply in
September, and with the peak in February. In AMZON,
however, this peak was 1 4 per cent whereas in Berlin during the
same winter the figure was 41 per cent.
Other Worries. Mentions of clothing and shoe shortages
rose, with eight per cent citing this in 1945 but 35 per cent
concerned about it by 1947. The percentage concerned about
prisoners of war decreased. Financial worries increased slightly.
Politics. In the fall of 1945, 69 per cent of the
population held pohtical meetings to be desirable but, by
August 1947, the number responding in this way had dropped
to 45 per cent. Local government officials did not maintain the
confidence of the people: Whereas in August 1946, 42 per cent
thought they were doing their jobs well, only half as many
192 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
(22%) gave them the same credit in October 1947. In 1945, 62
per cent said that they felt these officials were working for the
good of the community, but by late 1947 only 45 per cent felt
that this was the case. The number feehng that the jobs were
being done for selfish reasons rose from 1 2 to 42 per cent.
Loss of confidence in the Americans also occurred. In
August 1947, 44 per cent of the people said that they thought
the United States was helping in the reconstruction of
Germany; in November 1945, however, this positive attitude
had been expressed by 70 per cent of the people. Confidence in
Allied cooperation deteriorated radically as well: In January
1946, 15 per cent were pessimistic on this count; by the fall of
1947 the figure had risen to 70 per cent.
Confidence in news sources also dechned, from a high of
75 per cent reporting daily in January 1946 that they read a
newspaper to 55 per cent saying they did so in the fall of 1947.
Concomitant with the loss of confidence in the Allies was
a consistent reduction in the number of persons who would
choose communism over National Socialism if forced to pick
one: In the fall of 1945, 35 per cent of the people said that
they would take communism; in late 1947 only four per cent
made this choice. Those saying "neither" tripled during this
time from 22 to 66 per cent.
One figure that remained constant was the number of
people (62%) who said they preferred economic security to
guarantees of certain civil hberties.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 193
Report No. 86 (17 December 1947)
SUMMARY OF REACTIONS TO END OF LONDON
CONFERENCE
Sample: 188 West Berliners.
Interviewing dates: 16 December 1947. (3 pp.)
The interviews were conducted covertly on the streets of West
Berlin following the conclusion of the London Conference. Two
out of three (65%) had already heard about the end of the
Conference. Many more (40%) blamed the Soviet Union for the
breakup of the Conference than blamed the United States (1%).
A plurality, however, spoke in terms of allotting some respon-
sibihty to both sides (42%), although even these people put
primary blame on the Soviets for the outcome.
A large majority expected greater difficulties for Germany
following the Conference. One in three persons (32%) beheved
that Germany would eventually be divided into two parts.
Another one in four (26%) felt that there would be no change
in the current state of affairs. About 1 5 per cent thought the
situation would deteriorate, possibly into war. About the same
number (14%) suggested that a new conference might be called.
Of those who felt that Germany would be spHt, 63 per
cent expected no change in Berlin's status, 1 6 per cent thought
that the Western Allies would leave and that the Soviets would
take over the entire city, and 13 per cent thought that the city
would also be split.
The morale of the general public did not seem noticeably
affected by the results of the Conference although there were
indications that the people felt that events were taking place
over which they had no control. The report ends with the
suggestion that the Germans might be induced to see that it was
the Russian refusal to accept principles rather than Allied
disagreement that caused adjournment.
194 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 87 (9 January 1948)
THE TREND OF GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ALLIED
COOPERATION
Sample: an unspecified number comprising a representative
sample of Germans in the American Zone and West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 25 July 1946, 5 June 1947, 25 August
1947, and 15 September 1947. (3 pp.)
The failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London was
widely interpreted as responsible for the gloomy outlook of the
German people toward Allied cooperation. The data from the
present study indicated, however, that the pessimism could not
be attributed solely or even chiefly to the failure of that
conference, since the attitude had been apparent six months
before it took place.
In July 1946, a solid majority reportedly believed that the
Allies would work together toward the unification of Germany.
One year later, in the summer of 1947, a sohd majority denied
that the Allies would work together toward this end. Only in
West Berlin were there more - but only a very few more —
optimists in September (27%) than there had been in August
1947 (21%). Within the Laender, fewer Hessians tended to
expect cooperation than did residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden
or Bavaria; in fact, Bavarians were almost as optimistic as West
Berhners.
Throughout the period under consideration, there was a
marked difference in response between educational groups.
Consistently, the best educated people were more dubious
about Allied cooperation. The pessimists tended to be those
who claimed to think about political affairs and claimed to be
newspaper readers. Significantly, more of the optimists
appeared ready to accept broad German responsibihty for the
war.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 195
Report No. 88 (20 January 1948)
GERMAN OPINION ON THE PEOPLE'S PART IN
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Sample: a cross-section of over 3,400 Germans living in the
American Zone and West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: October 1947. (9 pp.)
Opinion was divided on the issue of whether or not an increased
interest in politics would help in the reconstruction of
Germany: 41 per cent said it would help and 46 per cent felt it
would not. Significantly, former members of the Nazi Party
(48%) and people with 12 years or more schooling (51%) were
more likely than others to deny the usefulness of an interest in
politics. Of those who said that poUtical activity would be of no
help, 1 1 per cent said that they had lost confidence in politics
and ten per cent said that working directly on the problems of
reconstruction would be worth far more.
Seven in ten AMZON Germans (70%) would reportedly
turn down a reasonable poUtical office if they were offered one.
In contrast to this, 82 per cent expressed a willingness to work
an hour longer every day for the reconstruction of their
country.
According to a third (34%) of the AMZON population and
almost a half of the West Berliners (46%), the individual could
not influence the activities of the political parties. About
two-thirds of the AMZON respondents (63%) and 78 per cent
of the West Berliners, however, felt that in the future the people
ought to have more influence on political activities.
196 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 89 (22 January 1948)
RECEPTION OF THE PAMPHLET "OFFEN GESAGT"
Sample: 1 40 persons in the American Sector of Berlin.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (8 pp.)
Several pamphlets were published and sold to the German
public in fairly large numbers as an overt orientation operation
of Military Government. This is the first study made of such a
pamphlet and concerns Off en Gesagt (Speaking Frankly) by
former Secretary of State James Byrnes. The respondents were
chosen to represent three specific groups: age groupings, social
status groupings, and men and women.
Slightly more than half (56%) of the people tested read the
pamphlet from beginning to end. The pamphlet appealed most
strongly to people in middle status positions: those with nine to
eleven years of education (63%), those between 30 and 45 years
of age (59%), and those from the lower-middle class (55%) as well
as the upper and upper-middle class (57%); also, many more
men (59%) than women (39%) found it very interesting.
Although young people and women were not as keenly
interested as the middle-aged and men, both the young and the
women claimed as frequently as their counterpart groups that
they had learned something from the booklet. Among those
who claimed to have learned something, 21 per cent mentioned
details about the Yalta Conference, 19 per cent mentioned
Allied disagreements with a negative emphasis upon the Soviet
Union, and 16 per cent cited the Berlin-Moscow pact indicating
that Hitler's meeting with Molotov showed the latter's unrea-
sonable attitude.
Practically all respondents (93%) said that the translation
was good and half (49%) of the respondents felt that stylisti-
cally it was clear and understandable. Two in three (66%) said
that they would have bought the pamphlet on the newsstand if
they had seen it there.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 197
Report No. 90 (23 January 1948)
GERMAN OPINIONS ON SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTRY
Sample: unspecified number of respondents in the Ameri-
can Zone and West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: November 1947. (8 pp.)
The survey attempted to get at attitudes toward the socializa-
tion or nationalization (Verstaatlichung) of industry.
Four in ten AMZON respondents (41%) and 50 per cent of
the West Berliners felt that the workers would not be better off
if industry were socialized; only 30 per cent in AMZON and 36
per cent in West BerUn said that they would be better off. There
was more support for the socialization of heavy industry (49
per cent in AMZON and 57 per cent in West Berhn).
When asked whether the responsibihty of German indus-
triaUsts for World War II was very great, great, or slight, 51 per
cent of the people in AMZON said that it was very great or
great. Two-thirds of those people who thought workers would
be better off under socialization as well as two-thirds of those
who favored socialization in part or in total also placed heavy
blame on the industrialists.
No population or geographical groups favored total
socialization of industry in significant numbers. Tending to
approve the socialization of heavy industry only were adherents
of the SPD, independent businessmen, officials, skilled laborers,
and the middle classes. Opponents of any socialization at all
were found in largest numbers among LDP/DVP sympathizers,
people from upper socioeconomic levels, and the highly
educated.
198 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Comparison of opinions on socialization of industry with
those on the workers' lot under such a regime showed some
interesting results. Not surprisingly, people opposed to any or
all socialization were almost completely agreed (89%) that it
would not be a good thing for the worker. Similarly, advocates
of complete socialization rallied in equal numbers (87%) to the
claim that it would be a good thing for the worker. In contrast,
the group favoring partial socialization (30 per cent in AMZON)
did not fall clearly into either extreme. As many of them
claimed the workers would be badly off under socialization
(45%) as claimed they would gain from it (41%).
Report No. 91 (24 January 1948)
GERMAN CONCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN BARTERING
AND BLACK MARKETEERING
Sample: not specified, in the American Zone and West
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: not specified (5 pp.)
Three out of ten AMZON Germans (30%) thought that there
were Americans in Germany who were enriching themselves
through barter activities; in West Berlin the figure was 48 per
cent. A similar proportion in AMZON (29%) felt that the
United States occupation troops were using German food
supplies; but in West Berlin only five per cent thought this to be
true. A somewhat larger number (36 per cent in AMZON and
30 per cent in West Berlin) reported hearing that Americans
wasted or destroyed food.
A close relationship was found between attitudes on black
marketeering and alleged American barter and food practices. In
AMZON, 71 per cent of the population said that black
marketeering was being practiced in their communities and 73
per cent felt that the German officials were not doing all they
could to stop it. Of those who thought that there was a great
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 199
deal of black marketeering going on in their community, 49 per
cent said that Americans were enriching themselves in Germany
by bartering; of those who said that there was no black market,
only 15 per cent said that the Americans were gaining from
barter.
A large number of persons who knew Americans (42%)
said that the Americans were enriching themselves, but only 26
per cent of those who did not know any Americans felt this to
be true.
Better-educated groups and upper-class groups tended
more frequently than their counterparts to think that Ameri-
cans gained from barter. Otherwise there were no marked
differences among the various population groups in attitudes on
these matters.
Report No. 92 (9 February 1948)
READERS OF "MEIN KAMPF"
Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone and West
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: November 1947. (4 pp.)
Two in ten AMZON Germans (19%) admitted having read all or
part of Mein Kampf. People who had read it in the greatest
numbers were those considered to be among the book reading
public, the well educated, professional and businessmen, and
those in the upper and upper-middle socioeconomic levels. More
men than women had read it, as well as more men who had
been in military service than those who had not. About the
same number of people in all age groups had read the book.
Among former NSDAP members, 72 per cent of those who
had read Mein Kampf but only 50 per cent of the nonreaders
said that every person has certain inalienable rights; among
those who had not belonged to the party, 64 per cent of those
who had read it and 43 per cent of those who had not felt that
there were such rights.
200 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 93 (1 1 February 1948)
"THE CREAM OF THE CROP" TWO YEARS LATER
Sample: 78 former prisoners of war who had attended a
course on democracy at Fort Getty and who filled out a
mailed questionnaire.
Interviewing dates: spring 1947. (15 pp.)
At the end of the war, a group of specially selected German
prisoners of war in the United States was sent to a school at
Fort Getty to learn about democracy and the principles for
which the United States stands. They were later released in
Germany with no special provision having been made for their
future. Some maintained contact with each other and with their
former teachers. Not surprisingly, the proportion of profes-
sional people and white collar workers among the group was
very high (73%) and their poHtical attitudes differed consider-
ably from the picture presented by the population as a whole.
The Fort Getty respondents said that, on their return to
Germany, they were more impressed by the chaotic state in the
mental attitudes of the people than by the physical and material
conditions. Nearly half of them mentioned widespread corrup-
tion, low levels of both morals and morale.
Four in ten said that the length of the occupation would
depend on what happened in the international arena; one in ten
felt it would last until there was a functioning democracy in
Germany. Four in ten thought it should last until democracy
was established in the country. On the future of Germany, less
than a fifth thought the country would recover regardless of
outside help and an equal number were completely pessimistic.
Seven out of ten considered the general economic, political,
and social conditions to be the greatest obstacle to the democra-
tization of Germany. Half of all respondents accused the Germans
of pohtical apathy, intolerance, and lack of a genuine concept
of freedom. Three out of ten were severely critical of the
denazification process and many felt that this hindered the
education of the German population to democratic ways.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 201
Nearly a fourth of the respondents (23%) were members of
one of the political parties, whereas only about five per cent of
the general public claimed membership. Over a third (35%)
preferred the SPD, one in seven belonged to the LDP/DVP, and
one in ten to the CDU/CSU. The third of the respondents who
had disclaimed preference for any party said that the parties
pursued self-centered policies, inspired Uttle confidence, were
old-fashioned, and many blamed them for Hitler's rise to power.
Quite a large number refused to make predictions concern-
ing their own futures but half of all respondents were rather
confident and considered their prospects good. One point worth
noting was the concern expressed by many over whether or not
to take an active part in politics. Siding with any poUtical party
was considered dangerous, but a strict neutrality was also
thought to be disadvantageous.
Three-fourths of the group had already thought about
emigrating. Four in ten had decided not to leave, an equal
number said that they did hope to emigrate, and another two in
ten said they would consider it if the economic or political
situation in Germany turned out to be hopeless.
Less than half claimed to be sufficiently well-informed on
current events. One-fourth mentioned the lack of newspapers,
radio sets, and preoccupation with burdens of daily hfe.
Significantly, 64 per cent of the group was employed at
the time of the questionnaire in some sort of government work.
The Fort Getty certificate proved to be helpful to four out of
ten in obtaining such work. A fifth had never made use of the
certificate. Nine per cent were white-collar workers and
professionals, and five per cent worked in private business.
202 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 94 (24 February 1948)
CONTACTS BETWEEN GERMANS AND AMERICANS
Sample: a representative sample of people in the American
Zone and West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: November 1947. (16 pp.)
About a quarter of AMZON Germans (27%) and West Berliners
(25%) said that they had become acquainted with Americans
after the war. Most of these contacts were made by chance or
through professional and work channels, and most of the
acquaintanceships remained extremely casual. Germans who
knew Americans tended to be predominantly from the upper
socioeconomic and educational strata; more men and younger
people than women and older people had American acquain-
tances. Very few people ( 1 2%) had received gift packages from
Americans; recipients were more likely to be residents of
medium-size cities than those of large cities or rural areas.
Although knowing Americans appeared to have little
influence on general attitudes and opinions, it did affect
opinions relating to Americans in Germany. Of those who knew
Americans, 63 per cent said that German employees were well
treated by the Americans, whereas among those who did not
know Americans only 52 per cent felt this to be true. On
certain issues, such as American wastefulness and negligence
regarding property, people who knew Americans were more
critical than those who did not.
More significantly, personal relationships with Americans
did not affect views on certain basic issues. Among those under
40 years of age with nine or more years of education. National
Socialism was a good idea badly carried out for a sizable
majority of both those who knew Americans (68%) and those
who did not {10%). In both groups, just over 40 per cent felt
that the Germans were responsible for Hitler's rise to power and
about a fourth said they were to blame for his staying in power.
A third of the AMZON Germans thought that the United
States occupation troops were more popular then than they had
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 203
been a year earlier, another third said the popularity level was
the same, and 22 per cent felt it had diminished. Those who
said that they were more popular also held generally more
favorable attitudes towards Americans. Those who said that the
Americans had become less popular than formerly were also
more prone to attitudes consistent with Nazism; 53 per cent felt
that some races are more fit to rule than others.
More West BerUners than AMZON Germans thought that
the Americans had gained in popularity. The same was true of
men, people with eight years of education, and older people,
whereas the young and those with nine to eleven years of
education tended toward the belief that the Americans were less
popular.
Report No. 95 (25 February 1948)
APPRAISAL OF THE CONTENT OF EDUCATION AND
EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES
Sample: 45 1 adults in West Berlin and 223 in Stuttgart, all
1 8 years of age and over.
Interviewing dates: January 1948. (8 pp.)
The outlook toward educational problems in themselves did not
differ markedly between the two cities. More people in West
Berlin (55%) than in Stuttgart (18%) expressed concern about
the lack of clothing and shoes for the children. Shortage of
buildings, however, concerned the respondents in Stuttgart
(43%) more than it did those in West Berhn ( 1 6%).
Nearly everyone in both communities (90%) supported the
teaching of religion in the schools and large majorities (60%)
felt that such instruction should be compulsory. In Stuttgart,
however, 63 per cent felt it ought to be handled by clerics
whereas in West Berhn only 37 per cent favored clerics as
contrasted with 47 per cent who felt school teachers should give
religious instruction.
204 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Only minorities supported beating of students as a basic
right of teachers (under 30 per cent). Large majorities in West
Berlin (86%) and Stuttgart (85%) favored the formation of a
school board in every city. Few West Berhners (24%) and
Stuttgart residents (14%) thought that the dismissal of teachers
who were former NSDAP members had had favorable effects
upon the educational system.
In both cities, residents gave as the chief aim of general
education "a comprehensive general education" (37 per cent in
West Berlin and 52 per cent in Stuttgart); for West Berliners the
second most important goal was discipline (28%) whereas in
Stuttgart it was training for a future job (20%). The educational
philosophy of various groupings showed a primary emphasis
upon order and conduct, with a fairly heavy vote for vocational
training among the old, the lower class, and those with eight
years or less education. The youth of Germany, however, those
with nine or more years of education, and the upper and
middle-class members overwhelmingly selected the other two
objectives — a rounded education and the development of
independent thinking.
About half (49 per cent in West Berlin and 5 1 per cent in
Stuttgart) the public said that the failure to teach history would
have very serious effects. Teaching of history was considered
least important by those who regarded vocational training as the
prime aim of education (57%) and most important by those
who considered critical thinking the main objective (55%).
Asked why history was not being taught at the time of the
survey, the bulk of those who had opinions pointed to a general
confusion in the poUtical situation, a revision in the conception
of history, or the fact that the AlHes and the "experts"
disagreed on matters of interpretation (48 per cent in West
Berlin; 31 per cent in Stuttgart). About a fifth of the total
sample (22 and 21 per cent, respectively) responded that
nothing more dared be said about militarism or Nazism. Only
eight and four per cent, respectively, thought it necessary or a
good idea to remove the influence of miUtaristic and Nazi ideas.
Ten per cent in West Berlin and 26 per cent in Stuttgart had no
opinion on this question.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 205
Report No. 96 (3 March 1948)
GERMAN YOUTH VERSUS ADULTS ON QUESTIONS OF
DEMOCRACY
Sample: 1,000 adults and 2,000 young people from the
American Zone and samples from both groups in West
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: December 1947. (5 pp.)
German youth and adults gave an edge to democratic principles
when they were asked to choose between a democratic and an
authoritarian way of forming a new club. Of the AMZON young
people between 13 and 25 years old, 57 per cent thought that
the leader should be chosen by majority vote, as compared to
40 per cent who would have the leader appointed. About the
same number of adults (54%) were in the same democratic
camp. Young people between the ages of 13 and 25 who lived
in cities were the most democratic, and boys and men over 16
voted for majority rule considerably more often than girls and
women. Youngsters belonging to youth clubs that elected their
leaders supported democratic principles (71%) to a greater
extent than members of clubs that appointed their leaders
(49%). Youngsters and adults who might be considered politi-
cally informed were more likely to choose the democratic
alternative than were those who were uninformed. Although in
general those who kept up with current events were also most
likely to favor electing their leader, mass media did not seem to
affect the opinion of those between ten and 17 as much as the
older groups.
206 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 97 (3 March 1948)
BERLIN REACTIONS TO NAGY'S PAMPHLET
"MACHTRAUB IN UNGARN"
Sample: 149 people from the American Sector of Berlin
(controlled for age, social status, and sex only).
Interviewing dates: not specified. (7 pp.)
Machtraub in Ungarn {Power Grab in Hungary) by Ferenc Nagy,
like Secretary of State James Byrnes' volume, Offen Gesagt
{Speaking Frankly), was published and sold to the German
public as an overt orientation operation of the Military
Government (cf. Report No. 89).
Unlike Offen Gesagt, whose appeal was concentrated in
middle status, middle-aged, and slightly above average educa-
tional groups, Nagy's booklet evoked interest among all groups.
The least interested seemed to be those under 30 (39%), the
well educated (54%), and women (49%). Lower interest among
the more sophisticated seemed to be attributable to the
sensational character of the pamphlet.
About 75 per cent of those given the booklet actually read
it through from cover to cover. Within the individual groups,
those who had finished it were predominantly in the age group
from 46 to 60 (80%), those with a high school education (78%),
men (84%), and people of lower middle-class status (78%). Only
59 per cent of the respondents reported recommending it to
someone else; for the Byrnes book the figure had been 71 per
cent.
While 70 per cent of the respondents claimed to have
learned something from Offen Gesagt, only 48 per cent made
the same claim for Machtraub. Many more women (57%) than
men (39%) felt they had come upon some new fact. More
persons under 30 (53%) admitted having learned something
than the middle-aged (44%) or the old (49%). Pressed to
indicate what it was they had learned, most (54%) of these
people referred to the "crass brutahty" of the Russians.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 207
A very large majority (84%) of those who read the
pamphlet thought it good rather than fair (11%) or poor (2%).
Only three per cent expressed no opinion.
Practically everyone (87%) thought the presentation of the
facts to be fair rather than one-sided. Poorly educated people
and those under 30 v^ere slightly more likely to criticize the
factual presentation than was any other group.
Technically, there were almost no objections to the
booklet. Nearly all approved the style of writing and the
translation. To some, the cover seemed to smack of sensa-
tionalism, but relatively few sharply rejected the cover on this
ground. Almost no one (5%) said that the price was beyond
their means.
Report No. 98 (6 March 1948)
GOVERNMENT BY POLITICIANS, EXPERTS, OR THE
PEOPLE?
Sample: a cross-section of residents in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: November 1947. (4 pp.)
An overwhelming majority was in favor of the popular
determination of policy as opposed to its determination either
by poHticians or experts.
Those most strongly opposed to both politicians and
experts were members of poUtical parties; they appeared most
consistently in favor of determination of policy by the people.
Educated people appeared to differentiate sharply between the
two choices: When they could choose between poUticians and
the people, they rejected the former emphatically (13%) in
favor of the people (85%), but when the choice was between
the people and the experts, the vote for the former dropped
below the average for the entire population; almost three out of
208 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
ten (29%) educated people preferred experts rather than the
people.
When asked whether they thought some human rights to
be inalienable, or whether the state had a right to suspend any
rights when necessary, those who had voted for rule by the
people tended also to vote for the inviolability of human rights
(52%), while the others tended to vote for their suspension
when necessary (46%). Similarly, when questioned about racial
theory, those who thought that the experts should determine
policy also tended to think that some races were more fit to
rule than others (48%).
Report No. 99 (5 March 1948)
A REPORT ON GERMAN YOUTH
Sample: 1,996 respondents between ages of 10 and 25
from the American Zone and 341 from West Berlin; and
1,171 over the age of 26 from the American Zone and
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: late December 1947. (17 pp.)
The purpose of the study was to analyze three aspects of
German youth: the membership, organization, and activities of
youth clubs; club members contrasted with nonmembers as to
interests, activities, attitudes, and group activities; young
Germans contrasted with older Germans regarding interests and
activities.
In AMZON, 15 per cent of the younger sample claimed
membership in youth groups; in West Berlin the figure was 1 1
per cent. City youth were more likely to belong than were rural
youth. Most members (78%) went to the club at least once a
week. In most areas, the majority of clubs had either a special
room or club house. Over half the members said that their clubs
had no financial support and only a third in AMZON (37 per
cent in West Berlin) reported paying dues.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 209
Positions of leadership were limited among AMZON club
members as a whole. Only seven per cent held any office. In
West Berlin 17 per cent held some office. Older members
tended to hold office more often than younger members.
Office-holders tended to be male (68%), from the middle class
(68%). A majority, both in AMZON (51%) and West Berlin
(53%), said that their leaders were appointed by outsiders.
Few AMZON club members (11%) but as many as 32 per
cent in West Berlin complained about the lack of good
leadership and discipline and the fact that groups of different
ages were in the same room.
Of those club members who had also belonged to the
Hitler Youth, 63 per cent contrasted the militarism of the
earher group with the freedom and democracy of the new. The
most popular activities in the Hitler Youth had been social
activities (36%) followed by sports and games (32%). The most
disliked aspect was the militarism of the organization (43%).
Club members, although more likely than nonmembers to
read youth magazines and other publications and to Usten to
the radio, were not better informed on such matters as world
leaders or the name of their local mayor. Attitudes toward
democratic and ethical values did not differ greatly between
members and nonmembers. Both groups selected similar figures
as the greatest German: Goethe and Schiller ranked first,
nonpoUtical figures came second, nationaUst or military figures
third; almost half gave no reply. Club members appeared to
come from a relatively higher socioeconomic level than non-
members and were more often regular churchgoers. Members
and nonmembers did not differ with respect to the occupation
of the head of the family.
Among all age groups, the most read sections of the
newspapers were the local news and the advertisements. A
majority of radio listeners preferred musical programs. Older
people liked news and commentaries more than did the
younger. Large majorities of all age groups did not like to
attend lectures. Leisure-time activities were fairly similar in all
age groups, with handicrafts and studying, writing, and reading
mentioned most frequently.
210 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 100 (March 1948)
TRENDS IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION
Sample: the number of respondents varied from 365 in the
first survey to 4,000 interviewed in January 1948; the
total number of persons interviewed was over 1 6 million in
the American Zone and West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: from 26 October 1945 to 5 January
1948 during which time more than fifty full-scale surveys
were conducted. (43 pp.)
This report summarizes in graphic form major trends of German
opinion in the American occupied areas, and covers seven major
issues: reorientation, politics, media, the occupation, economic
affairs, food, and expellees.
Reorientation. In 1947 surveys an average of 52 per cent
accepted National Socialism as a good idea badly carried out;
this was a rise of five percentage points over the previous year
but only two points higher than it had been in 1945. If forced
to choose between communism and National Socialism, "a
plurality preferred the former in 1945, most people rejected
both in 1946, and by 1947, although the "neither" category
remained large, more chose National Socialism, and almost no
one picked communism. Two years after the war's end, the
number of Germans wilHng to assume responsibihty for their
country's part in bringing on the war continued a downward
trend. About four in ten AMZON Germans felt that some races
are more fit to rule than others.
Whereas before January 1948 over half the public had
accepted the right of communists to speak on the radio, after
this date only a Uttle more than a third did so. From the outset,
large majorities of AMZON Germans said that, if they had to
choose, they would prefer a government guaranteeing jobs
rather than one that promoted personal liberty.
Politics. The number of Germans who claimed to be
informed about politics continued to drop after 1947 and the
number of people who did not wish to see their sons enter
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 21 1
politics remained at over 75 per cent. In all surveys, about a
third of the people said that they thought about pohtics, with
the rest leaving this task to "the others." In early 1947 a high of
72 per cent said that they thought pohtical meetings were of
value, but by the end of that year the figure had dropped to 45
per cent; in early 1948 it had again risen, but only to 58 per
cent. Confidence in the motives of local German officials
showed a definite downward trend; disenchantment with the
performance of these officials was also growing.
Throughout AMZON, the CDU/CSU lost half the popular
support it had enjoyed in the fall of 1945. Meanwhile the
LDP/DVP gained, particularly in Wuerttemberg-Baden. At the
same time, the number of people Uking none of the parties
tripled.
Media. Regular newspaper readership declined between
early 1946 and the spring of 1947, levehng off at about half
the AMZON population; in West Berlin about three-quarters
claimed to be regular readers. In January 1948, 56 per cent of
the AMZON population were regular or occasional radio
hsteners; more than four in ten consistently claimed to be
nonUsteners. In January 1948 only 47 per cent felt that they
were getting more accurate news coverage than during the war;
the "no opinion" replies rose sharply from 22 per cent in
January 1947 to 49 per cent in January 1948. In early 1946, 50
per cent of the AMZON public felt that newspaper coverage was
more complete than that given on the radio; by January 1948
the two were given equal ratings.
The Occupation. Confidence in Allied efforts to rebuild
Germany dropped from 43 per cent in September 1946 to only
three in ten by January 1948. Confidence in American efforts
to rebuild Germany, which had dropped from 70 to 44 per cent
between 1945 and 1947, rose to 55 per cent in January 1948,
possibly because of the Marshall Plan. No more than a third ever
felt that the four powers would cooperate in rebuilding
Germany; in early 1948, in fact, less than one in ten held this
view.
212 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Between January 1946 and January 1948, there was a
sharp increase in pessimism regarding a united Germany as an
end product of the occupation, from 7 1 per cent saying that the
Allies would cooperate to 80 per cent saying that they would
not.
Ever increasing numbers of Germans said that the United
States would be the most influential country in the world
throughout the next ten years and that this influence would be
toward peace. Almost all who named the Soviet Union saw war
as a result. Majority opinion continued to hold that the
Americans ought to reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in
order to prevent its falling prey to communism.
Economic Affairs. In January 1946, 67 per cent of the
AMZON population said that their family incomes were
sufficient to meet necessary expenses; two years later, however,
only 57 per cent did so. Large majorities in West Berhn claimed
that they could not meet living costs. There was no discernible
trend on opinions concerning the direction which prices would
take. Fluctuations also marked the trend in opinions on the
future conditions in AMZON. On the whole, between January
1946 and June 1947 about as many people thought that the
Reichsmark would not maintain its value as thought it would.
Increasingly large numbers of AMZON residents had come
to the conclusion that a local black market existed and was
serious. In February 1946, 51 per cent thought that there was
no black market but by January 1948, 71 per cent recognized
there was; similarly, at the earlier date only 1 5 per cent felt that
it was serious, but by the later date 47 per cent thought so. At
the same time, confidence in official efforts to stop the black
market decreased sharply, although in early 1948 the trend
seemed to be on the upswing once again.
Food. Increasing numbers of people cited food as their
chief source of concern, having risen from only 17 per cent in
AMZON in 1945 to 53 per cent in 1948. Clothing and shoes
followed in importance and the percentage mentioning them
had also increased. Majority opinion in AMZON continued to
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 213
hold that the ration card system was being handled fairly,
although the number thinking so had decreased sharply from 93
per cent in late 1945 to 64 per cent in January 1948. Majorities,
often large ones, maintained that they did not get enough food
to do their jobs well; in West Berlin the figure was as high as
eight in ten.
Expellees. By January 1948, as many as 93 per cent of
the Germans held the opinion that the expulsions had been
unjustified. Both expellees and native residents were almost
unanimous in feeUng that the expellees would hke to return to
their homelands. As in the previous year, about half of the
AMZON population said that the expellees would get along well
with the local residents and about four in ten said that they
would not; Hessians were most optimistic on this score, the
residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden the most pessimistic. The
expellees themselves were less satisfied in January 1948 with
their reception in Germany than they had been in the fall of
1946.
Report No. 101 (24 March 1948)
GERMAN YOUTH AND ADULTS VIEW
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Sample: 1,000 adults and 2,000 young people in the
American Zone and West Berhn.
Interviewing dates: late December 1947 and early January
1948. (7 pp.)
Few German youngsters between 10 and 12 considered an
individual member of a club responsible for the actions of other
club members. When asked if a boy should help pay for a
window broken by other members of his club while he was not
present, about a fourth (23%) of the children between 10 and
1 2 thought he should help pay, while over half of those
214 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
between 13 and 25 and 38 per cent of those 26 years old and
over supported such group responsibiUty. In Bavaria, Hesse, and
Wuerttemberg-Baden, youth and adults tended to have about
the same idea on this question. The size of town that children
between 10 and 12 lived in seemed to have Uttle or no effect on
their attitudes although those between 13 and 25 who lived in
large cities were considerably more conscious of the group spirit
than the same age group living in small towns. Of the children
who had belonged to one of the Hitler youth groups, 48 per
cent thought the boy ought to help pay for the window.
In considering what a young boy should do whose club
friends have decided to steal a lamp, respondents between the
ages of 18 and 25 as well as adults — especially West Ber-
liners — were most Ukely to recommend that the boy take some
positive steps registering his disapproval. Those who advocated
such action were from the middle socioeconomic groups,
former members of the Hitler youth groups, the more highly
educated, and those who kept up with current events. Children
of ten and eleven were least hkely to say that, if they were the
young boy in question, they would go as far as to leave the
club, try to prevent others from stealing, or tell someone about
the plan.
The next and final sketch continued the previous one, with
the young boy accompanying his friends in the theft of the
lamp and the entire group being caught. Since he had opposed
the action, was the young boy to blame or not? In AMZON, 80
per cent of the children between 10 and 17, 85 per cent of
those between 18 and 25, and 79 per cent of the adults
considered him guilty. In West Berlin, young people between
the ages of 18 and 25 almost unanimously (97%) gave the
verdict guilty, while 81 per cent of those between 10 and 17
and 87 per cent of the adults gave the same verdict.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 215
Report No. 102 (24 March 1948)
PATRONAGE OF U.S. INFORMATION CENTERS
Sample: an unspecified number of adults in the American
Zone, West Berhn, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (3 pp.)
One out of every 1 00 adult Germans in the American Zone said
he had visited an Amerika Haus (United States Information
Center). In West Berlin the figure was slightly higher with two
out of every 1 00, and in Bremen it was as high as three out of
100.
Knowledge of what the centers had to offer was not very
extensive, either. More than nine out of ten in AMZON claimed
to know nothing about them, in West Berlin 89 per cent
disclaimed any such knowledge, and in Bremen the figure was
78 per cent.
People living in cities were both more likely to have heard
about the information centers and to have visited one. Even in
the largest cities (250,000 and over), however, knowledge of
them was only at the eight per cent level and a mere one per
cent had visited one.
When people were asked about the Amerika Haus nearest
them it turned out that the best known were those in
Heidelberg (14%), Wuerzburg (11%), Darmstadt (8%), Bamberg
(8%), and Regensburg (7%).
Although very few AMZON residents frequented informa-
tion centers, those who did represented the leadership groups,
those with higher levels of education, men, and readers of
foreign periodicals.
216 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 103 (24 March 1948)
READERSHIP OF POLITICAL BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS
Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: February 1948. (3 pp.)
The purpose of the report was to ascertain the readership of five
political books or pamphlets: Der SS-Staat by Eugen Kogon
(read by 2.4 per cent of the sample), Offen Gesagt by James
Byrnes (2.0%), Hinter dem eisernen Vorhang (2.9%), Machtraub
in Ungarn by Ferenc Nagy (0.5%), and Marshall stellt klar
(0.1%). Readership was extremely limited, with more men
having read them than women. And compared with the
population as a whole, the readers tended to be better educated,
city dwellers from the upper socioeconomic levels.
Report No. 104 (24 March 1948)
THE MARSHALL PLAN IN PROSPECT
Sample: 3,003 adults in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (5 pp.)
In August 1947 nearly half (41%) of a representative cross-
section of adults in the American Zone said that they had heard
of the Marshall Plan. By March 1948, six months later, 69 per
cent claimed to know about it. Among those who had heard of
it, 75 per cent were in favor of it and 85 per cent thought that
it would have a favorable effect upon living conditions. About
twice as many people thought that the chances for success were
poor (13%) or nonexistent (1%) as believed the chances were
very high (6%); most people thought they were only high (36%)
or just fair (32%).
Many people in AMZON (53%) felt that American aid
would not be sufficient; in West Berlin the figure was even
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 217
higher, at 59 per cent. Women (27%) were less confident of the
sufficiency of American aid than men (35%), the young less so
than the old. People whose education or status was low tended,
also, to be slightly more pessimistic than those with more educa-
tion or higher status.
Among those who had heard of the Marshall Plan, 80 per
cent felt it had been set up to help keep western Europe from
turning communist; the second most frequently chosen reason
(44%) was America's sincere desire to help Europe; 29 per cent
thought it was to ensure allies in case of war with the Soviet
Union; and about the same number (25%) said it was a way for
the United States to dump goods resulting from overproduction.
The percentages of young people who accepted American inten-
tions as sincere (37%) was smaller than it was among the middle-
aged (45%) or among those over 50 (51%). Attitudes of confi-
dence that the plan would be carried out were strongly related
to the belief in the sincerity of American motives.
Report No. 105 (27 March 1948)
INTERNATIONALISM IN GERMANY
Sample: 3,750 people 18 years of age or older in the
American Zone, West Berhn, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: first three weeks of March 1948. (7
pp.)
Half (49%) of the people interviewed had heard of plans to
create a Western European Union; those with more than twelve
years of education were much more likely to have heard of it
(94%) as was true of those with upper- and upper-middle-class
status (85%).
Almost no one opposed the idea of such a union and
confidence in its realization was fairly high. Nonetheless,
obstacles were known to exist. Only one in 20 (5%) saw no
218 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
obstacles, while about 35 per cent gave no response. Of those
who thought the chances for realization of such a union were
very high, 48 per cent cited the Soviet Union and communism
as possible difficulties, another 1 6 per cent mentioned national-
ism. Of those who thought the chances were poor or even nil,
35 per cent mentioned the Soviet Union and communism, 41
per cent cited nationalism, and 14 per cent could give no
reason.
While a soHd majority (59%) of the general public and even
more West Berliners (66%) believed that there would be another
world war within a generation, a large number of people (45%)
thought that a Western European Union would decrease the
possibilities of such a war. Only 13 per cent felt the union
would increase the possibilities for war. Significantly, of the
small percentage of persons (3%) who opposed the idea of a
Western European Union, two-thirds (65%) thought that it
would either increase or not affect the chances for a third world
war.
Practically the same people who knew about the Western
European Union also knew about the United Nations. But
confidence that the UN could secure peace was markedly lower
than was confidence in the possibiHty of realizing a Western
European Union. Only about a third (35%) of the people who
had ever heard of the UN granted that it had a fair or better
than fair chance of ensuring peace. In contrast, 45 per cent of
all the people beUeved that a Western European Union would
decrease the chances of war, if not prevent one.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 219
Report No. 106 (27 March 1948)
THE RADIO AUDIENCE IN AMZON,
BERLIN, AND BREMEN
Sample: 3,700 respondents in the American Zone, West
Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: the last three weeks of February 1948.
(9 pp.)
More than half (52%) of AMZON adults listened to newscasts
regularly or occasionally. This audience comprised 67 per cent
of the sample in West Berlin and 76 per cent in Bremen. The
metropohtan station in each Land virtually monopolized the
audience in its area. Radio Stuttgart had more listeners outside
the borders of the Land than any of the other Laender stations
and Radio Leipzig had the largest audience of any station
outside the American Zone. Whereas Radio Berlin was the most
popular station (47%) in West Berlin in September 1947 and
RIAS was a close second (37%), by February 1948 the situation
had reversed itself: RIAS had 57 per cent of the audience and
Radio Berhn had only 31 per cent. Only in West Berlin was
there an important fraction that had tuned out because a
broadcast was considered untrue (36%) while 26 per cent had
done so when they thought that a program was bad.
More hsteners (31%) than nonlisteners (18%) favored a
government whose aim was to protect freedom of elections,
speech, and press, although both listeners (62%) as well as
nonUsteners (69%) favored a government whose aim was peace
and order.
Exactly half of those who listened to news on the radio
(50%) felt that the news they were getting was more accurate
than what they had heard during the war. The main source of
poUtical information for newscast hsteners was the radio (66%),
while for nonlisteners it was newspapers (61%).
Newscast listeners tended to be of higher socioeconomic
status (72%) than nonhsteners (28%), and to have more
education (66%) than nonlisteners (34%). Men (59%) were more
220 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
likely to listen than women (47%), city people more than rural
people, and the younger more than the older.
About a fourth of the AMZON radio audience had listened
to the Military Government's Thursday evening broadcasts,
although only ten per cent of the entire AMZON population
had done so. People who had listened and were also able to
describe the programs accurately gave strong majority approval
(68%).
Three-fourths of the AMZON radio audience listened to
the "Voice of America" broadcasts. Regular VOA listeners
differed from radio listeners in general, and even more so from
nonlisteners, in their attitudes toward various issues: 64 per
cent of them thought the news was more accurate at the time
than it had been during the war, 39 per cent would hope for a
government guaranteeing civil Hberties as against one whose
chief concern was peace and order, and 6 1 per cent felt that the
exercise of the right to criticize the government would not
endanger the peace and order of the state. Regular VOA
listeners were also the ones who made a point of turning on that
station, as compared with listeners to other stations who
claimed indifference as to whether or not they turned on any
particular station.
Report No. 107 (29 March 1948)
PUBLIC RECEPTION OF THE BIZONAL ADMINISTRATION
Sample: 3,000 in the American Zone, 500 in West Berhn,
and in the third part of the study 3 1 6 people in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: 6 October 1947; 5 January 1948; and
the first weeks of March 1948. (5 pp.)
The report presents a summary analysis of attitudes toward the
Bizonal administration. In October 1947 only about a third
(31%) of the AMZON public had heard of the Bizonal Council,
which by that time had been in operation for some months. By
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 221
January 1948, an additional ten per cent claimed to know of
the new organization. And two months later the number had
risen sharply to six in ten.
Between October 1 947 and January 1 948 confidence that
Bizonia would improve Uving conditions dropped from 73 per
cent to 53 per cent. In March 1948, 44 per cent said that
conditions had been unfavorably affected, while only 36 per
cent said that they were better. Indeed, at this time, only 20 per
cent were satisfied with the work of the Bizonal Economic
Council, whereas 64 per cent expressed dissatisfaction. Half of
the dissatisfied commented that nothing was getting done.
Not unexpectedly, the more alert, the better educated, and
the more sophisticated members of society were those most
likely to be informed about the existence of a Bizonal
administration. Almost all (96%) of the college educated adults
but less than half (47%) of those with only seven years of
schooling could claim in March to have heard of Bizonia. Again,
more men (78%) than women (46%) said they were informed.
The well educated also tended to be somewhat more dissatisfied
(70%) than the poorly educated (60%).
In March 1948, when asked whether they thought Bizonia
would aid or impede the unification of all four zones, a
pluraUty (39%) in AMZON and still more in West Berlin (47%)
and Bremen (46%) felt that Bizonia increased the possibihty of
four-zone unity. Among those who knew of Bizonia, 43 per
cent thought that it would help and 28 per cent felt that it
would impede unification; a third (33%) of those who had not
previously heard of Bizonia responded, when informed of the
plan, that it would help, and half that many (16%) thought it
would impede reunification.
222 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 108 (29 March 1948)
MAGAZINE READERS
Sample: more than 3,700 adults in the American Zone,
West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: during the last three weeks of February
1948. (5 pp.)
About a quarter (24%) of the AMZON Germans 18 years of age
and over claimed to be magazine readers. This represented an
increase since December 1 946 when the figure had been 1 8 per
cent. The three overt American publications, Heute, Neue
Auslese, and Amerikanische Rundschau, were mentioned more
frequently by AMZON readers than any other single magazine.
In West BerUn, which had a greater ratio of magazine readers in
the first place (42%), the pubHcation Sie was more popular
(13%) than Heute (8%), and the BqiUyi Illustrierte had the same
number of readers (8%) as Heute.
Very few Germans (nine per cent in AMZON; seven per
cent in West Berlin; 12 per cent in Bremen) appeared to read
foreign magazines. Those who did read primarily American and
British periodicals.
As is usually the case, magazine readers, although they
constituted only a minority of the sample, tended to be people
of superior socioeconomic status and educational attainment.
They were more hkely than nonreaders to choose civil liberties
over the maintenance of law and order, if a choice was required:
35 per cent of the readers chose a government whose aim is to
preserve freedom of elections, speech and press, while only 21
per cent of the nonreaders made this choice; a government
whose main aim is to maintain peace and order was the choice
of 56 per cent of the readers and 69 per cent of the nonreaders.
Of those who were magazine readers, 84 per cent were
regular newspaper readers, 72 per cent Ustened to newscasts on
the radio regularly or occasionally, 16 per cent had recently
read political books or pamphlets (in contrast to six per cent of
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 223
the total public), and 12 per cent had visited United States
information centers one or more times (whereas only five per
cent of the general pubUc had done so).
Report No. 109 (5 April 1948)
THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN TRAVEL ON
KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES
Sample: not specified (595 respondents on the linguistic
question).
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (4 pp.)
A fifth (20%) of the AMZON pubUc claimed to know at least
one foreign language, with Enghsh and French as the most fre-
quently mentioned. Knowledge of a foreign language was almost
entirely a matter of schooling.
Two-fifths (40%) of the adult population in AMZON had
been in a foreign country. Not unexpectedly, many more men
(65%) than women (20%) had had this experience. Those who
had been outside Germany tended to be better informed than
those who had not, and they also differed somewhat in their
attitudes, but not greatly. Of the men who had been in a foreign
country, 76 per cent had heard of the United Nations, whereas
among those who had never left Germany only 63 per cent had
heard of it. Among the women who had been outside of
Germany 50 per cent had heard of the UN; among those women
who had not travelled abroad the figure dropped to 28 per cent.
On the question of the formation of a Western European Union,
80 per cent of the men who had travelled abroad and 72 per
cent of those who had not were in favor; 61 per cent of the
women who had been outside of Germany and 42 per cent of
those who had not were for the idea.
224 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 1 10 (15 April 1948)
BREMEN ATTITUDES COMPARED WITH
BERLIN AND AMZON
Sample: not specified.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (16 pp.)
Following January 1948, the city of Bremen was included in all
surveys. This report details results found in Bremen on a
number of trend questions previously described in Report No.
100. Munich, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart are the "major AMZON
cities" mentioned in the report.
Bremen residents expressed somewhat more confidence in
future economic conditions in AMZON (49%) than did AMZON
residents themselves (42 per cent in the major cities) but less
than West BerUners (64%). More people in Bremen (45%) than
in other places thought that prices would go up.
Bremen residents evidenced greater awareness (69%) of the
Bizonal Council in Frankfurt and far greater approval of it
(85%) than others in Germany. They were also more inclined to
expect local advantages from Bizonia.
Residents of Bremen mentioned anxieties over food,
particularly, but also over clothing and housing more frequently
than other Germans. And although 86 per cent said they were
not getting enough food to work efficiently, a strong majority
(75%) approved the handUng of the ration card system.
As in other German cities, nine out of ten people in
Bremen said there was a large or very large black market
operating in the city and 84 per cent felt that the local German
authorities were not doing enough to stop it.
The people of Bremen showed about the same level of
interest in pohtics as West Berliners, but very few were in favor
of a poUtical career for their sons. Bremen opinion was divided
on whether local officials were more concerned with the welfare
of the people (48%) than with their own interests (51%)
whereas the residents of West Berlin, Munich, and Nuremberg
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 225
inclined more toward the less favorable view of local officials.
Like West Berliners — and unlike AMZON residents —
people in Bremen gave majority preference (59%) to a strong
central government with headquarters in West Berlin.
Almost three-fourths of the Bremen residents (72%) said
that they thought National Socialism was a good idea badly
carried out. This was a higher degree of favor than was found in
West Berlin (62%) and markedly higher than in AMZON (54%).
When asked what they would do if they had to choose between
communism and National Socialism, almost two-thirds of the
Bremen respondents said they would take neither; the same
held true in AMZON.
Only half of the Bremen residents considered the Germans
capable of democratic self-government, with the main reason
given being that the people would not accept majority rule.
As in AMZON and West Berlin, a large majority of
Bremen residents said that the news in Germany was more
truthful than it had been during the war. Three-fourths of
Bremen adults claimed to be regular newspaper readers, as was
true in West Berlin and AMZON cities.
Bremen respondents, hke others throughout Germany,
thought in overwhelming numbers that the four occupation
powers were not working together successfully to reconstruct
Germany or to unify it. In fact, more people felt that the Allies
had hindered reconstruction than felt they had furthered it.
More Bremen than AMZON respondents, but fewer than West
Berliners, nonetheless asserted that the United States had
furthered German reconstruction. And three-fourths of the
Bremen residents, as compared to half the West Berliners and
AMZON population, felt that the behavior of the American
occupation troops had improved since the end of the war.
226 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. Ill (9 April 1948)
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BAVARIAN PARTY
Sample: a cross-section of more than 1,600 adult Bavar-
ians.
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (3 pp.)
Half a year before this survey was made, the Bayernpartei
(Bavarian Party) entered the poUtical arena in Bavaria express-
ing separatist, anti-Prussian sentiments and calhng for a rise in
the Bavarian standard of living as well as the ouster of
non-Bavarians from the Land.
In the survey almost half (47%) had some judgment - fa-
vorable or unfavorable — to make about the party; even more
people (53%), however, withheld judgment, either because they
did not know anything about it or because they had not yet
made up their minds. Those who did have something to say
were a majority of those with nine or more years of education,
men, people who did not attend church regularly, those in the
middle and upper social levels, city people, businessmen, and
officials.
Among those who had an opinion about the party, 34 per
cent spoke favorably of it, 66 per cent made derogatory
remarks. Emphasis was put on the fact that it called for Bavarian
autonomy and that it defended Bavarian particularism. Some
said that they were attracted by the call to oust expellees and
DPs from Bavaria.
About two-fifths of small town and rural people were
likely to be for the Bayernpartei as against somewhat more than
one-fifth from towns with more than 5,000 population. Five
out of ten regular Catholic churchgoers, three out of ten
irregular CathoHc churchgoers, and one out of ten Protestants
saw good points in the party. Practically none of the expellees
or refugees had anything good to say about it, while four out of
ten of the native Bavarians did. Among occupational groups,
only the farmers — with six out of ten — showed a majority in
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 227
favor. While less than two out of ten of those who preferred
either the SPD, KPD, or LDP and a Uke number of those
without party preferences saw good points in the Bayernpartei,
four out of ten CSU sympathizers (44%) did so. Few people
(15%) with eight years or more schooHng considered the party
favorably, but a slight majority (53%) of those with only seven
years or less schooling spoke well of it. Since Catholics, people
with httle education, farmers, rural people, and CSU followers
were the groups that predominated in Bavaria, it seemed safe to
conclude that the Bayernpartei was best received among
"typical" Bavarians.
Report No. 1 1 2 ( 1 2 April 1 948)
REACTIONS TO A FOREIGN POLICY PAMPHLET
Sample: 155 persons in the American Zone and 156
persons in West BerUn.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.)
The study follows the same pattern described in two previous
reports, Nos. 89 and 97, concerning the pamphlets Off en Gesagt
(Speaking Frankly) by Byrnes and Machtraub in Ungarn
{Power Grab in Hungary) by Nagy. The pamphlet under discus-
sion here was Aspekte der Gegenwaertigen Aussenpolitik
{Aspects of Present American Foreign Policy), published by the
United States Department of State.
The pamphlet Aspekte had relatively less appeal than
either Machtraub or Offen Gesagt. In West Berhn only 41 per
cent had read it through completely as compared with 75 and
56 per cent for the other two. And, again in West Berlin, only
26 per cent found it very interesting while 57 and 49 per cent
had described the previous two pamphlets in this way.
More than half the readers (58 per cent in Berlin and 55
per cent in AMZON) claimed not to have learned anything from
228 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
the pamphlet. On the question of whether Aspekte presented a
one-sided or fair picture of American policy, the majority (72
per cent in West Berhn and 55 per cent in AMZON) thought
that it stated the American case fairly, while 22 per cent in West
BerUn and 35 per cent in AMZON felt that it was one-sided.
Almost everyone (95 per cent in West Berlin and 91 per cent in
AMZON) thought the translation good. The presentation also
won majority approval, although quite a few people found it
boring. Most people found the cover good and most of those
who did not like it said that it was too American.
Report No. 1 1 3 ( 1 5 April 1 948)
AMZON ATTITUDES AND INFORMATION ABOUT RUSSIA
Sample: a representative sample of Germans living in the
American Zone.
Interviewing dates: February 1948. (6 pp.)
Very few people in AMZON (2%) and only 1 1 per cent in West
Berlin reported thinking that Soviet policy was determined to a
large extent by the will of the people; about the same small
number (2 and 4 per cent, respectively) believed that all the
people got along well in the Soviet Union. The groups most
frequently mentioned as able to get along were the party leaders
(50 per cent in AMZON), government officials (29%), party
members (21%), industrialists and managers (14%), and the
upper classes (12%). Very few (9 per cent in AMZON; 14 per
cent in West Berlin) mentioned the workers.
Although the AMZON Germans had very strong opinions
about the Soviet Union and its people, their factual information
about the country was in general at a fairly low level. In
AMZON, 78 per cent said that Russians may not own
automobiles, 85 per cent said the same about factories, 75 per
cent about apartment houses, and 57 per cent about radios. On
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 229
the question of literacy, 3 1 per cent said that less than half the
Russians could read and write, 36 per cent placed the figure at
about half, and only 22 per cent said most or all could do so.
Group breakdowns of score groups ranging from the least
informed to most informed revealed that those who were well
informed about the Soviet Union were in general also those who
were well informed about anything else.
There was no clear relation between information about the
Soviet Union and the beUef that the government was oriented
by and for the people. People who had been in the Soviet Union
within the past few years seemed almost unanimously to give a
negative picture of the country.
Report No. 1 14 (23 April 1948)
GERMANS ASSAY THEIR FREEDOMS
Sample: a cross-section of over 3,500 Germans living in
the American Zone and West Berhn.
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (9 pp.)
When asked if they felt they had five rights and freedoms — pro-
tection from the police, the right to express their opinions, to
choose a job, to vote in an election, and to own a business — over
half of the AMZON (51%) and West Berlin (54%) respondents
answered that they had all five rights to a satisfactory degree.
Of the 40 per cent who said they did not have all these rights,
the largest number mentioned the right to choose a job as the one
they did not have to a satisfactory degree. In AMZON, the next
most frequent concern was about free speech. In West Berlin,
1 5 per cent mentioned the right to vote in free elections.
A majority (69%) of those with 12 years or more of
education as compared with 36 per cent of those with eight
years or less schoohng said that they did not have certain rights
to a satisfactory degree. Those who felt their rights to be
230 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
restricted were asked if they expected greater freedom in ten
years: Of this group a good majority in AMZON and even more
West Beriiners were optimistic about the future with regard to
freedoms.
Asked which two of the hsted freedoms they considered
most important, people mentioned free speech (55 per cent in
AMZON; 68 per cent in West Berhn) and free elections (51 and
60 per cent, respectively) more often than the right to choose
their own jobs (41 and 43 per cent, respectively), to own a
business (25 and 12 per cent, respectively), or to be protected
from the police (8 and 13 per cent, respectively).
Three-fourths (75%) of the AMZON Germans and 79 per
cent of the West Beriiners said that the Russians were not free
to express their opinions without fear of punishment, and over
half (56 and 57 per cent, respectively) felt that this was also
true of the Czechs. Seven out of ten (68 and 69 per cent,
respectively) said that Russians were not able to vote in fair and
free elections, and as many (69 and 74 per cent, respectively)
said that Russians could not own a private business.
Well-educated people in AMZON were almost unanimous
(97%) in saying that free speech did not exist to a satisfactory
degree in some countries as compared to 78 per cent of those
with eight years or less schoohng. Seven out of eight (86%) of
the well-educated, but only half (51%) of those with little
education, said that the people in Czechoslovakia could not
express their opinions freely.
Report No. 1 14A (1 1 May 1948)
GERMANS ASSAY THEIR FREEDOMS
Sample: over 300 people in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (3 pp.)
The report compares attitudes of Bremen residents with those
of people living in West Berhn and AMZON, as described in
Report No. 114.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 231
Asked if they felt they had five rights and freedoms - pro-
tection from the police, the right to express their opinions, to
choose a job, to vote in an election, and to own a business — 69
per cent of the residents of Bremen said they did not have all
these rights to a satisfactory degree. This was considerably more
dissatisfaction than was found in either AMZON or West BerUn.
Over half of those living in Bremen (58%) thought they did not
have the right to work at any job they chose, an attitude which
was twice as prevalent in Bremen as in AMZON.
When asked which of the five listed freedoms they
considered most important, more Bremen residents (58%)
emphasized the right to work at any job they chose than did the
West Berliners (43%) or AMZON residents (41%).
Bremen residents were slightly more often skeptical of the
degree of freedom found in the Soviet Union than were West
Berliners or AMZON residents; 86 per cent said that the
Russians could not express their opinions without fear of
punishment, while 78 per cent said that they could not vote in a
fair and free election.
Report No. 1 15 (26 April 1948)
THE "ADVERTISING PILLAR" AS AN
INFORMATION MEDIUM
Sample: a cross-section of 240 West Berliners.
Interviewing dates: 19 April 1948. (3 pp.)
About a quarter of the population could be considered regular
and attentive readers of the notices on the pillars (Litfass-
saeulen). Forty per cent said they never looked at or read them
while 60 per cent said they did. Of the latter group, 40 per cent
had not looked at one during the previous week, ten per cent
said they only glanced at them, and 26 per cent had looked at
one or more pillars during the week as well as spent some time
reading them. In the last mentioned group there were more men
232 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
than women, more people under 40 than over, and more upper-
and middle-class people than lower-class people.
Eight in ten said they read notices about theaters,
concerts, and the like; two in ten read the lost and found ads,
notices of robberies, rewards for apprehension of criminals, etc.;
and smaller proportions of respondents read notices about
sports events, official notices, ads for missing persons, etc.
For half of the people who read the notices, some action
resulted, such as going to the theater or attending a sports
event.
Report No. 116 (28 April 1948)
THE MOVING PICTURE AUDIENCE IN AMZON
Sample: a cross-section of more than 3,700 adults in the
American Zone, West Berhn, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: February 1948. (4 pp.)
In AMZON, 28 per cent of the people 18 years and over
attended a movie once a month or more often; this regular
moviegoing audience was larger in Bremen (40%) and larger still
in West Berhn (54%).
More people living in medium-size cities than in very large
cities or in small towns were regular moviegoers. The regular
movie audience was drawn largely from higher socioeconomic
groups (38 per cent in AMZON), the well educated (45%), the
young (56%), unmarried people (44%), and from among
white-collar workers (51%).
Most moviegoers (88 per cent in AMZON) said they had
seen the newsreel Welt im Film. Of these, 65 per cent expressed
satisfaction with it. 25 per cent were dissatisfied with it, and
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 233
nine per cent withheld judgment. Criticism centered around the
view that the newsreel tended to be superficial or frivolous,
ignoring the serious aspects of life in Germany at that time.
Report No. 1 17 (27 April 1948)
BERLINERS VIEW THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION
Sample: a cross-section of 260 West Berliners.
Interviewing dates: 12 to 21 April 1948. (5 pp.)
Concerning the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, 80 per cent
of the respondents said they had heard that a new government
had taken over in that country. The 20 per cent who had not
heard about it consisted almost entirely of poorly educated
women from the lower socioeconomic levels. A large majority
(80%) of the informed were of the opinion that the change was
the result of foreign pressure. Three-fourths (75%) of the
informed believed that the consequences of the coup were not
favorable to the Czechoslovakian people. People who thought
that the Czechs had benefited from the change were more
inchned (65%) than those who took the contrary view (41%) to
think that the same thing was possible in Berlin.
A small majority held that the events in Prague could not
be repeated in Berlin, although 44 per cent of those who knew
what had happened thought a similar coup was possible. More
than half of those who thought it possible, however, believed it
would not actually occur.
Among newspaper readers, more occasional readers (22%)
than regular readers (11%) thought that the change in govern-
ment in Prague had been carried out democratically and that
the Czech people had gained from the change, although in both
234 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
groups majorities held the opposite view. A majority of the
occasional newspaper readers (58%) held that a similar coup was
possible in BerUn; 56 pei cent of the regular readers said it was
not possible.
A similar study made in April 1 948 in the Austrian cities
of Linz and Salzburg revealed more extensive knowledge
concerning the change in Czechoslovakian government, with 96
per cent of the people in Linz and 85 per cent of those in
Salzburg knowing of the coup. In Linz 77 per cent of the
people and in Salzburg 67 per cent felt that the change resulted
from foreign pressure. More Linz residents (69%) than Salz-
burgers (57%) or Berliners (60%) felt the change not to be to
the advantage of the Czech people. About one in ten, both in
Linz and Salzburg, thought that a similar coup was possible in
Austria, although 67 per cent in Linz and 51 per cent in
Salzburg thought it not possible. About half of those who
believed it to be possible, however, did not personally expect
such a coup.
Report No. 118(3 May 1948)
NEWSPAPER READERSHIP
Sample: a cross-section of over 3,000 residents in the
American Zone, 513 West Berliners, and 235 residents of
Bremen.
Interviewing dates: February 1948. (5 pp.)
In AMZON, 64 per cent reported reading newspapers regularly;
over three-fourths of the West Berlin and Bremen residents (76
per cent and 79 per cent, respectively) made the same claim.
Throughout AMZON, as well as in Bremen, people said
that they read their local paper or papers most frequently. The
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 235
American-licensed Neue Zeitung had a readership of over
one-fourth of the AMZON population as well as of 17 per cent
of the people in Bremen. Relatively large proportions of the
Neue Zeitung readers preferred it to their local paper, such as in
Wuerttemberg-Baden where 27 per cent read it and 24 per cent
preferred it. More people in the higher socioeconomic groups,
more professional and business men, more of the better
educated, and more evacuees were counted among Neue
Zeitung readers than people in other groups.
In West Berlin, the British-licensed Telegraf was the most
widely read and best-hked paper, with more than six out of ten
(64%) saying they read it and four out of ten saying they liked
it best. The next most popular paper was the American-licensed
Tagesspiegel with 38 per cent saying they read it and 17 per
cent saying they preferred it. Six out of ten West Berliners
(60%) read only western-Hcensed newspapers, and fewer than
one in ten (7%) read only Soviet-hcensed papers; the remainder
(33%) read both western- and Soviet-licensed newspapers.
Almost all of the well-educated people (89%) and 71 per cent of
those in the higher socioeconomic group said they read only
western-licensed papers. Fully a third of the people on the
lowest rungs of the economic ladder — 33 per cent of those of
"lower lower" socioeconomic status and 37 per cent of the
"upper lower" group — said that they read Soviet-licensed
papers exclusively.
236 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 1 19 (10 May 1948)
CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE MASS MEDIA
Sample: about 3,000 persons residing in 225 communities
in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: February 1948. (7 pp.)
This report presents the overall picture growing out of a large-
scale study on mass media (cf. Reports #102, 103, 106, 113,
116, 118). The interrelationships of three composite sets of
scaled questions were examined, measuring (1) participation or
nonparticipation in the audience of at least six major media of
mass communication, (2) attitudes toward the United States,
Americans, and aspects of American policy toward government
and economics, and (3) information about the Soviet Union.
One in eight people (12%) seemed to have no source of
topical information at all, except perhaps conversations. An-
other one in six (17%) indicated that no source of information
reached him with any regularity. The number of audiences
within which AMZON Germans participated was strikingly
related to attitudes toward the American way of Hfe. Regardless
of social class, the more sources of information which an
AMZON German had, the more likely he was to be favorably
disposed toward American policies in government or economics,
ways of life, and activities. Similarly, regardless of social class,
the better informed Germans consistently were more often
favorably disposed toward the United States than were the
poorly informed. Regardless of the information level, however,
people with most sources of information proved better disposed
toward American policies than those who participated in few or
no audiences.
A consistent relationship was also found between levels of
information about the Soviet Union and attitudes toward
American capitaUstic hfe. Again, regardless of social class, those
who could give the most correct answers to a set of factual
questions about the Soviet Union more frequently displayed
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 237
favorable attitudes toward American capitalism. Those with
relatively httle factual knowledge about Russia, by way of
contrast, appeared more often less favorable toward the
American system.
Report No. 120 (20 May 1948)
GERMAN OPINIONS ON DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME
Sample: an unspecified number of respondents in the
American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: April 1948, (3 pp.)
The German people were generally in favor of daylight saving
time (54 per cent in AMZON; 75 per cent in West Berlin; 63 per
cent in Bremen). The two groups most opposed to the idea were
the farmers and residents of towns with less than 1,000
residents. Of the farmers, 40 per cent were against daylight
saving time, 31 per cent were for it, and 29 per cent expressed
no opinion. Among people living in small towns, 29 per cent
were opposed, 37 per cent were in favor, and 35 per cent had
no opinion on the matter.
People who did not Uke the idea of putting their clocks
ahead gave a variety of reasons, the most frequently mentioned
of which was that they would be deprived of much needed
sleep. Others said it was bad because people did not have
enough food to carry them through such a long day.
Men tended to be more favorable (57%) than women
(51%). Trade union members were also more favorable than the
general pubhc (59%). Other differences were not great except,
as the West BerHn and Bremen attitudes indicated, large city
dwellers tended to be most favorable to daylight saving time.
Among occupational groups, those who worked indoors — of-
fice workers, professional and business men — gave more fre-
quent approval than others.
238 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
These findings compared with those of a Gallup poll made
in the United States in April 1948. There, too, a majority
agreed to daylight saving time; farmers were the only people
who were largely opposed to it. Indeed, more American farmers
were opposed, and also more positive in their opposition, than
were German farmers. City dwellers in the United States, as in
Germany, were most favorable to the change.
Report No. 121 (19 May 1948)
UNIFORMITY OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES
IN AMZON COMMUNITIES
Sample: data from October 1946 census of the German
population. (4 pp.)
The report gives an analysis of some of the data gathered in the
October 1 946 census to ascertain the percentage of Catholics in
each community or city. A basic table at the end of the report
shows the number of towns of under 5,000 population within
each administrative district containing a certain percentage of
persons who claimed adherence to the CathoHc church.
Practically all the towns (97%) within the American Zone
contained less than 5,000 residents. This figure was consistently
high for each administrative district but was lowest in Baden
(92%) and highest in Schwaben and Unterfranken (99%). The
percentage of the total population represented in this set of
communities was, however, much more variable. Throughout
the entire Zone a majority of the population (56%) lived in
towns under 5,000. But in Baden less than half the people
(42%) lived in these smaller communities, while in Unterfranken
a large majority (78%) was found in towns of this size.
It is particularly striking that a great number of towns
(71%) fall at the extremes; they were either very largely
Catholic or very largely non-Catholic. Of 10,355 towns with
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 239
under 5,000 residents, 2,299 (22%) had zero to 20 per cent
Catholic population, while 5,008 (49%) had 81 to 100 percent
Catholic population.
Heavily Protestant towns were concentrated in Wuerttem-
berg (59 per cent of which had Catholic populations of less than
a fifth and 80 per cent of which had Catholic populations of
less than a half), Kassell (51 and 82 per cent, respectively),
Darmstadt (30 and 88 per cent respectively), Wiesbaden (36 and
78 per cent, respectively) and Mittelfranken (21 and 73 per
cent, respectively). Heavily Catholic towns were in Oberbayern
(94 per cent of which had Catholic populations of more than
four-fifths and 100 per cent of which had Catholic populations
of more than a half), Niederbayern (93 and 100 per cent,
respectively), Schwaben (88 and 94 per cent, respectively),
Oberpfalz (87 and 95 per cent, respectively), and Unterfranken
(75 and 81 per cent, respectively). Of Oberfranken's small
towns, 31 per cent were predominantly Protestant and 33 per
cent were predominantly CathoUc. In Baden, 14 per cent of the
small towns were predominantly Protestant and 44 per cent
predominantly CathoUc.
Report No. 122 (22 May 1948)
PREJUDICE AND ANTI-SEMITISM
Sample: a cross-section of persons 15 years of age and
older in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: April 1948. (11 pp.)
This study was a repeat of a survey made in December 1 946 (cf .
Report No. 49). Its purpose was to ascertain whether there
existed a general anti-Semitism among the German people and,
if so, to measure both the spread and its incidence within
certain groups of the population. One historical note should be
borne in mind: Whereas in 1933 there were about 503,000 Jews
240 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
in Germany (0.8 per cent of the total population), in 1948
there were less than 20,000.
A comparison of the two detailed studies on anti-Semitism
made in December 1946 and April 1948 revealed that overt
anti-Semitism had not increased during the year. Indeed, it had
decreased slightly, from 21 per cent to 19 per cent for
anti-Semites and 18 per cent to 14 per cent for intense
anti-Semites.
However, at the same time, racist attitudes — the basis of
anti-Semitism — had increased sharply, from 22 per cent to 26
per cent.
An objective estimate of population divisions (overcoming
possible objections to the wording of the questions) showed
that about two in ten persons were clearly anti-Semitic, about
three in ten were indifferent or unconcerned, and just over half
could be termed "not anti-Semitic." Group differences paral-
leled those found in the earlier report: women, the poorly
educated, and rural persons were more likely to be anti-Semitic
than men, the well-educated, or city dwellers. More detailed
analysis, however, revealed that locale was even more important
than education in shaping outlooks on this issue. Examination
of the Regierungsbezirke (administrative districts) showed that
in Wuerttemberg, for instance, there was more prejudice
(gradient score of 129 per cent on a scale ranging from 0 per
cent equalling the total absence of prejudice to 100 per cent
equalling absolute anti-Semitism) than in Baden (gradient score
of 103 per cent).
Knowledge reduces prejudice. However, parents of German
youth were more frequently carriers of prejudice than childless
couples. Germans between the ages of 15 and 19 showed more
anti-Semitism than other age groups. Trade union members
were less often anti-Semitic than nonmembers. Expellees from
the East did not differ from natives of an area in their degrees
of prejudice.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 241
Report No. 123 (25 May 1948)
REACTIONS TO THE VOLKSKONGRESS PETITION
IN BERLIN AND DARMSTADT
Sample: representative cross-sections of over 450 adults in
West Berlin and almost 200 in Darmstadt.
Interviewing dates: May 1948. (5 pp.)
As had been expected, almost everyone (96%) in both West
Berlin and Darmstadt hoped that Germany would again be
united. However, people did not want this unity at any price.
Most people (78 per cent in West Berlin and 87 per cent in
Darmstadt) said that they would not sign a petition if they
knew it came from a communist organization. Likewise, most
people (78 per cent in West Berlin and 85 per cent in
Darmstadt) said that they would not favor uniting Germany if
union could only be achieved under Soviet influence. And in
Darmstadt, almost eight in ten (78%) favored the establishment
of a provisional government for western Germany, although in
West Berlin only 49 per cent did.
A petition for German unity under the auspices of the
Volkskongress had some appeal, especially in Darmstadt where
fewer people than in West Berlin had heard or read anything
about the council. People who had heard of the Volkskongress
(80 per cent in West Berlin and 5 1 per cent in Darmstadt) were
much less inclined to sign its petition (32 per cent in West
Berlin and 53 per cent in Darmstadt) than those who had not
heard of it (44 per cent in West Berlin and 62 per cent in
Darmstadt). By the same token, regular newspaper readers were
more skeptical of the Volkskongress' efforts (30 per cent in
West Berlin and 53 per cent in Darmstadt) than were nonreaders
(53 per cent in West Berhn and 76 per cent in Darmstadt).
Both in West Berlin and in Darmstadt women, older
people, those from the lower socioeconomic groups, nonreaders
of newspapers, and people opposed to the creation of a
provisional west German goverment were more likely than their
counterpart groups to say that they would sign a petition
242 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Sponsored by the Volkskongress. Interestingly enough, however,
many of those who said they would sign such a petition also
favored a provisional government (29 per cent in West Berhn
and 62 per cent in Darmstadt); evidently they wanted unifica-
tion but were ready to accept separation.
Men, those from the middle class, regular newspaper
readers, those who would not sign a petition circulated under
communist auspices, and those who opposed unification if it
meant Soviet leadership were more favorable toward a pro-
visional government in the west than were their opposite
numbers. Those most strongly opposed were the KPD/SED
sympathizers, those who would sign a communist-sponsored
petition, and those wilhng to see a united Germany under
Soviet leadership.
Report No. 124(1 June 1948)
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE
IN THE AMERICAN ZONE AND IN BERLIN
(BRITISH AND AMERICAN SECTORS)
Sample: 14,973 respondents in the American Zone, and
1,999 in West Berlin, comprising the combined total of
respondents in several surveys.
Interviewing dates: 15 February to 8 July 1947. (41 pp.)
The report comprises 34 tables cross-tabulating the AMZON
and West Berlin population according to education, social
status, age, religion, occupation, monthly income, former
NSDAP membership, current party membership, political party
preference, and size of community. An appendix compares the
sample data with data from the census of 29 October 1946;
another appendix shows religious affiliation and church atten-
dance broken down by the sex, education, and social status of
the respondents.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 243
Report No. 125 (22 June 1948)
BERLIN RADIO LISTENERS APPRAISE
"AMERICAN VOICES"
Sample: a cross-section of West Berlin residents.
Interviewing dates: during the last two weeks of May 1948.
(3 pp.)
In this study an attempt was made to gather evidence about the
desirability of using as radio announcers persons with clearly
marked American accents or those with no accent at all.
Assuming that the speaker made himself understood, there
was no strong sentiment favoring the use of an American
accent. In fact, among all Usteners — those who had heard an
American on radio as well as those who had not — almost as
many favored a voice without an accent (35%) as said they
favored German spoken with an American accent (37%); the
remainder (28%) indicated no preference between the two.
A surprisingly large percentage (62%) said they had heard
an American speaking on the radio while about 1 5 per cent said
they had never heard one. Half of those who preferred an
accented voice said that this was one way of knowing that the
speaker really was an American; most of the others expressing
this preference said it sounded nicer.
Report No. 126 (29 June 1948)
RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOLS
Sample: 3,007 people 15 years and older in the American
Zone, 5 1 1 in West Berlin, and 3 1 5 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: April 1948. (6 pp.)
Almost everyone (96 per cent in AMZON; 92 per cent in West
Berlin; 93 per cent in Bremen) favored religious instruction in
the elementary schools (Volksschulen). In AMZON, 71 per cent
244 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
felt that it ought to be obUgatory. Even in West Berlin, 5 1 per
cent of the population wanted compulsory instruction in
religion. Only in Bremen was a majority (54%) in favor of such
instruction on a voluntary basis.
Opinions differed along regional lines on who should give
religious instruction. In Bavaria, 87 per cent voted for the
clergy, as did 75 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden. In Hesse,
however, almost as many (38%) favored classroom teachers as
favored the clergy (43%). In West Berlin, 49 per cent voted for
teachers, while in Bremen a majority of 62 per cent favored
teachers.
Only a minority, however, supported the idea of confes-
sional schools (28 per cent in AMZON; 26 per cent in West
Berlin; 30 per cent in Bremen). Of those in the American Zone
who did favor confessional schools, equal numbers (13%) were
opposed and in favor of having common schools as well.
There were mixed reactions to the question of financial aid
to schools whose curricula were determined by the church.
Bavaria split evenly on the question. A small majority in
Wuerttemberg-Baden (53%) and a larger one in Hesse (59%)
were opposed to such aid from the state. In West Berlin and
Bremen the opposition was even greater (73 per cent and 70 per
cent, respectively).
Report No. 127(8 July 1948)
SOME OPINIONS ON THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN
Sample: 200 people living in the Neukoelln district of West
Berlin.
Interviewing dates: first two weeks of May 1948. (4 pp.)
In late April 1948 three students who had played an active part
in University affairs were dismissed from the University of
Berhn for allegedly defaming the Institute and its head. This
survey was made in order to measure Berhn reactions to the
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 245
underlying issues of the matter, as well as to related problems.
Slightly more than half of the respondents (53%) knew
that the University was located in the Soviet Sector of Berlin.
Only four out of ten claimed to have heard of the expulsions,
and of these only 14 per cent said that the students had been
engaged in anticommunist or anti-Soviet activities; 63 per cent
had a general idea of why they had been expelled; and 16 per
cent could give no reason at all. Those who did give a reason
were overwhelmingly (85%) opposed to the dismissals. Whether
or not the respondents knew anything about the case of the
three students, however, most of them were of the opinion that
students should have the right to criticize University affairs.
Those opposed to the right to criticize based their beUef on
three arguments: that students ought to confine themselves to
studying, that public criticism only harms the University's
reputation, and that students are too immature to offer
criticism.
Seven in ten people thought it would be a good idea to
establish another university in West Berlin. Two-thirds of those
in favor of this idea said that there was no freedom of opinion
or security at the University in the Soviet Sector. Six out of ten
of the minority opposing the idea argued that setting up another
institution would simply widen the East-West split.
Concerning the question of selecting university students,
the largest number (67%) chose as a criterion the abiUty to
think independently. The possession of knowledge was the
second most frequently cited value (46%), pohtical background
was mentioned by only six per cent, and the traditional German
test of university admission - social status — was accorded
fourth place with four per cent.
246 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 128(8 July 1948)
A PILOT STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE JOINT
EXPORT-IMPORT AGENCY
Sample: 187 adults living in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (3 pp.)
Only 36 per cent of the West Berliners questioned claimed to
have heard or read anything about the Joint Export-Import
Agency (JEIA) and half of these were either unable to describe
its functions or described them vaguely or incorrectly. Few who
had heard or read of the Agency felt able to pass judgment on
its work. By the same token, only 22 per cent of the total
number of those interviewed could suggest any specific im-
provements.
Almost half of the "informed" group (15 per cent of the
total) agreed that an exchange of goods with foreign countries
was a good thing, but an equal number withheld judgment on
the matter. The main reason given for advocating exports was
that Germany would receive food and raw materials in return.
A plurahty (45%) favored German control of the Agency,
although a large minority (26%) felt that the trade program
would be worse off if run by German experts. The latter based
their statements primarily on German disunity.
Report No. 129 (19 July 1948)
REACTIONS OF A PANEL OF READERS TO THE
PAMPHLET "MIT VEREINTEN KRAEFTEN"
Sample: 155 people in American Zone cities and 88 in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.)
Mit Vereinten Kraeften {With United Force) was one of a series
of pamphlets issued by the Mihtary Government. The purpose
of the study was not to predict general readership, but rather to
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 247
explore the reactions of various kinds of people who had been
exposed to the pamphlet.
Mit Vereinten Kraeften appeared to be less popular than
the three previously published pamphlets. As few as 35 per cent
in AMZON said that they had read it in its entirety, whereas as
many as 77 per cent had read all of Machtraub in Ungarn
(Power Grab in Hungary); about two-thirds claimed to have
read Offen Gesagt (Speaking Frankly), and almost half had read
Aspekte der Gegenwaertigen Amerikanischen Aussenpolitik
(^Aspects of Present American Policy). As was true in the case of
the other pamphlets, men, those in the upper socioeconomic
group, and the better-educated were more Ukely to read Mit
Vereinten Kraeften than were their counterpart groups.
Of those who had read the pamphlet, 57 per cent in
AMZON thought the whole thing was interesting, 51 per cent
thought that in general it was good, 41 per cent had
recommended it to friends or relatives, and 54 per cent said
they would be willing to pay 50 Pfennig for it if they saw it on
the newsstand.
Less than two-thirds of those interviewed in AMZON
(63%) thought that Mit Vereinten Kraeften gave a clear picture
of the facts, and over half (54%) said they had not learned
anything new from it.
Technical appraisal of the pamphlet was generally favor-
able. Nine out of ten said it was well translated, most liked the
style in which it was written, and considered the cover
attractive.
248 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 130(23 July 1948)
BERLIN REACTIONS TO THE AIR LIFT AND
THE WESTERN POWERS
Sample: 300 people in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 19, 20, and 21 July 1948, one month
after suspension of land traffic to the city. (8 pp.)
Almost unanimously (98%), West Berhners said that the
Western Powers were doing the right thing by staying in Berhn.
In fact, 100 per cent of those with nine or more years of
education said the West should remain.
Confidence that the Americans would in fact stay had
risen in the course of the previous nine months. In October
1947, 74 per cent thought that they would stay; by July 1948,
the figure had risen to 89 per cent.
Five out of six West Berhners (84%) expressed confidence
that the air hft could supply enough food to maintain current
rations. Almost half (48%) said, however, that they personally
had not been making out as well with food during the previous
few weeks. Of these, 28 per cent blamed their worsening food
situation on the blockade and 1 1 per cent blamed the currency
reform. Opinion was divided on whether or not the air lift could
keep the city going through the winter. Those with nine or
more years of education were more skeptical of the possibilities
of maintaining hfe in West Berhn (61 per cent said no, 38 per
cent yes) than those with less education (47 per cent no, 49 per
cent yes). Most of those interviewed (86%) predicted that the
blockade would not last through the winter.
Three-fourths (77%) said that the Western Powers were
doing their utmost to relieve the distressed condition of West
Berlin. Of those who felt that the Western Powers could do
more (22%), 14 per cent suggested the use of more planes, five
per cent said that the blockade should be hfted by force; men
and those with more education advocated force more often
than women and those with less education.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 249
Of those interviewed, 82 per cent thought that the Western
Powers had gone up in the estimation of the German people;
the same number thought the Soviets had lost popularity.
A pluraUty of those interviewed (43%) thought that the
Americans were more interested in strengthening their power
than in the welfare of West Berliners.
In August 1947, 42 per cent of the West Berliners
predicted war within a decade; in April 1948, 66 per cent felt
this way; and by July 1948 the figure had risen to 82 per cent.
Almost three-fourths (73%) thought the Berlin situation serious
enough that it in itself could cause a war in the near future.
Again, those with more education tended to be more pessi-
mistic.
Report No. 131 (4 August 1948)
GERMANS VIEW THE SIX POWER CONFERENCE
PROPOSALS
Sample: 500 people in the American Zone, 100 in Bremen,
and 100 in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: early July 1948. (6 pp.)
The study showed widespread ignorance of the Six Power
Conference held in London and a lack of enthusiasm for the
proposals among those who claimed to be informed about
them.
Although BerUn had not been included in the plan, a
majority of "informed" people, even in West Berlin itself (65%),
thought that it had been; and vast majorities in AMZON (84%)
and Bremen (90%) and half the respondents in West Berlin,
regardless of whether or not they knew about the specific
London proposal, felt that the city ought to be included.
There was general agreement among respondents on the
practicabihty of setting up a western German government
250 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
although there was still strong sentiment in favor of a single
united Germany governed from Berlin. If, however, people were
asked to choose between a western German government and a
united communist Germany, then the overwhelming majority
opted for the former.
Relatively few people knew that any proposals regarding
the Ruhr had been made at London. Of those who knew about
the proposal for international control of this region, three in ten
favored it and two-thirds were opposed.
Large majorities (72 per cent in AMZON and 79 per cent
in Berlin) regarded the addition of the French Zone to the
Bizonal organization as a step toward the unification of
Germany.
Report No. 132 (10 August 1948)
SOME ASPECTS OF MORALE IN BERLIN
Sample: 284 adults in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 22, 23, and 24 July 1948. (7 pp.)
A large majority of West Berliners (63%) expressed confidence
in their own abihty to withstand further rigors imposed by the
blockade. Men and women did not differ markedly in their
expressed capacity to endure. Persons with nine or more years
of education, however, had greater confidence than those with
less.
Opinions were more divided on the question of how long
the population could withstand the imposed restrictions. Men
and the better educated were more inclined to be optimistic
than their counterpart groups, should the blockade last for a
long time or even indefinitely.
Almost unanimously (92%), West Berhners said that even
though the Russians had announced their willingness to take over
the food supply of the city, the Americans would have to
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 251
continue the airlift; 40 per cent said they had no confidence in
the Russians, that they did not keep their word. An almost
equal number (38%) said it would be physically impossible for
the Soviets to feed all of Berlin, and ten per cent linked the
Soviet food plan with political ambitions.
Most respondents had negative reasons to explain the
Soviet offer of food: 42 per cent thought it was propaganda, 25
per cent thought that the USSR wanted to draw West Berhn to
their side, and 14 per cent felt it was in order to get rid of the
Americans.
Seven out of eight West Berliners (86%) thought that their
own lives would be affected if the Americans were to leave West
Berlin. About half expressed a basic fear of the Russians; one in
six (17%) mentioned political consequences.
Report No. 133 (10 August 1948)
REACTIONS TOWARD CURRENCY REFORM IN THE
U.S. ZONE OF GERMANY
Sample: 500 people in the American Zone and 100 in
Bremen.
Interviewing dates: 21 to 25 July 1948. (1 1 pp.)
One month after the currency reform, the per capita cash on
hand reported by respondents was DM 22.41 in AMZON and
DM 21.39 in Bremen. One-half of the AMZON respondents
asserted that their food supply had increased during the
previous weeks and almost eight in ten made this claim in
Bremen.
Almost everyone (90 per cent in AMZON and 96 per cent
in Bremen) thought that the currency reform had been
necessary and 53 per cent even felt it should have come sooner.
In AMZON only a third of the respondents were satisfied with
all the regulations implementing it, with the most frequent
252 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
criticism concerning the effect of the ten to one conversion rate
on small savings accounts.
Three in ten (31%) in AMZON reported expecting another
currency reform and half of these expected it to come within
one or two years. SUghtly more than half thought that the new
Mark would retain its value during the coming year. Well over
half (58%) of the AMZON residents as well as 66 per cent of
Bremen residents expected to be better off during this time
period. Men and women shared similar expectations regarding
the future effects of the currency reform, but the better
educated and upper socioeconomic groups were more inclined
than their counterparts to take an optimistic view. Seven in ten
AMZON residents expected to buy more of certain goods than
before, with clothing and shoes heading the list. Four in ten in
AMZON (38%) and a fourth in Bremen (23%) said, however,
that they planned to cut down on purchases of certain items.
A fairly large majority (71 per cent in AMZON and 73 per
cent in Bremen) felt that the currency reform would cut down
the extent of the black market. Moreover, the proportion
thinking a local black market existed dropped sharply from 48
per cent who said it was a serious problem in June to 16 per
cent in July.
Huge majorities felt that the currency reform would
increase unemployment, as was indeed the case. Equally large
majorities were wiUing to work more to earn more, but large
fractions felt that there would be httle chance to do so.
Attitudes toward the currency reform were closely related
to the adequacy of the food supplies at the time. People who
said that their rations had improved tended also to think that
the reform had been necessary, it should have come earlier, the
new Mark would retain its value, they would be better off
during the coming year because of the reform, it would reduce
the black market, and they would increase their purchases of
certain items.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 253
Report No. 134 (2 September 1948)
SOME TRENDS IN BERLIN MORALE WITH SIDELIGHTS
ON RECREATION
Sample: a representative sample of 300 people living in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 19 August 1948, two months after
suspension of land traffic to West Berlin. (5 pp.)
The second month of the Berlin blockade saw an outstanding
increase in long term confidence in the air lift. Whereas in late
July a majority of Berliners (52%) believed that the Western
Powers could not maintain Ufe in the city through the winter by
air hft alone, by August almost eight out of ten Berliners (77%)
thought it would be possible to do so. The greatest rise in
confidence was among the more educated Berliners — the opin-
ion leaders. In July, only a minority of 38 per cent of the better
educated felt that the air lift could cope with the winter; in
August a very large majority (82%) felt this way.
By August 69 per cent of the West Berhners believed that
the Western Powers were doing their utmost to relieve distressed
conditions in the city (as opposed to 77 per cent in July). But,
at the same time, slightly more Berhners in August (29%) than
in July (22%) also felt that more could be done.
A majority of West Berliners (58%) felt that the blockade
had not appreciably reduced their opportunities for recreation.
A majority (60%), however, thought it would be a good idea if,
in the circumstances, the Mihtary Government helped increase
recreational possibilities. One in five (21%) nonetheless felt such
assistance would be a bad idea since there were more serious
matters to attend to.
254 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 135 (13 September 1948)
RADIO LISTENING IN BERLIN SINCE THE BLOCKADE
Sample: an unspecified number; a representative cross-
section of adults in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (5 pp.)
RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) had by far the largest
share (80%) of the West Berlin radio audience and was also the
most popular (80%), thus continuing the gains noted in
February 1948 (Report No. 106). The proportion of radio
Usteners to the total BerHn population decreased slightly since
February, no doubt as a result of the cuts in electricity: 61 per
cent of the population claimed to Hsten to the radio in August
as compared with 67 per cent in February.
The three most popular Ustening periods were from 9:00
a.HL to noon (26%), in the afternoon (31%), and evening until
midnight (38%).
Three-fifths (59%) of the radio audience listened regularly
or occasionally to the RIAS program "Varady funkt da-
zwischen, "which satirized the current Berhn pohtical scene with
special reference to the East. Eight in ten (80%) of the people
who hstened to the Varady broadcasts found them very good or
good. Their reahsm as well as their humorous irony were the
two most frequently mentioned characteristics.
Seven in ten of the radio audience — or 45 per cent of the
total adult population — claimed to hear "Voice of America"
broadcasts and six per cent of all listeners volunteered the
information that these were their favorite broadcasts.
Men and women differed somewhat on the kinds of radio
programs they preferred, although in general their tastes were
similar. Women liked musical and variety programs best of all
(73%), followed by newscasts (54%), discussions and talks
(27%), and news commentaries (17%). With men, newscasts
were the top favorite (65%), musical programs followed as a
close second (60%), and discussions and commentaries were
equally popular (about 30%).
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 255
Report No. 136 (21 September 1948)
ATTITUDES TOWARD A GOVERNMENT
FOR WESTERN GERMANY
Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone, 511 in
West Berlin, and 329 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (7 pp.)
In AMZON 70 per cent of the residents favored setting up a
provisional government for western Germany while only about
one in eight (12%) was against the proposal. In West Berlin, 74
per cent were in favor, while 23 per cent — almost twice as
many as in any other area — were opposed and very few (3%)
were undecided. In Bremen, 79 per cent favored and 13 per
cent opposed the idea.
More than half of those supporting the new government
(39 per cent in AMZON, 35 per cent in West Berlin, 56 per cent
in Bremen) did so because they thought Germany needed a
government of her own. Significantly, more West BerUners
(13%) than residents of AMZON or Bremen regarded the new
government as a move toward unification.
Most (6 per cent in AMZON, 1 2 per cent in West Berhn) of
those opposing the formation of a West German government did
so because they considered a united government essential for
Germany.
Asked whether they thought that a provisional West
German government should control foreign trade or whether
the Western Powers ought to continue in this field, 5 1 per cent
of AMZON residents, 69 per cent of those living in Bremen, and
52 per cent of the West Berliners responded that they
considered foreign trade within the domain of the German
government. Those with higher education and socioeconomic
status were more likely to hold this opinion than were those
with less education and of lower socioeconomic status.
Although a majority believed that the new government
should control foreign trade, 65 per cent in AMZON, 72 per
cent in Bremen, and 85 per cent in West Berlin felt that the
256 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Western Powers would keep Germany's interests in mind were
they to retain control over foreign policy.
About half of the respondents (47 per cent in AMZON, 5 1
per cent in West Berlin, 53 per cent in Bremen) thought that a
new western German government would widen the East-West
split of Germany, with the percentage thinking that it would
have Uttle influence varying from a third (33%) in AMZON to
38 per cent in Bremen, to almost half (46%) in West Berlin.
Those who felt it would widen the spht were more likely to be
men, the well educated, and those of higher socioeconomic
status.
Report No. 137 (21 September 1948)
THE MUNICH MOVIE AUDIENCE
Sample: a representative cross-section of 302 residents of
Munich, 1 5 years of age and over.
Interviewing dates: 29 and 30 July 1948. (4 pp.)
Two-fifths of the residents of Munich were regular moviegoers
by their own estimate. The same proportion said they went less
than once a month and 21 per cent claimed never to attend a
film.
The Munich movie audience was drawn largely from the
15-24 age group: Two-thirds (65%) of this age group were
regular moviegoers, the other third went irregularly. Educa-
tional differences appeared to be as important a factor as age in
marking the moviegoer: Although only a third (33%) of the
poorly educated were regular moviegoers, two-thirds (61%) of
the well educated were. Socioeconomic status was also related
to movie going: Half (51%) of those of higher socioeconomic
status went to the cinema as compared with one-third (34%) of
those of relatively lower status.
Every third moviegoer (36%) voted for musicals as the
preferred type of full-length film; historical films were second
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 257
with 22 per cent, and no one said that he preferred war films.
When asked what hypothetical film title they found most
attractive, 33 per cent chose "'Bauernhochzeif (The Farmer's
Wedding); this was followed by "Abenteuer im DschungeV
(Jungle Adventure) with 16 per cent.
The ten most popular films of that period included six of
American origin, with Gaslight heading the list (15 votes). Of
the total hst of movies named, the number of German titles
mentioned as favorites exceeded that of any other country,
although the largest number of votes indicating favorite films
went to those made in the United States. Despite this
popularity of American films, over two-thirds (69%) of the
respondents expressed a general preference for German over
American films; nearly a quarter (23%) gave qualified answers,
five per cent had no preference, and only three per cent
indicated a preference for American over German films.
Report No. 138 (17 September 1948)
NEWSPAPER READING IN BERLIN SINCE CURRENCY
REFORM AND THE BLOCKADE
Sample: a representative cross-section of 300 residents of
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: latter part of August 1 948. (4 pp.)
In West Berlin, 72 per cent claimed to read a newspaper
regularly and 14 per cent said they read one occasionally; this
represented a slight drop since March 1948 when the question
had also been posed. In August, 83 per cent of the men and
only 66 per cent of the women were regular readers.
The British-licensed Telegraf continued to be the most
widely read and popular newspaper in West Berhn with almost
six in ten (57%) of the total public reading it and over a third
(36%) preferring it. The American-licensed Tagesspiegel re-
mained in second place both in readership (32%) and preference
258 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
(22%). Neither newspaper, however, gained in popularity or
readership since the spring; the same was true for the Soviet- and
French-licensed papers.
People who read one or more newspapers published in
West BerUn were asked whether they paid for their papers in
West or East Marks. Six in ten (62%) replied West Marks, 2 1 per
cent said East Marks, and ten per cent said that they sometimes
paid with one currency and sometimes with the other.
Of the 37 per cent of those who cut down on their
purchases of newspapers after the currency reform, 1 4 per cent
had stopped reading the Telegraf, nine per cent the Tages-
spiegel. The main reason given for cutting down on newspaper
purchases was the lack of money, specifically a lack of West
Marks.
Newspapers seemed to have an adequate "pass along" rate,
with an average of 2.38 people reading each copy of a paper,
and with most (80%) of the exchanges going on between
members of a family.
Report No. 139 (22 September 1948)
CHIEF CARES AND WORRIES SINCE THE CURRENCY
REFORM
Sample: not specified.
Interviewing dates: nine surveys taken between February
and August 1948. (5 pp.)
During the spring of 1948, the cares and worries of the German
people were much the same as they had been the first time this
question was asked in the first survey. In June 1948, however,
when the Western Powers introduced the currency reform, a
change occurred in the German situation and consequently in
the cares and worries expressed by the public.
Before the currency reform, the most frequently reported
chief worry had always been food. Indeed, during the winter
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 259
and spring of 1948, over half the people in AMZON, two-
thirds in Beriin, and three-fourths in Bremen mentioned food
among their chief cares and worries. After the currency re-
form, however, the picture changed markedly in AMZON and
Bremen, while in West Berlin, where the blockade was instituted
along with the currency reform, the food situation remained
serious and 47 per cent of the population was still seriously
concerned with it.
During the winter and spring of 1948 clothing and shoes
ranked second as an expressed worry, with about four in ten
AMZON adults mentioning it. But after the currency reform
this figure dropped and by August only eight per cent thought
it important enough to mention. In Berlin, however, the drop
was only from 32 per cent to 14 per cent.
Fuel was a less pervasive worry but one which showed the
same tendency as food and clothing. In Berlin, after dropping to
its usual summer low of one or two per cent in late spring, it
rose again to one in ten during August.
Although worries over basic necessities tended to decrease
after the currency reform to nearly manageable proportions,
anxiety over the means of obtaining them skyrocketed. By
midsummer, half the AMZON population (48%) said that they
had no means of livelihood and by August this figure had risen
to 59 per cent.
In all the surveys, a small group of people in AMZON (less
than 5%) mentioned concern about the future in general. In
West Berlin, however, it rose from about five per cent to 1 3 per
cent in mid-April, dropped again in May and then rose again,
remaining relatively high (10% to 14%) during June, July, and
August.
Most of the other kinds of cares and worries remained
fairly constant: anxiety about prisoners of war and missing
persons (6-9%), loss of housing (8-14%), Nazi Party membership
(0-2%), health (3-6%), evacuee difficulties (8-9%). The number
claiming to have no worry varied from one to five per cent of
the AMZON sample.
260 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 140 (24 September 1948)
OPINIONS ON THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF THE
FOUR OCCUPYING POWERS
Sample: an unspecified number; a representative sample of
residents of the American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (4 pp.)
The proposal by the Soviet Union calling for the withdrawal
from Germany of all four occupying powers was greeted with
mixed feelings by many Germans. On the one hand, they
favored the idea of the withdrawal but, on the other hand, they
were dubious of the proposal since it emanated from the
Russians. In AMZON 39 per cent said they would like to see the
proposal carried out while 49 per cent were distrustful of it.
The lack of enthusiasm for the proposal was most marked in
Bavaria, where over half (54%) rejected it.
Throughout AMZON, those with more education and
higher economic status were less ready to accept the suggestion.
In West Berlin and Bremen, however, people tended to be more
favorably disposed toward the proposal than in AMZON. In
both cities, half the people (51 and 52 per cent, respectively)
hoped it would be carried out.
In AMZON, respondents who perceived that the Amer-
icans had hindered the reconstruction of Germany were more
likely to favor (58%) than to oppose (35%) the Soviet proposal;
those for and against the formation of a West German govern-
ment (54 and 53 per cent respectively) were almost equally
against the Soviet idea; and persons who thought that the forma-
tion of a West German government would have no influence on
the East-West split were more likely to oppose the idea (58%)
than were those who thought that the establishment of such a
government would widen this split (51%).
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 261
Report No. 141 (4 October 1948)
BERLIN ATTITUDES ON THE AIR LIFT:
FURTHER TRENDS
Sample: 300 people in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: 16 and 17 September 1948, three
months after suspension of land traffic to Berlin. (3 pp.)
While in July only 45 per cent of the Berlin population thought
the Western Powers would be able to bring in enough supplies
by air to maintain life in the city, by September this figure had
risen to 85 per cent. At the same time, indications were that the
accompUshments of the air lift had brought some West Berliners
to the belief that Western capabilities were limitless. In July, 77
per cent had felt the West was doing its utmost and only 22 per
cent thought they could do more; by September, 66 per cent
thought they were doing their utmost and 32 per cent felt they
could do more.
Confidence in the fact that the Americans would stay in
Berlin as long as they stayed in Germany remained high and
constant between July and September (87-89%); a year earlier,
however, the figure had been appreciably lower (74%).
Despite the restrictions and hardships caused by the
blockade. West Berliners were almost unanimous (88%) in
saying that they preferred things as they were rather than a
united city under the control of the communist-dominated
Socialist Unity Party (4%).
262 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 142 (5 October 1948)
ATTITUDES TOWARD JEIA
Sample: a representative sample of residents of the
American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: latter part of July 1948. (3 pp.)
Only 30 per cent of AMZON residents claimed to have heard or
read something about the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA).
In Bremen the figure was twice as high (59%), while less than a
fourth (24%) of the West Berliners said they had heard of it.
Of those who had heard of JEIA, half knew that it
regulated both German exports and imports. Only half of the
informed respondents in AMZON and Bremen and a third of
the informed West Berliners could evaluate its work. Most of
those with opinions thought that it functioned well or fairly well.
Report No. 143 (14 October 1948)
GOVERNMENT OR ADMINISTRATION FOR
WESTERN GERMANY?
Sample: 1,500 people in the American Zone, 250 in West
Berlin, and 162 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (6 pp.)
To the majority of AMZON respondents (58%) it made no
difference whether the proposed provisional western German
organization was called a "government" or an "administration."
Of those who did express a preference, more people favored,
especially in Bavaria (27%), the label "government" as proposed
by the Western Powers. Only in Berhn was a majority (56%)
even concerned about drawing this distinction, and then the
respondents split evenly in their support of the two terms.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 263
More men than women felt it was important to decide
between the rival conceptions; the same was true of those with
higher educational and socioeconomic levels.
Of those favoring the notion of "government" rather than
"administration," the majority in AMZON (66%), Berlin (73%),
and Bremen (63%) referred to what they considered to be
desirable implications of greater power, responsibiUty and
prestige. For the smaller group of people who favored the term
"administration," the reasons were more diversified although
the greatest number (40%) explained that, as long as Germany
was controlled by the Western Powers, one could not speak of a
government.
In addition to the usual questions, this survey contained a
series of 1 2 questions designed to yield a scale of confidence in
the Western Powers and support for the term "government."
Those with the least confidence in the West most favored the
"administration" label.
Report No. 144 (26 October 1948)
U.S. ZONE GERMANS VIEW THE AIR LIFT
Sample: 500 American Zone residents in July and 3,000 in
August; 300 West Berliners in July and 51 1 in August; 107
people from Bremen in July and 320 in August.
Interviewing dates: July and August 1948. (5 pp.)
The number of AMZON residents who expected the Americans
to stay in BerUn increased from 59 per cent in July to 71 per
cent in August. In West Berlin itself, the vast majority of
respondents thought they would stay although the figures did
decrease from 89 per cent in July to 87 per cent in August. In
all three areas, in AMZON, Bremen, and Berhn, respondents
were almost unanimous in saying that the Western Powers were
doing the right thing by staying in Berlin; this opinion did not
264 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
vary significantly in the July and August surveys. Although
most people agreed that the Western Powers should remain in
Berlin, they had different reasons for feeling this way: Almost
half (45%) of the AMZON residents and over half (56%) of
those Uving in Bremen felt that if the West withdrew at that
time it would mean a victory for communism. In West BerUn,
by way of contrast, 58 per cent mentioned drastic personal
implications for the Berliners.
Almost nine out of ten AMZON Germans (88%) as
compared to 75 per cent in West Berhn thought that the West
was putting all of its might into the air hft. Nonetheless,
although 84 per cent of the Berliners said that the air lift would
in the future supply West Berlin with enough food to maintain
rations at their then-current level, only 56 per cent of the
AMZON Germans expressed such confidence.
Most Germans, especially West Berliners (82%), felt that
the prestige of the Western Powers had gone up as a result of
the air Uft, and conversely that Soviet prestige had gone down.
In August 1947, 44 per cent of the AMZON residents
predicted war within the next decade. By April 1948 an even 50
per cent held this expectation. And in the summer of 1948, 67
per cent said they expected war; in West Berlin the figure was as
high as 82 per cent. In fact, 73 per cent of West Berlin
respondents felt that the situation at that time was serious
enough to cause a war within the near future; in AMZON only
59 per cent thought this to be true.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 265
Report No. 145 (1 November 1948)
THE "AMERIKA HAUS" IN FIVE GERMAN CITIES
Sample: a random sample of 300 adults from each of five
cities: West Berlin, Bremen, Frankfurt, Nuremberg, and
Stuttgart, as well as Munich as presented in an appendix.
Interviewing dates: last two weeks of September 1948. (19
PP)
The report consists of three parts: a general discussion of the
five cities, the summary of a similar study done in Munich in
late July 1 948, and a series of 20 tables giving detailed statistics
from each of the five cities.
Majorities ranging from 52 per cent in West Berlin to 74
per cent in Nuremberg knew that there was an Amerika Haus in
their city, and four in ten of the total adult population in each
of the five cities could mention specific things offered there.
Asked how they had found out about the Amerika Haus,
most people mentioned newspapers, although the radio and
conversations with others were also frequently mentioned. A
comparison with a survey made in March 1948 showed that
knowledge of Amerika Haus offerings had increased approxi-
mately fourfold.
In each of the cities, the most frequent visitors to Amerika
Haus programs were the better-educated groups, particularly
community and opinion leaders. And in all cities except West
Berlin and Nuremberg, about twice as many men as women said
they had visited one.
In Munich, 26 per cent of the respondents could name
offerings of their city's Amerika Haus, a smaller proportion
than in any of the other cities studied. The most frequently
Usted facihties of the center were the hbraries and books (65%).
Only four per cent said that they had actually been in the
Amerika Haus there.
As in the other cities, majority opinion (56%) viewed the
purpose of the Amerika Haus to be giving visitors the
opportunity to take part in various activities and to read books
from the United States and other countries.
266 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 146 (13 November 1948)
THE PROBLEM OF CLEANLINESS IN
PRESENT-DAY GERMANY
Sample: a representative sample of 1,500 people in the
American Zone, 242 in West Berlin, and 160 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (11 pp.)
In their own eyes the Germans ranked first in prewar standards
of cleanUness as compared with the peoples of the four
occupying powers. Asked about Germany's international ranking
in cleanliness under current conditions, 23 per cent of AMZON
residents and 26 per cent in Bremen still placed German
standards first.
West Berliners (and it should be remembered that the
study was made during the blockade) were least satisfied with
the level of cleanliness which they were able to achieve (69%);
men and people from the upper and upper-middle classes were
also less satisfied than their counterpart groups.
When asked whether the inability to keep sufficiently
clean had any effect on their character, 83 per cent of the West
Berliners and 80 per cent of the Bremen residents replied in the
affirmative. The most frequently mentioned effect (67%) was a
feeling of inferiority and irritability. Questioned specifically
about soap supphes, 76 per cent of the West Berliners, 74 per
cent of the Bremen residents, and 50 per cent of the AMZON
residents said that they managed poorly with the amount of
soap at their disposal. This was true despite the fact that large
proportions in both West Berlin (79%) and Bremen (77%) said
that they supplemented their soap ration through outside
sources. In fact, the largest proportion of West Berhn and
Bremen respondents felt that three times as much soap as they
currently were getting was needed as a minimum supply.
In West Berhn, 39 per cent of the respondents said that
they were never able to take a bath or shower, but a further 23
per cent said that they did so once a week. In AMZON, without
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 267
the handicaps of the blockade, fully three out of ten still
maintained that they could never take a bath and 43 per cent
said they did so once a week.
The problem of soap aside, the most irritating difficulty on
the score of cleanhness reported in AMZON and in Bremen was
the lack of sufficient clothing. In West Berlin it was the lack of
fuel.
Report No. 147 (17 November 1948)
HOW BERLINERS EXPECT AND WANT THE CRISIS
SETTLED: WITH THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS
Sample: a representative sample of 400 people living in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: middle of October 1948. (8 pp.)
Four months after the suspension of land traffic to West Berlin,
residents of the city expressed little hope that the crisis would
be settled in a desirable way. Most (46%) expected only further
disagreement and quite a few (27%) thought that the city would
be divided into East and West Berlin. What they hoped for was
that the Four Powers would agree peacefully and return to Four
Power administration of the city (39%); a quarter hoped that
the Soviets would leave Berlin with only the West remaining;
and 24 per cent said that they would like all four occupying
countries to leave.
If the West Berhners had been in a position to decide how
the Western Powers should settle the Berlin problem, 58 per
cent would have used more force against the Soviet Union than
the West was doing. The intensity of this feeling was shown by
the fact that 46 per cent of the respondents wanted the West to
take active steps even if it meant war; 50 per cent said a war
should be avoided even if it meant that the blockade would
continue. Larger numbers of men, young people, the well
268 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
educated, and those in the upper and middle economic levels
than their counterpart groups considered breaking the blockade
more important than avoiding war. Those whose morale was
low enough to want to leave Berlin were more likely to say that
the West should break the blockade (55%) than were those with
higher morale who wanted to stay in the city (43%).
A large majority of Berliners (83%) considered the
Americans to be in a superior mihtary position and felt that the
United States would win in case war did come.
Almost unanimously (95 per cent; in July the figure had
been 98 per cent) West Berhners thought that the West was
doing the right thing by staying in Berhn and about nine in ten
thought that they would continue to stay. The large majority of
West Berliners (65%) thought that the Western powers were
doing their utmost to reUeve distressed conditions in the city. A
growing minority, however, (from 22 per cent in July to 34 per
cent in October) felt that the West could do more. Asked what
they could use more of, 14 per cent mentioned food and, with
the approach of winter, 1 2 per cent said coal and solid fuel.
Report No. 148 (30 November 1948)
RADIO BREMEN EVALUATED BY BREMEN LISTENERS
Sample: 167 persons randomly selected from a listing of
radio owners in Bremen as contained in the Deutsche Post
file.
Interviewing dates: early September 1948. (5 pp.)
Nine out of ten radio-owners (89%) said that they were regular
listeners. On an average, three people hstened to each set. A vast
majority (96%) reported listening to the radio in the evening.
Every single person interviewed claimed to hsten to Radio
Bremen, with the Nord-West Deutscher Rundfunk being the
second most popular station (63%).
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 269
Most people (87%) preferred news broadcasts with light
music a close second (69%). Although the great majority of
Bremen radio-owners (80%) were satisfied with Radio Bremen
programs, about two in ten said that they would like some
programs cut down or eliminated altogether so that others
could be lengthened.
Over half (54%) of the respondents felt that the radio
stations ought to be independently owned; only 22 per cent
preferred state ownership. Those wanting independent owner-
ship were most inclined to think that state ownership precluded
really free expression of opinion (34%), private initiative
produced better programs (17%), or only independent radio
could be unpoUtical (3%). Proponents of state ownership most
frequently cited the need either for financial assistance (1 1%) or
for governmental supervision (8%).
Report No. 149 (10 December 1948)
TRENDS AND PRESENT ATTITUDES
ON THE MARSHALL PLAN
Sample: approximately 3,000 cases in the American Zone,
500 in West Berlin, and 300 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: 17 September 1948, with reference to
four other surveys between 4 August 1947 and 2 August
1948. (11 pp.)
For a previous report on reactions to the Marshall Plan, see
Report No. 104, 24 March 1948.
By September 1948 awareness of the Marshall Plan had
spread to the point where fully nine out of ten in Berlin (90%)
and Bremen (91%) said they had heard or read something about
the European Recovery Program and as many as three out of
four in AMZON (76%). Ignorance of the Marshall Plan in
AMZON was most concentrated among the lowest socio-
270 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
economic level where 44 per cent were still unaware of the
European Aid Program.
From the outset the majority reaction to the plan was one
of approval (74 per cent in favor, 3 per cent against). In
AMZON, this approval was greatest among residents of Wuert-
temberg-Baden (87%), men (82%), the higher educated (82%),
older (79%), and economically better situated (87%), and those
living in larger cities. Increasing numbers of Germans viewed the
American motives in promulgating the Marshall Plan in a
favorable light, as a sincere desire to help Europe get back on its
feet (51 per cent in September 1948). Prevention of commun-
ism, however, was the most frequently cited motive in all five
surveys (74%), The upper socioeconomic levels saw more
materialistic motivations in American support of the Marshall
Plan than did the lower levels, but it was also the former group
that was most favorably disposed to the Plan, Youth was less
sold on it and more suspicious of American motives than their
elders.
Although extremely few Germans (3%) thought that the
United States would withdraw its support completely, there was
a certain degree of pessimism concerning the continuing
adequacy of American aid to Europe. AMZON and Bremen
respondents seemed to be less confident of the continued
sufficiency of American aid specifically to Germany than they
were of the sufficiency of such aid to Europe in general. In
Berlin, however, where the air lift was in progress, there was
more widespread confidence in America's wilUngness to con-
tinue aiding Germany.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 271
Report No. 150(15 December 1948)
ATTITUDES AND RESOURCES OF BERLINERS AS THEY
LOOK FORWARD TO A BLOCKADED WINTER
Sample: representative sample of 400 persons living in
West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: mid-October 1948. (12 pp.)
In October, 71 per cent of the Berlin population thought that
the blockade would last through the winter, while in July only
ten per cent had thought so.
Similarly, opinions reversed on the potentiahties of the air
lift. In July, 52 per cent felt that the Western Powers would not
be able to maintain hfe in Berlin through the winter and 45 per
cent thought they could; by August, 19 per cent felt they could
not do so and 77 per cent thought they could; and in October,
ten per cent responded negatively while 89 per cent felt it could
be done.
Along with the belief that the blockade would last through
the winter, most Berhners expected Uttle help with their heating
problem. A majority (55%) thought they would get enough
heating material to survive, 12 per cent thought they would get
enough to be fairly comfortable, and 33 per cent expected to
get none. Over half (54%) had no heating material in the house
at the time of the interview and about one-third (32%) had no
candles or lamps to light their homes during those times when
the electricity would be turned off. Among those lacking both
heat and light — as compared with the group having both —
there were more old people, women, those with little edu-
cation, and those in the lower socioeconomic group. Over
half (54%) of this deprived group felt that the West could do
more to help the distressed conditions in Berlin. Surprisingly,
however, their outlook on the general situation in the city was
somewhat more optimistic in that fewer expected war, and
more thought the big four would come to an agreement about
the BerUn situation.
272 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
The financial status of almost all Berliners was grave.
Although, on the average, families had about as many East
Marks as they needed, they lacked 85 West Marks in order to
make ends meet. In addition, over half (55%) of the families
with no way of heating or lighting their homes also reported
having no West Marks whatever in their previous month's
income.
About two-thirds (61%) of the Berliners reported that
their mood was the same at the time of the interview as it had
been before the blockade; one-quarter (25%) said it was worse,
eight per cent said much worse, and, interestingly enough, six
per cent said their morale had improved. Less than a third
(30%) said they would want to leave Berhn if given the
opportunity, as compared with 43 per cent who felt this way in
July.
Report No. 151 (18 December 1948)
SECURITY VERSUS FREEDOM IN BLOCKADED BERLIN
Sample: unspecified.
Interviewing dates: summary of seven surveys made
between February 1947 and November 1948. (4 pp.)
Until June 1948 there had been a slight trend toward an
increased vote for "freedom" and a decreased vote for
"economic security" in response to a question designed to
measure their relative importance. In general, however, a clear
majority of about six out of ten preferred "freedom." In
November 1 948 a definite change in the majority point of view
took place: Over half (54%) told Military Government inter-
viewers that they preferred a government which assured
"freedom" to one which provides "economic security." These
findings were all the more significant in view of the fact that
they occurred at a time when the economic security of the
Berliners had, if anything, been decreasing.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 273
Report No. 152 (24 January 1949)
AMZON VIEWS ITS CIVIL SERVICE
I. Religion and Party Membership as a Factor in Government
Employment
Sample: approximately 1 ,500 cases in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (7 pp.)
More than half (55%) of the Germans in AMZON said that
members of SPD and CDU/CSU were equally well-quaUfied to
hold government jobs; an even greater majority (75%) felt this
was true of Catholics and Protestants. Of the few who did claim
there was a difference, relatively more felt that SPD members
were better quahfied (15%) than members of the CDU/CSU
(8%); and in Bavaria more people considered Catholics better
equipped (14%) than Protestants (6%). Pluralities in all three
Laender felt that members of both leading parties enjoyed an
equal chance for government work, although in Bavaria 23 per
cent felt that CDU/CSU members had a better chance.
Majorities said that government jobs were also equally available
to members of the two faiths. Again, however, Bavarians noted
that they felt it was easier for the dominant faith there, the
Catholics, to obtain such positions.
Although considerably more people believed that non-
members of political parties were better qualified for govern-
ment jobs (35 per cent, as opposed to 7 per cent who said that
party members were better quahfied, and 43 per cent who said
that it made no difference), it was felt that party members could
in fact obtain them more easily.
Opinion was evenly divided on whether or not government
workers should be allowed to work actively for a pohtical party
(36 per cent in favor, 38 per cent against) but there was also a
fairly large fraction of people (22%) with "no opinion" on the
subject.
274 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 153 (26 January 1949)
BOOK READING IN THE U. S. ZONE, BERLIN,
AND BREMEN
Sample: 3,000 adults in the American Zone, 500 in West
Berlin, and 300 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: October 1948. (9 pp.)
In AMZON half (50%) the adult population claimed to be book
readers; in Bremen and Berlin almost two-thirds (64%) made
this claim. Residents of cities were more likely than small town
and rural people to read books. Men, white-collar workers, and
younger people were more likely to be book readers.
Entertaining literature and novels were far more popular
than classics or nonfiction. The books most frequently men-
tioned were the Bible (71%) and the Prayer Book (27%),
followed by the works of Goethe ( 1 9 per cent mentioning his
Faust and 26 per cent listing other titles).
Half (45%) of the readers read fewer books then than
before the war.
The currency reform did not greatly affect the overall
availability of books since, on the one hand, it increased the
number of books published although, on the other hand, it
decreased the amount of money available to buy or rent them.
Report No. 154 (3 February 1949)
OPINIONS ON THE "NEUE ZEITUNG"
Sample: 1 ,500 adults in the American Zone, 250 in West
Berlin, and 150 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (10 pp.)
Claimed readership of the Neue Zeitung was largest in Berlin
where 20 per cent said they read it regularly, smallest in Bremen
where only four per cent claimed regular readership; in AMZON
ten per cent were regular readers, with proportionately more
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 275
readers in Wuerttemberg-Baden than in the other Laender.
Sizable fractions had either stopped reading the paper or read it
less frequently than before. Although the most frequently cited
reason for no longer seeing the paper was lack of money, the
absence of local news was probably as important a reason.
Large majorities of present and former readers (63%) said
they liked the paper "well," and another large fraction (27%)
said "moderately well"; very few of these respondents (3%)
claimed not to like it at all. Few people recognized any change
in the paper. Wide news coverage, the political news, and the
literary and art features were most frequently cited as praise-
worthy. But over one in ten (11%) criticized the literary and art
features for being expressionist and too modern. Only bare
majorities (51%) in AMZON called the paper "impartial" in its
poUtical reporting, as opposed to 22 per cent who thought the
paper "one-sided."
Report No. 155 (3 February 1949)
THE TOWN HALL MEETING IN REILINGEN
Sample: 400 Reilingen residents between the ages of 15
and 50, selected from current ration card lists.
Interviewing dates: 25 September 1948. (9 pp.)
The survey is based on the first town hall meeting held in
Reilingen, a typical small town in Wuerttemberg-Baden, on 15
September 1948. The town had at that time a population of
3,500, with most residents being small farmers, many of whom
worked in nearby factories.
Ten days after the meeting, 19 per cent said they had
attended, 68 per cent said they had heard of it but not
attended, and only 13 per cent had neither attended nor heard
of it. A large majority (78%) of the informed respondents felt
that public forums of this kind were useful. Almost all of the
Reilingen population approved the idea of future town hall
meetings. Of those who had attended or heard about the first
276 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
one, 95 per cent expressed such approval; of those who had not
heard about it, 82 per cent thought it would be a good idea. If
another meeting were held, more than three times as many
people (63%) said they would attend than had been at the first
one. Only a minuscule one per cent claimed they had no inten-
tion of going a second time.
Almost all (97%) of the respondents who took part in the
Reilingen meeting felt that participation by Americans was
desirable.
Just over half (52%) of the audience either had no
criticisms to make of the meeting or could not or did not wish
to articulate adverse comments. The criticisms that were made
were directed primarily at the MiUtary Government officials.
Four out of ten of those actually present at the Reilingen
meeting claimed they had learned something new and interest-
ing. Of even greater significance is the fact that just as many of
those who knew of but had not attended the meeting also
claimed to have learned something from it. Finally, although
only one of three people interviewed before the meeting could
name the Landrat, three out of four could identify him after
the meeting.
Report No. 156 (9 February 1949)
AMZON VIEWS ITS CIVIL SERVICE
II. Men versus Women in Public Employ
Sample: 1,500 respondents in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (5 pp.)
Both a majority of men (61%) and a majority of women (56%)
felt that men were basically better quahfied for government
jobs. Only a third (34%) felt there was no difference. About
two-thirds (64%) of men and women in AMZON agreed that it
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 277
was easier at the time of the interview for men to obtain
positions with the government than for women. More than a
third (37%) felt that a woman did not have the same
opportunity for government work even when she had the same
abihties. Significantly enough, however, fully two-thirds (67%)
of the group holding this last opinion approved of such a state
of affairs.
Report No. 157 (3 February 1949)
OPINIONS ON THE WORK STOPPAGE IN BAVARIA
Sample: 1 ,600 residents of Bavaria.
Interviewing dates: late November and early December
1948. (5 pp.)
The report concerns the work stoppage in Bavaria on 12
November 1948. One-tenth (9%) of the respondents said that
they themselves had participated in the demonstration while 1 2
per cent said that a member of their immediate family had done
likewise. Support for the strikes came chiefly from men, those
under thirty, and from urban dwellers. Only two per cent
claimed that the stoppage affected their daily routine.
Asked whether such work stoppages were right or wrong,
nearly two-thirds (64%) disapproved of them, 16 per cent
approved, seven per cent had mixed feelings, and 13 per cent
withheld judgment. Of those approving, most argued that it was
an effective way to protest the high cost of living. The most
frequently heard argument against the stoppages was that they
were useless, did not accomplish anything.
278 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 158 (4 February 1949)
BREMEN VIEWS THE PICTURAMA "AMERICA TODAY"
Sample: 188 write-in questionnaires.
Interviewing dates: 24 January 1948. (12 pp.)
Bremen audience reaction to the picturama /I menca Today was
overwhelmingly (96%) favorable, and 97 per cent would
recommend it to friends. A third (34%) of the audience
reported that their opinions of the United States became more
favorable as a result of the program, while a majority (60%)
maintained that their attitudes remained the same. Two-thirds
(65%) thought the pictures and commentary equally interesting;
a third (32%) preferred the pictures. PluraUties among
university-educated people felt that the presentation of certain
topics, such as American foreign relations and black Americans,
was neither very impressive nor very realistic. Many respondents
wrote on the questionnaire additional comments, the most
frequent of which was that the program was crammed too full.
Report No. 159(11 February 1949)
BAVARIAN REACTIONS TO TOWN HALL MEETINGS
AND PUBLIC FORUMS
Sample: cross-section of Bavarian population with 1,608
respondents in 108 communities and towns, as well as
mayors and deputy mayors in each community selected.
Interviewing dates: late October 1948. (10 pp.)
About one in four (27%) of the people in Bavaria (excluding
Munich and Nuremberg) claimed to have heard of public
forums, town hall meetings, or similar assemblies. Only six per
cent said they had taken part in such a meeting, with four times
as many men as women making this claim.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 279
Over three-quarters (78%) of those who knew about the
meetings approved them; approval was higher among those who
had attended one than among those who had only heard of
them.
Mayors' views on the meetings were divided. Among those
from towns where no assemblies had been held, on the one
hand, twice as many expressed negative views as positive
opinions on their value. On the other hand, five times as many
mayors of towns where meetings had been held made favorable
rather than unfavorable comments.
Meetings without MiUtary Government sponsorship had
taken place in about 1 5 per cent of the localities included in the
sample. It appeared that the Military Government sponsored
meetings in larger towns and cities more frequently than in
smaller villages.
Report No. 160 (23 February 1949)
GERMANS CONSIDER THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE OCCUPYING POWERS
Sample: a representative sample of 1,500 adults in the
American Zone, 250 in West Berlin, and 1 50 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: August and November 1948. (6 pp.)
The report stems from the Soviet proposal that all occupying
powers withdraw from Germany. In November almost six in ten
AMZON residents (57%) as compared with 49 per cent in
August rejected this proposal. A third (34%) still saw virtue in
the idea but the trend appeared to be toward rejection. A
breakdown of replies of different groups in the population
shows that people with university training or of higher
socioeconomic status disapproved with greater frequency than
others.
The inference that acceptance of the proposal arose in part
from a failure to note some of its implications received strong
280 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
support from replies to a further question concerning its effects
on German security. Of the 65 per cent of respondents in
AMZON who felt that Germany would not be in a politically
secure position if the occupying powers withdrew, most feared
civil war and chaos; they also mentioned the fear of Soviet
aggression.
When questioned as to Soviet motives in making the
proposal, only one per cent in AMZON had something nice to
say about the Russians. By far the most common (65%) reason
given was that it was a Soviet scheme to get control of
Germany. Asked then whether any of the occupying powers
would misuse this plan to gain greater influence in Germany, 65
per cent in AMZON mentioned the Russians and four per cent
pointed to the Western Powers.
Report No. 161 (24 February 1949)
SOME GERMAN OPINIONS ON OCCUPATION COSTS
Sample: 1,500 adults in the American Zone, 250 in West
Berlin, and 150 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (6 pp.)
There was widespread ignorance of the German share of
American occupation costs. Less than a quarter (22%) in
Bremen, 39 per cent in Berlin, and 43 per cent in AMZON were
unable even to hazard a guess as to the German share. Of the
Germans who did give estimates, almost four out of ten (38%)
in AMZON, and in Bremen a full majority of 61 per cent
thought that the Germans were paying substantially all of these
costs; in Berlin the proportion was not so large, but still an
appreciable 29 per cent.
Breakdowns of the major population groups show first
that those people who usually had fewer opinions on other
subjects hkewise had fewer opinions on the subject of occupa-
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 281
tion costs. The breakdowns also reveal that the groups who
were usually best informed — men, the well-educated, those
with higher socioeconomic status, and city-dwellers — definitely
tended more often than did their counterparts to make the
larger estimates.
Only one AMZON respondent in ten suggested that
occupation costs were a major cause of the difficulties which
the Laender had in balancing their budgets. This suggests that
there was little support for the view of the German officials
who pointed to occupation costs as the major problem
regarding Laender finances.
Report No. 162 (4 March 1949)
CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIVES AND REFUGEES
IN AMZON IN 1948
Sample: varies from as low as 1,500 to a maximum of
6,000.
Interviewing dates: during summer and fall of 1948. (6
pp.)
The report consists of seven tables showing differences between
refugees and nonrefugees in AMZON. In general, the middle-
aged population groups were overrepresented among the
refugees; they were more inclined to support the SPD than were
natives; their occupational and educational status was lower, as
was their income; they had a higher rate of unemployment,
were more Catholic, and lived in smaller towns than the natives.
282 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 163 (7 March 1949)
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE
IN BAVARIA, HESSE, AND WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN
Sample: 8,056 in Bavaria, 3,643 in Hesse, and 3,274 in
Wuerttemberg-Baden .
Interviewing Dates: between 15 February 1947 and 8 July
1947. (45 pp.)
The report consists of 34 tables cross-tabulating demographic
variables of the populations in Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-
Baden. The variables included are: sex, age, education, occupa-
tion, size of community, monthly income, social status,
religion, former NSDAP membership, present party member-
ship, and poHtical party preference. A detailed explanation of
sampling procedures as well as a definition of the various terms
used throughout the report precedes the presentation of the
data.
Report No. 164 (2 April 1949)
AMZON VIEWS ITS CIVIL SERVICE
III. Prestige Value of Government Work
Sample: approximately 1,500 cases in the American Zone.
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (7 pp.)
Fifteen per cent of AMZON adults claim that they were at
that time or had at one time been employed by the government.
Of the remaining 85 per cent, very few had ever considered
doing so.
The prestige value of working for the government was not
particularly high in AMZON. It was generally lowest among the
better-educated and among the young; highest among those
with less education and those over 50 years of age. Given a
choice between a position with the government and an
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 283
equivalent one in private industry, 31 per cent preferred
government work, 16 per cent did not care which, and 48 per
cent opted clearly for private industry. The chief argument in
favor of private industry was freedom from bureaucracy, that
for government work was security and pensions. Finally, more
people (47%) preferred to see their sons work for the
government than wanted to do so themselves.
Nearly four out of ten (37%) felt that some government
offices were overstaffed. Those most frequently mentioned
were the ration board, housing, and employment offices. These
were also the offices mentioned most often by the 25 per cent
of the population who felt that some offices could be
eliminated entirely. On both questions, the young, the better-
educated, and former government employees were more
inclined to say that some offices could be reduced or abolished.
Report No. 165 (22 April 1949)
OPINION ON FUSION IN WUERTTEMBERG AND BADEN
Sample: about 600 respondents in Wuerttemberg-Baden.
Interviewing dates: autumn 1948. (7 pp.)
A plurality of people (46%) in both Wuerttemberg and Baden
hoped for unification of the three Laender of Wuerttemberg-
Baden, Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, and Suedbaden. About a
quarter (27%) felt that the entire territory should be divided
into two Laender: Wuerttemberg and Baden, a return to prewar
political boundaries. Only six per cent preferred the existing
situation. The two groups most favorably disposed to unifica-
tion were the better-educated (69%) and former members of the
NSDAP (73%).
Almost all respondents who favored change also felt that
the change ought to be made immediately. However, about
one-half of the original number withdrew their support for
284 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
change when it was suggested that this might mean a rise in
taxes. Those who did not withdraw their support were primarily
the higher-educated, men, and older people.
Although most people were unable to name any specific
hindrance to unification, three such hindrances cited most
frequently were: traditional differences, disunity among
Laender governments, and differences among the occupying
powers.
Report No. 166 (25 April 1949)
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD POSTWAR GERMAN POLICE
I. General Appraisals
Sample: a cross-section of 1 ,900 residents of the American
Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (9 pp.)
Nearly two-thirds (64%) of the people in AMZON seemed
reasonably well-satisfied with the German pohce force with
regard to its primary function of maintaining order and
security; the figures were higher in Berlin (71%) and Bremen
(70%), and somewhat lower in Bavaria (61%). A pluraUty (47%)
of AMZON respondents also thought that the poUce force
provided as much security and order as in former times,
although a large minority (37%) expressed the opposite view.
Among those who thought the police force better in a prior era,
the Nazi period was the one most frequently cited in this
connection.
In AMZON 45 per cent thought the police should not have
more authority. When the 31 per cent who would like the
police to have more power in certain areas were asked to be
specific, they most frequently mentioned the black market and
control over displaced persons. Only four per cent in AMZON
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 285
named areas in which they felt the pohce had too much power
at that time.
Six in ten AMZON respondents (59%) did not want
members of the police force to take an active part in political
hfe. More than half (55%) felt that policemen should not run
for public office.
Only a relatively small proportion (17%) of the respon-
dents in AMZON thought that the members of the police force
came primarily from certain groups in the population. A strong
majority also felt that the police force should draw its members
evenly from all parts of the population.
When asked whether they thought the local pohce should
be under the mayor of the town or under the Ministry of the
Interior, Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden residents (38 and 40
per cent, respectively) favored decentralized control at the town
level; in Bremen and Hesse, a plurality (22 and 21 per cent,
respectively) favored control at the Land level. High "no opinion"
figures show that the issue is not particularly salient for the
respondents.
Report No. 167 (25 April 1949)
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD POSTWAR GERMAN POLICE
II. Awareness of Civil Rights versus Police Powers
Sample: a cross-section of 1 ,900 residents in the American
Zone, Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (10 pp.)
Only one person in twenty (5%) in AMZON and Bremen (one in
12 in Berhn) was aware of the fact that the new postwar
constitution of their Laender or cities provided certain protec-
tions for the individual against the arbitrary use of power by the
police. Still fewer could name a specific measure designed to
286 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
protect civil rights. Large majorities nonetheless had a sensible
proposal as to what they would do if they felt that the police
had violated their rights.
About six people in ten in AMZON (62 per cent, as
contrasted with 69 and 72 per cent in Berlin and Bremen
respectively) were aware that an off-duty policeman is "just
another citizen" with no particular authority.
Over three-quarters (77%) of the AMZON respondents
thought that the police had a right to search a private dwelling
without a warrant, merely on suspicion that a suspect might be
there. When asked about a hypothetical case in which a
policeman levied an on-the-spot fine, only 44 per cent in
AMZON knew he had exceeded his authority. Over half (54%)
the AMZON respondents, however, were aware of a suspect's
right to be brought before a judge within a reasonable amount
of time after his arrest. Even more people (55%) were aware
that a police chief has no right to break up a peaceful public
meeting on the grounds that he doesn't Uke the sentiments
being expressed. Finally about six in ten (59%) were aware
that a police chief has no authorization to precensor newspaper
editorials of which he disapproves.
Report No. 168 (27 April 1949)
WEST BERLIN'S REACTION TO A SINGLE CURRENCY
Sample: a cross-section of 300 West Berliners.
Interviewing dates: 29-30 March 1949, ten days after the
announcement that the East Mark would cease to be legal
tender in the western sectors of Berlin. (7 pp.)
Eight in ten respondents (81%) felt that it was basically
necessary to make the West Mark the only legal tender in West
Berlin. Of those who thought it unnecessary, most cited the
personal disadvantages they suffered.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 287
Six in ten (62%) thought the conversion was carried out
justly. Among those who felt it was unjustly carried out, 15 per
cent thought the rate of exchange was too low.
Two-thirds (68%) of West BerUn's residents thought that
they personally would be better off as a result of the currency
change. More people could think of certain groups within the
population that might be worse off as a result of the change
than could think of groups that might profit from it. Those who
had to cross into the Soviet Sector to work were considered by
most to be the hardest hit.
The majority (59%) of respondents thought that the
conversion would have little influence on the east-west split of
Germany.
As another consequence of the change, 62 per cent felt
that black market activities would decrease; 16 per cent felt
they would stop altogether. Most West Berliners (84%) thought
that they would continue to be able to use their East Marks. A
majority (57%) also foresaw a currency change in East Berlin.
Report No. 169 (6 May 1949)
GERMAN APPRAISAL OF "LASTENAUSGLEICH"
Sample: about 1,500 residents of the American Zone, 250
West Berliners, and 150 people from Bremen.
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (12 pp.)
About three-quarters of the population in AMZON (73%) and
Bremen (76%) knew the meaning of the term Lastenausgleich, a
term used to refer to pohcies aimed at equalizing war losses
among the people. In Berlin, however, only 30 per cent of the
respondents could give a satisfactory definition of the term. In
Berhn and Bremen an overwhelming majority (91 per cent and
89 per cent, respectively) was in favor of the programs; in
AMZON the people were slightly less enthusiastic (74%).
288 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
More than half of the respondents felt that the program
should be carried out immediately and more than eight in ten
thought it would indeed be carried out eventually. A large
minority in AMZON and Berlin (43 per cent and 41 per cent,
respectively) and 50 per cent in Bremen, however, thought it
could not possibly be carried out fairly.
Refugees and bombed-out persons were most frequently
mentioned as the ones who ought to benefit from the program.
Almost a fourth (24%) of the AMZON respondents expected to
benefit themselves; almost a third (32%) expected that they
would have to pay for a Lastenausgleich.
In AMZON only 40 per cent of the respondents knew that
German authorities would develop the plans for the equaliza-
tion program. Among those who knew about the program, 40
per cent wished that the Americans would carry it out as
contrasted to only 26 per cent who wanted German authorities
to implement the plan. Reasons given by the former group were
almost without exception variants of the theme that the
Mihtary Government would be more just and more objective
than German officials. This was particularly the case among
those expecting to receive something from, rather than pay
something to, the program.
Report No. 170 (16 May 1949)
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL STRIKES
Sample: 1,500 residents of the American Zone, 250 West
BerUners, and 1 50 people in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: February 1949. (9 pp.)
The large majority of respondents in AMZON (68%), Bremen
(81%), and Berhn (72%) disapproved of strikes for higher wages.
In AMZON, however, fewer people disapproved of politi-
cal than of economic strikes, although more respondents
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 289
expressed indecisiveness by giving "no opinion." The main
reason advanced in support of strikes for political purposes was
to call politicians' attention to the shortcomings of their
decisions. The main counterargument was that such strikes are
useless and accomplish nothing.
Respondents from the younger age group were more
wiUing to express approval of both economic and pohtical
strikes, but even with them it was only a minority sentiment. As
might be anticipated, people in the upper income and better-
educated groups-where most employers are found-looked
more askance at strikes for better wages or more food.
Attitudes on political strikes could not be categorized so easily.
Among political groups, SPD sympathizers registered widest
support for strikes, although the extent of approval was still no
greater than three out of ten. Even among union members, less
than one out of three supported strikes as an economic or
political weapon; moreover, present union members were less
favorable toward the idea of strikes than were would-be
members.
Group comparisons for the AMZON population add up to
the clear suggestion that disapproval of strikes was not an
attitude localized among particular groups, but was the domi-
nating sentiment among all the major segments of German
society.
290 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 171 (23 May 1949)
CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN
MOVIE AUDIENCE
I. Impact of Currency Reform on Attendance
Sample: sl representative sample of 3,000 American Zone
residents, 500 West Berliners, and 300 people in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (6 pp.)
The currency reform markedly reduced movie attendance,
especially in West Berlin. About a fifth (21%) of the AMZON
population went to a movie once a month or more frequently.
Young people, the better-educated, and those of upper socio-
economic status attended films more frequently than did
others. Most moviegoers wished that they could see more
movies; lack of money was the main reason given for not doing
so.
As would be expected, theaters were least accessible to
AMZON 's rural population. They were most accessible to
people living in towns between 5,000 and 10,000 population
rather than in the largest AMZON cities. People living close to a
theater saw considerably more movies than those at a distance.
Only a negligible number of Germans (4 per cent in
AMZON) had seen an American movie in an American theater,
thus being exposed to productions whose suitabihty for German
consumption had not been controlled.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 291
Report No. 172 (23 May 1949)
CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN
MOVIE AUDIENCE
II. Most Popular Type of Movie
Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone, over 500
West Berliners, and 300 people from Bremen.
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (7 pp.)
Among those who went to movies, a large majority (67 per cent
in AMZON) selected a film rather than going to any film that
happened to be showing when they had time. Selection was
based primarily on advice from friends and the film title, as well
as advertising. Newspaper commentaries were also instrumental.
Most people who went to movies hoped to find entertain-
ment and diversion rather than serious problems, although a
sizable minority (21 per cent in AMZON) expressed an interest
in problem films. Movies accenting a love theme appeared to be
the most popular kind of film; in AMZON, movies featuring
classical or operatic music vied with revues for second place.
Of the 26 films people hsted as their favorites, 13 were
produced in the United States, eight were German, four British,
and one was from France. In West Berlin, foreign films were
more popular: Of the fifteen favorite films listed by respon-
dents, only four were made in Germany.
292 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 173 (18 May 1949)
CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN
MOVIE AUDIENCE
III. German Versus American Films
Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone, over 500
West Berliners, and 300 people in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (7 pp.)
A larger percentage of people in AMZON, West Berlin, and
Bremen had seen American films than had seen pictures made in
either Great Britain, France, or Russia.
About half of the AMZON and Bremen moviegoers (45 per
cent and 48 per cent, respectively) said that German films were
better than foreign ones; in West Berhn only 30 per cent felt
this way. Asked to compare the quality of the best American
films with the best German films, most people (66 per cent in
AMZON; 79 per cent in Bremen; 73 per cent in West Berlin) felt
that they were of about the same cahber. Those who felt that
German films were better said that they thought the contents
more worthwhile. Those who rated American films more highly
cited their technical superiority. Less than one- quarter (21%)
of the AMZON moviegoers, however, thought that the best
American pictures were being shown in Germany.
Although the majority of German moviegoers preferred to
see German trims, a sizable minority (37 per cent in AMZON)
said that their evaluation depended on the nature of the film
rather than its country of origin. Those preferring German films
stressed the subject matter; they found German movies easier to
understand, both from a cultural and a language point of view.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 293
Report No. 174(27 May 1949)
HESSIANS CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF LIFTING
THE BLOCKADE
Sample: a representative sample of 475 people in Frank-
furt, Giessen, and Kassel.
Interviewing dates: second week of April 1949. (9 pp.)
A large majority of Frankfurt (70%), Giessen (54%), and Kassel
(70%) residents were aware of the fact that a parliamentary
assembly had been meeting to draw up a constitution for the
West German government. About three-fourths of these favored
setting up such a government in the near future. Majorities in
each of the three cities felt that plans for a West German
government should not be given up if the Berlin blockade were
hfted, primarily because this would not change the East-West
conflict. Opinion divided quite evenly on whether or not Hfting
the blockade and dropping plans for a West German government
would improve chances for uniting Germany.
A large majority of Frankfurt (67%) and Giessen (68%)
residents and a plurality in Kassel (40%) felt that Frankfurt
ought to be made the capital city. Almost no support existed in
this survey for independent governments in the individual
Laender as opposed to a centralized government.
Few people in the three cities thought that the Western
Powers initiated the new West German government primarily as
a bulwark against communism; the largest proportion of those
with ideas on the subject thought it was designed for better
administration and the return of order and normal conditions.
294 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 175 (June 1949)
TRENDS IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION
Sample: an unspecified number of persons in the American
Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: from October 1945 to February 1949
during which time sixty-seven full-scale surveys were
conducted. (71 pp.)
This report summarizes in graphic form major trends of German
opinion in the American occupied areas, covering ten major
issues: cares and worries, reorientation, politics, economic
affairs, food, international relations, BerUn, the occupation,
media, and expellees.
Cares and Worries. Up to June 1948, the outstanding
trend was the rise in anxiety over food. By April 1948, 54 per
cent of the AMZON public mentioned this as the greatest
worry. The next in importance was adequate clothing and
shoes, which had risen to four in ten by 1948. Anxiety about
prisoners of war and missing persons leveled off at about ten per
cent in 1947. The category "unemployment and no means of
support" dropped in 1947 to about 12 per cent.
The currency reform produced a remarkable shift. From
the April 1948 high of 54 per cent, concern about food
dropped to 19 per cent by July 1948, and by 1949 it was as low
as ten per cent. Concern about clothing and shoes also sharply
decUned from 40 per cent in April 1948 to one per cent in
February 1949. From July 1948, money trouble took over as
the all-pervading claimed worry. Indeed, well over 60 per cent
mentioned financial problems, far exceeding the peak figure of
54 per cent that had mentioned food as a major concern.
Reorientation. A plurahty of Germans appeared doubtful
of their ability to carry on democratic self-government. If
forced to make a choice between a government offering
economic security and one guaranteeing civil liberties, six in ten
Germans said they would pick the former. The same number,
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 295
however, said they would not give up the two civil rights of the
franchise and freedom of the press; four in ten would do so.
In 1 946 the average figure for the number of persons who
felt that National Socialism was a good idea badly carried out
was 40 per cent. In 1947 it had risen to 52 per cent and by
1948 it was 55.5 per cent. Given the choice between a
communist and National Socialist government, the trend was
from neither to National SociaUsm: In November 1946, 17 per
cent selected National Socialism; in February 1949, 43 per cent
preferred it, as against two per cent for communism. During this
period the "neither" vote dropped from 66 per cent to 52 per
cent.
From November 1946 until January 1948 majorities held
that Communists had a right to radio time. From then on the
trend changed and by February 1949 about six in ten opposed
giving Communists a chance to air their views.
On the question of war responsibility, more Germans in
January 1949 than in November 1947 blamed Germany for the
outbreak of World War II.
Politics. The number of Germans who claimed to be
informed about poUtics dropped from 1945 to 1947 and
interest in pohtics remained consistently low at about four in
ten. Disinterest did not, however, imply lack of opinion.
Approval of the idea of a West German government was
consistently high and most people felt that its establishment
would not prove a permanent bar to unification. Although
confidence in local government officials was not very high,
there was a definite upward trend.
Concerning political parties, in AMZON the SPD con-
tinued to gain in preference over the CDU/CSU, although the
gain was only marginal. In West Berlin the SPD got much higher
preference than in AMZON. Since 1945 both parties lost favor
among the population.
Economic Affairs. Popular opinion on economic matters
mirrored the German economic recovery. The trend in con-
fidence in the D-Mark was upward, gaining twenty points from
296 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
July 1948 to February 1949. Approval of currency reform
measures remained at a very high level, averaging about nine out
of ten. Although money and high prices in general were great
cause for concern, after June 1948 majorities felt that prices
would go down. In January 1949, 52 per cent of the AMZON
Germans claimed to be better off than they had been a year
earlier, at which time 57 per cent had said they were worse off
than a year prior to that time. Nonetheless, in February 1949,
57 per cent claimed that they could not make ends meet on
their income.
In January 1948, more people thought that conditions
would get worse than thought they would get better, but
immediately after the currency reform almost three-fourths
expected an improvement in the near future. By January 1949,
however, it had again fallen, but only to approximately the
two-thirds level.
Well over half the respondents continued to feel that a
local black market existed to a serious degree and majorities
thought that local officials ought to increase their efforts to do
something about it.
Food. In the spring of 1946 six in ten AMZON Germans
claimed that they did not get enough food to do their work
well. By January 1949 the situation had been reversed and only
four in ten made this claim. Confidence in the fairness of the
food-rationing system also appeared to be enjoying an upturn
following a decline from the very high point registered in the
fall of 1945 and spring of 1946.
International Relations. Since February 1948 majorities
of varying sizes favored a Western European Union. The
consistently large proportion of respondents with no opinion
indicated concern over WEU's effect on future war or peace;
within a period of eight months the majority tendency was that
it would lessen the chances for war but, at the same time, the
fraction seeing war as a possible result grew. During 1948 there
was a steady upward trend in awareness of the Marshall Plan; by
December the figure had risen to 83 per cent in AMZON. A
majority consistently thought that the prime motive for
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 297
American aid to Europe was to prevent the spread of
communism, although during 1948 belief in an altruistic motive
rose nine points. Half the population feared that the United
States would not adequately meet Europe's future needs; very
few (about four per cent), however, ever stated that the United
States would stop all assistance. Nearly seven in ten felt that the
United States would have the most influence on world affairs
during the next ten years. From August 1948 to February
1949, the proportion thinking that the Soviet Union would be
the dominant world power nonetheless rose from 11 to 16 per
cent. During the previous year, about six in ten people felt that
there would be another world war in the next 25 or 30 years,
but an optimistic three in ten said there would be a good chance
to avoid it.
Berlin. Whereas about seven in ten AMZON Germans
expected that the Americans would stay in BerUn, as many as
nine in ten West Berliners held this view. In contrast, more
AMZON residents than West Berliners consistently felt that the
Western Powers were doing all they could to relieve West
Berhn's distress. Both AMZON and West Berlin residents gave
outstanding support (over 90 per cent) to the correctness of
Western pohcy regarding West Berlin.
Occupation. Up to January 1948, majority opinion was
that the United States should hasten the reconstruction of
Germany to prevent its becoming a prey to communism. By
February 1949 the figure had dropped from 57 per cent to 49
per cent; at the same time the view that the Germans should
reconstruct their country alone rose from 16 to 20 per cent.
Whereas in November 1947 only 39 per cent had felt that
the United States had furthered the reconstruction of Germany,
by August 1948, 63 per cent thought so. In 1946 seven in ten
said that the Allies would cooperate to bring about a united
Germany before withdrawing. In February 1949, eight in ten
said they would not do so.
Media. In January 1947, three-quarters of the population
felt the news to be more trustworthy then than it had been
298 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
during the war; by January 1948 the figure had dropped to 47
per cent, with the less trustworthy column remaining constant
at about five per cent but the no opinion column growing
steadily. Throughout the postwar period, more than seven in
ten AMZON residents consistently claimed to read newspapers
regularly or occasionally. The radio audience scarcely varied
during the previous eighteen months. And approximately a
fourth of AMZON adults claimed to read magazines.
Expellees. Both natives and expellees were in constant
and almost unanimous agreement that the expulsions had been
unjust. During the previous year, native residents tended to
become more positive in their views on the ability of the
expellees to get along with local residents. A corresponding
trend was apparent in the expellees' attitudes toward their
reception in Germany. There was little change in native opinion
concerning the expellees' wish to return to their homeland;
about nine in ten were sure that the expellees wanted to go
back. The expellees themselves also expressed a desire to return,
although the negative opinion was consistently greater among
them than among the native born.
Report No. 176 (27 May 1949)
GERMAN OPINIONS ON THE "VOICE OF AMERICA"
Sample: unspecified number in the American Zone, West
Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: last week of April and first two weeks
of May 1949. (3 pp.)
The study showed that 41 per cent of the adult population in
AMZON listened to the "Voice of America" regularly or
occasionally. Among those who never tuned in, almost seven in
ten (68%) knew of the program while three in ten had never
heard of it.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 299
More than half (56%) of the AMZON audience considered
the program good. Very few (3%) thought it was poor. The two
most frequently cited criticisms offered by those who found the
program fair or poor were that it was propagandistic and that it
was dull or uninteresting. Of those who liked the program, four
out of ten stressed that it informed them about hfe in the U.S.,
and another three out of ten merely found VOA interesting.
Report No. 177 (15 June 1949)
READERSHIP OF "HEUTE"
Sample: a cross-section of adults in all cities of 100,000 or
more in the American Zone, as well as West BerUn and
Bremen.
Interviewing dates: May 1949. (13 pp.)
The study reports on general critical reaction of readers of
Heute, a publication put out by the United States Mihtary
Government in Germany, as well as reaction by these readers
and the general magazine reading public to a specific issue of
Heute.
Of the total sample, 32 per cent reported reading Heute
(the next most popular magazine was Quick with 29 per cent)
and of magazine readers the Heute readership was 62 per cent
(57 per cent for Quick). Of the Heute readers, 58 per cent said
that they usually read the editorials. More women (55%) than
men (39%) claimed to read the seriaUzed stories. A large
majority (85%) hked the covers on the magazine. A majority
(63%) thought the cartoons on the back page were good.
Heute readers were also asked whether they thought that
the magazine should carry more information about their own
country, the United States, and other countries. The largest
proportion thought that the publication was fine in this regard,
although more people wanted an increase in information than
wanted less. On the general question of whether Heute had
300 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
improved over time, 42 per cent saw no change, 27 per cent
thought it had improved, five per cent felt it had gotten worse,
and a large fraction could not make up their minds. Those with
a university education, from upper socioeconomic levels, and
men were more inchned than their counterpart groups to notice
an improvement in the magazine.
Few (11%) of the readers claimed to subscribe to Heute;
most (457o) bought it at the newsstand, while 21 per cent got it
from friends or relatives. Almost all Heute readers (89%) said
that others also read the copy they read.
As is the case with magazine readers in general, Heute
readers were better educated, of higher socioeconomic status,
and wealthier than the population as a whole.
All respondents — those who read Heute as well as those
who read no magazines whatever — were asked to leaf through
the 13 April 1949 issue oi Heute and to indicate their interest
in specific items. The items which the largest majorities
regarded as interesting were a two-page spread of miscellaneous
pictures with detailed captions (82%), the cartoons (80%), an
article on students from Marshall Plan countries in the United
States (78%), "Letter from Vienna" (74%), "Old French
Actors" (72%), "German Fisherman" (68%), and the fashion
section (65%).
Report No. 178 (30 June 1949)
GERMANS VIEW THE RUHR STATUTE
Sample: a representative sample of about 1,500 persons in
the American Zone, 250 in West Berlin, and 150 in
Bremen.
Interviewing dates: February 1949. (6 pp.)
A month after the announcement of the Ruhr Statute — a plan
for international administration and control of the Ruhr area,
proposed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg - a majority (54%) of those
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 301
interviewed admitted that they had never heard or read
anything about it. Among those who professed awareness of the
plan, only half (27 per cent of entire AMZON sample) knew
that Russia had not participated in drawing up the Statute. This
informed group consisted primarily of men, the better edu-
cated, and those with high socioeconomic status.
Among all respondents aware of the Ruhr Statute, a strong
majority (68 per cent in AMZON) disapproved of it. A majority
of informed respondents in AMZON (62%) and Bremen (53%)
and almost a majority in West Berhn (48%) felt that the
economic effect on West Germany would be bad or very bad.
Most admitted, however, that it would be good for Western
Europe.
A major objective of the Ruhr Statute was the reconstruc-
tion of Western Europe. Almost two-thirds (65%) of the
AMZON Germans recognized that the Ruhr Statute would
further this goal, but 57 per cent thought that the Ruhr district
could be used better. Of this latter group, the largest proportion
felt that complete German authority would be the most
efficient way to utilize the Ruhr for this purpose.
Report No. 179(1 July 1949)
GERMAN DESIRES AND EXPECTATIONS ON FUTURE
OWNERSHIP OF THE RUHR FACTORIES
Sample: aproximately 1,500 residents of the American
Zone, 250 West Berliners, and 150 people in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: February 1949. (1 1 pp.)
The survey had a twofold aim: to establish what the respon-
dents hoped for with regard to future ownership of the Ruhr
factories as well as what they expected to be the actual
settlement of the ownership question.
A majority of respondents in AMZON (51 per cent, as
contrasted to 66 per cent in West Berlin and 63 per cent in
Bremen) were in favor of social ownership of the Ruhr factories
302 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
either by the German national or Land governments or by the
workers and employees of the factory in question. Of those in
favor of private ownership (31%), the vast majority favored
returning the factories to their former owners rather than giving
them to new private owners. Sex, education, and age compari-
sons in AMZON indicated substantial similarity of attitudes on
the ownership question - but not socioeconomic status, as
indicated by the fact that 52 per cent in the upper classes
supported private ownership. Viewed according to occupations,
the greatest support for social ownership existed among
governmental officials (69%) and master craftsmen (67%); the
greatest support for private ownership came from farmers (45%)
and business and professional groups (40%).
A sharp contrast characterized what Germans hoped for
and what they actually expected the outcome of the ownership
question to be. There was widespread behef (42 per cent in
AMZON, 59 per cent in West Berlin; and 48 per cent in Bremen)
that the Ruhr factories would ultimately be foreign-owned.
Most people holding this view anticipated possession by foreign
governments rather than by private foreign interests. Just as in
the case of ownership preferences, no sex differences were
evident in ownership expectations. Age comparisons, however,
revealed that younger respondents were more likely to expect
foreign ownership than were their elders. Similarly, half of the
lower-middle class, those with greater income, and those with
nine or more years of education anticipated eventual foreign
ownership, as did pluralities from all the major pohtical parties.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 303
Report No. 180(1 July 1949)
BONN AND BERLIN, GERMAN CAPITALS
Sample: 500 residents of the American Zone, 100 from
Bremen, and 100 from West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: May 1949. (4 pp.)
A majority (46 per cent in AMZON, 60 per cent in West Berlin,
and 66 per cent in Bremen) of Germans agreed with the choice
of Bonn as the capital of West Germany. While a vast majority
gave no reason for their view on the choice of Bonn, most
people who did comment specifically referred to aspects of the
city itself (e.g., university town, cultural center) or its con-
venient location. Those who felt that Berhn ought to be the
capital again at some future date increased in number over 1947
when the question had last been asked. In AMZON, the
percentage of those wanting Berlin to be the capital in the
future rose from 58 per cent in 1947 to 77 per cent in 1949; in
BerUn it increased from 93 to 97 per cent; and 93 per cent of
Bremen respondents expressed this wish in 1949. Of the ten per
cent in 1949 who did not think Berlin should ever again be the
capital, half thought that the choice should be Frankfurt, and
two per cent mentioned Munich.
Report No. 181 (7 July 1949)
THE RIAS AUDIENCE IN WEST BERLIN
Sample: a representative cross-section of the West Berlin
population.
Interviewing dates: May 1949. (3 pp.)
Among West Berlin radio listeners, RIAS (Radio in the
American Sector) continued to be the favorite station, having
increased its popularity from about 80 per cent in August 1948
to 91 per cent of the radio audience and 65 per cent of the total
304 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
population in May 1949. A considerable fraction (36%) noted
an improvement in programs during the previous year, while 50
per cent felt the programs had remained qualitatively the same.
RIAS listeners exhibited no marked group distinctions as
compared to the general public except with regard to their
political interests. A large majority (76%) thought there was
great interest in poHtics in Germany, 68 per cent took a
personal interest in poHtics, and 92 per cent could correctly
identify the mayor of West Berlin; comparable figures for
nonhsteners were 54 per cent, 29 per cent, and 75 per cent,
respectively.
Report No. 182 (11 July 1949)
GERMAN VIEWS ON DENAZIFICATION
Sample: 1,900 residents of the American Zone, West
Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: January 1949. (7 pp.)
Adverse criticism of the methods of denazification reached a
high point in early 1949, as the denazification hearings
approached completion. The predominant opinion (65 per cent
in AMZON) was that the program had been badly carried out.
Although exact comparisons with previously expressed attitudes
were not possible because the questions had been phrased
differently, there was a strong indication that approval of the
methods and procedures had declined over the years. In
November 1945, 50 per cent expressed satisfaction with the
program. In March 1946 it rose to 57 per cent. By December of
that year it had dropped sharply to 34 per cent, to 32 per cent
in September 1947, and further to 17 per cent in May 1949.
This decline does not necessarily imply hostility to the idea of
denazification; critics based their objections on its laxness,
rather than its harshness or unfairness.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 305
Those who disapproved of the denazification procedures
were most Hkely to come from upper income groups (83%), to
be better educated (85%), have a higher socioeconomic status
(90%), and they were more Hkely to be native residents (69%)
than expellees from elsewhere (47%), "liberal" conservatives
(84%), men (71%), and of course, former NSDAP members
(78%) and their relatives (79%). Critics of the program claimed
that it had treated the less important former members of the
NSDAP more harshly than major offenders. People who
approved the conduct of the hearings tended to talk primarily
in terms of the justice of punishing the guilty for past crimes
and misdeeds.
Generally speaking, majorities in each American-occupied
area voiced their approval of the idea of denazification; 66 per
cent in AMZON, 68 per cent in West Berlin, and 64 per cent in
Bremen. Very revealing, however, is the fact that the opinion-
leading and most vocal groups — the university educated (49%)
and the upper socioeconomic groups (55%) — were most likely
to express their opposition to the principle of denazification.
Arguments of those who disapproved even the idea of holding
supporters of Nazism responsible for the regime were scattered.
The argument most frequently mentioned was that these people
had been idealists and were therefore not deserving of punish-
ment.
306 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 183(21 July 1949)
PEOPLE IN THREE HESSIAN CITIES CONSIDER THEIR
RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS
Sample: a representative sample of 475 residents of
Frankfurt, Giessen. and Kassel.
Interviewing dates: mid-April 1949. (6 pp.)
Asked about the main problem of their city, the largest number
of Frankfurt and Kassel residents (59 per cent and 49 per cent,
respectively) answered "construction of homes" whereas most
of the others answered in terms of general reconstruction or
removal of ruins.
Two-thirds (68%) of those living in Kassel and half (54 per
cent and 48 per cent, respectively) of those living in Frankfurt
and Giessen expressed dissatisfaction with the rate of progress
in the reconstruction of their cities. Lack of money and
incompetent officials were considered the main reasons for the
lack of progress. In Frankfurt 1 1 per cent held the Mayor
responsible.
There was httle consistency between the way people felt
public funds ought to be spent and the way they thought such
funds were in fact being spent. Almost everyone felt that
housing should be given priority over all other types of
construction but most thought that in actual practice anything
but houses was being built.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 307
Report No. 183-S (26 July 1949)
KNOWLEDGE OF THE BONN CONSTITUTION
Sample: representative sample of more than 1 ,400 people
in the American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: late June 1949. (2 pp.)
Large numbers of Germans were not aware that a Basic Law had
been framed for a West German Federal Republic. In AMZON
only 18 per cent of those who did know that it had been
completed knew something about it. In western Germany
majorities could not say whether they would ratify it if given a
chance to do so; in West Berlin, however, 60 per cent would
vote for it. Significantly, among those respondents who were
informed on the subject of the constitution, 70 per cent said
that they would ratify it.
Report No. 184 (26 July 1949)
THE "VOICE OF AMERICA" AUDIENCE
Sample: approximately 1,400 residents of American-
occupied areas of Germany.
Interviewing dates: late July 1949. (5 pp.)
The findings in this report were based on people who claimed to
be radio hsteners, said that they usually tuned in their radios at
7 p.m., and also listened to the "Voice of America." An
additional group comprised those respondents who, when queried
to the point, claimed to listen to VGA sometimes and correctly
stated that it was aired at 7 p.m.
On an average, four in ten residents in all American-
occupied territories (38 per cent in AMZON and West Berlin, 45
per cent in Bremen) stated that they listened to the "Voice of
America" more or less regularly. VGA had not only the most
308 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
extensive audience of any of the overt American information
programs, but reached proportionately more of all segments of
the German society.
In AMZON 64 per cent of the respondents said that they
considered the programs good. Negative opinions (27%) rested
primarily on the view that the programs were uninteresting, did
not appeal to the listeners' interests, were not objective or were
biased.
Majorities (65 per cent in AMZON, 74 per cent in West
Berlin, and 76 per cent in Bremen) of the audience claimed to
like the theme music "Oh, Susanna" played at the start of every
program, but fairly large proportions, especially in Bavaria
(27%) and Wuerttemberg-Baden (32%) said that they disliked it.
Report No. 185 (29 July 1949)
GERMAN OPINIONS ON A PEACE TREATY
BEFORE UNIFICATION
Sample: more than 1,400 in the American Zone, West
Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: late June 1949. (3 pp.)
Majorities varying from 57 per cent in AMZON, to 59 per cent
in Bremen, and to 84 per cent in West Berlin would have
rejected the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the Paris
Foreign Ministers' Conference to conclude a German peace
treaty prior to the reestablishment of a united government. It is
worth noting, however, that considerable fractions in all places
except Berlin would either have accepted the proposal or
withheld judgment. Although the idea of a peace settlement was
attractive to a minority, very few people (2 per cent in
AMZON) appeared to trust Soviet motives in making the
proposal, and most (82 per cent in AMZON) suspected ulterior
purposes.
Within all population groups, majorities disapproved of the
Russian proposal for a peace treaty at that time, but those most
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 309
likely to approve were SPD adherents (27 per cent as opposed
to only 15 per cent for CDU/CSU adherents), the less educated
(24%), and those of lower socioeconomic status (24%).
Report No. 186 (22 August 1949)
GERMAN OPINIONS ON AMERICAN AID
Sample: unspecified number comprising a representative
sample of Germans in the American Zone, West Berlin, and
Bremen.
Interviewing dates: January and April 1949. (8 pp.)
The majority (68%) of Germans thought that Germany could
produce half or more of the food it needed. However, a
majority (55 per cent in January, 61 per cent in April) also felt
that America was at that time supplying half or more of all
rationed food then being sold in West Germany, In response
to a question about America's motives in giving this aid,
respondents most frequently cited humanitarian reasons (37 per
cent in January, 33 per cent in April). Reasons of self-interest
(bulwark against communism, to improve business, etc.) also
received frequent mention. In all instances, the figures for
Berlin were higher. Confidence that American aid to Europe
would prove adequate appeared to increase between January
and April.
Urban dwellers were more inclined to blame the farmers,
and farmers were more inclined to blame inefficient distribution
for the difficulties in the food situation - but there was a
growing tendency to feel that there were no food problems,
only a shortage of money.
Those who understood the background of the offer made
in the fall and winter of 1948 by several foreign countries to
supply Germany with certain foods in exchange for machinery
were more likely to approve the rejection of the offer than were
those who did not understand what had been asked in exchange.
310 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 187 (23 August 1949)
CURRENT VIEWS ON A SUGGESTED WITHDRAWAL
OF THE OCCUPIERS
Sample: 1 .000 respondents in the American Zone, 200 in
Bremen, and 200 in West Berlin.
Interviewing dates: late June 1949. (5 pp.)
The number of AMZON residents who favored Soviet proposals
for withdrawal by the occupying powers rose from 34 per cent
in November 1948 to 43 per cent in June 1949. An even larger
percentage (46%), however, was opposed. Asked whether they
thought such a withdrawal would endanger German security, 57
per cent responded negatively and 21 per cent positively. Of
those who felt that withdrawal would leave Germany politically
insecure, the most frequently cited consequences were civil war,
disunity, and pohtical chaos. Soviet aggression and/or a com-
munist coup also received frequent mention, although fewer
respondents tended to list this point in June 1949 (16%) than in
November 1948(24%).
Suspicion concerning Russia's motives in proposing the
withdrawal of the occupying powers was very great (55%). Only
one per cent in AMZON and Bremen and four per cent in West
Berhn gave Russia credit for having a good motive in proposing
the withdrawal, namely, to make Germany free and inde-
pendent.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 31 1
Report No. 188 (1 September 1949)
CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN
MOVIE AUDIENCE
IV. Appraisal of Movie Influences
Sample: a representative sample of 3,000 American Zone
residents, over 500 West Berliners, and 300 people from
Bremen.
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (6 pp.)
Opinions divided on whether or not American movies gave a
true impression of how the average American lives, with 44 per
cent of the AMZON residents feeling that this was the case and
42 per cent disagreeing. The largest group of those who said
that the movies do not represent American life (13%) said that
in general movies portray a world of unreality. When asked
what they thought to be the basis for selecting movies sent to
Germany. 16 per cent of those asked in AMZON replied, "to
familiarize Germans with the American way of life," ten per
cent felt it was "for democratic indoctrination," and six per
cent mentioned their "cultural value."
In AMZON a majority (59%) thought that movies could
strongly influence people's opinions. Problematic and political
films were considered most likely to affect people's point of
view.
Of those interviewed in AMZON, 74 per cent thought that
certain movies were undesirable for children. Movies which
might affect children's political attitudes were not considered as
dangerous as those which might affect their behavior. There was
little agreement on who should determine which movies
children ought to be allowed to see: In AMZON 44 per cent felt
it should be up to the parents, 46 per cent thought the decision
should be in the hands of the authorities.
312 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Report No. 189 (21 September 1949)
THE PUBLIC COMPARES PRESENT AND PAST
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Sample: 3,000 in the American Zone, 500 in West Berlin,
and 250 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: July 1949. (4 pp.)
Most people (48 per cent in AMZON, 57 per cent in West
Berlin, and 61 per cent in Bremen) felt that their economic
situation was better in July 1949 than it had been a year earlier.
Those who felt they were worse off (17 per cent in AMZON
and West Berlin. 14 per cent in Bremen) were not any
particular, well-defined, cohesive group. To be sure, many more
people in the lower income brackets than in the higher brackets
said that they were not getting along as well as they had in the
previous year. Also, people with grammar schooling only, or
those in the lower socioeconomic levels were more likely than
the better-educated or upper social groups to make this
complaint. But the differences were not usually marked, and in
no case did a single group reverse the general trend of attitudes.
People who felt that they were worse off in July 1949
tended to view other related economic issues somewhat more
pessimistically than did those who said that they were better off
than in the previous year, or than did the AMZON population
as a whole. They were inclined to take a bleaker view of future
prospects in the American Zone of Occupation, although the
plurality view was that conditions would be better. They were
also slightly more pessimistic about future prices and the value
of the Mark. Their buying expectations were substantially less,
and considerably fewer of them claimed that they had enough
food to perform their jobs adequately. Finally, many more said
that they could not make ends meet with their current incomes.
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 313
Report No. 190 (17 October 1949)
THE MARSHALL PLAN AND WESTERN GERMANY
Sample: an unspecified number of respondents repre-
senting a cross-section of residents of the American Zone,
West Berlin, and Bremen.
Interviewing dates: last two weeks of August 1949. (8 pp.)
Large majorities (67 per cent in AMZON, 73 per cent in
West Berlin, and 76 per cent in Bremen) felt that economic
conditions in West Germany had improved during the previous
year. Foreign aid ranked second to currency reform as a
voluntarily stated reason for this improvement.
Seven in ten AMZON residents (69%) were aware of
American aid to Europe and majorities (53%) could identify
this aid program with the name Marshall Plan, ERP, or EGA.
Awareness that West Germany and West Berlin were receiving
Marshall Plan aid was very extensive (67 per cent of the total
population, 97 per cent of those who knew of an American aid
plan), particularly among men, the more highly educated, and
the upper socioeconomic groups. Along those aware of ERP, 71
per cent knew that the Soviet Union was not included and 62
per cent knew that the Soviets had not wished to participate.
Marshall Plan aid was generally (84 per cent in AMZON,
94 per cent in West Berlin, and 88 per cent in Bremen) regarded
as favorable to West Germany. A minority of AMZON Germans
(29%) felt that the United States would use the Marshall Plan to
influence political and commercial life in West Germany, and an
additional 45 per cent thought that the United States would
control the allocation of money and materials without any
interference in German affairs; only 17 per cent expected the
United States merely to provide the money and materials,
leaving their allocation up to the Germans. Few thought that
such aid was being given unconditionally. In AMZON 63 per
cent felt that the primary motive for giving assistance was
United States desire to curb the advance of communism.
314 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Of those who knew about the aid plan and who also read
newspapers regularly or occasionally, 88 per cent claimed to
have seen articles on the plan. Among radio listeners, 66 per
cent recalled broadcasts dealing with it. Majorities (52%)
believed that the military aid program would not affect the
economic recovery program. Among those who did see a
connection between the two programs, 14 per cent felt the arms
aid would result in increased economic aid. A large majority
(67%) held that the economic slump during the summer of
1949 in the United States was not a cause of Europe's economic
difficulties.
Report No. 191 (9 December 1949)
THE STATE OF GERMAN POLITICAL INTEREST AT THE
OUTSET OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC
Sample: 500 to 3,000 in the American Zone; 100 to 500
in West Berlin; and 100 to 300 in Bremen.
Interviewing dates: several surveys, from May 1949 to
September 1949.(21 pp.)
Widespread passivity characterized the state of German political
interest at the outset of the West German Republic. Only 36 per
cent of AMZON Germans indicated in May 1949 an interest in
politics, a figure that dropped to 33 per cent in August 1949.
By way of contrast, 64 per cent in May and 67 per cent in
August preferred to leave politics to others. Less than two in
five (38%) reported great poHtical interest in Germany, almost
half (48%) thought that there was httle interest, and the
remainder (14%) had no opinion on the question. Those who
perceived great interest thought that there either was enough
(49%) or should be more (35%), whereas those who perceived
httle interest were more inclined to say that there should be
more (49%) rather than that there already was enough (40%).
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 315
Three in ten saw as the chief obstacle to democratic self-govern-
ment in Germany the fact that people were not sufficiently
interested. And, asked whether the low degree of participation
in governmental affairs stemmed from the lack of opportunity
or the lack of interest, only 22 per cent pointed to the former
whereas 67 per cent cited lack of interest.
Low levels of information about politics bolstered conclu-
sions about its low salience. As few as 58 per cent of the
AMZON residents knew that the name of their Land's Minister-
President, although, it must be added, 96 per cent of West
Berhners and 98 per cent of Bremen residents knew the name of
their mayor. Less than one in ten in AMZON knew that their
Land constitutions contained provisions for an initiative or
were correctly informed about provisions for a referendum.
About four in ten (39%) were aware of the fact that the
Parliamentary Council had drawn up a constitution for the
Federal Republic, and less than half of these (17%) claimed any
knowledge of its provisions. Although 96 per cent of the
AMZON Germans knew about the pending election, fewer than
half of these (47%) knew what the election was about.
Lack of confidence in political parties and leadership
contributed to low interest in politics. Only 20 per cent of
AMZON residents felt that, if called upon to decide, political
parties would opt for the good of the country, as opposed to 62
per cent who thought that the parties would pursue their own
interests. Somewhat over a third (38%) felt that people could
influence the activities of political parties. The bulk of those
who perceived little chance of influence (34%) argued that the
parties would do as they pleased without regard for the wishes
of the people. Two-thirds of those who thought that the people
could exert influence thought that this would be desirable, as
did three-quarters of the more pessimistic. Regarding the Land
parliaments, about four in ten (41%) thought their members to
be in touch with public opinion, 30 per cent felt that their
members welcomed expressions of opinion from the public, and
29 per cent felt their own interests as citizens sufficiently
represented in these parliaments.
316 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY
Nor were the prospects for political participation any
greater. To be sure, three-quarters (76%) of the AMZON
Germans indicated their willingness to work an hour daily
without pay for the economic reconstruction of Germany. But
an almost equally large percentage (71%) voiced their unwilling-
ness to take a responsible position in the political life of their
community if they were requested to. Only 40 per cent were
aware of "citizens' meetings" in their communities; as few as 13
per cent claimed to have attended such a forum. Indeed, less
than one in five (19%) had attended any political meeting since
the end of the war. Roughly half this number (11%) had
attended an election meeting during the campaign going on at
the time of the survey.
In this election campaign, which culminated on 14 August
1949, 80 per cent of AMZON Germans indicated their intention
to vote and, in fact, 78 per cent of those eligible did vote. Two
weeks before this vote, 69 per cent had not decided for whom
they would vote. Almost three-quarters (73%) of those who
knew of the election had not seen the list of candidates for their
voting district, and an equal percentage responded negatively or
with no opinion to queries designed to find out if they were
familiar with the electoral law. Over half (56%) of the AMZON
residents could subsequently recall who won the election on the
national level, 51 per cent were in general satisfied with these
results, and 19 per cent were dissatisfied. The dissatisfied
respondents were not only more knowledgeable about the
electoral outcomes — which party and which candidate for
chancellor had emerged on top — but they were also more
informed about the aims of the individual parties. Asked why
they voted, the largest number (27%) responded that it was
their duty, 18 per cent hoped to defeat communism, an equally
large percentage expressed partisan reasons (voting for or
against a particular party), and 14 per cent hoped to achieve
better conditions.
Despite their low level of political interest and participa-
tion, AMZON Germans gave expression to a norm of participa-
tion: Almost three in four (73%) thought it a good idea that
THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 317
people were able directly to make a proposal for a law; 65 per
cent thought it "a good idea for the people directly to be able
to vote on the acceptance of a law, instead of its going through
the Land parliament"; 60 per cent considered political meetings
desirable and 67 per cent even considered such forums to be
worthwhile. As opposed to 23 per cent who favored a
government by experts, fully two-thirds (68%) of the AMZON
respondents thought it best that all the people determine the
political direction that the government should follow.
INDEX
(Note The numbers listed after each
entry refer to report numbers rather
than to page numbers.)
Advertising (on Lit fasssaeulen), 115
Aid (American food), 186. See also
Marshall Plan
Air lift, 130, 141, 144; and morale in
Berlin, 134
Allies: aid to Germany, 22: and limits on
German industry, 31; cooperation
among, 62, 63, 87, 100: loss of
confidence in, 85 ; attitude toward in
Bremen, 110; withdrawal from Ger-
many, 175. See also Occupation a/ic?
Western Powers
American Military Government
Economic policies: reconstruction, 22
60, 76, 100, 104, 175; food contri-
butions, 22, 64, 186; inflation, 25;
food supply, 31, 36; trade unions,
35; economic difficulties in the
United States and policy toward
Europe. 190
Information policies: films, 20, 158,
173, 188: licensed newspapers, 21,
34, 77, 83, 118, 138: licensed maga-
zines, 43, 53, 108, 177: pamphlets,
89, 97, 112, 129
Occupation forces: relations with chil
dren. 12; and Germans, 24; contacts
with Germans, 27, 94: and German
youth, 46, 56; role in bartering and
black market, 91
Political policies: opinion of by com-
munity leaders, 5; town hall meet-
ings, 155, 159
America Today (picturama): reaction to
in Bremen, 158
Amerika Haus, 102, 145
Amerikanische Rundschau (American-
sponsored magazine), 43, 53, 108
Anti-Semitism, 49, 122; measured on
German attitude scale, 19; and col-
lective guilt, 51
Arbeiter Zeitung (Viennese newspaper)
23
Army Youth Program, 46, 56
Aspekte der Gegenwaertigen Aussen-
politik (United States State Depart-
ment pamphlet), 112, 129
Atomic bomb: and schoolchildren, 12
Austria: economic problems, 40; knowl-
edge of Czech coup, 117. See also
Vienna
Baden: fusion with Wuerttemberg, 165.
See also Wuerttemberg-Baden
Bank accounts, 32
Bartering: in Berlin, 41: and reconstruc-
tion of buildings, 52; by Americans,
91
Basic Law, 174, 183A. 191
Baths: number taken, 146
Bavaria: schoolchildren in, 12; attitude
toward newspapers, 78; opinions on
319
320/ INDEX
work stoppage in, 157; reaction to
public forums, 159; social character-
istics of population, 163
Bavarian party (Bayernpartei), 111
Berlin air lift, 130, 134, 141, 144
Berlin blockade, 130, 141, 150; morale
during, 132, 134; radio listening
after, 135; newspaper reading after,
138; recommendations for settle-
ment, 147; and Marshall Plan. 149;
winter of, 150; economic security vs.
freedom during, 151 ; effect of lifting
on formation of new government,
174
Berlin, University of, 127. See also West
Berlin
Bible, 153
Bi-polarization of world, 17
Bizonal Economic Council, 107; aware-
ness of in Bremen, 110
Bizonia, 107, 110; addition of French
Zone to, 131
Black market, 18, 32, 100, 175; in
Vienna, 40; as cause of food short-
age, 70; and Americans, 91; in
Bremen, 110; and currency reform,
133,168
Blockade, Berlin. See Berlin blockade
Bonn, as capital, 180
Book reading, 13. 153
Bremen: level of political interest in,
110; Amerika Haus, 145; radio
listening in, 148; reaction Xo America
Today, 158
Building materials: availability of, 52
Byrnes, Secretary of State James, 44, 89,
97
Capital city: choice of. 71, 174, 180
Capitalism: American. 79
Catholics: in politics, 9; in towns of
5,000 population, 121; and civil ser-
vice, 152
CDU. See Christian Democratic Union
Censorship: of the press, 77; police, 167
Children: and American occupation, 12;
and democracy, 12; future expecta-
tions of, 12; and political prefer-
ences, 12; and religion, 12; corporal
punishment of in schools 66; and
movies, 188. See also Youth
Christian Democratic Union (CDU): sup-
port for. 3, 60, 175: and resurgence
of Nazism, 5; and Landtag elections
(1946), 26; and civil service, 152
Christian Socialist Union (CSU): and
Landtag elections (1946). 26; sup-
port for. 60
Church affiliation: and Nazism, 9; and
Military Government, 9; in politics,
9; and trade unions, 35; and ex-
pellees, 84; attendance, \2A. See also
Catholics, Protestants, ana Religion
Civil liberties, 82, 114, 114A, 167; vs.
economic security, 74, 82, 85, 100,
151, 175; limitations on, 175
Civil Service: religion and party member-
ship as qualifications for, 152; men
vs. women, 156; prestige value of
government work, 164
Clay, General Lucius: and denazifica-
tion, 55
Cleanhness, 146
Clothing: as major worry, 29, 60, 175;
percentage of income for, 32
Clubs, youth, 96, 99; democracy and,
96. See also Youth Program
Collective guilt, 5, 14, 22, 31, 36, 51;
and Nuremberg Trials, 33; general-
ized notion, 101
Communism: vs. National Socialism, 60,
72, 84, 85, 100, 175; as obstacle to
European union, 105; West German
government as bulwark against, 174;
United States desire to curb, 190
Communist Party of Germany (KPD):
merger with SPD, 3; and resurgence
of Nazism, 5; and Landtag elections
(1946), 26; support for, 60
Communists: right to radio time, 48,
175
Community leaders: and collective guilt.
5; and democracy, 5; and denazifica-
tion, 5; and party preference, 5, 44;
on rise of Nazis, 5 ; and unification of
INDEX /321
Germany, 5; characteristics of, 44;
and possibility of war, 44
Concentration camps: documentary film
on, 20; learned about during Nurem-
berg Trials, 33
Concerns and worries, 60, 100, 139
175; in Bremen, 1 10
Confidence in the United States, 141,
143,144
Constitution, federal. See Basic Law
Corporal punishment: in schools, 66, 95
CSU. See Christian Socialist Union
Currency reform: need for, 32; blamed
for food shortage, 130; and black
market, 133, 168; effects of, 133.
175, 190: newspaper reading in
Berlin after, 138; chief cares and
worries after, 139, 175; effect on
book reading, 153; in West Berlin,
168; and film attendance, 171. See
also Reichsmark
Czechoslovakia: expellees from, 47, 84;
civil liberties in, 114, 114A; coup in,
117
DAF. See National Socialism
Daylight saving time, 120
Democracy : meaning of for community
leaders, 5; and trade unions, 11, 35;
and Bavarian school children, 12;
potential for as measured by German
attitude scale. 19; and Army Youth
Program, 56; and attitudes toward
National Sociahsm, 68; potential for,
72, 74, 82, 93, 175, 191; in youth
clubs, 96, 99; and government in
Germany, 98; in Bremen, 1 10
Denazification, 5, 7, 38, 39, 54, 55, 60,
80, 93, 182; opinions on by com-
munity leaders, 5; attitude of former
NSDAP members toward, 7; level of
information about, 7, 55; effect on
job status, 38; and mass media in
Vienna. 39; reaction to new laws in
Vienna, 54; and General Clay's
speech before Laenderrat , 55
Die Goldene Stadt (film), 20
Displaced persons. See Refugees
Economic reconstruction, 62, 142
Economic security: vs. civil liberties, 74
82,85, 151, 175
Economy: of Austria, 40; conditions of.
60, 189, 190; in Bremen, 110,
strikes, 170; effect of currency re-
form, 175; personal income, 175
Education: level of and religion, 9; aims
of, 95; religious instruction in
schools, 95, 126
Elections: January 1946, 3; Landtag
(Fall, 1946), 26; right to vote freely
in, 114, 114A; August 1949, 191
Emigration, desire for, 93
Employment: degree of satisfaction with
job, 6
Equalization of war burdens, 169
Europe, prospects for unification of, 44,
69. See also Western European
Union
European Recovery Program. See Mar-
shall Plan
Evacuees. See Refugees
Expellees. See Refugees
Expenses, family, 4, 32. 41
Experts vs. politicians in government, 98
Factories, Ruhr: future ownership, 179
Farmers: urban dwellers' attitude to-
ward, 186
Fibns: American, 20, 171, 173, 188
attendance, 20; Die Welt im Film
(newsreel), 20; preferences, 20, 172
173; Todesmuehlen (documentary)
20; in Vienna, 39; types of audience
116; in Munich, 137; America To
day, 158; attendance after currency
reform, 171; basis for selection, 172
foreign, 172. 173; German vs. Ameri-
can, 173; and children, 188; and
political attitudes, 188
322/ INDEX
■'Flattery scale": and German attitude
scale, 19
Food: percentage of income for, 4, 32;
scarcity of in England and Germany,
15; rationing, 15, 18, 42, 60, 175;
supplementary sources of, 18; effect
of scarcity on job efficiency, 18, 64.
175; American contributions of, 22.
64; as major source of concern, 29,
60, 85, 100; and Military Govern-
ment, 31, 36; effect of increase in
rations, 52; as biggest problem facing
Germany. 62; attitudes toward sup-
ply of. 64; reasons for shortages, 70;
adequacy of, 175
Foreign Ministers' Conference: Moscow
(March-AprU 1947), 62. 63; London
(November-December 1947), 75,86,
87; London Six Power Conference
(February-June 1948), 131
Foreign policy: control of, 136
Foreign trade: control of, 136
Fort Getty: training for democracy at,
93
Frankfurt: Amerika Haus, 145; resi-
dents' attitude toward blockade and
West German government, 174; as
possible capital, 174, 180; recon-
struction in. 183
Frankfurter Rundschau: readership, 57
Freedom of speech. 48, 114, 114A, 175
Freedoms: perception of degree of, 114,
114A
Fuel: as source of concern, 5 2, 85
Gallup poll: in United States on daylight
saving time, 120
German Attitude Scale, 19
Giessen: residents' attitude toward
blockade and West German govern-
ment, 174; reconstruction in, 183
Goethe: as greatest German, 99; most
popular author, 153
Government: type preferred for Ger-
many, 74; local officials, 85; by
people, politicians, or experts, 98;
West German, 136, 174; or adminis-
tration. 143; jobs with, 156, 164.
See also Civil Service
Great Britain: food scarcity in, 15; atti
tudes toward, 17. 44, 67, 76
Guilt. See Collective guilt
Guttman scale: and anti-Semitism, 49
Health: and food shortage, 18
Hesse: social characteristics of popula-
tion, 163; attitude of residents to
lifting of blockade, 174; reconstruc-
tion problems in, 183
Heute (American-sponsored magazine),
43,53. 108, 177
History: teaching of, 95
Hitler: Mein Kampf, 2, 92; as greatest
German, 12; trust in, 22; guilt for
regime of, 33, 51; and responsibility
for National Socialism, 68; responsi-
bility for power, 94
Hitler Youth, 99; and Bavarian school-
children. 12
Housing: as problem for expellees, 14A,
28
Hungary: expellees from, 47
Illustrierte (Berlin magazine), 108
Income, family, 4, 32, 41, 100, 189; of
expellees vs. native population, 84
Industrialists: responsibility for World
War II, 90
Industry: attitude toward limits on, 31,
36; effect on worker of socialization,
90; vs. civil service employment, 164
Inflation: expectation of, 25, 41, 60;
knowledge of causes, 25; and Mili-
tary Government, 25
Information: vs. opinion on Soviet
Union, 1 13; level of on United States
and Soviet Union. 1 19
Insurance, life, 32
Internationalism, 105
INDEX /323
International Military Tribunal (IMT):
guilt of defendants, 16; interest in,
16, 33,60: news coverage of, 16, 33,
60; as source of information, 16, 33;
reactions to the verdicts, 33; and
collective guilt, 33; fairness of, 33;
and community leaders, 44
Litfasssaeulen ,115
London Foreign Ministers' Conference
(November-December 1947): atti-
tudes toward in West Berlin, 75, 86;
and Allied cooperation, 87
London Six Power Conference (Febru-
ary-June 1948), 131
Loritz, Alfred: dismissal of, 65
Jews: as profiting from war, 22. See also
Anti-Semitism
Jobs: change in after war, 38; lower
status, 38: economic security vs. civil
liberties, 74. 82, 85. 100, 151, 175;
right to choose, 114, 114A; with
government, 156, 164
Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA),
128,142
Judiciary: separate from police, 167
Kassel: residents' attitude toward block-
ade and West German government,
174; reconstruction in, 183
KPD. See Communist Party of Germany
Laender budgets: and occupation costs.
161
Landtag elections (1946): intention to
vote. 26
Languages: knowledge of and attitutdes.
109
Lastenausgleich , 169
Law and order: as function of govern
ment, 174
Law No. 3, 6
Law of National Liberation, 80
LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party
Leaders: community, 5, 44. See also
Community leaders
Leadership: and Youth Program, Army,
56; in youth clubs, 96,99
Leisure: activities, 99
Liberal Democratic Party: and Landtag
elections (1946). 26
Libraries; use of, 1 3
Machtraub in Ungarn (Military Govern-
ment pamphlet), 97, 103, 112, 129
Magazines: American-licensed, 43, 53,
108, 177; Amerikanische Rund-
schau, 43, 53, 108; contrasted with
those of Hitler era, 43, 53, 108, 175;
Neue Auslese, 43, 53, 108; Neue
Illustrierte Zeitung, 5 3; readership,
53; Sie, 53, 108; Illustrierte, 108;
Heute, 111
Mannheim: Negro soldiers in, 24
Marshall, Secretary of State George:
reaction to speech by, 62
Marshall Plan, 69, 75, 100, 104, 149,
175,190
Mass media, 60, 119; in Vienna, 39;
trustworthiness of news, 58, 100,
175. See also Magazines. News-
papers, Radio
Mein Kampf: readership, 2, 92
Men: and women in civil service, 156
Militarism, 82
Military Aid: and Marshall Plan, 190
Military Government. See American Mili-
tary Government
Mit Vereinten Kraeften (Military Gov-
ernment pamphlet), 129
Morale. 72; in West Berlin during block-
ade, 132. 134. 150
Moscow Conference (March-April 1947):
reasons for failure, 62, 63
Motion pictures. See F'ilms
Movies. See Films
Munich: movie audience. 137; Amerika
Haus. 145; as capital, 180
324/ INDEX
Nagy, Ferenc, 97
Nationalism: and anti-Semitism, 49; as
obstacle to European union, 105
National Socialism: resurgence of and
community leaders, 5; and religious
affiliation, 9; and German Workers
Front (DAP), 11; and labor policy,
11; as good idea badly carried out,
22, 31,49,54,60,68,94. 100,175;
feelings about and newspaper reader-
ship in Vienna, 23; vs. communism,
60, 72. 84, 85, 100, 175; trends in
attitudes toward, 68; tendency to-
ward and knowing Americans, 94;
attitude toward in Bremen, 110
National Socialist German Workers Party
(NSDAP): former members and po-
litical participation, 3; and denazifi-
cation. 7; as nonchurchgoers, 9; and
bookreading, 13; responsibility for
war, 22
Negroes: contact between Negro troops
and Germans, 24
Neue Auslese (American-sponsored mag-
azine), 43, 53, 108
Neue Illustrierte Zeitung (Soviet-licensed
magazine), 53
Neue Presse (Frankfurt newspaper), 57
Neue Zeitung (American-sponsored news-
paper), 77, 118, 154
News coverage: on radio, 1, 45; of
Nuremberg Trials, 16, 33, 60; in
Vienna, 30; in Frankfurter Rund-
schau and Neue Presse, 57; trust-
worthiness of, 58, 100, 175. See also
Magazines, Newspapers, Radio
Newspapers: vs. radio for news, 1. 30,
58; trustworthiness of reporting on
Nuremberg Trials, 16, 60; American
licensed, 21, 34.77,83. 118. 138; in
Vienna, 23, 30. 39; Wiener Kurier,
23, 39; dissatisfaction with, 34; li-
censing of, 34; propaganda in, 34;
readership. 34, 37, 57, 60, 78, 83,
110, 118, 175. 190; political influ-
ence on, 37; rating of, 37; as source
of news, 45 : Frankfurter Rundschau,
57; Neue Presse, 57; trustworthiness.
58, 100. 175; independent vs. party
press, 77; Neue Zeitung. 77, 118,
154; readership in Bavaria, 78; in
Berlin, 83, 118, 138; Tagesspiegel ,
83, 118,138; TelegrafS3, 118, 138;
readership in Bremen. 110; Soviet
licensed, 118; readership and Mar-
shall Plan. 190
Newsreel: Die Welt im Film, 20
Nonrefugees: characteristics of in AM-
ZON,162
Nordic race: superiority of, 22
NSDAP. See National SociaHst German
Workers Party
Nuremberg: Amerika Haus, 145
Nuremberg Trials. See International Mili-
tary Tribunal
Obedience: to state, 22
Occupation, occupying troops: and
German attitude scale, 19; as humil-
iation, 22, 49, 60; and reconstruc-
tion, 22, 100, 175;withdrawalof, 22,
93, 140, 160, 187; community lead-
ers and, 44; attitudes toward, 76, 94;
Soviet proposal to withdraw, 160;
costs, 161; and Lflende/- budgets, 161
Occupational prestige: civil service vs.
private industry, 164
Offen Gesagt (Military Government pam-
phlet), 89, 97, 103, 112, 129
Opinion: vs. information on Soviet
Union, 113; right to express, 114,
114A
Optimism: as measure of morale, 72;
about economic future, 189
Paris Conference: Soviet proposal for
peace treaty, 185
Parliamentary Council, 174
Peace treaty: hopes for, 62, 63; Soviet
proposal for, 185
People: vs. experts and poUticians in
government, 98
INDEX/ 325
Pessimism: correlated with age and edu-
cational level, 72; about economic
future, 189
Police: protection from, 114, 114A;
attitudes toward, 166, 167; central-
ized or decentralized, 166; and poli-
tics, 166; recruitment of, 166
Political awareness, 3, 74, 175, 191; and
German attitude scale, 19; and radio
listening. 106
Pobtical books and pamphlets, 89, 97
103, 112. 129
Political meetings, 3, 155, 159
PoUtical participation, 3, 72, 85, 88,
191; and community leaders, 5; and
Landtag elections (1946), 26; of
community leaders, 44; of expellees,
47; and degree of anti-Semitism, 49
Political parties: preferences, 3,60, 175;
preference by community leaders, 5,
44; preference and religion, 9; and
newspapers, 21, 34, 77; and trade
unions, 35; poUtical and community
leaders, 44; and anti-Semitism, 49;
and morale. 72; expellees vs. natives,
84; attitudes toward, 93, 191; and
civil service. 152
Political strikes. 170
Politicians: vs. experts in government. 98
PoUtics: and religion, 9; as career for
younger generation, 10; and school-
children, 12; interest in, 36, 60, 74,
100, 110, 175, 181, 191; and atten-
tion to news, 83; expellees and. 84;
and police, 166; and movies, 188
Prayer Book. 153
Press: censorship. 77. See also News-
papers
Prices, 25.60, 100
Prisoners of war: attitudes of former, 93
Propaganda: in newspapers, 21, 34; on
radio, 45; pro-American, 73; United
States government pamphlets, 89,
97, 103. 112. 129
Protestants: and politics, 9; in AMZON,
121; and civil service, 1 5 2
Public forums: Bavarian reaction to.
159; in Reilingen, 155
Race: racism, 49, 122; and leadership
requirements, 82, 98
Radio: listening habits of audience, 1,
45, 60, 100, 106, 175; vs. news-
papers for news, 1, 30, 58; in
Vienna, 30, 39; in Berhn, 45, 83,
106, 181; and censorship. 45; music
on. 45; most popular stations, 45;
program preferences, 45 ; propaganda
on, 45; as source of news, 45, 58, 83;
and freedom of speech, 48; poUtical
awareness, 106; American accents
on, 125; in Berhn after blockade,
1 35 ; and Marshall Plan, 1 90. See also
RIAS and "Voice of America"
Radio Berhn, 83, 106
Radio Bremen, 148
Radio Leipzig, 106
Radio Stuttgart. 106
Rationing: food. 15, 18, 60
Reading. See Book reading, Magazines,
Newspapers, United States State De-
partment Pamphlets
Reconstruction: Law No. 3, 6; religion
as force in. 9: attitude toward Ameri-
can effort in, 22, 60, 63, 76, 85,
100, 104, 175; cooperation among
occupying powers, 22; obstacles to,
22; and poUtical parties, 22; and
SPD, 22; allocation of building mate-
rials for, 52; economic, 62, 63, 142;
AlUed effort in, 76, 85, 100: and
poUtical activity, 88; attitude toward
in Bremen, 110; responsibiUty for,
175; and Ruhr Statute, 178; in
Frankfurt, Giessen, and Kassel, 183.
See also MarshaU Plan
Recreation: in Berlin during blockade.
134
Refugees (including displaced persons,
evacuees, and expellees): future
plans of, 14A, 50; impact upon
economy, 14A; justification of ex-
pulsion. 14A, 28. 47. 81, 100, 175;
level of information about, 14A;
political rights and participation of,
14A. 47, 81; reception in new area,
14A, 28, 47. 81, 84, 100; desire to
326/ INDEX
return home, 28, 47, 50, 81, 100,
175; problems of, 28, 84; responsi-
bility for, 28, 47, 81; countries of
origin, 50, 84; socioeconomic charac-
teristics and attitudes, 84, 162
Reich government: claims against, 32
Reichsmark: anticipated value of, 25; in
bank accounts, 32; confidence in,
41. 60, 100; rumors about, 42. See
also Currency reform
ReiUngen: town hall meeting, 155
Religion: as political force, 9; and politi-
cal preference, 9; and reconstruction,
9; and schoolchildren, 12: and anti-
Semitism, 49; expellees vs. natives,
84; teaching of in schools, 95, 126;
in AMZON, 121, 124; in West Berlin,
124; and civil service, 152. See also
Catholics, Church affiliation, and
Protestants
Rent: percentage of income for, 32
Reparations, 59
Responsibility: individual, 5, 99, 101
Reunification. See Unification
RIAS (Radio in the American Sector),
83, 106, 181; Varady funkt dazwi-
schen, 135
Ruhr: international control of, 131;
ownership of factories, 179
Ruhr Statute, 178
Rumors: about another war, 22, 42, 60;
trends in, 42
Savings: use of, 4
Schiller: as greatest German, 99
Schoolchildren: attitudes of in Bavaria,
12
Schools: in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 61;
corporal punishment in, 66, 95; reli-
gious instruction in, 95, 126. See
also Education
SED. See SociaUst Unity Party of Ger-
many
Self-government for Germany, 3, 110
Separatism: sentiments for in Hesse, 174
Sie (American-sponsored magazine), 53,
108
Six Power London Conference Accord
(June 1948), 131
Soap: lack of, 146
Social characteristics: of population in
Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-
Baden, 163
Social class: as viewed by interviewee
and interviewer, 36
Social Democratic Party of Germany
(SPD): merger with KPD, 3; support
for, 3, 60, 175; and resurgence of
Nazism, 5; and reconstruction, 22;
and Landtag elections (1946), 26;
and civil service, 152
SociaUst Unity Party of Germany (SED):
merger with KPD, 3; attitude toward
in Berhn during air lift, 141
Socialization: effect on worker, 90
Soviet Union: as dominant power, 17,
44, 67, 69, 76, 175; lack of cooper-
ation, 22; rumors about, 42; change
in attitude toward by community
leaders, 44; and reparations, 59; as
obstacle to European union, 105;
information and attitudes about,
113, 119; civU liberties in, 114,
114A; fear of in West Berlin, 132;
views on during air Uft, 144; pro-
posal to withdraw all occupying
forces, 160, 187; and Ruhr Statute,
178; proposal for peace treaty, 185;
fear of aggression by, 187; and Mar-
shall Plan, 190
SPD. See Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Speech: freedom of, 48
Spruchkammer: denazification rulings of,
55
Standard of living: reduction in, 31;
improvement in and reparations. 59
Stimme Amerikas. See "Voice of Amer-
ica"
Strikes: work stoppage in Bavaria, 157:
economic, 170; poUtical, 170
Students: right to dissent, 127
Stuttgart: Amerika Haus, 145
INDEX /327
Tagesspiegel: (West Berlin newspaper),
83. 118, 138
Tax laws: 8, 41
Telegraf (West Berlin newspaper), 83,
118, 138
Tetrachoric coefficient correlation: used
in newspaper survey, 34
Todesmuehlen (film), 20
Town hall meetings: in Reilingen, 155;
Bavarian reaction to, 159
Trade: importance of for Austria, 40; of
major importance for Germany, 63;
attitudes toward in Berlin 128; con-
trol of , 136
Trade Unions: characteristics of mem-
bers, 11, 35; old and new, 11; and
the Church, 35; expansion of, 35;
leadership, 35; level of information
about, 35; and the Military Govern-
ment. 35; organization of, 35; poUti-
cal parties, 35 ; attitudes of members
toward strikes, 170
Travel- foreign, 109
Trustworthiness of news reporting, 58,
100,175;onIMT, 16,60
Unemployment: reasons for, 6; as major
worry, 29; and currency reform, 133
Unification: and community leaders, 5;
and Bizonia. 107; under Soviet
leadership. 123; Volkskongress peti-
tion, 123; under communism, 131;
chances for, 174; and peace treaty,
185
United Europe: first step toward, 44
United Nations, 105, 109
United States: as world leader, 17. 44,
67, 69, 76, 100, 175; as presented in
magazines, 43; change in attitude
toward by community leaders, 44;
attitudes toward, 73, 79, 85, 141,
143, 144, 158; capitalism, 79; infor-
mation on, 119; opinion of as based
on America Today, 158; attitude to-
ward in Berlin during air lift, 141,
144. See also American Military Gov-
ernment.
United States Army Youth Program, 46,
56
United States of Europe: chances for
success. 69
United States Information Centers, 102,
145
United States State Department pam-
phlets, 89, 97, 112, 129
University of Berlin: in East Berlin, 127
Utilities: cost of, 32
Values: in blockaded Berhn. 151
Versailles Treaty: as cause of war, 5 1
Vienna: newspapers. 23, 30, 39; party
composition, 23; newspapers vs.
radio, 30; radio listening in, 30, 39;
"Voice of America" in. 30; informa-
tion media in. 39; mass media and
denazification, 39; Wiener Kurier,
39; reaction to new denazification
laws, 54
Vienna Fair, 40
Vienna Philharmonic, 39
"Voice of America," 1, 106, 176, 184;
mail to, 14; in Vienna. 30; news
reports on, 45; audience breakdown,
45, 184; popularity in Berhn. 135
Volkskongress petition: for unification,
123
Voting habits: as seen in January 1946
elections, 3; and Bundestag election
(1949), 26; and Landtag election
(1946), 26
War: expectation of another among
Bavarian schoolchildren, 12; respon-
sibility for last, 22, 31; rumors of
another, 22, 42, 60; possibility of
another, 105, 130; acceptance of as
price for breaking Berlin blockade.
147
Welt im Film (newsreel). 1 16
Weltpresse (Viennese newspaper), 23
328 / INDEX
West Berlin: as capital, 71, 180; news-
papers, 83, 118, 138; during block-
ade, 130, 132, 134, 141, 150, 151;
fear of Russians, 132; Amerika Haus,
145; financial status of families dur-
ing blockade, 150; currency change
in, 168; and Allies, 175
Western Europe: reconstruction of and
Ruhr Statute, 178
Western European Union, 105, 109, 175
Western Germany: government for, 5,
131, 175
Western Powers: prestige, 141, 144; West
Berlin expectations of during air lift,
147, 150; and Berlin reconstruction,
175. See also Allies
Wiener Kurier (American-sponsored news-
paper), 23, 39
Women: and men in civil service, 156
Worries: chief, 29, 60, 100, 139, 175; in
Austria, 40
Wuerttemberg-Baden: expellees and na-
tives in, 28; school system of, 61;
characteristics of population, 163;
fusion, 165
Youth: United States Army program for,
46, 56; and schools, 61; group activi-
ties of, 99; and attitudes toward
individual responsibility, 101. See
also Children
A NOTE ON THE AUTHORS
Anna J. Merritt, a freelance writer and translator, received her
B.A. from Smith College. While studying on a Fulbright
Fellowship she met her husband Richard at the Free University
of Berlin where they were both exchange students. They have a
common interest in the German people, and spend nearly every
third year in Berlin.
Richard L. Merritt is professor of political science and
research professor of communications at the University of
Illinois. He received his B.A. from the University of Southern
CaHfornia and his Ph.D from Yale University. Honors he
has received include a Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship,
a German Government grant for graduate study, a Social Science
Research Council predoctoral fellowship, and a Fulbright Re-
search Professorship at the Free University of Berlin. A member
of the American Political Science Association, Mr. Merritt served
as editorial associate of The American Political Science Review
from 1963 to 1967, and is program chairman for the associa-
tion's 1970 annual meeting. He is also author of Symbols of
American Community, 1735-1775, Systematic Approaches to
Comparative Politics, and has co-authored several books includ-
ing Comparing Nations, and Western European Perspectives on
International Affairs.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS